Don's Weekly, 19 August 2024: Part 1

by Donald HIll

Aug 19, 2024

Hello everybody!

The battle in the south-western Kursk Oblast is heating up. The FSB has ordered an evacuation of the civilian population of Rylsk and Lgov districts. Ukrainians have knocked out the third Seym bridge in the Glushevsky District - the one at Karyzh, connecting Glushevsky with the Rylsk District - then secured Apanaskovka and Troitskoe, and entered Krasnooktyabrskoe, Komarovka, and 10-y Okyabr. Since the ZSU trashed the I Battalion, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in the Kolychevka-Tolpino area (and captured one of its company commanders), the Russians are counterattacking from the north towards Koreneve with everything they’ve got: obviously, they’re trying to punch through to the remnants of the garrison. For three days already, the VKS is heavily bombing (and the VSRF is shelling and rocketing) the area between Kremyanoe, Zhuravli, Novoselovka, and Pogrebki - indicating this as some sort of staging grounds of Ukrainian attacks towards Rylsk and Lgov. On the eastern side, the ZSU has repelled several Russian counterattacks between Novosenickij, Osipova Luka, and Belitsa, while mopping up the area in between: the FSB remains obsessed with recovering Martynovka, regardless how many VSRF troops get killed in the process; while, the mopping up is necessary because there are dozens (if not hundreds) of scattered Russian troops still present in that area. The ZSU is also raiding in direction of Belaya and seems to be pushing on Demdovka and Grafovka, too.

That much for latest developments. Don is going to round-up the last week, and update us on latest events elsewhere.

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Kursk

Russians are sending a lot of infantry as reinforcements and they have an easier time reaching the eastern side of the battlefield and most of their attacks are on that side. There have been two counterattacks by Russians that not only failed, but company commanders have been captured. This is definitely not normal for the meat wave assaults conducted in Ukraine. In those assaults, the Russian privates are given a direction and told to attack while the officers remain behind. This may be an indication of how chaotic the situation is for Russia to the point were company commanders are required to accompany attacks without them collapsing in confusion.

The only way Russia can bring units into the north or west is to enter through Rylsk, Sugrovo or Artuhovka and then drive along the E38 highway. The Russians say there are so many drones flying over E38: that it’s ‘just a kill zone’.

The Russians are saying that the Ukrainians are using pairs of MRAP vehicles for reconnaissance and they try to avoid engagement. So the Russians are waiting until the MRAPs are at close range before triggering the ambush and they have been able to kill a few of the vehicles in that manner.

That said, the Ukrainians are attacking everywhere, and are conducting deep raids to disrupt movement and defenses before returning to friendly lines. The Ukrainian forces at Tetkino, in the far southwest, should meet up with the Ukrainian forces near Glushkovo sometime next week. Russian forces in the north are having trouble with the drones so their reinforcements and supplies can’t easily reach them. It would not be surprising if Ukraine reaches the E38 highway in the near future. And there have been heavy Russian airstrikes and helicopter rocket strikes in a 1500 square meter patch of woods to the east of Kremanoe. It is possible they are bombarding those woods and selective treelines in the area because they have been receiving artillery fire from those locations. This is supported by the fact that Lgov (north of Sugrovo) is being attacked by artillery.

Ukraine reached Korenevo on 9 August, three days after the start of the Kursk offensive. There’s a tributary of the Seym river that runs through the town and Ukraine occupied the town south of the tributary and fought with Russian forces along the length of the tributary in the villages of Olgovka, Kremanoe and Sheptukhovka. On 12 August, the Russian defenses of these villages collapsed and Ukrainian forces crossed the tributary and moved north. By the 15th of August, they had entered Tolpeno and Kolycevka, a small village a kilometer north of Korenevo, cutting the town off from supplies and reinforcements. Russian reinforcements did arrive on 16 August, but two of their attacks were stopped in the vicinity of Zadino, 9 km north of Korenevo, and by the end of the day Ukraine had secured most of Korenevo, except its western side.

The Seym river is a dominant terrain feature in the Kursk battlefield. It cannot be crossed without bridges or boats, so the bridges are important for transporting supplies and replacements. With Ukraine attacking Korenevo, the Russian land to the west and south of the Seym became dependent on the three bridges at Karyzh, Zvannoe and Glushkovo. There are three bridges at Tetkino but they lead to a small portion of Russian land that is already cut off from the rest of Russia by the Ukrainian border and Ukraine has since occupied it. Also, at the beginning of last week, Russian volunteers fighting for Ukraine say they captured the border village of Tetkino, though fighting in the area continued afterwards.

The bridge at Glushkovo had already been damaged once, and then again with a Russian blogger providing battle damage assessment (at least for the public; the ZSU had a good view thanks to its UAVs). When Ukraine attacked it once more with an airstrike, the damage was easy to assess. This is a video of the Zvannoe bridge being hit by an airstrike. Satellite imagery shows that Russia erected a pontoon bridge 1700 meters east of the Glushkovo bridge before the Glushkovo bridge was destroyed. If the other two bridges across the Seym have also been destroyed then the pontoon bridge will not be secure enough to sustain Russian forces south of the river with ammo and food. Snagost has been in Ukrainian hands for five days now: the Russians were slow to realise this fact. Ukraine hit Vnezapnoe with an airstrike when they approached and occupied it. Ukraine will soon occupy that territory and it will be easy to defend.

The Glushkovo bridge (left) and the Zvannoe bridge (right).

Another view at the wreckage of the Glushkovo Bridge over the Seym, as it appeared in the Russian social media, the last night.

There is a report that back on 11 or 12 August a Russian Ka-52 helicopter shot at their own column and destroyed two 152 mm SP guns at Krivitskie Budy, 30 km from where Ukrainian troops were. The 2S19 Msta-S howitzers are a model the Ukrainian army is operating in minimal numbers: at least it does not have any in the Kursk Oblast. In this case, the Russian Ka-52 shoot at two more of their own vehicles. Friendly fire happens in all armies, but with a fluid battlefield and poor Russian command and control the risk to Russian troops is higher. The Russian Ka-52’s have been very active and this is one of three that have been shot down (in this case by the troops of the 82nd Airborne).

The situation in the south-western Kursk Oblast as of 18 August 2024, afternoon.

In 2022, when the battlefield was still fluid, small teams of Ukrainian infantry would move through the forests and other terrain to hit Russian flanks and rear areas in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Izyum and other areas. As movement stagnated and defensive lines were connected through the terrain, it was no longer possible to freely move in the terrain. In Kursk, the battlefield is fluid and defensive positions are more like islands protecting villages and roads. In between these islands, Ukrainian infantry is patrolling to find and destroy Russian units. It’s one reason why Ukraine is still finding abandoned Russian vehicles, like this T-80, although it’s not known when it was abandoned. They also engage any Russian positions they find, as this SSO unit does with a disciplined firing line.

Whether Ukrainians are in a defensive position or patrolling the woods, Ukrainian logistics is a little more strained because of the limited number of vehicles, the mobile battlefield, and the additional tasks they have, such as returning prisoners and creating new forward ammo dumps. One way they are meeting logistical needs is using drones to fly supplies, something both sides have done for a while. It won’t fulfill the fuel and ammo needs for vehicles, but it can provide food, water and medical supplies for smaller positions that are further away from the main roads, allowing the trucks to focus on the high volume heavy loads with quicker turnaround times.

18 km southeast of Sudzha, a Russian drone tracks Ukrainian infantry and has artillery shell the house he enters. 2 km east of Sudzha, a Ukrainian vehicle is attacked by a Lancet. 30 km north of Sudzha, a Ukrainian MRAP is ambushed, as seen from another point of view. A Ukrainian column moving south from a raid on Kremanoe is hit by an MRL strike. On the Ukrainian side of the border, a HIMARS was spotted firing by a Russian drone and followed to its hide position where a Russian missile hit it.

One Ukrainian unit of 200 has 50 soldiers that were in prison three months ago. They were released under a new Ukrainian law that lets them serve in the army instead of prison and the commander says they are the best warriors he’s seen.

Ukrainian infantry walk alongside their vehicles in a village. A Ukrainian infantryman hears a vehicle approaching on the road and wonders if it is Ukrainian or Russian. A pleasant encounter between Ukrainian soldiers and two Russian grandmothers. Ukrainians captured the headquarters of a battalion the Russians pulled from Urozhaine.

Russia continues to build defensive positions at Lgov and other locations 50 km from the border. Lgov itself was hit by Ukraine, specifically, the train station.

At the beginning of last week 121,000 Russians fled Kursk and the authorities were evacuating 59,000 more. The widespread looting of Ukrainian homes and businesses by Russians is well known, and when 4,500 citizens of Orsk had to evacuate because of a burst dam, their fellow citizens looted their homes, as well. Now there are multiple reports that Russian soldiers are looting evacuated houses and businesses, as well.

Russian prisoners are still being taken, even if they have to be carried. Almost a year ago, the 3rd Assault Brigade used a drone with loudspeakers to convince some Russians to surrender in Avdiivka. The Ukrainians are using the loudspeakers again in Kursk. These Russians were abandoned by their commanders so they surrendered. In the mobile battlefield, Ukrainians have been captured, too, but how many is unknown.

Outside Sverdlikovo, near the border to Ukraine, the Russians constructed a big underground bunker complex. This was bypassed by advancing Ukrainians on the first day of this operation, and a small force was left to make sure the Russians do not exit. Last week they called on the Russians to surrender and they complied. 102 prisoners were taken. This video shows some of those POWs taken and much of the bunker. Another bypassed bunker complex was manned by FSB personnel. Images of Ukrainians walking above the bunkers, convincing some to surrender, and using explosives on others. A Ukrainian soldier in a gas mask inspects the bunker with the bodies of the FSB personnel that didn’t surrender.

Just over one thousand Russians were taken prisoner in the first five days of the Kursk offensive. And it turns out that the Akhmat battalion ran away, as reported, but those pictured here weren’t captured on the front line but deep in the Russian rear by Ukrainian raiders.

Before the Kursk offensive, Russia held 6,500 Ukrainians and Ukraine held 1,300 Russians. In the last two weeks, Ukraine has taken 2,000 POWs. Russia and Ukraine are now discussing another POW exchange. More Chechens were captured as were other Russians.

At Kolotilovka, 20 km south of the fighting around Sudzha, a Ukrainian MRAP tried to storm a border guard outpost on 12 August and failed under heavy artillery fire. This post said that members of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade cut off the head of a Ukrainian soldier and displayed it. Other posts said more. Ukrainian soldiers are understandably angry but many voices are reminding people that Russian prisoners are needed to return Ukrainian prisoners.

The planning for the offensive began in early July with the intent to draw Russian troops away from the Donbass and take territory for bargaining. Bryansk was also considered as a location. Aside from some Army intelligence personnel, a few generals and security personnel and Zelensky (without his staff), no one was briefed on the planning. Senior leaders in the Ukrainian brigades didn’t learn about the plans to invade Kursk until three days before the operation began. The soldiers didn’t find out until the day before. The Ukrainian leadership didn’t confiscate their phones and relied on their discipline. Ukrainian citizens in the border region could not be told and the government hurried to evacuate 20,000 people within six miles of the border once the operation began. The commander of the 80th Brigade believed the mission to be too risky when compared to the benefits. He refused the order and was replaced and the 80th went into Russia with a new commander.

On 7 August, Putin appointed Alexander Bortnikov, the director of the FSB, to take over the ‘counter-terrorism’ operation in Kursk. He was replaced six days later by Aleksey Dyumin, a former security guard for Putin who was later governor of Tula and moved to the Ministry of Defense after the Wagner rebellion. He is loyal to Putin but does not have a military background.