Don's Weekly, 16 June 2025: Part 3

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 2…)

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Equipment

In a battlefield environment dominated by drones, towed artillery gained value because of the high chance of spotting and attacking anything that moved, such as self-propelled artillery, and because towed artillery is easier to protect with defensive positions and harder to see when camouflaged. Russia’s Shchuchye arsenal had 4,839 towed artillery pieces before the war. By April 2025 they only had 2,753 pieces and those were in rough shape due to poor maintenance. A lot of artillery was pulled to equip 70 new regiments that the Russian army created. The poor condition of the remaining pieces will limit the number of guns that can be refurbished and the rate at which they are repaired.

Russia used to refurbish 72 towed artillery pieces a month at Shchuchye. That rate fell to 17 guns per month.

Planet Labs is a US cube satellite company that has been providing imagery to Ukraine and will now be providing it to NATO.

South Korea is working on a missile capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at altitudes of up to 100 km and is scheduled to be completed in 2028. Japan and the US were jointly developing a missile interceptor that was supposed to begin testing in 2029 and delivery in 2032 but funding cuts pushed the delivery date to 2035.

Germany and Japan are experimenting with drone protection for their armored vehicles.

In addition to 5,000 Martlet missiles and 100,000 drones, Ukraine will receive an unknown amount of RapidRanger air defense systems that have a detection range of 15 km and a firing range of 7 km. Since Russian drones now fly higher than machine guns can engage, Ukraine needs systems to replace that capability.

Ukrainian drones have intercepted Russian drones controlled by radio signals and jammed them, causing a non-contact kill.

A French automotive company will produce drones in Ukraine for both Ukraine and France. They plan to produce several thousand drones within a few months.

Ukraine’s Sapsan ballistic missile can reach a velocity of Mach 5.2 (ATACMS is Mach 3), has a range of at least 300 km (the stated plan was 500 km) and a 480 kg warhead (ATACMS’s warhead is 227 kg). It already struck a target last month and is in full production now. Ballistic missiles can only be intercepted with hit-to-kill missiles. The S-400 is designed to intercept missiles at ranges of 120 km, 250 km and 400 km, depending on the missile that is used. The rate of production was not disclosed.

The Saab AEW planes, Ukrainian F-16s, Mirage 2000s, and Patriot systems can now share data through Link 16 communications, which will make them more effective.

Russia’s V2U drone can fly for one hour at 60 kph with an electric motor, and up to 100 km with a combustion engine. It has a 3 or 3.5 kg warhead and has US and Chinese electronics that allows it to search for targets autonomously if it is jammed. It has a 100-GB drive with terrain maps and a laser range finder that allows it to navigate if GPS/GLONASS satellite signals are jammed. It can match equipment profiles with images in its on-board library to select a target to attack.

It is important to adapt to a changing combat environment and protecting sources and indicators is part of that. For a couple decades now it’s been known that surges at the pizza establishments around the Pentagon are indicators of pending operational activity. This particular indicator was revealed prior to the Israeli attacks on Iran. I’ve been to the food court in the Pentagon. They clearly need to establish a secure pizza outlet.

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Ukrainian Leadership

Ryan O’leary was a soldier that fought in the 59th Brigade. He has some opinions on Ukrainian leadership:

An army is sustained by food, but its will to fight, its ability to withstand and destroy the enemy, is in the hands of its command. There is a huge difference between a unit that simply survives and a unit that actually fights.

Let's start by saying that this is not an appeal to a specific command, but it is something that, in my opinion, is critically lacking in understanding among the officer corps of Ukraine. A mediocre officer in peacetime affects combat readiness — which can sometimes be ignored. But a mediocre or incompetent officer in wartime leads to the death of soldiers and reduces the morale of the unit and its ability to hold the defense or conduct offensive operations.

We have lost more people due to poor command than from Russian actions. I will repeat again: as a soldier since February 2022, I claim that we have lost more people due to poor leadership and Soviet thinking than from direct Russian actions. The officer corps of Ukraine behaves like a caste system of untouchables or "army princes". Instead of caring about the normal living conditions of soldiers, most of the leadership is more concerned about the availability of a shower, a private room, etc.

This system allows incompetent officers not only to avoid responsibility, but also to be promoted or transferred to other positions to avoid red tape or so that the brigade or battalion commander who appointed them does not have to demote friends or deal with the consequences. This system of nepotism has a direct impact on the situation on the front lines.

A real-life example is the 59th Brigade. After Sukharevskiy was transferred to the SBS, command was transferred to Shevchuk. In the first two months of his command, he sent intelligence officers on assault operations, which led to deaths and serious injuries among those who had nothing to do with combat operations. This undermined not only the morale but also the effectiveness of the unit. He sent soldiers to unreachable positions without any hope of reinforcement or even survival. It took more than 16 months for him to be removed from his post. 16 months of decisions that cost dozens, if not hundreds, of lives.

Such situations are part of the problem in the Land Forces of Ukraine. The NCO corps has not been properly formed since the start of a full-scale war in 2022, and the officer corps continues to live according to Soviet templates, where failures are covered up, and soldiers pay for it. We shed blood for Ukraine, we die for Ukraine, we fight for our children, wives, sons and daughters - while officers who do not care, who are not motivated, who do not have the right to command, continue to make mistakes that lead to senseless deaths.

I can’t speak for the level above the battalion, but given the recent statements of officers who tried to change the system and were forced to resign, this should be a signal to those in power. Change is needed if we want to preserve the freedom of the next generation, Ukrainian identity, and continue the path to democracy. At the current pace, these officers will continue to fill the cemeteries with brave, courageous Ukrainians for no good reason.

That is why I will no longer lead brave men and women into the very hell of combat unless I know that there is an officer in the rear who cares about our lives and wants to complete the mission with us.

The most valuable thing we have is our people, our minds, our ability to think. We must instill the belief that people are more important than meters and medals - unfortunately, this is not the case at the moment. There are butchers among us, there are bastards among us, and these officers must be removed immediately if we are to win this war and save our state.

If you are an officer reading this, or you are a person in power—political or otherwise—and this is making you angry, take a look at the six questions below. If you don’t pass even 75%, you are most likely the problem. Or the problem is your command. It’s 2025—it’s time for Soviet thinking to die with the Russians in the field.

We can no longer be led to the slaughter by promising the bare minimum and placing our lives in the hands of those who don't care.

1. I trust my company commander and am sure that he will do everything possible to get me out of a crappy situation.

2. I believe that command is acting in my best interests when planning the defense of forward positions.

3. I know that my officers will do everything they can to remove me from the position if problems arise and the Russians are able to gain a foothold.

4. Before each operation, I receive all the necessary information about the goals and am able to provide feedback to successfully complete the task.

5. We are being provided with all the information necessary to not only fight, but also to displace Russian forces.

6. I trust that the command of my brigade or battalion will come to my aid and do everything possible to get me out of a bad situation.

If you don't get well above 75% positive answers to these six questions, you are not coping with the command and should be removed immediately.

Ukraine has always had an army dominated by officers. IT'S 2025 - THIS BEHAVIOR OF OFFICERS IS UNACCEPTABLE. IF AN OFFICER IS UNMOTIVATED, INDIFFERENT, INCOMPETENT, HE SHOULD BE FIRED IMMEDIATELY, NOT IN MONTHS.

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Ryan O’Leary’s post was endorsed by Tatarigami:

A timely critique of the officer corps from Ryan. Unfortunately, even when I was training at the Military Academy, everything actually came down to teaching you to be a “stick” that mindlessly passes orders to the NCOs. And the NCOs, in turn, as the same “stick” were supposed to “put pressure” on the soldiers. Leadership, in the sense in which it is understood, say, in the US Marine Corps, was not conceptually taught. Although, of course, there was always a small minority who, thanks to their moral and business qualities, became real leaders, and not just instruments of coercion.

As long as senior officers look at sergeants as a tool of coercion, which, through constant coercion and fear of punishment, forces personnel to perform even basic functions, we will remain within the framework of the Soviet model of the army. And junior officers will eventually become the same senior officers themselves, because they simply have not seen other approaches and do not know how to do it differently.

…that much about ‘Ukraine is already in NATO’…