Those constantly growing Russian bridgeheads over the Oskil are a real threat they should counter now.
Missed opportunities always come back later as a punishment. If they don't stop them now, Ukraine will lose Kupiansk till summer and that would create additional big problems.
The Russian infantry can still cover 5km a day if unopposed. The Russians still have armored vehicles and can organize an exploitation force if they want.
The Russians suffer from a diffusion of effort and havee too many attack directions.
I am highly positive and consider this to be an exemplary project. In a sense that it has a clear scope, high sitting support, limited by deadlines, high team enthusiasm and commitment, no extra levels of command/management, that would hinder the development of project to personal vision of those low level (comparably) commanders. I am far more optimistic on that then on Corps.
And this not at all interferes with UAS Forces, which I read from this interview went quite a different way, and have limited management resources to be honest:
With one successful mini counterattack in Kursk and one quasi-successful (results unclear; Russian advance stopped at least temporarily) near Pokrovsk it seems that news from the front are getting somewhat better. As for the Ukrainian air campaign, are there any signs/news that it is working?
Thanks Tom and Don. Question for Tom regarding "Syrsky's leadership style". Yesterday I heard on the radio the opinion of one military man. In his opinion, the removal of commanders who disagree with him from their positions by the Commander-in-Chief is aimed at maintaining military discipline and the vertical of one-man command, even if this brings some collateral damage - the loss of centralized command of the troops is much more dangerous. What do you think about this point of view?
But IMHO Syrsky is a complete idiot if he believes in it. Military discipline is one thing and vertical one-man command is a completely different story.
It is now obvious that he is completely stuck in the Soviet military doctrine and is incapable of looking beyond his own nose and learning something new.
As underdog Ukraine will never win with command tactics, for that Ukraine needs sober implemented mission tactics.
This is the only way to give Ukraine a decisive edge in quality, which is their only chance as the much smaller force.
In his decision making he will always be too late and therefore make many mistakes as the war is much too big to handle it with micromanagement.
The 'idea' you're asking about is wrong because of the 'system' that's well-established at the level of brigade- and battalion command.
Essentially, there's an entire generation of brigade- and battalion commanders that 'grew' through combat experience since 2014. The people in question are fundamentally different to Syrsky, and in the way they work (especially in comparison with the mass of 'new' brigade- and battalion commanders appointed by Syrsky to command newly-established units over the last three years). The majority of them are no autocratic loners, like Syrsky, but have built-up finely-tuned command-staff teams for their units. Which is why their units are working well.
Thus, whenever Syrsky is as dumb as to remove any of them, usually because of issues like 'discipline' - read: they're refusing to blindly follow his incompetent orders - he's badly damaging the units in question.
Thanks Tom. The question is mostly closed, but your last sentence requires clarification. This is only true in a local aspect. But in general, if, within the framework of some defensive/offensive operation, some brigade commanders carry out Syrsky's order, while others do not (consider this order "stupid"), then the consequences for the front could be catastrophic. In this case, the Commander-in-Chief is simply obliged to suppress such a tendency.
No it doesn't work like that. First every commander needs the trust of the soldiers beyond him. If the trust is lost, the soldiers will start tor run away (voting with feet), are unwilling to really fight and/or will surrender at the first opportunity. The last thing is stopped by the Russians killing their POWs.
If trust is lost it is very hard to regain it and this would also cost a lot of sacrificies.
So the real catastrophic event is lossing the trust of your soldiers (there are more than enough examples in history) and Syrsky is on the best way to achieve that.
The problem is dual: 0 trust in Syrsky, and then the unwillingness of 'soldier commanders' to take over (resulting also in 'autonomous areas', discussed earlier). I hope to discuss this when I finally find some time for more of 'in-depth analysis'.
"Firstly, it’s going to take some time for the Ukrainian air force to ‘integrate’ the type: for its pilots to explain to their superiors (all provided the later might listen) what the jet can do, and what not. (Hopefully, this time, without any of them being shot down and killed, too…)"
France has been training Ukr aviators to fly Mirages. The Dutch and others have trained Ukr aviators to fly Falcons. Why is it up to the newly trained aviators of NATO airframes to "educate" their superiors on the effective USE of NATO air assets in combat air ops. Why weren't those "superiors" also not trained/indoctrinated in Western airops using NATO combat air assets by those various nations who have been training their Ukr aviators in flying/fighting those combat aircraft?
Wasted opportunity: too bad that the West hasn't modified combat aircraft destined for Ukraine to employ a counterpart to the Russian R-37M.
To use the Meteor missile against the Sukhois, you need radars with a range at least 200 km. Probably, the Saab ERIEYE systems could do the targeting for the Mirages?
Thanks for it Tom.
As the VSRF is de-mechanized, are the bridgeheads a lesser threat? They don't have explotation forces to introduce an OMG in the rear with them.
Maybe a consecuence of this new style of war?
The point is this: the more terrain the Russians control, the more units and troops the incompetent Glavcom needs to keep them in check...
Thus, how mechanised - or de-mechanised - the VSRF might be, is becoming irrelevant.
Those constantly growing Russian bridgeheads over the Oskil are a real threat they should counter now.
Missed opportunities always come back later as a punishment. If they don't stop them now, Ukraine will lose Kupiansk till summer and that would create additional big problems.
The Russian infantry can still cover 5km a day if unopposed. The Russians still have armored vehicles and can organize an exploitation force if they want.
The Russians suffer from a diffusion of effort and havee too many attack directions.
Thank you very much.
Dear Tom and Don, thank you!
A development from this weekend is about "Line of drones" project, including "Achilles" regiment, "Magyar birds" brigade, K-2 regiment, and 2 others:
https://t.me/robert_magyar/1030
https://t.me/robert_magyar/1031
And while some estimates are cautious, or even negative:
https://t.me/pekhno_news/12158
I am highly positive and consider this to be an exemplary project. In a sense that it has a clear scope, high sitting support, limited by deadlines, high team enthusiasm and commitment, no extra levels of command/management, that would hinder the development of project to personal vision of those low level (comparably) commanders. I am far more optimistic on that then on Corps.
And this not at all interferes with UAS Forces, which I read from this interview went quite a different way, and have limited management resources to be honest:
https://youtu.be/8huHGfY4xYQ
Thanks Tom&Don,
With one successful mini counterattack in Kursk and one quasi-successful (results unclear; Russian advance stopped at least temporarily) near Pokrovsk it seems that news from the front are getting somewhat better. As for the Ukrainian air campaign, are there any signs/news that it is working?
Thanks Tom and Don. Question for Tom regarding "Syrsky's leadership style". Yesterday I heard on the radio the opinion of one military man. In his opinion, the removal of commanders who disagree with him from their positions by the Commander-in-Chief is aimed at maintaining military discipline and the vertical of one-man command, even if this brings some collateral damage - the loss of centralized command of the troops is much more dangerous. What do you think about this point of view?
Okay I am not Tom and I cannot answer for him.
But IMHO Syrsky is a complete idiot if he believes in it. Military discipline is one thing and vertical one-man command is a completely different story.
It is now obvious that he is completely stuck in the Soviet military doctrine and is incapable of looking beyond his own nose and learning something new.
As underdog Ukraine will never win with command tactics, for that Ukraine needs sober implemented mission tactics.
This is the only way to give Ukraine a decisive edge in quality, which is their only chance as the much smaller force.
In his decision making he will always be too late and therefore make many mistakes as the war is much too big to handle it with micromanagement.
The 'idea' you're asking about is wrong because of the 'system' that's well-established at the level of brigade- and battalion command.
Essentially, there's an entire generation of brigade- and battalion commanders that 'grew' through combat experience since 2014. The people in question are fundamentally different to Syrsky, and in the way they work (especially in comparison with the mass of 'new' brigade- and battalion commanders appointed by Syrsky to command newly-established units over the last three years). The majority of them are no autocratic loners, like Syrsky, but have built-up finely-tuned command-staff teams for their units. Which is why their units are working well.
Thus, whenever Syrsky is as dumb as to remove any of them, usually because of issues like 'discipline' - read: they're refusing to blindly follow his incompetent orders - he's badly damaging the units in question.
Thanks Tom. The question is mostly closed, but your last sentence requires clarification. This is only true in a local aspect. But in general, if, within the framework of some defensive/offensive operation, some brigade commanders carry out Syrsky's order, while others do not (consider this order "stupid"), then the consequences for the front could be catastrophic. In this case, the Commander-in-Chief is simply obliged to suppress such a tendency.
No it doesn't work like that. First every commander needs the trust of the soldiers beyond him. If the trust is lost, the soldiers will start tor run away (voting with feet), are unwilling to really fight and/or will surrender at the first opportunity. The last thing is stopped by the Russians killing their POWs.
If trust is lost it is very hard to regain it and this would also cost a lot of sacrificies.
So the real catastrophic event is lossing the trust of your soldiers (there are more than enough examples in history) and Syrsky is on the best way to achieve that.
The problem is dual: 0 trust in Syrsky, and then the unwillingness of 'soldier commanders' to take over (resulting also in 'autonomous areas', discussed earlier). I hope to discuss this when I finally find some time for more of 'in-depth analysis'.
"Firstly, it’s going to take some time for the Ukrainian air force to ‘integrate’ the type: for its pilots to explain to their superiors (all provided the later might listen) what the jet can do, and what not. (Hopefully, this time, without any of them being shot down and killed, too…)"
France has been training Ukr aviators to fly Mirages. The Dutch and others have trained Ukr aviators to fly Falcons. Why is it up to the newly trained aviators of NATO airframes to "educate" their superiors on the effective USE of NATO air assets in combat air ops. Why weren't those "superiors" also not trained/indoctrinated in Western airops using NATO combat air assets by those various nations who have been training their Ukr aviators in flying/fighting those combat aircraft?
Wasted opportunity: too bad that the West hasn't modified combat aircraft destined for Ukraine to employ a counterpart to the Russian R-37M.
To use the Meteor missile against the Sukhois, you need radars with a range at least 200 km. Probably, the Saab ERIEYE systems could do the targeting for the Mirages?
Thanks for the update. Actually I have read more concerned reports than this. Onwards to the next two!