Don's Weekly, 24 March 2025: Part 1
by Donald Hill (intro by Tom Cooper)
Hello everybody!
Yup, meanwhile it’s late March this year: third anniversary of the ZSU clearing north-western Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy of Putin’s hordes… in between of the second anniversary of the fall of Bakhmut and the first of the fall of Avdiivka.
Meanwhile, ‘drones rule’ - almost everywhere. Usually from between 50 kilometres behind- and 2000 kilometres deep behind the enemy lines. On both sides, more or less. In this regards, it’s funny to watch the official Kyiv - whether the government or the Glavcom and the GenStab - ‘chasing cars’: running after the ‘car’ of Ukrainians organising themselves and doing things on their own (regardless how much is the government, diligently, claiming the fame for itself). One good example is the 14th UAV Regiment, which seem to have been granted the permission to exit anonymity. It wasn’t me, but yes, the following article in the Ukrainska Pravda is promptly explaining why is the latest round of the Ukrainian long-range UAV-offensive into Russia as successful: ‘Invisible Force, …The untold Story of the 14th Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Regiment’.
…because it’s ‘few clever troops working in anonymity’, no generals with high-profiles in the social media who are running it.
Is of even more interest because of all the massive blows this unit has delivered upon Russia in the last few weeks - which is something that will be discussed in one of comming sequels of the IADS-series.
BTW, ‘despite’ my (meanwhile) ‘famous’ critique of the ZSU, have received a request to ‘spread the word’. Thanks a lot, and with pleasure! Here you are: the official account of the Land Forces of Ukraine, in English, in the social media. Sadly, on X, not yet on the (European) Blue Sky, but pay attention at the ‘spirit’ of the message there (which, in turn, appears promising for that with ‘from X to Blue Sky’ to change soon).
Now back to Don telling us what was up the last week.
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Kursk
Russia gained up to 2 km of territory in some sectors, including inside Ukraine. Russian assault groups reached Basivka but do not appear to control it. They were able to take one of their dead back to Novenke. Russian attacks pounded frontline positions at Gogolevka with drones and artillery before taking control of the village. Ukrainian drones are dropping mines 2500 m north of Plekhovo and Russian vehicles run over them. Russian airstrikes hit Guyevo and targets 3 and 5 km west of the village. In turn, the Ukrainians unleash a rocket attack on Russian positions 1800 meters north of Guyevo.
The Sudzha gas compression station 500 meters from Ukraine’s border was shelled by Russia. 500 meters south of that event, a Ukrainian pickup truck survives multiple attacks on the main road to Sudzha that is dominated by Russian drones. It manages to make it to an anti-drone net tunnel with just three wheels.
Artillery used to be organised into batteries of six guns, to mass-fire at enemy positions. Drones made it easier to spot enemy positions and once guns in position were detected, they could be attacked by both drones and artillery, so guns were dispersed to individual positions. As an exception to this, three North Korea 170 mm guns were spotted adjacent to each other and protected from drone attacks. They were still detected by drones and DPICM shells were able to attack all three guns at once. We can be 1000% sure: the North Koreans have learned their lesson.
The Russians who travelled through the gas pipe to infiltrate Sudzha and escaped ‘without a scratch’ may yet die or be permanently disabled due to lung damage (many might remember the Russian soldiers that fished and dug trenches in Chernobyl three years ago also ended up dead or sick). There are reports that some spent four to six days in the pipe and others suffocated. The event has already been memorialized near the Church of the Blood in Yekaterinburg.
Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade said they were suffering 1200 wounded a day before Sudzha fell. The brigade also displayed their new technical transport vehicle with puncture-proof wheels, two convenient passenger seats with optional cushions and titanium mounts.
The moment Russians received the blue tape to pose as Ukrainians.
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The Story of an Ukrainian Marine
Since we’re at ‘spreading the word’ about social-media presences: for something like two years, meanwhile, we’ve got the opportunity - and a privilege - to follow the ‘Kriegsforscher’. A Ukrainian Marine who, the last few months, served in a drone unit on the western flank of the Kursk bulge. His own team destroyed over 30 AFVs there. This thread summarizes his experiences in Kursk. He lists 8 of the best Russian brigades and divisions, plus the best drone operators, that were present in Kursk, signifying how important that battle was for Russia. Their soldiers were well-equipped, they had the latest model of AFVs, and they had a lot of antennas, dozens of which were satellite antennas. These formations of 4-8 AFVs didn’t totally ‘turtle’ up their vehicles against drone attacks, which allowed them to fire during their assaults, but very few vehicles survived these assaults.
October was the hardest month for Kriegsforscher’s unit. Russia used 84 bombs against one village and the adjacent tree-lines within just 24 hours. Ukraine would use armored vehicles to attack down one road in the morning, and Russia would use that same road to attack the Ukrainians a couple hours later.
Since November, the Russians had the perfect weather for assaults because the Snagost river created fog, which was sometimes supplemented by smoke, and it was very difficult for the drone teams to detect them when they rotated units or assaulted. Early detection is important to defeating an assault. Even so, most of the Russians attacked when the fog dissipated and it was sunny.
The bad weather prevented the widespread use of long-ranged drones from both sides, both to detect and attack targets deep behind the lines. When there were breaks in the weather, Russian fiber-optic drones destroyed a lot of Ukrainian armor. The Ukrainians use of HIMARS was also limited, but effective when used.
Kriegsforscher says the last offensive began on November 7th and that Russia had a three month time limit to push Ukraine out of Kursk. Because of that restriction they did a lot of stupid things.
They kept trying to place a bridge over the Snagost river. It kept failing, with casualties, and they never stopped trying. If a road was bordered by dragon’s teeth on one side and a river on another side they would still attack along it with no room for manoeuvres. Because of these actions, none of Russia's mechanized assaults were successful and 90-100% of the vehicles were destroyed.
The Russians were also hampered by poor coordination. The drivers didn’t know where they were going and the delays and wrong turns contributed to their destruction. Their artillery would fire only after their AFVs were destroyed. In fact, the Russian artillery had just a minor impact on the fighting in Kursk. There was also a complete absence of the TOS thermobaric rockets.
The Russians also took more risks because of the time constraint. Their drone pilots and mortars were closer to the front line than their Ukrainian counterparts and were more effective because of it.
The Russians started having more success when they just used infantry in their attacks. An attack with 5-9 ATVs would be more successful than one with 8-9 BMDs. And the only reason the Russian infantry attacks were successful was because Ukraine didn’t have enough infantry.
His unit was extremely happy when they found out they would be entering Russia and was surprised and proud that the Ukrainian army could fight anywhere. He has mixed emotions about Kursk but he learned a lot and was motivated because he was fighting the 76 VDV Division.
***
(…to be continued…)
The information about artillery is interesting. We are finally seeing the evolution that started back when I was a brand new LT. The US Army was trying to "decentralize" the use of FA, and the Paladin M109A6 was supposed to be deployed in single guns (like we did with M270 MLRS) making it harder to counter-fire. But it never quite got there, there was always a reason units didn't try it (harder to control, commo issues, Force Protection, harder to resupply, etc). Now we are seeing it in action because it HAS to happen.
Thank you so very much for this very interesting text. Cheers to the request to "spread the word". I am so proud to be one of those who read you since the beginning of the war of destruction against Ukraine.