Don's Weekly, 2 June 2025: Part 1

by Donald Hill & Tom Cooper

Hello everybody!

May is over, and June began with severe Ukrainian UAV-strikes all over Russia. Indeed, with a sort of ‘big boom’: the ‘spectacular’ attack by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) on four bases of the Russian Long-Range Aviation (DA), plus a number of sabotages on the Russian railways - all tidily followed by yet another mass-strike by UAVs (out of Ukraine). With other words: a lot happened over the last 48 hours. Thus, lets start with the start.

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Operation Spider Web

In 2022, the DA entered this war with a total of following number of bomber airframes (following figures are based on literal ‘counting’ of aircraft visible on photographs from the last 10 years, during the work on the book War in Ukraine, Volume 6):

• 55 Tupolev Tu-22M-3 ‘medium’ bombers,

• 57 Tupolev Tu-95MS, and

• 16 Tupolev Tu-160 strategic bombers.

All of these are big aircraft, and all are old: their production ceased in the early 1990s (this is valid for Tu-160s, too, despite the Russian claims about resumption of their production). They are maintenance intensive (indeed, Tu-160s are ‘renowned’ for their chronical engine-related problems) and thus there was always the question of their actual availability. In military terminology, this is summarised with the number of ‘fully mission capable’ (FMC) aircraft: aircraft with all systems in operational condition. Not only their age, but also three years of the war in Ukraine are showing their effects: earlier Ukrainian UAV-strikes on the DA’s bases have knocked out at least 2-3 Tu-95s and several Tu-22M-3s. Indeed, the situation with Ukrainian UAV-strikes on DA’s bases became serious enough to force the Russians to move their Tu-95s and Tu-160s away from their primary base at Engels, and re-distribute them to more distant facilities. This further complicated their maintenance. Correspondingly, as of early this year, the DA on average had less than 10 Tu-95MS’ and only 4-6 Tu-160s in FMC-condition. Similarly, only some 27 Tu-22M-3s were operational on average. The others would have taken anything between 24 and 168 hours to bring to that state. Rather unsurprisingly, in March this year two major Russian factories were contracted to overhaul six Tu-95MS’.

Marked in yellow are bases used by the DA to house and operate its bomber fleet ober the last two years.

According to the Ukrainian accounts, the planning and execution of the Operation Spider Web began as much as 18 months ago. As first, the SBU had to smuggle the necessary 150 FPV drones to Russia. These were stored in several discrete storage facilities rented for that purpose. There, the Ukrainians rebuilt a number of commercial containers into ‘UAV-launchers’ looking like housing modules, as obvious from following photos:

More images of the drone preparation phase of the operation.

At the desired point in time, containers were then loaded on randomly selected commercial trucks, and their (Russian) drivers ordered to drive to selected points near the air bases of Olenya, Ivanovo, Daghilevo, and Belaya. Once there, and per remote control (the Ukrainians used Russian telecommunication networks for this purpose), their tops were opened, the UAVs activated, and sent into attack. As far as is known, a total of 116 UAVs were actually launched.

Their appearance is meanwhile certain to have taken the Russians completely by surprise: the air bases that came under attack were well-protected by electronic warfare- and air defence systems, but their crews expected UAV-strikes by big, ‘winged’, long-range UAVs by night. Not an attack by ‘FPVs’, and even less so ‘in the middle of the day’.

Unsurprisingly, the SBU claimed damage or destruction of 41 bombers, surveillance and transport aircraft, which it characterised as ‘34% of Russia’s bomber-fleet’, worth ‘US$7 billion’.

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What can be concluded about ‘results’ of this operation?

Based on visual evidence provided so far (less than 24 hours since this operation was executed), only a small portion of claims for ‘41 aircraft destroyed and/or damaged’ can be confirmed.

Olenya AB

One report says that a truck arrived in Olenegorsk near Olenya air base. As FPVs flew out of his trailer the driver reported to the traffic police that he was told to drive there and that someone would meet him.

A video of what was probably the first strike on Olenya AB. Subsequent footage and then another where four Tu-95s and an AN-22 are seen burning (tyres were placed on the wings of planes in hope of disrupting drone-recognition of images, perhaps as a ‘last ditch’ method of defence, too). A fuel depot on the eastern side of Vysokii burns.

Smoke rises from the aftermath of the attack. Another quick look at the burning airfield. For comparison, here a 26 May satellite image (bottom).

A view from the FPV as seen approaching the first in the row of three Tu-95MS’ at Olenya AB. Obviously, the nearest aircraft is already damaged by a hit near the right wing-root: this is containing a large fuel tank. Notable in the foreground is a big heap of disused car tyres: obviously, this aircraft was in the process of being prepared for a flight. Gauging by other, subsequently taken photographs and videos, this aircraft went up in flames.

A view from the FPV as seen approaching the second in the row of three Tu-95MS’ at Olenya AB. Clearly visible are tyres still lined down the wing, and a fire-fighting vehicle to the left. Indeed, fire-fighting efforts were already underway: this aircraft was damaged by a hit into the left wing-root, which caused fuel to spill to the tarmac underneath and start burning: the fire-fighters were trying to contain that fire.

A view from the FPV as seen approaching the thrid in the row of three Tu-95MS’ at Olenya AB. This hit caused the most spectacular explosion: indeed, it broke the wing of this aircraft and threw large pieces of engine nacelles and wing skin into the sky. This Tu-95MS is a definite ‘write off’.

Notably: warheads used by drones were no ‘high explosive’ type, and they contained no shrapnel. Instead, the Ukrainians used shaped charge warheads - like in anti-tank ammunition: the aim was to breach the thick skin, punch through the wing longerons and fuel tanks, causing as much (irrepairable) damage as possible.

Conclusion: 2 Tu-95MS’ were definitely destroyed, 1 ‘at least’ damaged. Additionally, a transport aircraft variously described as ‘An-12’ or ‘An-22’ was destroyed (if this was an An-22: this was the World’s largest turboprop-powered transport; 67 were manufactured, of which 60 remained in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; 5 were in storage; 6 written off in accidents, leaving only 4 in operational condition; reportedly, their operations ceased in late 2024).

Daghilevo AB (outside Ryazan)

A report that Ryazan air base was attacked and smoke of some kind was seen.

Ivanovo AB

There are reports that a single A-50 was hit at Ivanovo but no visual confirmation for this: merely ‘noise’ and ‘yet more noise’, and an image of smoke. (For a review of the Russia’s A-50-fleet, see earlier summary: A quick Review of the Russian A-50-Fleet.)

Conclusion: presently-available evidence is not enabling a confirmation of the claim that an A-50 was destroyed there.

Belaya AB

It is indisputable that drones for this attack were launched out of cargo trucks towards Belaya Airbase - over 4,000km far from Ukraine. Russians climbed on a truck to stop the drones from flying. The truck then exploded.

Satellite images from May 31 (top image). Drones speed towards the air base. An aerial view of some of the damage. The burning planes are seen from the highways, and then there is the video from which the following still was taken, showing the UAV in the process of being perfectly positioned to hit the wing-root of the Tu-95MS below:

The aircraft in question can be assessed as ‘at least damaged’. Thanks to sat photos like the one below, it can meanwhile be assessed as ‘destroyed’, too (see the first wreckage from the left).

The first post-strike satellite photograph that became available in the social media is indicative of the Ukrainians destroying ujp to 3 Tu-95MS and 1 Tu-22M-3 at the main apron of Belaya AB.

Reportedly, two additional Tu-22M-3s were hit while parked inside blast pents, elsewhere around Belaya AB.

This satellite photograph is indicative of no two, but three Tu-22M-3s destroyed at Belaya AB.

Conclusion: presently available visual evidence is indicative of the destruction of 3 Tu-95MS and 3 Tu-22M-3s at Belaya AB. One, two, or even three additional Tu-95MS have been damaged.

Voskresensk AB

Individual fires can be seen in the distance at Voskresensk air base.

Ukrainka AB

There is a report that the Ukrainka air base in Amur (the Russian Far East) was targeted but, the truck with drones never reached it. The report said the truck started burning and a man entered the trailer when it exploded.

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(…to be continued…)