Don's Weekly, 23 June 2025: Part 1
by Donald Hill (Intro by Tom Cooper)
Hello everybody!
It was… sigh… yes, an ‘exciting’ week in Ukraine. And tragic, too.
…between others, because Syrsky & Buddies are continuing their successful extermination of skilled ZSU officers and other ranks, while fantastically establishing ever more machine-gun-equipped anti-aircraft units…
…to counter Russian attack UAVs, your know, and although knowing very well, these are entirely pointless…
Or, how about the newest example: say, a Russian missile strike on a training camp in the Kherson Oblast, killing and wounding who-knows-how many troops bunched together…?
Scenes of this kind are meanwhile churning my insides out…
When this happened under Drapaty’s command - two times - he resigned (although it was not his fault; it was Syrsky who was intriguing to subvert his authority). Now it’s ‘happening’ again, and nobody is going to resign. Because Syrsky & Buddies know better…
And, with this happening again, and again, and again, and again, and again… please tell me - especially all those complaining ‘I’ve abandoned Ukraine’, not to talk about those ‘furious’ I’m critical of Israel (and thus an ‘anti-Semite’): what shall I analyse in this war? Count ‘Hero Zelensky’s’ mistakes? Yermak’s mistakes? Count Syrsky’s mistakes? Count all the incompetent buddies appointed by Syrsky? All of their mistakes? Count all the battles lost because of them? All the villages and towns irrecoverably ruined because of them?
…count the Ukrainian troops and civilians killed or wounded because of them…?
Again: I’m so fed up of this, I prefer to limit myself to supporting our collection for the ZSU (see: Rickshaws for the ZSU). This is presently the only thing making sense (and it’s neither helping Zele, Yermak, nor Syrsky, although the latter is near-certain to claim even this as ‘his win’).
Thus, I’m handing over to (a much more) patient Don, where… ugh… even Don can’t stand this any more…
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Ukrainian Command Issues
Drapaty said that when he became the Commander of the Ground Forces the army was mired in managerial stagnation. There was fear, lack of initiative and detachment on the frontline units. There was systemic abuse, personnel decisions based on connections and low internal organization. He tried to shift the army from a culture of fear to a culture of responsibility. In removing half of the Ground Forces leadership, he focused on decentralization, accountability and professionalism. Decisions were made on the basis of analysis, results, and respect for subordinates, not on status or loyalty. He also made an effort to eliminate corruption and increase transparency in mobilization.
In frustration, he resigned, saying “I was unable to make people follow my orders. I didn’t push hard enough or change attitudes toward discipline. This is my responsibility.”
The final straw that lead to his resignation was yet another missile strike on a Ukrainian training base. If he hoped his resignation would be a wake up call, if failed. Yet another Ukrainian training base was hit with a missile and it killed and wounded more soldiers.
Many talented officers refuse promotions above the brigade level because of the politics on the General Staff level. Drapaty now commands the Joint Forces, focusing entirely on combat operations, operations that are still micromanaged by Syrsky.
Zelensky appointed Hennadiy Shapovalov as the new Commander of the Ground Forces. From 2019 to 2021, he had been commander of the 59th Brigade. In March 2022 he was promoted to Brigadier General and served in the positions of the head of the Military Cooperation of the Armed Forces in Ukraine, a member Commission on the Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, and became the commander of the forces of the Operational Command South in April 2024. In February 2025 he became the liaison at the NATO military aid coordination center in Germany until becoming the number two man under Syrsky.
“Changes are needed and this is an imperative,” he said.
***
The formation of corps is quietly…slowly… ‘progressing’…
The three Operational Strategic Groupings (OSUV) will remain. Each had 3-6 Operational Tactical Groupings (OTU) and they had 3-22 brigades and several battalions each. 22 brigades are simply too many for any command organization to effectively manage and support. The OTU’s will be replaced by corps that will have 4-6 brigades each. The OSUV might have 5-15 corps and hopefully an operational reserve to aid any sector that is being threatened by Russian attacks.
It is difficult to restructure organizations in the middle of combat. Some brigades have to be moved and there’s always a vulnerability when changing units in a defensive position, even if it’s a regular rotation of personnel within the unit. And then there is the fact that Syrsky constantly detached battalions from brigades in one sector and sent them to another sector as reinforcements. Reuniting detached battalions with the brigades is an additional level of complexity.
Syrsky said that “several” corps-level commands have been created and have received their brigades and support units. They’ve been assigned their sectors of responsibility and the corps has, in turn, assigned sectors of responsibility to the brigades and coordinated with the units to their left and right. The corps commanders are responsible for the selection of their own staff.
Syrsky said that the transition to a corps-based organizational structure should be complete by the end of 2025. Obviously, it takes him time to select ‘the right one’ between his buddies for every single position.
And, he’s in no hurry.
***
Kursk/Sumy
The 225th Regiment counter attacked and seized the village of Andriivka. In the process they killed a Russian battalion commander. Ukraine is now advancing on Yunakivka. Russia drops eight bombs on Khotin.
North Korea is sending 5,000 construction workers and 1,000 combat engineers to Kursk. They will remove mines and repair roads, buildings, and electrical and communication lines. 15,000 North Korean workers are already in Russia. Moscow is transferring technology and sending sculptors and architects to North Korea to build memorials for the North Korean dead in Kursk.
12 km north of Tyotkino and 3 km from the border, Ukraine said they dropped four bombs on houses in Alekseyevka that were used for drone operations. They also bombed Tyotkino itself.
***
Vovchansk
A soldier from the 57th Brigade talks about his experiences in the ruins of Vovchansk, where sometimes the Russians run to him and all he tries to do is wound them so the drones can finish them off, and sometimes the Russians are just across the road from him. At night, he stays away, listens to the radio and thinks about his family.
***
Kupiansk
Kupiansk is hit by a nighttime airstrike. Russia advances 2 km out of Dvorichna to the woods and are met by Ukrainian drones.
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Terny
A Russian assault was launched on quad bikes that they bought with their own money. There was a driver and passenger on each bike and they were supposed to travel to one treeline before dismounting and attacking Ukrainian positions. They were attacked by drones and four survivors took shelter in a dugout. Ukrainian drones dropped bombs on them so they decided to leave. A lone Ukrainian defender decided it was better to take the initiative so he advanced against them, firing his weapon. Low on ammo, he threw a grenade, which wounded one of them in the heel. Upon hearing the moaning, the Ukrainian soldier told the Russians that they were outnumbered and the Russians agreed to surrender.
Just outside of Makiivka, Russia bombards a village with thermobaric rockets.
South of Terny, a Ukrainian is observed moving and that is enough to justify an airstrike.
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Siversk
Another Russian assault towards Hryhorivka is attacked by artillery and drones. Some Russians move into well concealed positions, but they were seen moving into those positions.
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Chasiv Yar
Yet more thermobaric rockets on Ukrainian positions just outside Chasiv Yar.
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Toretsk
A Russian attack towards Yablunivka was met by ATGMs, artillery and drones and resulted in the loss of 14 armored vehicles, six motorized vehicles and 50 men. Russian drones attack Ukrainians in Oleksandro-Kalynove. The outskirts of Kostiantynivka are hit by Russian airstrikes. All the roads leading into the town are already being intercepted by drones.
The 36th Marines destroyed ten pieces of Russian artillery in the last seven days.
This firefight happened in May as the Russians approached Romanivka. The Russians eventually took the village a couple of weeks ago.
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Pokrovsk
It was nine weeks ago when the Russians overran Tarasivka. Since then, they’ve been slowly encircling Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka to the north. A Russian assault towards Uspenivka failed.
***
(…to be continued…)
Thanks for the analysis. Take a break Tom if you need it, we understand the frustration. But don’t despair. Let’s hope for changes even if slowly. And thanks to Don for keeping up.
RE: Incompetence--All the comments you have made regarding incompetence through many of your substack articles make me think of Ukraine's position in this nasty war seemingly as hopeless. Alternately, perhaps if Ukraine prevails (wins) in this war then it may be due in large part to the relatively lesser incompetence of its leaders (from top to bottom) compared with the greater incompetence of Russian leadership from top (Putin) to Russia's lowest level of leadership. Nonethless, this still would suggest that incompetence is the norm in this war and perhaps most other wars.