Do you expect some dramatic shift after more and more commanders are publicly complaining about the micromanagement from general staff? The current leader could sack them (if he wants to replace these irritating commanders with sycophants... his call)
They might not know anything else, but: Zelensky and Syrsky both know: if they sack the people in question, the frontline isn't going to hold for longer than 2-3 weeks.
And by the way this. I do not necesarily fully support the individual, but as far as I know he had first hand experience of GenShtab-U and MOD system from inside for quite some time.
I agree fully about the article. It is just he was consulting UA government for years on those matters, so probably his strategy in terms of how to approach organisational change is not that effective. Though I still have a questionmark there, as I do not know story well enough.
Trump is good when planning to take over the government. Stuffing the Supreme Court, setting up a voting machinery, asking the Senate to be in recess so he can install his government without confirmation etc show a ruthless team which can plan how to take power (House of Cards, anyone?)
Now that he achieved it (thanks in no small part to the Democrats), he'll have to decide how to satisfy his ego.
Everything after 20th January will be an improvisation, as far as I can guess.
The large successful brigades should get the ball rolling by turning themselves into official divisions. Any issues and solutions they encounter could be shared with the rest of the army.
Successful - combat effective, proven as taking care to train their troops and lead them successfully in combat, and thus attracting the mass of recruits (and defectors) - 'brigades' , are already 'divisions' by everything than their names.
Their commanders are also the ones mostly operating autonomously. That shouldn't mean they're disobeying all the orders: just that 99% of time they're acting on their own, usually in cooperation with neighbouring units. Which in turn means they're already 'de-facto expanding' their command authority.
All their known operations are successful. No surprise: their troops are (far) better trained and motivated, their subordinate commanders are (far) better trained and held responsible for their actions, they are running pre- and post-mission briefs/de-briefs; their COs know the terrain, know the opponents, and were appointed for their proven skill and merits, not because they're somebody's buddies.
The only thing hampering them currently is the lack of 'divisional infrastructure'. This is why all their 'autonomous' operations are small in scale: their own logistics can't manage more.
Yes and they actually need it. As a comparison (Please don't take it literally), how far can on get when the tank is filled up completely and how far can one get when the tank is always filled only for one third.
I can imagine. Water, Food, fuel and munitions are the main requirements for a mechanized troops, and a good logistics system behind the lines is crucial for a war of movement
This is going so far that, had - for example - the 1st wave of the Kursk Operation had sufficient logistics support, they could've driven all the way to Kursk. Not 'just' to Korenevo.
And fully enabled ATACMS supply for at least the Kursk oblast - imagine the havoc done on Russian logistics that deep.
Enabling the use of ATACMS just now, three months after Ukraine invaded Kursk oblast, is like the harsh joke of ATACMS use in 2023, months after the Ukraine offensive hit the wall of Ka-52 and minefields...
I think it will be done but I have no idea on what kind of timeline. As that one officer in the article said, Syrsky conducted a survey regarding organization but never changed anything. So he knew there was a problem. This is simply more pressure for implementing the change.
The first step is to stop detaching battalions and companies from their parent units and throwing them into a breach as an ad hoc solution. The reason this is done is because there are insufficient reserves to respond to enemy actions. They need to create a reserve with complete units so they don't have to fragment other units when reacting to a crisis.
For the brigades that already have 11 battalions, it's simple: Turn them into divisions with brigades of 3-4 battalions each. For brigades with 8 battalions, split them into two brigades, add another brigade with 3-4 battalions and make a division out of them. Once you've organized three divisions, create a corps. All the brigades in the division will be fighting adjacent to one another (unless one is nearby in reserve). All the divisions will be fighting adjacent to one another.
Creating divisions and corps is an easier task than trying to manage dozens independent battalions and brigades in a cauldron under intense enemy attacks.
>> Creating divisions and corps is an easier task than trying to manage dozens independent battalions and brigades in a cauldron under intense enemy attacks.
....at least everywhere else but in Ukraine.
There, 'those at the top' are always scared the 'army' might 'stage a coup' against them - and thus from putting too many forces under the command of one person.
(Originally, this was also the reason why there was a separate National Guard, in addition to the Armed Forces.)
Well politically, Armed Forces in UA have the highest traditional level of trust, and also there is a history of military self-governing in Ukraine, which was also a consequnce of being constantly under threat in the past, which is still the case. And most probably would be the case for a long time.
So at least a resemblance of Turkish model (which maybe was inspired by cossak model, I do not know), provided though, first, the natural evolution of commanders, could be and should be employed.
And by natural evolution of commanders I mean, as example, if I understand correctly Prokopenko and Biletskiy (Azov 3rd) do not stand each other. Which is good, and they in the end could sit at the same table, and find way to solve their differences, and apply their stregths together. That makessystem stronger.
I always read all your interventions with the greatest interest and these reforms that you have been talking about for a long time seem to me to be essential and simple common sense. But you also mentioned the fact that the Ukrainian army is largely from the Soviet tradition, certain mentalities and operating methods, in view of the many examples, of all kinds, that you have already given, show that this does not only affect the hierarchy, high or intermediate, but also the rank and file soldiers. To know the incredible inertia that can exist in a large hierarchical organization, to have been confronted with fear and the fight against change even when it is requested and generates strong discontent, I would not want to be in Syrski's shoes. Is he micromanaging by choice or because he thinks he cannot trust everyone? For a change as radical as the one you are proposing to be viable, sometimes it is necessary to wait until the rank and file are asking for it, and for the idea to have made its way into people's minds. I have the impression that a campaign in this direction has been going on for several months, because if the base has the feeling that things come from them, they will be less likely to reject the "shitty orders" and changes that come from the high command and on the contrary will welcome the novelty without the traditional passivity and inertia but with enthusiasm and a positive spirit.
The ZSU... is, actually, an 'unusual' situation. Usually, problems are to be found in different aspects of training and command. In this case, the MASS of problems is at that top. The Soviet way of thinking = at the top. The Soviet way of training = at the top. The Soviet lack of care for individual troops = at the top. Generals that simply do not care about subordinates = at the top. Generals micromanaging = at the top. Generals that are hopelessly incompetent and can't cope with their assignments = at the top. Generals that are corrupt = at the top...
The 'rank and file' (starting with 'Colonels & below') are asking for a major and fundamental reform (and not just asking for it: crying for it). If they wouldn't, such nobodys like me would not know about them doing that.
The 'generals' simply must go. The mass of them is entirely wrong in place. That part can be done in a matter of days. Reforming the GenStab-U is likely to take a few days - where the start would be simple: whoever wants to seriously work, can stay, whoever not, is retired or re-qualified for de-mining purposes, as secretaries/assistants (necessary because re-writing the complete doctrine and new tactical manuals is going to take a few weeks) and similar. More problematic - and thus slightly longer - is then going to be the period necessary to fine-tune the work of the (new) GenStab.
What's certainly going to take much longer (and cause additional losses in terrain) will be the disbandment of the majority of inefficient (and surplus) brigades, re-training, and re-appointment of their staff, creation of divisional structure, (serious) corps structure etc. There are so many 'usless' brigades, so many 'independent' battalions meanwhile, this is going to take a few months.
Only a few months? Training of senior staff officers and leaders does not seem to me to be a short-term process. Perhaps promoting junior leaders (competent brigade commanders) to division and corps levels (Wait! Ukraine doesn't have any of these military organizations.) is the way to go. Still, division and corps leaders require effective staffs to perform competently.
I don't know if this is possible for a land army, but during WWII in the Pacific, within 6 months or perhaps the1st year of the war, the majority of submarine captains were replaced by submarine qualified officers who, in the peacetime Navy, otherwise would have been considred mavericks, misifts, and the like in the peacetime U.S. Navy. These odd fellows likely would have experienced mediocre to unsuccessful careers during peacetime.
The replacements for Captain turned out to be gunslingers and they fought their boats aggressively. No wimps or wussies at all! In one situation, a fleet (diesel) boat's entire wardroom was replaced with its entire officer complement busted up and then reassigned to different boats. Sometimes a leadership team just doesn't work well together, so cleaning house by breaking up the team and sending them separately to different commands was the proper solution to a problem.
It is my perception that if you want to break the general officer team of the Ukrainian army and replace them with gunslingers, then you will have to break the power of those generals and the power of the source that appointed those generals their positions. It seems to me that this will be a lot harder to accomplish than doing what SUBPAC did to its submarine captains in the early stages of World War II in the Pacific. Furthermore, Ukraine is not in the early stages of its war with Putin, and it seems from reading this Substack blog over much of this time period, that a lot of damage already has been done to the Ukrainian military, and that many opportunities have been lost that would otherwise perhaps have visited catastrophic damage to the Russian military in Ukraine.
The only thing to remember, is that many battallion/brigade commanders are fighting for 10+ years. You know what I mean? I would suspect that 10 years of war could substitute academy training. Depending on the circumstances of course. But potential is significant. They have quite a first hand experience with both commanding and organising lives of their units. And that experience I believe scales up quite well.
More than substitute for academy training! Regarding, scaling up, that may be true too. Nonetheless, for today (only) I will appoint myself the Substack curmudgeon and crank by noting the following: In the U.S. Civil War some generals promoted upward from brigade command, performed well in their junior flag officer rank, but when given higher command, they ended up mediocre leaders. One example I recall reading about was Confederate General Jubal Early. General Early commanded the Confederate "Lightning Division" competently. As both a brigade and division commander, General Early was quick and aggressive on the offense (in my words a real gunslinger) and stout and resolute on the defense. When he was promoted to Corps command, with some exceptions, General Early did not distinguish himself.
I am not saying that this would be the situation for promotion of Ukrainian brigade commanders upwards, but one nevertheless must look out cautiously for a situation that I described above.
Up to this point it was defense using fortifications and jabs at Russian weak points. The situation is no longer relevant and most frontlines don"t have fortifications built over several years.
Ukraine must decide for a main goal: inflict Russian casuaties or buy time.
Fighting in cauldrons may buy time but the casualty rațio is not favorabile. Ukrainian units are already becoming ineffective.
Slow retreats will keep a good casualty ratio but will create political pressure for negotiations or anothrr Kursk.
I suppose that Ukraine is pursuing both targets at the moment, with stiff resistance in Donbas and killing/maiming thousands of Russian troops in Kursk
The biggest issue Ukraine has in maintaining its defensive lines is the lack of local counterattacks. The 72nd Brigade maintained its lines for many months with counterattacks. Everytime the Russians grabbed territory they were pushed back. Then they stopped receiving replacements and started running low on ammo. They were struggling just to hold their defensive lines and couldn't afford to counterattack. This meant every advance Russia made, it retained. And then it just advanced some more. This destabilized the defenses of adjacent units, which destabilized the defenses of units adjacent to them, and eventually everything collapsed.
It's the same thing that happened at Avdiivka, Bakhmut and Popasna.
Some brigades don't have the training and leadership to conduct local counterattacks. That means if they're in the front lines then there needs to be a divisional or corps reserve to counterattack on their behalf. Oh, wait: Ukraine doesn't have divisions and corps. Ok, then the OTU's and OSUV's need to provide the reserve forces. Oh, wait: Ukraine doesn't actually have functioning OTU's and OSUV's. So that means the reserves must come from the army level. No, most of the time they don't have reserves, either.
So they strip battalions from brigades and send them to wherever the crisis is on the thousand kilometer front, thus weakening unit cohesion. Plus, it takes a while to travel and arrive to the crisis location and now the crack in the line is a hole and it's getting bigger. Well, the battalion that was sent isn't big enough to deal with that hole, so they better strip more battalions from other units and send them to the ever-increasing hole in the line.
Now you have maybe four battalions that are either independent or from different brigades, and they're supposed to coordinate their defenses with adjacent unknown units while under a constant streaming enemy assault.
A different strategy would be great. A different doctrine is imperative.
All this is correct and beautiful in words, but reorganization during military operations will lead to disaster. Usually, army reforms in peacetime take 10 years or more, as this requires training new personnel and retraining existing ones.
I really don't understand the compulsion to object to the obvious. The Continental Army was transformed at Valley Forge in one winter. Armies in WW2 transformed how they organized and utilized tanks, artillery, aircraft, submarines and other assets.
Why would Ukrainian officers suggest these changes if they didn't think they were possible? Several brigades have already changed how their units are organized and how they fight.
I don't know what your objectives are but your statements are not grounded in fact.
I am wondering, how can Ukraine reorganize their ground forces after a thousand days of an all-out war? Reading about more and more voices against micromanagement of a dozen-plus brigades, will the general staff relegate itself to strategic planning and avoid messing in operations?
Fortunately it mostly takes the reorganization that already exists on some levels and in adjacent organizations to flow through the entire army. The key is to disempower the old guard. And, to preempt the obvious question, that will not lead to loss of control or collapse because of the existing autonomy described in a different post.
Re-organnization is easy and feasable because the Ukrainian Army is în a state of flux for 3 years. The only constant is change în UAF.
Ex: Infantry batalion A from brigade W is detached and sent from Donbass to Harkiv. It is now controlled by brigade Y and receives fire support from detached artillery and drone units of brigades X and Z. Brigade X has actually been on that front until 3 months ago but has suffered large infantry losses and was rotated. It has left behind its artillery, medical and logistical units because there's never enough. The neighbour of batalion A is independent batalion B which popped up a week later.
So batalion A interacts with 4-5 units from different organizations, all under the umbrela of brigade Y.
Actually, the mass of Western armed forces is not even seriously studying what's going on in Ukraine. Their Experten are writing papers indicative of their authors living in the parallel universe. Occasionally, they then send a few Experten from different think-tanks or academies to talk to GenStab-U officers, these tell them fairy tales, and then everybody is happy. When one then talks with receivers of resulting assessments (see NATO officers)... sigh... one wants to cry.
US Army - does. Just not sure how widespread is that yet. Moreover, the mass of US manufacturers of mini-UAVs are cheating: they go to western Ukraine, and demonstrate their products to representatives of the GenStab, who are not only useless since they have no certain ideas about such systems, but - and foremost - can't afford them, anyway. Then they go to the Pentagon and claim 'combat-proven in Ukraine' - which is BS...
Thanks for this. Reading this was really a flashback to my early training in organization and management theory. The first principle is the span of control, it should not be to large. Very simple, and actually well known since ancient times. In the Bible Moses complains about having to many people asking him for advice and his father in law suggested a hierarchy to deal with it. Based on tens I think. And the term span of control was introduced more than 100 years ago, I think it was by a guy called Galbraith. Never mind, that was only the branding, this has been understood for millennia. And repeatedly ignored. Nothing new there. But if you don’t think that matters you are simply an idiot. The second point is about autonomy. Yes, you want autonomy. The guys in the front always knows more. Still the higher up’s have a better overview and should set goals. Sigh. Again relatively well known organization theory. I think any one studying organization theory or management would learn this in his/her first year. Now the problem here unfortunately is the application. Still, what needs to be done is crystal clear. Reduce span of control and provide autonomy. As Tom has said. And this isn’t “just” military science (which of course is enough in a military setting) it is common sense. But then again common sense ain’t that common.
Glen Grant: "Ukrainian troops demonstrate exceptional effectiveness when they are able to act independently. However, under strict control of the generals, their effectiveness in combat and logistics is significantly reduced."
I totally support the author and I want to add. Ukraine should increase firepower in some brigades. I mean the Territorial Defense Forces. It's a catastrophe literally. They have mainly assault rifles and 7,62 machine guns. I know the combat gears like APC, IFV and MRAP are not enough, but strength the TDF brigades with heavy infantry weapons like 12,7 (.50 cal) guns, automatic grenade launchers, mortars, and perhaps 105mm or 122mm artillery guns. The lads in the TDF deserve it.
Perhaps when the divisions or army corps will create two mechanised brigades and one TDF brigade will make the new military unit.
Giving the territorial brigades some heavy equipment like medium tanks (eg Leopard 1A5 or T-72) and a dozen IFVs each, plus mortars and heavy guns like the Browning 0.50 should be very helpful. But someone has to procure all this equipment.
Singing words of wisdom… Let it be, let it be 👌
Impresive analisys, thanks for this magister class
Thanks
Dear Don, thank you! On this note Redis (Prokopenko, Azov 12th) also published this: https://novynarnia.com/2024/11/18/kombryg-prokopenko-pererahuvav-plyusy-vid-formuvannya-korpusiv-i-dyvizij-u-zsu/
Oh-oh.... the last time somebody from Azov spoke out, Sodol was dismissed...
Do you expect some dramatic shift after more and more commanders are publicly complaining about the micromanagement from general staff? The current leader could sack them (if he wants to replace these irritating commanders with sycophants... his call)
They might not know anything else, but: Zelensky and Syrsky both know: if they sack the people in question, the frontline isn't going to hold for longer than 2-3 weeks.
I worry Sirsky would do some small changes only and would stay in his chair.
That's my worry too - and that's why I hope for his dismissal, together with the mass of the GenStab.
If change is going to happen, will it not be forced from the bottom up?
And by the way this. I do not necesarily fully support the individual, but as far as I know he had first hand experience of GenShtab-U and MOD system from inside for quite some time.
https://global.espreso.tv/news-colonel-grant-many-of-trumps-plans-to-be-undone-by-unforeseen-circumstances
It's not about whom is who supporting, but about the content.
This is simply an excellent article, and he's right in every single point.
I agree fully about the article. It is just he was consulting UA government for years on those matters, so probably his strategy in terms of how to approach organisational change is not that effective. Though I still have a questionmark there, as I do not know story well enough.
Trump is good when planning to take over the government. Stuffing the Supreme Court, setting up a voting machinery, asking the Senate to be in recess so he can install his government without confirmation etc show a ruthless team which can plan how to take power (House of Cards, anyone?)
Now that he achieved it (thanks in no small part to the Democrats), he'll have to decide how to satisfy his ego.
Everything after 20th January will be an improvisation, as far as I can guess.
Like I said before, if you think his first term was chaotic, just wait.
What are the chances that they actually reform and is it even possible to do when the situation is so fluid and critical in the frontlines?
Growing. Now 'even' Prokopenko (CO 12th NG Azov) appeared in the public to demand a reform. And when 'Azovs' start demanding such things...
The large successful brigades should get the ball rolling by turning themselves into official divisions. Any issues and solutions they encounter could be shared with the rest of the army.
Is the obvious way, of course.
Successful - combat effective, proven as taking care to train their troops and lead them successfully in combat, and thus attracting the mass of recruits (and defectors) - 'brigades' , are already 'divisions' by everything than their names.
Their commanders are also the ones mostly operating autonomously. That shouldn't mean they're disobeying all the orders: just that 99% of time they're acting on their own, usually in cooperation with neighbouring units. Which in turn means they're already 'de-facto expanding' their command authority.
All their known operations are successful. No surprise: their troops are (far) better trained and motivated, their subordinate commanders are (far) better trained and held responsible for their actions, they are running pre- and post-mission briefs/de-briefs; their COs know the terrain, know the opponents, and were appointed for their proven skill and merits, not because they're somebody's buddies.
The only thing hampering them currently is the lack of 'divisional infrastructure'. This is why all their 'autonomous' operations are small in scale: their own logistics can't manage more.
So, these "super brigades" (let's not call them divisions yet) would be quite well served by a logistics brigade and some extra command personnel?
Yes and they actually need it. As a comparison (Please don't take it literally), how far can on get when the tank is filled up completely and how far can one get when the tank is always filled only for one third.
I can imagine. Water, Food, fuel and munitions are the main requirements for a mechanized troops, and a good logistics system behind the lines is crucial for a war of movement
This is going so far that, had - for example - the 1st wave of the Kursk Operation had sufficient logistics support, they could've driven all the way to Kursk. Not 'just' to Korenevo.
And fully enabled ATACMS supply for at least the Kursk oblast - imagine the havoc done on Russian logistics that deep.
Enabling the use of ATACMS just now, three months after Ukraine invaded Kursk oblast, is like the harsh joke of ATACMS use in 2023, months after the Ukraine offensive hit the wall of Ka-52 and minefields...
I think it will be done but I have no idea on what kind of timeline. As that one officer in the article said, Syrsky conducted a survey regarding organization but never changed anything. So he knew there was a problem. This is simply more pressure for implementing the change.
The first step is to stop detaching battalions and companies from their parent units and throwing them into a breach as an ad hoc solution. The reason this is done is because there are insufficient reserves to respond to enemy actions. They need to create a reserve with complete units so they don't have to fragment other units when reacting to a crisis.
For the brigades that already have 11 battalions, it's simple: Turn them into divisions with brigades of 3-4 battalions each. For brigades with 8 battalions, split them into two brigades, add another brigade with 3-4 battalions and make a division out of them. Once you've organized three divisions, create a corps. All the brigades in the division will be fighting adjacent to one another (unless one is nearby in reserve). All the divisions will be fighting adjacent to one another.
Creating divisions and corps is an easier task than trying to manage dozens independent battalions and brigades in a cauldron under intense enemy attacks.
>> Creating divisions and corps is an easier task than trying to manage dozens independent battalions and brigades in a cauldron under intense enemy attacks.
....at least everywhere else but in Ukraine.
There, 'those at the top' are always scared the 'army' might 'stage a coup' against them - and thus from putting too many forces under the command of one person.
(Originally, this was also the reason why there was a separate National Guard, in addition to the Armed Forces.)
I suppose it's not a good situation when you're more afraid of your own officers than you are of an enemy army destroying your country.
Well politically, Armed Forces in UA have the highest traditional level of trust, and also there is a history of military self-governing in Ukraine, which was also a consequnce of being constantly under threat in the past, which is still the case. And most probably would be the case for a long time.
So at least a resemblance of Turkish model (which maybe was inspired by cossak model, I do not know), provided though, first, the natural evolution of commanders, could be and should be employed.
And by natural evolution of commanders I mean, as example, if I understand correctly Prokopenko and Biletskiy (Azov 3rd) do not stand each other. Which is good, and they in the end could sit at the same table, and find way to solve their differences, and apply their stregths together. That makessystem stronger.
That is still part of their history (soviet paranoia), because they exactly knew how they did come to power and how they did stay in power.
I always read all your interventions with the greatest interest and these reforms that you have been talking about for a long time seem to me to be essential and simple common sense. But you also mentioned the fact that the Ukrainian army is largely from the Soviet tradition, certain mentalities and operating methods, in view of the many examples, of all kinds, that you have already given, show that this does not only affect the hierarchy, high or intermediate, but also the rank and file soldiers. To know the incredible inertia that can exist in a large hierarchical organization, to have been confronted with fear and the fight against change even when it is requested and generates strong discontent, I would not want to be in Syrski's shoes. Is he micromanaging by choice or because he thinks he cannot trust everyone? For a change as radical as the one you are proposing to be viable, sometimes it is necessary to wait until the rank and file are asking for it, and for the idea to have made its way into people's minds. I have the impression that a campaign in this direction has been going on for several months, because if the base has the feeling that things come from them, they will be less likely to reject the "shitty orders" and changes that come from the high command and on the contrary will welcome the novelty without the traditional passivity and inertia but with enthusiasm and a positive spirit.
The ZSU... is, actually, an 'unusual' situation. Usually, problems are to be found in different aspects of training and command. In this case, the MASS of problems is at that top. The Soviet way of thinking = at the top. The Soviet way of training = at the top. The Soviet lack of care for individual troops = at the top. Generals that simply do not care about subordinates = at the top. Generals micromanaging = at the top. Generals that are hopelessly incompetent and can't cope with their assignments = at the top. Generals that are corrupt = at the top...
The 'rank and file' (starting with 'Colonels & below') are asking for a major and fundamental reform (and not just asking for it: crying for it). If they wouldn't, such nobodys like me would not know about them doing that.
The 'generals' simply must go. The mass of them is entirely wrong in place. That part can be done in a matter of days. Reforming the GenStab-U is likely to take a few days - where the start would be simple: whoever wants to seriously work, can stay, whoever not, is retired or re-qualified for de-mining purposes, as secretaries/assistants (necessary because re-writing the complete doctrine and new tactical manuals is going to take a few weeks) and similar. More problematic - and thus slightly longer - is then going to be the period necessary to fine-tune the work of the (new) GenStab.
What's certainly going to take much longer (and cause additional losses in terrain) will be the disbandment of the majority of inefficient (and surplus) brigades, re-training, and re-appointment of their staff, creation of divisional structure, (serious) corps structure etc. There are so many 'usless' brigades, so many 'independent' battalions meanwhile, this is going to take a few months.
". . . this is going to take a few months."
Only a few months? Training of senior staff officers and leaders does not seem to me to be a short-term process. Perhaps promoting junior leaders (competent brigade commanders) to division and corps levels (Wait! Ukraine doesn't have any of these military organizations.) is the way to go. Still, division and corps leaders require effective staffs to perform competently.
I don't know if this is possible for a land army, but during WWII in the Pacific, within 6 months or perhaps the1st year of the war, the majority of submarine captains were replaced by submarine qualified officers who, in the peacetime Navy, otherwise would have been considred mavericks, misifts, and the like in the peacetime U.S. Navy. These odd fellows likely would have experienced mediocre to unsuccessful careers during peacetime.
The replacements for Captain turned out to be gunslingers and they fought their boats aggressively. No wimps or wussies at all! In one situation, a fleet (diesel) boat's entire wardroom was replaced with its entire officer complement busted up and then reassigned to different boats. Sometimes a leadership team just doesn't work well together, so cleaning house by breaking up the team and sending them separately to different commands was the proper solution to a problem.
It is my perception that if you want to break the general officer team of the Ukrainian army and replace them with gunslingers, then you will have to break the power of those generals and the power of the source that appointed those generals their positions. It seems to me that this will be a lot harder to accomplish than doing what SUBPAC did to its submarine captains in the early stages of World War II in the Pacific. Furthermore, Ukraine is not in the early stages of its war with Putin, and it seems from reading this Substack blog over much of this time period, that a lot of damage already has been done to the Ukrainian military, and that many opportunities have been lost that would otherwise perhaps have visited catastrophic damage to the Russian military in Ukraine.
The only thing to remember, is that many battallion/brigade commanders are fighting for 10+ years. You know what I mean? I would suspect that 10 years of war could substitute academy training. Depending on the circumstances of course. But potential is significant. They have quite a first hand experience with both commanding and organising lives of their units. And that experience I believe scales up quite well.
"I would suspect that 10 years of war could substitute academy training. "
*************************************************************************
More than substitute for academy training! Regarding, scaling up, that may be true too. Nonetheless, for today (only) I will appoint myself the Substack curmudgeon and crank by noting the following: In the U.S. Civil War some generals promoted upward from brigade command, performed well in their junior flag officer rank, but when given higher command, they ended up mediocre leaders. One example I recall reading about was Confederate General Jubal Early. General Early commanded the Confederate "Lightning Division" competently. As both a brigade and division commander, General Early was quick and aggressive on the offense (in my words a real gunslinger) and stout and resolute on the defense. When he was promoted to Corps command, with some exceptions, General Early did not distinguish himself.
I am not saying that this would be the situation for promotion of Ukrainian brigade commanders upwards, but one nevertheless must look out cautiously for a situation that I described above.
Article linked at the bottom has a non-AI English translation:
https://babel.ua/en/texts/112593-the-ukrainian-line-of-defense-is-slowly-collapsing-how-does-it-happen-on-different-levels-why-does-it-happen-and-what-to-do-with-it-high-ranking-officers-of-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-explain
That article linked at the end is really enlightening. Thanks for sharing
Ukraine also needs a war strategy.
Up to this point it was defense using fortifications and jabs at Russian weak points. The situation is no longer relevant and most frontlines don"t have fortifications built over several years.
Ukraine must decide for a main goal: inflict Russian casuaties or buy time.
Fighting in cauldrons may buy time but the casualty rațio is not favorabile. Ukrainian units are already becoming ineffective.
Slow retreats will keep a good casualty ratio but will create political pressure for negotiations or anothrr Kursk.
I suppose that Ukraine is pursuing both targets at the moment, with stiff resistance in Donbas and killing/maiming thousands of Russian troops in Kursk
The biggest issue Ukraine has in maintaining its defensive lines is the lack of local counterattacks. The 72nd Brigade maintained its lines for many months with counterattacks. Everytime the Russians grabbed territory they were pushed back. Then they stopped receiving replacements and started running low on ammo. They were struggling just to hold their defensive lines and couldn't afford to counterattack. This meant every advance Russia made, it retained. And then it just advanced some more. This destabilized the defenses of adjacent units, which destabilized the defenses of units adjacent to them, and eventually everything collapsed.
It's the same thing that happened at Avdiivka, Bakhmut and Popasna.
Some brigades don't have the training and leadership to conduct local counterattacks. That means if they're in the front lines then there needs to be a divisional or corps reserve to counterattack on their behalf. Oh, wait: Ukraine doesn't have divisions and corps. Ok, then the OTU's and OSUV's need to provide the reserve forces. Oh, wait: Ukraine doesn't actually have functioning OTU's and OSUV's. So that means the reserves must come from the army level. No, most of the time they don't have reserves, either.
So they strip battalions from brigades and send them to wherever the crisis is on the thousand kilometer front, thus weakening unit cohesion. Plus, it takes a while to travel and arrive to the crisis location and now the crack in the line is a hole and it's getting bigger. Well, the battalion that was sent isn't big enough to deal with that hole, so they better strip more battalions from other units and send them to the ever-increasing hole in the line.
Now you have maybe four battalions that are either independent or from different brigades, and they're supposed to coordinate their defenses with adjacent unknown units while under a constant streaming enemy assault.
A different strategy would be great. A different doctrine is imperative.
All this is correct and beautiful in words, but reorganization during military operations will lead to disaster. Usually, army reforms in peacetime take 10 years or more, as this requires training new personnel and retraining existing ones.
Ok, then let's surrender, because it's too hard to reform the army.
I really don't understand the compulsion to object to the obvious. The Continental Army was transformed at Valley Forge in one winter. Armies in WW2 transformed how they organized and utilized tanks, artillery, aircraft, submarines and other assets.
Why would Ukrainian officers suggest these changes if they didn't think they were possible? Several brigades have already changed how their units are organized and how they fight.
I don't know what your objectives are but your statements are not grounded in fact.
This was good, Don. Not sarcastic, not mean. Very understandable.
I am wondering, how can Ukraine reorganize their ground forces after a thousand days of an all-out war? Reading about more and more voices against micromanagement of a dozen-plus brigades, will the general staff relegate itself to strategic planning and avoid messing in operations?
Fortunately it mostly takes the reorganization that already exists on some levels and in adjacent organizations to flow through the entire army. The key is to disempower the old guard. And, to preempt the obvious question, that will not lead to loss of control or collapse because of the existing autonomy described in a different post.
Agreed.
Re-organnization is easy and feasable because the Ukrainian Army is în a state of flux for 3 years. The only constant is change în UAF.
Ex: Infantry batalion A from brigade W is detached and sent from Donbass to Harkiv. It is now controlled by brigade Y and receives fire support from detached artillery and drone units of brigades X and Z. Brigade X has actually been on that front until 3 months ago but has suffered large infantry losses and was rotated. It has left behind its artillery, medical and logistical units because there's never enough. The neighbour of batalion A is independent batalion B which popped up a week later.
So batalion A interacts with 4-5 units from different organizations, all under the umbrela of brigade Y.
This sounds quite messy to me. How can disparate battalions cooperate well with people they don't know/trust to cover their sides?
Now you're starting to understand.
Basically, I got an idea when reading about Syrskyi micromanaging 100+ brigades and pulling battalions left and right, trying to plug some gap.
That's not the way to run a large scale war.
Thank you for the straightforward pragmatism as always. Keeping it real in Kyiv
Tom, do you think there is any kind of mentoring being given by Western military formally or informally to try and fix these issues?
Nope. Certainly not.
Actually, the mass of Western armed forces is not even seriously studying what's going on in Ukraine. Their Experten are writing papers indicative of their authors living in the parallel universe. Occasionally, they then send a few Experten from different think-tanks or academies to talk to GenStab-U officers, these tell them fairy tales, and then everybody is happy. When one then talks with receivers of resulting assessments (see NATO officers)... sigh... one wants to cry.
Do you know, does the same happen in the countries on the front (Baltic countries, Poland, Finland)? One would think they pay much more attention...
AFAIK, Baltic states are paying a lots of attention. Already Poland, Finland, Sweden and Norway - less; and the rest of NATO.... sigh...
https://roguesystemsrecon.substack.com/p/drone-war-accelerated-evolution-in
What of the U.S. army incorporating lessons about drones? Or is this not in a significant way?
US Army - does. Just not sure how widespread is that yet. Moreover, the mass of US manufacturers of mini-UAVs are cheating: they go to western Ukraine, and demonstrate their products to representatives of the GenStab, who are not only useless since they have no certain ideas about such systems, but - and foremost - can't afford them, anyway. Then they go to the Pentagon and claim 'combat-proven in Ukraine' - which is BS...
Thanks for this. Reading this was really a flashback to my early training in organization and management theory. The first principle is the span of control, it should not be to large. Very simple, and actually well known since ancient times. In the Bible Moses complains about having to many people asking him for advice and his father in law suggested a hierarchy to deal with it. Based on tens I think. And the term span of control was introduced more than 100 years ago, I think it was by a guy called Galbraith. Never mind, that was only the branding, this has been understood for millennia. And repeatedly ignored. Nothing new there. But if you don’t think that matters you are simply an idiot. The second point is about autonomy. Yes, you want autonomy. The guys in the front always knows more. Still the higher up’s have a better overview and should set goals. Sigh. Again relatively well known organization theory. I think any one studying organization theory or management would learn this in his/her first year. Now the problem here unfortunately is the application. Still, what needs to be done is crystal clear. Reduce span of control and provide autonomy. As Tom has said. And this isn’t “just” military science (which of course is enough in a military setting) it is common sense. But then again common sense ain’t that common.
Essentially, the same basic rules of management are applicable everywhere - in civilian- and in military life.
Glen Grant: "Ukrainian troops demonstrate exceptional effectiveness when they are able to act independently. However, under strict control of the generals, their effectiveness in combat and logistics is significantly reduced."
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1858547435557310486
That matches much of what we read and understand, but his words carry more weight as he's a professional soldier
I totally support the author and I want to add. Ukraine should increase firepower in some brigades. I mean the Territorial Defense Forces. It's a catastrophe literally. They have mainly assault rifles and 7,62 machine guns. I know the combat gears like APC, IFV and MRAP are not enough, but strength the TDF brigades with heavy infantry weapons like 12,7 (.50 cal) guns, automatic grenade launchers, mortars, and perhaps 105mm or 122mm artillery guns. The lads in the TDF deserve it.
Perhaps when the divisions or army corps will create two mechanised brigades and one TDF brigade will make the new military unit.
Giving the territorial brigades some heavy equipment like medium tanks (eg Leopard 1A5 or T-72) and a dozen IFVs each, plus mortars and heavy guns like the Browning 0.50 should be very helpful. But someone has to procure all this equipment.