(….continued from Part 1…)
On the domestic plan, and since its leadership has (finally) realised it cannot depend on Western ‘allies’ for more than financial aid (and half-hearted promisses for military aid of temporary nature), Ukraine is working-up (or ‘re-activating’) its arms industry. Back during the Soviet times, this was a major economic factor, driving the development of guided weapons and tanks in particular.
This process is time-consuming, relatively costly, and marred by different sorts of problems, but mind that this is ‘normal’ for a situation of this kind: thanks to lots of ingenuity, innovation, and cooperation with international partners, one can expect that once the sector is ‘back’ to its full might, Ukraine is going to establish not only vast technological superiority vis-a-vis the Russian Federation, but position itself as a major factor on the international markets, too.
***
Ukraine
Ukraine tripled its production of weapons and ammo in 2023 and will increase it by six times in 2024. Financing and a lack of gunpowder prevents it from ramping up at a faster pace. Production is also dispersed, which is less efficient but reduces the risk of catastrophic damage from a drone or missile attack. Gunpowder and rocket propellant shortages have periodically shut down production. It will not be enough to replace foreign aid, but it will produce additional mortar, 122mm, 152mm shells, and later this year it will produce 155mm shells. Rocket artillery systems similar to HIMARS/MLRS are being developed, as are air defense systems. They already repurposed their Neptune anti-ship missile to attack land targets 600 km away. Domestically produced weapons would not be subjected to foreign targeting restrictions…https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/20/ukraine-weapons-industry-domestic-production/
***
After a 44 day pause, Russia attacked Kyiv with two ballistic missiles and 29 cruise missiles. All were shot down but 17 were injured, and 40 homes and two buildings were damaged. Russia spent $390 million on the attack, which is less than 1% of the taxes international companies have paid Russia since 2022. In that time, there have been 1,020 air raid sirens and 8,000 missiles launched towards Ukraine.
"We feel hatred, terrible hatred. This is not fear, this is hatred. Towards Russia generally and everyone there in particular," said one resident of Kyiv. His wife said, "I send greetings to my parents in Crimea who voted… They went to the elections and voted for Putin. Mum, and Dad, thank you very much that my husband and I were almost killed today. Thank you."
(The source link is no longer operable: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-capital-kyiv-is-under-russian-missile-attack-mayor-says-2024-03-21/)
The next day, the Russians launched a bigger attack, as covered by Tom.
The Dnieper hydroelectric dam as it’s hit by a missile…
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1771110851652596054
The damage assessment for the dam…
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1771162538215940108
The Russian missile strikes of 22 and 24 March have caused lots of damage to critical infrastructure. The one of 24 March targeted 136 objects of Ukraine’s energy system in Lviv, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, and Odesa. Clockwise around Ukraine, the most-important results can be summarised as follows:
Lviv: two Kinzhals struck a ‘critical infrastructure’ object, causing a fire that was extinguished only late in the evening, because the Russians attempted an (Israeli-style) ‘double-tap’ attack later on, interrupting fire-fighting efforts.
Kharkiv: thermal power plant and all transformer substations destroyed; about 60% of the population is still without electricity; about 40% is still without heating; only water supply was restored in most of the city.
Zaporizhzhya: Dniprovska power line was damaged, cutting off power supply for the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
Odesa: emergency electricity shutdowns.
Even when there is power supply, in all four of these regions, ‘controlled power outages’ are still implemented to stabilise the network.
***
Laser-guided missiles shoot down three Russian Shahed drones…
https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1771108107222950345
After last winter’s attack on Ukraine’s energy grid, Ukraine built physical defenses to protect electrical equipment. Not all power plants have this protection but those that do have it have survived attacks from near misses of 30 to 40 meters with little to no damage…https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/3843473-sistemi-zahistu-energoobektiv-u-patnicu-spracuvali-efektivno-ekspert.html?fbclid=IwAR2LWmQqQNotagPOxb2GrmPCOJ7x7m4JLzhzaPvxKRY9cWVEJEidx7oTx3Y
Russian aircraft have launched 3500 UMPK bombs on Ukrainian troops…
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1769808353218232424
The characteristics and capabilities of the UMPK bombs, the SU-34s that launch them and the Ukrainian air defense systems…https://texty.org.ua/articles/111999/shoot-down-su-34/
A view from the ground as UMPK bombs arrive in the distance…
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1770791062883140038
Somewhere, a Russian stands through a near miss from a DPICM strike…
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1770742228727583067
***
Diplomacy
Germany ‘can’t deliver (heavy) weapons’, but will spend $500,000 for 180,000 shells from the Czech initiative, plus deliver another 110,000 shells, 100 (lightly) armored vehicles and about 100 supply vehicles…https://mil.in.ua/en/news/germany-announces-a-half-billion-dollar-military-aid-package/
€190 billion in frozen Russian assets are held at Brussels. The first €1 billion of interest from this money will be sent to Ukraine around July…https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/21/eu-agrees-in-principle-to-give-profits-from-frozen-russian-assets-to-ukraine
There was a lots of talk about legality of such actions ‘but’: eventually, even numerous lawyers have concluded that through its own behaviour, the Russian Federation distanced itself so much form all the possible international laws and regulations, that these simply do not matter for it.
The Czech government talked to countries around the world and was able to secure 500,000 rounds calibre 155mm and 300,000 calibre 122mm: 18 European countries and Canada are paying for them. They found another 700,000 shells that other countries are willing to sell them. Some of these countries are open allies of Russia, which is why much of the deal - except for ‘most important figures’ - is kept semi-secret. Privately, they are willing to part with the ammunition for cash but they want the deal to go through the Czech Republic or some third country to hide their origin. The fact that Czechoslovakia used to be part of the Warsaw Pact has been helpful in the negotiations because the Czech Republic is considered neutral whereas the US is considered an adversary. Funding still needs to be found for these additional rounds. The total cost for the 1.5 million shells is $3.6 billion.
To understand the impact of these shells, a month ago, Ukraine was firing about 2,000 rounds a day. The rate of fire seems to have increased a little since then. The 1.5 million shells gathered by the Czech initiative will double Ukraine’s rate of fire to 4,000 rounds a day for an entire year. Just the Czech shells by themselves. The EU is currently producing about 1,200 shells a day and that will probably increase to 3,000 shells a day by the end of the year. Not included in the count are any US shells that will eventually head their way…https://english.nv.ua/nation/czechia-buying-ammunition-for-ukraine-from-russia-s-allies-wsj-50402051.html ….sometimes in the future…
American companies sell satellite imagery from around the world. Even US government agencies buy commercial imagery. Due to sanctions, they are not allowed to sell to Russia and they don’t. But resellers of the imagery might be selling to Russian agents. While there is no direct proof, imagery has been ordered for a particular location, then that location was hit by a missile, and then imagery was ordered again of the same location, likely to check for battle damage assessment…https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/03/american-satellites-russia-ukraine-war/677775/
***
Equipment
Ballistic missiles are reaching altitudes of up to 50km. They are large missiles that are approaching the target almost vertically. Cruise missiles and aircraft can be effectively engaged by air defense missiles that explode near to the aircraft and riddle it with shrapnel. Those same missiles are ineffective against ballistic missiles because the fragmentation will not alter its flight path. Only air defense missiles that impact a ballistic missile with kinetic energy can destroy it. Ukraine has one missile used by the Patriot system that is a hit-to-kill missile.
The S-300 is a surface to air missile designed for air defense. It was first produced in the late 1970s. With most missiles being 30-40 years old, they have expired and need to be taken out of storage and destroyed. Rather than destroy them, Russia converted them to surface to surface ballistic missiles, even though they are not very accurate. In the ground attack mode they have a range of 120 km, limited not by its fuel but by its guidance system. There were 8,000 of these missiles in 2022. At the current rate of use they will be firing them through 2025, and the Patriot system has the only missile that can shoot it down…https://visitukraine.today/blog/1212/how-many-missiles-russia-has-left-commentary-of-the-minister-of-defense-of-ukraine
Giatsint-B and Giatsint-S are 152mm towed and self-propelled guns. They have a range of 30 km and Russia said they had 950 in use and 850 in storage, plus another 150 in use with the naval infantry. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies said that in 2023 Russia had 85 self-propelled guns on duty with 850 in storage, plus 650 (active and stored) of the towed guns for both the Russian army and naval infantry. They use a shell that is incompatible with other 152 mm guns due to the Giatsint’s semi-automated loading system.
To date, 54 of the self-propelled guns and 36 of the towed guns have been destroyed. The last towed gun that was destroyed was in October and the last self-propelled gun was observed being destroyed in December. It is possible they are conducting fewer fire missions because they are low on the 152 mm ammunition that is specific to their gun. It could also be that the lack of Ukrainian ammunition is impacting counterbattery operations. The highest loss rate for all Russian self-propelled guns was from September-November in 2022 during the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives, and from June-November 2023 for SP guns, (May-September 2023 for towed guns), during the summer offensive. In both periods Russian artillery was firing aggressively to hold back Ukrainian advances and Ukraine was firing at a much higher rate…
https://twitter.com/verekerrichard1/status/1768972622224601232
Although the observed destruction of Russian towed and SP guns is around a thousand, Ukraine claims that 10,000 have been destroyed while other OSINT sources estimate that around 5,500 have been destroyed. In addition to the destroyed guns, artillery barrels wear out from the explosions and friction after around 2,000 rounds in Russian guns, or 5,000 round for most western guns, to 20,000 rounds for the German PzH 2000. Once a barrel is worn, it won’t shoot as far due to gasses escaping up the sides of the shell, and it won’t be as accurate because there is a (very) small amount of room for the shell to move around horizontally while traveling down the barrel. Given enough wear, the barrel will burst under pressure. Russia produces 50 artillery barrels a year. This low production forces it to rely on artillery barrels reclaimed from guns that are in storage. Russia has almost 5,000 guns deployed. At the current rate of guns being destroyed and barrels wearing out, Russia will run out of stored barrels by the end of 2025…https://web.archive.org/web/20240321191451/http://https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/03/20/might-russia-run-out-of-big-guns
***
Drones
While it is easy for a drone to use GPS to target stationary objects, such as buildings, it is much more difficult for GPS to target objects that can move, as aircraft and vehicles can. Artificial Intelligence can be used to identify targets once GPS flies the drone to a particular area. Last October, both Ukraine and Russia announced they were developing and using AI drones to identify enemy vehicles on the front lines. It turns out that neither side has a drone that can effectively use AI.
AI targeting is a difficult task. US efforts are still in early development. It is unknown how long it will take for either Ukraine or Russia to produce an operational AI drone, but while the US often develops weapons until they are 100% effective, Ukraine and Russia might start utilizing them when they are mostly effective…https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/the-revolution-that-wasnt-how-ai-drones-have-fizzled-in-ukraine-so-far/
One individual has been tracking drone strikes with a consistent set of parameters for a long time. For several months, Ukraine has attacked more vehicles with drones than Russia has. For the first time, Ukraine has now attacked more infantry targets than Russia has. For the first time, Ukraine has attacked more defensive positions than Russia has. And for the first time, Ukraine has conducted more nighttime attacks than Russia has…
https://twitter.com/VozimDrony/status/1769611282729017406
Each drone has a frequency used for video and a frequency used by the operator to send signals to the drone. If either one is jammed then the drone is neutralized. But drone operators on both sides intercept their opponent’s video drone feeds and try to warn their fellow soldiers of pending attacks. If warned in time, vehicles and troops in defensive positions can turn on short-ranged jammers. Here are four videos showing Russian drone operators intercepting Ukrainian drone video feeds in the Kherson region. It is possible that terrain could block the video transmissions but Kherson is dominated by flat terrain and the Ukrainian drone operators on the right bank are 20-30 meters higher than Russian positions on the left bank. When you see the video feed losing its connection it is more likely that the truck or defensive position has a short-ranged jammer…
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1769742001409274208
More than 40% of Shahed drones are shot down by mobile heavy machine guns and ZSU-23-4’s. Gepards aren’t mentioned but of the ~4000 Shahed attacks, they killed more than 500 in the first six months…
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1769799923908710411
China is selling “dual-use” drones to both Russia and Ukraine/EU. It is giving priority to Russian orders not because of political preference, but because they will fill the larger orders first and Russia is spending more money. This is why Ukrainian drone producers are working to establish supply chains to do not impede their production and assembly…https://war.obozrevatel.com/zelenskij-putin-ne-imeet-prava-vyiigrat-on-dolzhen-poteryat-vozmozhnost-lomat-zhizni-drugih.htm
Don, mentioned guy (https://twitter.com/VozimDrony/status/1769611282729017406) managed himself drones supply to UA for more than 2 years, directly to the front units all secured by crowdfunding and donations (thousands of drones)
In case anyone wants to aparticipate https://www.weaponstoukraine.com/kampane/drony-pro-dobrovolniky-na-ukrajine
or you can join this initiative https://www.dronynemesis.cz/en (originally aimed fo 10k drones, but there is no limit)
And we also bought 15 Victors to manage not only Shaheds a year ago (https://www.weaponstoukraine.com/kampane/zavreme-ukrajinske-nebe)
Thanks Don. My only gripe is with the initial 2 paragraphs. Kyiv has not realised anything. Back in June 2023 Zelenskyy fired the chief of Ukroboronprom for essentially failing to do anything useful. Rumours of plans for join ventures and building factories abroad, have also been flying around since last year. How far that has gone, I do not know.
There is nothing ingenious or innovative about munition production. There's simply being competent or incompetent. Also, I don't know what you consider a major weapons producer but Ukraine will not be an important international arms exporter for decades, if ever.