Don's Weekly, 19 August 2024: Part 4

by Donald Hill

A Failure in Command Culture

I’ve mentioned it a few times. I’ve posted comments of others who mentioned it. Here we are, 2,5 years into the war and we’re still discussing one of the basic skills in warfare: defensive positions.

In defensive operations, the defensive positions are never complete. Never. Never.

There’s always something more you can do and the failure to do it is a failure in the company level leadership, the sergeants, lieutenants and captains.

There’s no excuse for leaders not knowing what to do by now. There’s no excuse for them not wanting to do it by now. And ultimately, that responsibility is on the senior leadership of the Ukrainian army. The culture of the army has to change and it’s their responsibility to change it. You may not be able to conduct brigade level combined arms operations. I can understand that. But you can dig a damn hole with interlocking fields of fire, alternate firing positions and overhead cover that not only vastly increases your effectiveness, it also saves lives…which increases effectiveness.

These are the words of Ryan O’Leary, a company commander in Chosen Company, foreign volunteers attached to the 59th Brigade, specializing in assaults.

***

So after seeing it brought up hundreds of times of the last month etc. Let’s get into some things. So is Ukraine suffering from a manpower shortage? Yes, yes they are. Is it why Ukraine is losing ground or the most significant reason? No, no it isn’t. I’ve been fighting here in Ukraine for over two years now, and the only thing that’s stayed consistent is the failure at command on multiple levels when it comes to defense in depth, troop organization in regards to building defenses, and discipline on work to get it done.

There is this belief in this war that a cellar or a basement is a fighting position, it is not. It’s typically a hole in the ground with ZERO fields of fire. Yet it continues that Ukrainians would rather sit in a basement instead of building defensive positions utilizing the basement as a strong point. This ultimately fails as the only way to defend it is to leave cover and expose yourself on open ground, typically resulting in injuries or death depending on the enemy assault force etc.

There’s also an issue of constant repairs. Trenches need repaired throughout combat. This is literally never done by most units though. There were countless times we would go out with the 59th to take over a position. We would bring supplies to reinforce trenches (sand bags, angle iron, etc) to build out bunkers, firing positions etc. we would get rotated out and another brigade would take over. 5 days later we go back and ZERO or negligible improvements were done. Usually the extra supplies we brought to build improvements sitting exactly where we left them and the Ukrainians sitting in holes smoking cigarettes vs digging.

Trench defense is pretty simple: You’re either sleeping, digging, or defending. If you’re not sleeping, you’re digging. If you’re not digging, you’re defending. If you’re doing neither of those you’re sleeping. The problem is this is rarely done. And not doing this erodes the ability to defend and hold a position. You could put 100 men in a trench, if it isn’t constantly improved upon the 100 men will achieve nothing. You put half that amount in the same trench and they actively improve the defenses, they will do 10 times better and likely survive with less injured.

Off the front areas, like 10km-15km back there should be a multitude of trenches, yet there isn’t. The Pokrovsk area as an example should have had 10 times the prepared defenses it had. In 2023 when we pushed the dipshit Russians back towards the Donetsk airport, out of Neveleske and almost out of Pervomaiske. The areas that became out of artillery range should have had guys digging 24/7 to have defense in depth built out. Yet it wasn’t. We’d show up for an assault and another units soldiers would be smoking and joking in a bunker vs digging.

Unprepared defenses, coupled with quite frankly shitty leadership that refused to delegate defense improvements and move to building rear interlocking trenches etc is the problem facing the east. Under the 59th it was their SOP that every soldier brings a shovel and they better use it. The problem is there’s anywhere from 2-10 brigades in a sector and if only 10% actively work on improvements it’s still fucked.

Manpower again isn’t the main issue, proper foresight that rear defenses need to be focused on, discipline on defense improvements in positions and actual oversight by some commands is the issue. If you’re a soldier and you ain’t digging, you’re dead. If you’re a commander and your troops aren’t digging, you’re failing your men and the units around you.

Rant over.

***

When I say that the Russian meat waves that are beaten back with heavy losses eventually erode the defenses, part of the equation is that the defenses are not being repaired and maintained. Ryan said, “There’s also an issue of constant repairs. Trenches need [to be] repaired throughout combat. This is literally never done by most units though.

Back in the Marinka section, do you recall the video in which a Russian (red circle) drops a satchel charge on the opening of a partially destroyed basement (yellow circle)? Ryan: “There is this belief in this war that a cellar or a basement is a fighting position, it is not. It’s typically a hole in the ground with ZERO fields of fire. Yet it continues that Ukrainians would rather sit in a basement instead of building defensive positions utilizing the basement as a strong point. This ultimately fails as the only way to defend it is to leave cover and expose yourself on open ground, typically resulting in injuries or death depending on the enemy assault force etc.”

An example of defensive positions with interlocking fields of fire: Multiple positions can fire on the same ground that leads to their positions.

Does this hole in the ground have fields of fire? If it did, they could fire on the Russian approaching. Where are the other defensive positions with interlocking fields of fire? They could protect each other in case one position is compromised. What if they had to fall back? Where is the exit route that is protected from enemy fire?

The Ukrainian soldier or soldiers couldn’t escape. They may not have known they were threatened since they couldn’t see the unarmed Russian approaching them with a satchel charge. And so they died. People are going to die even if they do everything they’re supposed to do. They’ll die a lot faster if they don’t do what they’re supposed to do. And these were good soldiers of a good brigade that have destroyed over 350 Russian vehicles and who knows how many Russian personnel in the last eight months.

Go back to the Pokrovsk-Avdiivka section and the video of the Ukrainian soldiers being rescued from their position. It’s a pretty good defensive position, probably created with an excavator. It has solid overhead protection, which came in handy for when they called in DPICM on their position. The two exits are good, especially since one caught on fire. It gave them an alternate way out. And for being out in the open, it is decently camouflaged, enough to fool a Russian walking just ten meters away who didn’t recognize it for a defensive position.

But, how was the Russian able to walk up on the position without being shot? I can’t see clearly enough to make out any firing ports, but there’s a good chance they were limited to the yellow lines and the space in between. That’s fine if there are other positions that could cover the blind spot. There obviously aren’t. Every single avenue of approach (ways to walk towards a position) needs to be covered by someone that can see it and someone that can fire on it. This decent position is unsupported by other positions. Somehow the Russians entered the woods, because that approach wasn’t covered, and they were able to approach this position from the side and rear. Since they didn’t have a covered and concealed means of exiting their position, the four Ukrainian infantrymen had to wait for help in the form of two Bradleys. Fortunately, they lived.

An example of where they got it right was a street in Marinka. All the houses had some level of destruction but they all had basements. They turned the basements into strongpoints with the ability to see any approaching Russians and fire on them. They knocked holes in the basement walls and created tunnels and trenches in between the basements. They even had a trench to the rear to give them cover when they had to eventually withdraw across the open field. With Russians just a hundred meters or less away from them, they held those positions from 16 February to 25 December, 2023.

Even when there’s little to no time to dig a fighting position, you can establish a hasty defense in which you find cover behind trees or buildings but you still make sure every avenue of approach is covered and these hasty positions support each other. There are many sectors in which Ukraine can only use ten people to defend a hundred meters of terrain. You still create five two-man positions that are 20 meters apart. And when you’re not fighting and you’re not sleeping, you dig a shallow fighting position where you’re prone on the ground and there’s just a mound of dirt in front of you. And if you’re still there, then you dig deeper until you can kneel in it. And if you’re still there, you dig until you can stand on it. Then you work on overhead protection.

This concept isn’t new to warfare. From the 3rd century BCE to the 3rd century CE the Romans would march deep into enemy territory and each night they would create a marching camp. There was no one to come to their rescue if they were attacked in the middle of the night, so they created defensive positions for the entire army before they went to sleep. Every night. They dug positions while under attack. They dug positions while laying siege. Everyone knew what they had to do and their officers kept their soldiers on task.

Some Ukrainian units have the leadership, knowledge and discipline to establish effective fighting positions for both individuals and the unit as a whole. Other units have a failure in leadership, and leadership starts at the very top.

There are a lot of things in this war that Ukraine cannot control. This is not one of them. The culture of the army needs to change.