Don's Weekly, 24 February 2024: Part 3

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 2…)

***

Russia

A train in Rostov was damaged by fire. The cause of the fire was not explained.

A big explosion in Grozny created a small fire at an Chechen police barracks.

A tour of a building in Taganrog airbase that was hit by ATACMS, killing one and wounding 41 after a barracks and repair plant was hit.

A warehouse in Novosibirsk caught fire, consuming 7,000 square meters.

An oil depot in Orel burns after a drone attack. It was still burning hours later.

Since Novatek doesn’t pay taxes on natural gas extraction, it is arguing that it doesn’t contribute to Russia's war effort and that sanctions against it should be lifted. It doesn’t expect any changes with the Biden administration but is hopeful with the Trump administration.

Because of fixed prices and rising production costs, saline solution can only be produced at a loss in Russia. Production has been reduced by 40-50% from January to September, they are short 20 million units across Russia with a wait time of two months for IV drips. Other shortages include immunoglobulin, insulin, antibiotics, and heart disease medications. The government will raise the fixed price for saline and other medications so they will be profitable to produce. The saline shortage isn’t expected to be resolved until February-March 2025.

Russia uses over 200 vessels to bypass sanctions and earn billions of dollars in oil revenue.

In 2022, Olenivka prison was demolished by a ‘missile’ that killed 50 Ukrainian soldiers that were incarcerated. 50 were killed and Russia blamed it on a Ukrainian missile attack. The Russian commander of the prison was just killed by a car bomb in Donetsk city. Back in Russia, a scientist involved in developing Kh-59 stand-off precision guided missiles and drones was shot in a forest.

***

Ukraine

There were three days without Shahed drones and a trend of fewer drones since November.

The Pischane coal plant, south of Pokrovsk, was finally closed on 12 December due to intense shelling. It was just 1500 meters from the fighting. It provided half the coal to Ukraine’s largest steel producer. Almost unnecessary to explain what a negative consequences is this loss going to have for the Ukrainian capability to continue manufacturing steel.

….and this is how you remove a warhead from a cruise missile.

***

Ukrainian Leadership and Organization. Again.

Colonel Dmytro Ryumshin was the commander of the successful 33rd Mechanized Brigade before assuming command of the 47th Brigade during the defense outside of Avdiivka. He was relieved of command two months later in March because of the general staff’s concerns about the brigade’s performance, even though Syrskyi just praised the performance of the 47th in its fight around Orlivka and Berdychi. In May, the existence of the newly formed 155th Brigade was acknowledged and Ryumshin was named its commander. It was one of ten that were formed despite many existing brigades being low on personnel. Named after Anne of Kyiv (who married the French king Henri I) this brigade was entirely trained in France. Except for its tank-crews: they were equipped with Leopard 2A4s and trained in Poland. Other non-infantry units remained in Ukraine.

Despite the fact that not all the units of the 155th Brigade were present in France, the French tried to train the brigade as an integrated combined arms unit. However, and as is meanwhile ‘standard’ when ZSU units are trained by NATO - the 155th was never provided with drones and EW drone defenses, key tools that every brigade needs. A member of the French parliament had a request to supply drones to the unit but, because the entire French government resigned, all related requests were suspended.

Then again, there’s no need to provide the brigade with drones and EW defenses if you were simply going to break them up and use their battalions to reinforce other brigades - which is precisely what Syrsky did once the unit was back in Ukraine. A member of the brigade said that the entire existence of the brigade was just a show for France to secure weapons from them, and that as soon as they returned to Ukraine they were used as ‘organ donors’ to reinforce existing brigades.

Ryumshin was relieved from command, probably as early as November, possibly for being critical of these issues. The deputy commander of a logistics unit was made acting commander until he was replaced by an artillery commander from the 14th Brigade. A change of command right before committing the brigade to combat adds to instability. At least as likely is that Syrsky never intended to deploy all the elements of the brigade together - so that this aspect ‘doesn’t really matter’ to him. A soldier in a different brigade suggests there is more to the story.

The biggest weakness in the Ukrainian army is the lack of integrated, coordinated operations that rely on effective communications. The decision by the general staff to constantly detach battalions from brigades and send them ad hoc into battle, or subordinate them to different other brigade is systematically destroying unit cohesion. It continues to weaken the army, greatly decreasing combat effectiveness of its units - and leading to ever more problems, right now, and in the future, too.

Instead of creating integrated, coherent units with a stable and competent command structure, the Ukrainian general staff continues to move around leaders, personnel, brigades and units detached from brigades to plug holes in the latest crisis that presents itself. These actions often don’t solve the crisis at hand: instead, they are creating ever additional crises - if nowhere else, then at the location from which a unit was removed. An example of the latter was when the 24th Brigade at Toretsk was swapped with the 41st Brigade at Chasiv Yar. It provided a stronger defense at Chasiv Yar but soon after, the Russians broke through the previously stable Toretsk sector.

The newly deployed units and detached sub-units are not integrated into an existing command structure that is focused on a narrow front. They are deployed into a broad front and micromanaged by a general staff that should be three echelons above it. This general staff of any nation cannot possibly be aware of all the details of each narrow front that are needed to make competent decisions regarding logistics, replacements, enemy dispositions and behaviors, and coordinated defensive and offensive operations.

If a sector is lucky, there is a veteran and successful brigade that can provide stability as long as it receives replacements and ammo. This was not the case for the 72nd Brigade as it was eventually worn down from losses and overwhelmed over several months. They did not collapse overnight. The shortages in personnel and ammo were known and ignored. The 15th Brigade had similar issues. They were not only short on personnel, but were constantly being outflanked by ineffective defenses on its flanks.

If a sector is really lucky, there are multiple veteran and successful brigades that coordinate operations among themselves and largely ignore the micromanagement of the general staff. That is what is happening in Kursk.

A successful army has to run on systems. There are checklists for each activity at the individual, squad, platoon and company level. There are standard organizational procedures at the battalion level and higher to shoot, move and communicate. There is a defined organizational heirarchy that facilitates communications both vertically and horizontally, and provides operational objectives. Vertical communication not only runs from the top down, but from the bottom up. These systems, coupled with individual initiative, multiplies the combat power of an army.

The Ukrainian army is not an army of systems. It is an army that generally suppresses initiative and feedback. There are islands of success in which some brigades have the ability to isolate themselves to some degree from the chaos of the general staff. In those brigades you have systems, initiative, and two-way communications.

The biggest advantage Ukraine has is that the Russian army is also not an army of systems and also suppresses initiative and feedback. The Russian level of chaos exceeds Ukraine’s disorganization by some level of magnitude. It does not effectively multiply its combat power. Being a smaller army, Ukraine needs to maximize its combat power as much as possible. If it did, with just the personnel, weapons and ammo it had on hand, there would not have been breakthroughs at Pishchane, Bakhmut, Toretsk, Avdiivka or Vuhledar.

“The commander of the 108th Battalion “Da Vinci Wolves” called the main cause of the defeats of our troops in the Pokrovsky direction - incompetent management of troops. Yes, not the number advantage of the enemy, not the lack of people we have, but the management and organization of the troops in the first place, that's what bothers the military in the first place. The vast majority of commanders of units and units under Pokrovsk speak the same thing.”

There is no evidence for a Single Integrated Operational Plan for air defense or strategic air attacks. There is no evidence of such a plan for ground forces and there is no time to develop one because of the micromanagement by Ukraine’s general staff of individual brigades and battalions. The general staff reacts to Russian actions in a haphazard way. Its reactions to one crisis create new problems that lead to new crises, which lead to more reactions that create more problems.

Ukraine’s army needs a standard organization of divisions and corps. They have promised the organization of corps but there is no evidence of that so far.

Brigades need to remain intact. There needs to be reserve formations at the (theoretical) divisional, corps and army level. These reserves don’t have to be large, but they have been essential throughout the history of combat. There has to be a standard doctrine of an immediate counterattack to any penetration, and that capability has to be created and preserved. And the initiative of subordinates has to be trusted and encouraged. If Ukraine can somehow manage this, their OODA loop can dramatically shrink and their army will be significantly more powerful. This is all within their capability.

Successful brigade commanders have just recently been placed in positions of influence. Nothing has changed so far but the new commander of the ground forces is saying the right things, so there is reason for hope:

• Military training: this involves reforming training programs and centers, as well as using the most modern simulators and other cutting-edge technologies in training. A soldier’s training should be best adapted to the needs of the front.

• Recruitment and social support: a transparent recruiting model with zero tolerance for corruption will be introduced in the Land Forces. At the same time, the approach to social support for a serviceman will change. He should feel constant care for himself: from the first day of service to employment in civilian life after release.

• Technologies: a Ukrainian infantryman should have a technological advantage over the enemy on the battlefield.

• Optimization of management processes: “Maneuverability and efficiency” are needed in the administrative apparatus, the basis for this will be organizational changes and digitalization.

We will have to see if they have the ability to change anything or if they will be overwhelmed by the inertia of the status quo.

***

Diplomacy

Ukraine has conducted sabotage and assassinations within Russia. Russia has conducted almost 150 hybrid attacks on Ukraine’s allies in the form of infrastructure attacks, violence campaigns, weaponized migration and election interference and information campaigns.

The US provided Ukraine with a $20 billion loan that will be paid for by the interest from the frozen Russian assets. This is part of the $50 billion loan from Russian assets that the G7 group agreed upon earlier this year. The US is sending a $500 million aid package, including ammo for HIMARS/MLRS and High-speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARMs). And Trump “disagrees very vehemently” with Biden’s decision to all US-made missiles to be used in Russia.

The Republican-controlled house passed a defense bill that refuses to recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territories, a requirement to work on AI weapons collaboration with allies and to report Russian-funded terrorism. But there is no Lend-Lease of Ukraine.

Russia will send an unknown number of MiG-29s and Su-27s to North Korea in return for the troops that North Korea sent to Russia. This is in addition to the anti-aircraft missiles Russia sent last month.

After a second vote, South Korea impeached their president, to the joy of many. The prime minister will take over his duties while he is suspended. The Constitutional Court has 180 days to determine whether to dismiss the president or restore him to office. If he is dismissed, an election must be held within 60 days. South Korea is alarmed by the Russian-North Korean alliance, but even after resolving their constitutional crisis, there is a lot of public resistance to sending weapons to nations at war, and there is a law that forbids it.

Russia will send 500,000 barrels of oil a day to India for ten years. This should earn Russia $12-13 billion a year.

Russia stopped sending wheat to Syria. Ukraine said they will supply wheat.

A claim that Georgians are usually more likely to be headed to bed at 7 AM, and yet here they are protesting.

The nominee to head the FBI doesn’t believe reports documenting US aid to Ukraine.

***

Equipment

Drones are meanwhile regularly used to deliver food and water.