Dahiya Doctrine vs. the Axis (of Islamic Resistance)

Hello everybody!

Arguably, trying to follow and analyse two major conflicts at once by a single person is, nowadays, de-facto impossible. There’s too much info flying around. Therefore, I’ll remain focused on ‘Ukraine’, but – like in this case – ‘throw a casual look’ at what’s up in the Middle East, every now and then. That’s why today I’m starting with the latter.

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…and, for that start, a quick check of what I am after, and what is my assessment that everybody involved is after… where I cannot but start with an observation that a quick check of what are the politics and the mainstream media here in ‘the West’ offering us, is quickly revealing something like a steady, yet very fat, sugar-spiced diet of reporting on ‘war on terror’, ‘war on Hamas’, ‘expansion of the war on Hamas’, and ‘a suitable collection of excuses for ignoring Israel’s genocide on Palestinians’. So much so, one is near certain to catch diabetes from watching all of that. Call me cold and calculated, but got no time for discussing such topics. Therefore, after this, ‘introductionary’ round, I’m going to ignore about 99% of what’s usually reported by the mainstream media: I might ‘mention in passing’ the ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip, the wholesale demolition of Lebanon and Syria by Israel in best traditions of the Dahiya Doctrine, or damage to Israeli civilians caused by the Hezbollah/Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) -conglomerate. However, that’s going to remain outside my focus. Instead, my primary focus remains trying to find out what kind of military aims might one or the other side have – even when their political and/or ideological masters so obviously have no clarity in this regards.

Right now, the situation is looking like this:   

-          Israel: wants - but can’t - ‘destroy Hamas’, ‘destroy Hezbollah’, ‘topple the Mullah regime in Iran’…Additionally, not just a few of fanatics there in Israel want to secure parts or all of the Gaza Strip, more (or all) of the West Bank, and some of southern Lebanon (‘just for the start’). Finally, Israel ‘must extract revenge’ from Syria, Yemen, and Iran: they all must learn to ‘fear Israel’, and never dare striking back. Indeed, the IDF and Israeli intelligence services must avenge Hamas-led terror of 7 October 2023, re-establish deterrence and re-instil fear between their opponents. Correspondingly, Israel is aiming to herd the remaining Palestinians into one or another part of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, where it thinks they might be easier to control, pending either their complete extermination or survivors being driven out. Similarly, Israel is driving the Lebanese population (and whatever of about 470,000 registered Syrian refugees in that country it can target) out of the area south of Beirut (not only south of Litani River). Finally, Israel is also targeting whatever facilities in Syria, and whatever it can reach in Yemen and it finds ‘worth’ its attention (and its US-made and -supplied bombs). One has to expect that Israel is going to expand this ‘target list’ to Iran, as soon as Netanyahu agrees the content of that list with his cabinet, too (less so once Netanyahu agrees the content of that list with the Biden Administration).

-          USA: actually, about 99% of the US-Americans (including politicians, military commanders, or anybody else, but minus some 600 officials of the State Department and few other governmental agencies that quit their jobs in protest over all the US-supported terror of the last 12 months) have no trace of clue what’s going on in the Middle East, or why do they have a troop presence there, any more. But, it’s better to maintain the latter: it’s keeping defence sector fat, and convincing the others the USA have… ‘something there’ under control, even at the times there is no trace of that. Foremost, the mass of US-Americans is indoctrinated to think that Israel is their holy ally, the only friends they have, and exclusively doing things that are in US interest. Therefore, can’t wait for somebody there to recommend the dogma that Israel must be protected and supported no matter what is it doing to be entered into the next version of the Bible. And terror must be destroyed, of course – preferably with yet more terror, even when it’s obvious that this terror is provoking only yet more terror in response. In comparison, it’s totally unimportant that support of Israel is considered crucial for winning the coming elections – and that both by Democrats and Republicans: that, and like ever since 1948, the leadership of both parties is firmly convinced it couldn’t win without Zionist-support. That’s pure accident, of course and should by no means even hint at the possibility of somebody like Netanyahu controlling the USA and its ‘democracy’…

-          Hamas, Palestinian Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militant factions: want – but can’t – ‘destroy Israel’, but that’s not as important for them as further embedding themselves within what’s left of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, which – thanks to daily massacres by Israeli artillery shells and bombs – they continue doing with significant success. Because… ah, what a surprise: the more killed there are, the more extremised the survivors get. An absolutely incomprehensible system… Therefore they continue their armed insurgency against forces of the Israel Defence Force (IDF).

-          Hezbollah: wants – but ‘can’t – ‘destroy Israel/liberate occupied territories (Palestine)’, and certainly strives to protect Lebanon from (yet another) Israeli invasion, occupation, and a land grab. More details to follow below…

-          Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) – the branch of the IRGC responsible for ‘spreading the Islamic Revolution’ (outside Iran): wants – but can’t – ‘destroy Israel/liberate Palestine’. Like above, ‘more details to follow below’…

-          Syria, (i.e. the regime of ‘President’ Bashar al-Assad): endemically corrupt and completely incompetent, bankrupt already since late 2011 to a degree where it couldn’t survive without Iranian financing and the Russian military presence. But, fanatic in keeping Bashar in power. Assad might be considered ‘legitimate government (and thus the representative) of the Syrian Arab Republic’, and accepted as such by different foreign governments. However, he, literally, can’t tie his shoe laces without permission from the IRGC-QF, and without the Russian protection (necessary also because the IRGC seems to be keen to get rid of him). The IRGC-QF is meanwhile controlling many of military bases, and arms/ammunition production facilities in Syria, which is why the IASF is regularly striking these (just like ever since 2012). Still, the Israeli efforts in this regards were hopelessly insufficient to prevent the IRGC-QF from embedding itself and establishing a para-state in Syria. Assad would like to, but has no means to get involved against Israel: that would bring him lots of PR-points at home and abroad. Therefore, his PRBS-industrialists are reporting not only ‘joint’ defence from ‘Zionist aggression’, quasi in cooperation with the Russians, but also ‘joint’ operations against ‘IS’ along the border to Lebanon and in eastern Syria. Both are lies, if only because the Russians are never shooting at the IASF bombing Hezbollah/IRGC in Syria. The IRGC-QF also considers Assad’s involvement unnecessary (perhaps even unwanted): it’s got more than enough forces provided by its own, local surrogates (‘Hezbollah Syria’, which was quantitatively larger than the ‘original’ already back in 2017 ‘or so’), and is bringing yet additional own forces from Iran.

-          Khatayib Hezbollah: this is ‘Hezbollah Iraq’, i.e. the IRGC-QF-controlled branch of the conglomerate in that country. Becoming an important factor because it’s launching strikes by attack-UAVs on targets in northern Israel, and a few of these have been quite successful, about a week ago.

-          Houthis in Yemen: ‘the West’ loves describing them as ‘terrorist organisation’ and a ‘group’, but since completely demolishing traditional tribal social structures in the country (those in southern Yemen were largely demolished by Marxists of the 1970s and 1980s), exterminating political opposition in form of the Islah Party (Saudi-supported Wahhabists, plus a miscellany of different minor groups), and assimilating over 60% of former Yemeni armed forces, they have (northern) Yemen in a tight grip, like it or not. While the presence of advisors from Hezbollah and IRGC-QF, and Iran’s continuous supply of weapons (primarily via Oman) are meanwhile indisputable, the level of influence exercised by Tehran is unclear at best. At least as likely is that the Houthis are excelling at exploiting their strikes on Israel for gaining additional popularity within population impoverished by decades of constant wars.

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With this, all the ingredients necessary for a ‘wonderful & long war’ are in place. Each of involved parties is holier than holy, the only one that’s ‘good’, ‘right’, angels only – and everybody else is bad and wrong and evil and ‘devil’ in person. And all are pursuant to fascistoid ideologies and led by fanatics, too. If it wouldn’t be for Israel’s stringent application of the Dahiya Doctrine – resulting in mass-murder of Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian civilians – and Hamas’ terror not only of the Palestinians, but also of the Israelis - sincerely: this would actually be ‘fun to watch’.

Now, what has what of these parties done in the last few days? …and where shall I start?

Clockwise…

Lebanon… the ‘party’ (i.e. Hezbollah) was certainly – and throughoutly – ‘de-capitated’ by Israeli campaign of assassinations and air strikes of the last four weeks. Its force equipped with ballistic missiles was heavily hit by Israel already back in August (‘pre-emotively’, of course, at least according to Israel), and then again on 7 October, too, and is dysfunctional (bar the element armed with anti-ship missiles, which is why we are yet to see the Israeli Navy appear off the coast of Lebanon). However, Hezbollah rocket forces continue targeting Israel ‘down’ to Haifa (occasionally: all the way down to Tel Aviv) with (at least) 100+ rockets a day, and ground forces remain not only operational, but also highly effective in countering the IDF ground invasion of southern Lebanon.

Results of an Israeli air strike on Ain Zhalta, in central lebanon, on 24 September. the place is predominatnly populated by Christians…

The Israeli air strikes on Hezbollah leadership are ‘great’ – especially from the point of view of the IRGC-QF: seems, Bibi is determined the Iranians to assume total control over the organisation, because there’s hardly any higher official of Lebanese origin left alive. Unsurprisingly, the IRGC-QF is currently busy with attempts to reorganise what’s left of Hezbollah leadership. They do so principally in the course of meetings at different spots in Damascus, which in turn is attracting yet additional IASF air strikes in similar fashion like fecces attract flies. Simultaneously, the IRGC-QF is busy with resupplying Hezbollah with arms and ammunition – whether from Iran, or from its bases inside Syria, which is the reason for at least some of IASF air strikes on that country.

As everybody knows: there is no such thing like ‘Lebanese airspace’. Since the 1970s it’s widely accepted that the country’s airspace is owned by Israel, and so the IASF is free to run 3-5 waves of air strikes on Lebanon per day, entirely undisturbed. Sure, primary targets (approximately 50% of sorties flown) are in the Dahiya District of southern Beirut. However, at least every second day, the IASF is also bombing districts of Beirut populated by the Sunnis, where there was no Hezbollah ever. Moreover, at least as many air strikes are flown against targets in the Beka’a Valley and northwards along the border to Syria. As usual ever since at least 1974, many of air strikes are aiming to demolish the Lebanese economy. See: refineries, factories, TV- and other media offices, roads, bridges etc. But, that’s unimportant: what we usually get to see are 1-2 strikes a day actually targeting one or another of Hezbollah facilities.

On 4 October, the IASF targeted this apartment building in Tripoli (Lebanon), reportedly killing Sayyed Attullah, of Hamas’ Qassam Brigades.

On 5 October, the IASF blew up a petrol station in the Dahiya District of Beirut. The exploding tanks of cooking gas were then widely declared for ‘secondaries’…

The results are revealing and certainly making especially the Israeli intelligence services and the best air force of the world particularly proud. According to official Israel (via the Times of Israel), within 12 months since 7 October 2023 (i.e. as of 7 October 2024), the IDF and the IASF have hit ’11,000 Hezbollah positions’, killed ‘at least 800 (terrorists)’, ‘mostly members of Hezbollah’, and ‘including 90 Hezbollah commanders’. Indeed, over 400 of Hezbollah, so official IDF, should have been killed since Israel’s ‘all out’ onslaught on Lebanon, starting with 23 September this year. Just for comparison, data collected by people scrounging the local social media for related reports (whether official Hezbollah releases, or private announcements of funerals), is revealing the following statistics:

24 Sep: 12
25 Sep: 6
26 Sep: 26
27 Sep: 20
28 Sep: 7
29 Sep: 21
30 Sep: 21

1 Oct: 12
2 Oct: 10
3 Oct: 15
4 Oct: 13
5 Oct: 12
6 Oct: 14
7 Oct: 12

That’s 201 since 23 September 2024. Combined with around 200+ confirmed Hezbollah KIA since 8 October 2023… well, I have a feeling that’s less than ‘800’… but I’m bad in mathematics, and even worse when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict… so, who can say…

Entirely unimportant is that the Israelis killed 492 Lebanese civilians on 23 September alone, and then over 1,500 by 1 October. This is so irrelevant, that I can’t find any more recent report: nobody cares…

The Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon is none. Or if it is one, then it’s ‘limited, localised, and targeted’. Depending on the time of the day and the weather, I guess…

Actually, it’s such a small, diminutive, and unimportant operation that it’s meanwhile involving no less than four full divisions: 36^th, 91^st, 98^th and the 146^th. Nominally, that’s some 40,000 troops (plus).

Unsurprisingly, these are coming forward at an extremely high speed, too. Read: not at all. Actually, after one week of fighting, they’re still on approaches to about a dozen of border villages inside southern Lebanon. Unlikely reason is that every morning, there are new reports about 3-5 big ambushes set up by Hezbollah, followed by reports about IDF casualties, and videos showing evacuation of the latter by IASF helicopters. For example, after one week of operations, yesterday the IDF claimed to have captured the border village of Maroun al-Ras. The Hezbollah reported the Israelis tried to reach the nearby UNIFIL outpost, but were ambushed, and forced to withdraw. This morning, Hezbollah claimed to have ambushed another group of IDF as this was approaching Blida, and claimed ‘dozens’ of IDF troops as killed or wounded.

A typical scene from early-morning’s CASEVAC of IDF troops ambushed by Hezbollah while trying to enter one of Lebanese border villages..

But, that’s all terrorist propaganda.

…which is why yesterday in the morning the IDF confirmed 48 wounded-in-action (WIA), of whom 7 critically, in a matter of 24 hours…

Interestingly, not all the Israeli casualties from ground fighting are ‘typical’ infantrymen or special forces operators: between those known to have been wounded is a personal assistant to the Minister of Finances and two members of the IDF’s Unit 504, specialised in ‘Human Intelligence (gathering)’ – i.e. HUMINT. Two days ago, also two members of the 5515 Combat Mobility Unit were KIA by a mortar attack on a troop concentration inside Israel.

Yes, this is looking quite like my map of 1 October. Just yet additional broken blue arrows. But, don’t blame me, please…

Syria… the last week, there was a lots of uproar when the IASF flew an air strike on a storage facility outside Jableh. The place is only some 3-4 kilometres south of the Russian Hmeimem Air Base, on the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and thus everybody (and the next kin) jumped to the conclusion that the Israelis have bombed the Russians. Of course they didn’t: Bibi and Pudding are buddies and only that last week Pudding announced that Israel is a brotherly nation…

Actually it’s so that after Israeli air strikes of 2017-2018, the Hezbollah and IRGC-QF have moved their most important facilities (see ‘weapons production and storage’) to the ‘Masyaf Triangle’: the area between Hmeimim in the north, Masyaf in south-east and Tartous in south-west. These are also the most important Russian bases in the country. The calculus should be obvious, but seems to have been avoided by almost every monitor of this war: whenever the Israelis want to hit something Hezbollah/IRGC-like in that part of Syria, they must ‘aim close to the Russians’ – which, in turn, was something the Hezbollah/IRGC were hoping would prompt the ‘brotherly’ Russians into shooting back. So far, they didn’t: the Russians prefer bombing 3 million (plus) Syrian ‘IDPs’ herded in camps in the Turkey-controlled north-western Syria instead, or roads used by dozens of thousands of Syrian refugees now fleeing Lebanon back to Syria to reach that Turkish-controlled area. Because civilians can’t shoot back, and the Turkish armed forces there are prohibited from shooting back…

And so, what is left of the Assadist armed forces (or was re-formed by the Russians into such) is left on their own, and regularly getting hit by the IASF at will. The last week (on 2 October), this included a number of Assadist radar stations and air defence facilities in the area between southern Damascus and as-Suwayda. The last two or three days, the IASF foremost bombed around Damascus. For example, the last night it hit a building in al-Mezzeh District (NW part of the city), adjacent to the building of the Iranian embassy, reportedly targeting a meeting of Hezbollah and the IRGC-QF.

An IASF air strike demolished this road outside Hassia, blocking the flight of both Lebanese and Syrian refugees. How good the IDF warned them to leave the targeted areas - and that on time…

Israel… over the last two weeks, and except by 180-200 ballistic missiles fired by the IRGCASF on 1 October, Israel was hit every day by an average of 120-140 rockets fired by Hezbollah, by 5-10 attack UAVs released by Katayib Hezbollah, by 3-5 attack UAVs and or one or another ballistic missile fired by the Houthis. Primary targets are such like HQ of the Mossad and the Unit 8200 (in Gillot northern Tel Aviv), but also Ramat David AB. Sporadically, some are reaching downtown Tel Aviv, too. The mass of rockets and attack UAVs was shot down by Israeli air defences and, usually, the damage caused is reported as ‘light’. However, some of videos of the last few days are indicative of ‘growing’ amounts of damage. Well, after one year of war, wouldn’t be surprised if the IASF starts running out interceptors for its Iron Dome SAM-system…

Impacts of Hezbollah-fired rockets in Haifa, on 6 October.

Gaza Strip… According to the Times of Israel, the IDF claims that since 7 October 2023, it killed ‘17,900 terror operatives’ in the Gaza Strip, including ‘8 Hamas brigade commanders or those with equivalent rank’, ‘more than 30 battalion commanders’, ‘more than 165 company commanders’, that the IDF and the Israel Air-Space Force (IASF) destroyed ‘4,700 tunnel shafts’ etc., etc., etc….

Rather amazing then to hear that even the smallest of Hamas ‘brigades’ (the Rafah Brigade, claimed as ‘destroyed’ by the IDF, already months ago) remains operational, not to talk about bigger units, like the Khan Younis Brigade. Indeed, through the last few days it transpired that organisation is – essentially – still intact, and they continue fighting with almost exactly the same effectiveness like since 7 October 2023. Al-Qassam Brigade remains operational, too. And if that was not enough, on the first anniversary of the terror attack on Israel, Hamas also fired another volley of rockets at Tel Aviv and Sderot…

Of course, the official Israeli line is that the Hamas (the other Palestinian militant factions do not matter to official Israel) is ‘ineffective’. Thus, one is left to wonder how comes that according to official IDF (via Times of Israel), since 7 October 2023, the IDF lost 346 troops KIA in the Gaza Strip, while another 2,299 were WIA….

…probably yet more of terrorist propaganda…

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That’s about that topic – for today.

Now let’s grab some coke and popcorn and wait for the – much anticipated – Israeli retaliation to the IRGCASF missile strike, run in retaliation to the Israeli assassination of the Deputy IRGC, run in retaliation to… sigh.. sorry, that list is very long, and reaching back to around 1981. Might explain it some other time.