No your introduction in Iran Iraq war was just right. Excellent work as always. Thank you for the updates and keep us in the loop during another wretched war. Thank you very much Herr Sarcastausaur. Just a quick question - what is the story with the Iranian regime getting Su-35s from Pudding? Just Rumint rubbish or is there more and that would be going against the grain of defunding the IRAF?
On the other hand, 'Bibi' and Pudding are simply buddies. Therefore, Pudding is not letting Iranians get anything that might help improve their defences from Israel.
Remember, as one Tsar put it: Russia has only 2 allies abroad: Russian Army and Russian Navy...
And Israel eliminating Iranian potential nukes is a GOOD thing from Russian perspective, the nukes could be ainmed at Moscow one day - and remember history, all the Russo-Persian wars from Tsars times aside, remember that 1941 time when Churchill and Stalin got excellently along to invade Iran?
As the media points out, the situation is now in favor of the Russians, since gas and oil prices will rise sharply, and China, for which Iran was the main supplier of oil, will increase purchases from Russia. One thing is good - Iran, which brought so much grief to the Ukrainians with its supplies of ammunition and technology to the aggressor, has now felt the consequences of air terror on its own skin.
Iran brought so much grief to Ukraine - through supplying 2000 Shaheds and selling their licence to Russia?
Netanyahu didn't cause any grief to Ukraine - by prohibiting re-deliveries of US-owned Patriots collecting dust in Israel for over a decade; by turning down different other of Ukrainian requests for help; nor now by striking Iran's oil industry with the effect of rising oil prices so Putin can earn more...?
It is noted that the downed drone has no Russian markings and is white, which corresponds to its Iranian origin.
There is also information about Iran transferring Fatah-360 missiles last year. The launchers were expected to be delivered now, but apparently something got in the way...
My father was a pilot in the SAAF and flew Dakota’s into Tehran for the conference. I had pictures of him in the snow with Soviet troops. 44 squadron SAAF.
Thanks for the information, your blog is definitely the best only source to familirise with Middle East militaries development. Nevertheless, as Ukrainian I still have a few questions about Ukraine war like:
Do you plan to make some update about "War in heaven" in Ukraine? I especially interested in the Iskander and its interception, as many videomaterials(like from 6th of June atack) show that noticable part seemingly go through in protected areas. I know that Partiot and Samp T can't intercept everything, but it is another matter when 4-8 interceptors still seemingly intercept only 1-2 Iskanders and allow other to go through. But nevertheless it can still be manipulative due to nature of source(usually prorussian channels), hence your expertise would be appreciated.
Secondly, there are crucial changes in drone war, such as evolution of Russian Shahed tactics(high altitude and combination with Lancets in near-border regions) and Ukrainian development(more successful stikes in Moskow area and in general against military industry and FP-1 drone that seemingly can carry bigger warhead and have very high precision)
Thirdly, UMPK situation as Russians add more and more advanced anti jam electronics but I haven't heard about UMPK efficiency after this measures. Moreover, recent satelite imagery shows heavy usage of bombs on nothern flank of Pokrovs direction, but again real efficiency is hard to determine.
Lastly, Ukraine balistic missile program gained more attention that usual. I know that there is usually propaganda or rumors, but recently there was quite verifiable statement that "missile was successfully tested by destroying Russian command place in mid-May 2025, flying 300 km in the process". Don't you have any information about this event, as usually destruction of such staff doesn't remain unnoticable.
Re. 'Ukraine': there are ever more topics there, where I do not feel free to talk about. Especially when it comes to air warfare. Is the principal reason why am I 'abstaining'.
Just one example: I'm 'holding back' even with my critique of that (morbidly) incompetent Syrsky. Really, I simply have no trace of clue why is he still working where he is: I wouldn't trust him even with the cleaning of my toilette...
Anyway, USN SM crashing inside Iran didnt make sense - if at all, they were used in Israel itself to augment defense there...
(caveat: with possible exception of Gulf-launched in some crazy boost-phase intercept SM crashing in very south coastal Iran - but its really stretching imagination...)
It seems like missile tech is something that can lend itself to indigenous manufacturing as opposed to exports in a way that busts Western sanctions. (This conveniently fits into the ethos of self sufficiency jihad.) Not so, air superiority fighters.
I half-hope some of this stuff came to Iran from China originally by way of Israeli espionage. Oh what a tangled we weave..
Thanks Tom for another superior piece of analysis that’s been coming like hotcakes off the griddle the past few days. And rhis is just another impressive example of how China is able to amass and improve foreign tech.
Your identification is incorrect. Additional images of the missile’s wreckage clearly depict four attitude control nozzles at the base of the motor as well as CAGE codes for Raytheon and FEC.
It is a Mk 136 Third Stage Solid Rocket Motor from a U.S. Navy SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade, launched by the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Trevor Ball's identification, which I have linked below, is accurate.
Yes, especially if they miss, like this one. SM-3 public max range is 900- 1200 km, depending on version. Remember that intercept takes place outside the atmosphere, so over 100 km altitude, at mach 8-13. Now do the maths / phisics how far it can reach if there is no impact. I'd say it is certainly possible.
If it hits, everything (SM-3 and its target) explodes in thousands of pieces, in beutiful white, pink and blue colors, as seen in some videos. The one in the photos was a miss, otherwise it wouldn't have survived in such large parts.
Vici18's comment is correct as it concerns the kinematics of the engagement. A spent TSRM is easily capable of traveling 1,500-2,000+ km from the point of origin.
The second section is incorrect however. SM-3's Kinetic Warhead separates from the TSRM prior to engaging the target. The spent Mk 72 (first stage motor), Mk 104 DTRM (second stage motor), and the TSRM all fall back to earth independent of the engagement's outcome.
Sources: Iranian state media, IDF statements, and X posts align on three distinct waves with these estimates. Claims of a fourth or fifth wave (e.g., from @Osint613
) lack corroboration and are excluded.
Night of June 14–15, 2025:
Waves: Two confirmed waves.
Missile Counts:
First wave: ~90–100 ballistic missiles.
Second wave: ~45–60 ballistic missiles.
Total Missiles: Approximately 135–160 missiles.
Sources: Reports from Reuters, The Times of Israel, and X posts confirm two waves, with damage reported in Rishon LeZion, Bat Yam, and Haifa. No reliable evidence supports additional waves.
Night of June 15–16, 2025:
Waves: One confirmed wave.
Missile Counts:
Single wave: ~28–50 ballistic missiles.
Total Missiles: Approximately 28–50 missiles.
Sources: IDF statements, CBS News, and X posts confirm a single wave with sirens in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, causing damage in Bat Yam and Rehovot. No credible reports indicate additional waves.
Trend Analysis
Number of Waves:
June 13–14: 3 waves.
June 14–15: 2 waves.
June 15–16: 1 wave.
Conclusion: The number of waves has decreased progressively each night, from three to two to one.
Number of Missiles:
June 13–14: ~285–310 missiles.
June 14–15: ~135–160 missiles.
June 15–16: ~28–50 missiles.
Conclusion: The total number of missiles launched per night has also decreased significantly, dropping by roughly half from the first to the second night and then to a fraction (about 10–17% of the first night’s total) on the third night.
Possible Explanations for the Reduction
Depletion of Missile Stocks: Iran may have expended a significant portion of its readily available ballistic missile arsenal on June 13–14, limiting its capacity for subsequent large-scale attacks. While Iran’s missile inventory is estimated to include thousands of munitions, liquid-fueled missiles (e.g., Emad, Ghadr) require extensive preparation, and solid-fueled missiles (e.g., Kheibar Shekan) may be in shorter supply.
Israeli Counterstrikes: Israeli airstrikes on Iranian missile production facilities, launch sites, and command centers, reported after June 13, likely disrupted Iran’s ability to sustain high-intensity attacks. Damage to IRGC infrastructure could have reduced operational capacity.
Strategic Shift: Iran may have scaled back attacks to conserve resources for potential escalation or to focus on diplomatic efforts, as suggested by some analysts on X noting Iran’s calls for ceasefires after heavy losses.
Interception Effectiveness: Israel’s multilayered air defense system (Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling), supported by U.S. and allied forces, intercepted most missiles, potentially prompting Iran to reduce salvo sizes to avoid wasting munitions.
Caveats
Data Limitations: Missile counts are approximate, as exact numbers vary slightly across sources. Some reports may undercount or overcount missiles due to confusion with drones or intercepted munitions.
Unverified Claims: Claims of additional waves or higher missile counts (e.g., from @Osint613
or other X posts) were excluded unless corroborated by reliable sources like the IDF or major news outlets.
Ongoing Conflict: As of June 16, 2025, at 09:06 AM CEST, the situation remains fluid, and new attacks could alter this trend. However, the analysis is based on confirmed data up to the night of June 15–16.
Conclusion
Yes, it can be concluded that both the number of waves and the number of missiles in Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel have been reducing between June 13 and June 16, 2025. The waves decreased from three (June 13–14) to two (June 14–15) to one (June 15–16), and the total missile count dropped from ~285–310 to ~135–160 to ~28–50 over the same period. This reduction likely reflects a combination of depleted stocks, Israeli counterstrikes, and strategic recalibration by Iran.
No your introduction in Iran Iraq war was just right. Excellent work as always. Thank you for the updates and keep us in the loop during another wretched war. Thank you very much Herr Sarcastausaur. Just a quick question - what is the story with the Iranian regime getting Su-35s from Pudding? Just Rumint rubbish or is there more and that would be going against the grain of defunding the IRAF?
Thx.
Re. Su-35s: a relatively complex story.
On one side, the way Iran is 'governed' (as explained here: https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/the-mess-of-russo-iranian-arms-deals-781 ).
On the other hand, 'Bibi' and Pudding are simply buddies. Therefore, Pudding is not letting Iranians get anything that might help improve their defences from Israel.
Thank you - bibi and pudding are one bizarre combination I can never quite get my head around….like a tango duet from hell.
All too apt a metaphor!
The explanation is in this video, but it's in Russian. Mainly connections through criminal and financial circles of the Kremlin.
https://youtu.be/cZoKHTMVr6k?si=vD6-K7IoAJeJ6sGc
Thank you will have a look when I can…
Remember, as one Tsar put it: Russia has only 2 allies abroad: Russian Army and Russian Navy...
And Israel eliminating Iranian potential nukes is a GOOD thing from Russian perspective, the nukes could be ainmed at Moscow one day - and remember history, all the Russo-Persian wars from Tsars times aside, remember that 1941 time when Churchill and Stalin got excellently along to invade Iran?
Yes, but Iran provides drones for Russia. And are likely to be busy with Israel the next few years.
Iran is not providing any kind of drones to Russia already since 2023.
and I thought I followed the conflict closely… oh well. Thanks for the update
As the media points out, the situation is now in favor of the Russians, since gas and oil prices will rise sharply, and China, for which Iran was the main supplier of oil, will increase purchases from Russia. One thing is good - Iran, which brought so much grief to the Ukrainians with its supplies of ammunition and technology to the aggressor, has now felt the consequences of air terror on its own skin.
Iran brought so much grief to Ukraine - through supplying 2000 Shaheds and selling their licence to Russia?
Netanyahu didn't cause any grief to Ukraine - by prohibiting re-deliveries of US-owned Patriots collecting dust in Israel for over a decade; by turning down different other of Ukrainian requests for help; nor now by striking Iran's oil industry with the effect of rising oil prices so Putin can earn more...?
Man, am I relieved now. Can't say...
Thank you, Sergey. Thank you!
Thank you, so much!
Hi Tom, Here's some official information that has appeared.
https://24tv.ua/shahed-236-pomitili-ukrayini-yuriy-ignat-prokomentuvav_n2856594
It is noted that the downed drone has no Russian markings and is white, which corresponds to its Iranian origin.
There is also information about Iran transferring Fatah-360 missiles last year. The launchers were expected to be delivered now, but apparently something got in the way...
https://www.dw.com/ru/iran-mozet-peredat-rossii-puskovye-ustanovki-dla-raket-maloj-dalnosti/a-72498304
My father was a pilot in the SAAF and flew Dakota’s into Tehran for the conference. I had pictures of him in the snow with Soviet troops. 44 squadron SAAF.
Thanks for the information, your blog is definitely the best only source to familirise with Middle East militaries development. Nevertheless, as Ukrainian I still have a few questions about Ukraine war like:
Do you plan to make some update about "War in heaven" in Ukraine? I especially interested in the Iskander and its interception, as many videomaterials(like from 6th of June atack) show that noticable part seemingly go through in protected areas. I know that Partiot and Samp T can't intercept everything, but it is another matter when 4-8 interceptors still seemingly intercept only 1-2 Iskanders and allow other to go through. But nevertheless it can still be manipulative due to nature of source(usually prorussian channels), hence your expertise would be appreciated.
Secondly, there are crucial changes in drone war, such as evolution of Russian Shahed tactics(high altitude and combination with Lancets in near-border regions) and Ukrainian development(more successful stikes in Moskow area and in general against military industry and FP-1 drone that seemingly can carry bigger warhead and have very high precision)
Thirdly, UMPK situation as Russians add more and more advanced anti jam electronics but I haven't heard about UMPK efficiency after this measures. Moreover, recent satelite imagery shows heavy usage of bombs on nothern flank of Pokrovs direction, but again real efficiency is hard to determine.
Lastly, Ukraine balistic missile program gained more attention that usual. I know that there is usually propaganda or rumors, but recently there was quite verifiable statement that "missile was successfully tested by destroying Russian command place in mid-May 2025, flying 300 km in the process". Don't you have any information about this event, as usually destruction of such staff doesn't remain unnoticable.
Mate, that's very kind, thanks a lot.
Re. 'Ukraine': there are ever more topics there, where I do not feel free to talk about. Especially when it comes to air warfare. Is the principal reason why am I 'abstaining'.
Just one example: I'm 'holding back' even with my critique of that (morbidly) incompetent Syrsky. Really, I simply have no trace of clue why is he still working where he is: I wouldn't trust him even with the cleaning of my toilette...
Anyway, USN SM crashing inside Iran didnt make sense - if at all, they were used in Israel itself to augment defense there...
(caveat: with possible exception of Gulf-launched in some crazy boost-phase intercept SM crashing in very south coastal Iran - but its really stretching imagination...)
Yup. Iran is far too far away from SMs 'protecting Israel'.
People complain about all sort of things. Personally I say thank you for the detailed analysis.
It seems like missile tech is something that can lend itself to indigenous manufacturing as opposed to exports in a way that busts Western sanctions. (This conveniently fits into the ethos of self sufficiency jihad.) Not so, air superiority fighters.
I half-hope some of this stuff came to Iran from China originally by way of Israeli espionage. Oh what a tangled we weave..
Thanks Tom for another superior piece of analysis that’s been coming like hotcakes off the griddle the past few days. And rhis is just another impressive example of how China is able to amass and improve foreign tech.
Your identification is incorrect. Additional images of the missile’s wreckage clearly depict four attitude control nozzles at the base of the motor as well as CAGE codes for Raytheon and FEC.
It is a Mk 136 Third Stage Solid Rocket Motor from a U.S. Navy SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade, launched by the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Trevor Ball's identification, which I have linked below, is accurate.
https://x.com/Easybakeovensz/status/1934038022669914292
https://x.com/Easybakeovensz/status/1934220514924302499
So, SM-3s fired from USN warships in the Eastern Mediterranean are flying over 1,500 kilometres to crash in Iran?
Yes, especially if they miss, like this one. SM-3 public max range is 900- 1200 km, depending on version. Remember that intercept takes place outside the atmosphere, so over 100 km altitude, at mach 8-13. Now do the maths / phisics how far it can reach if there is no impact. I'd say it is certainly possible.
If it hits, everything (SM-3 and its target) explodes in thousands of pieces, in beutiful white, pink and blue colors, as seen in some videos. The one in the photos was a miss, otherwise it wouldn't have survived in such large parts.
OK, thx.
Vici18's comment is correct as it concerns the kinematics of the engagement. A spent TSRM is easily capable of traveling 1,500-2,000+ km from the point of origin.
The second section is incorrect however. SM-3's Kinetic Warhead separates from the TSRM prior to engaging the target. The spent Mk 72 (first stage motor), Mk 104 DTRM (second stage motor), and the TSRM all fall back to earth independent of the engagement's outcome.
How much of this post is correct?
https://www.facebook.com/share/16kL2pQXF4/
It's 'OK' - minus that with Western fighter jets: they can't do anything against ballistic missiles.
Summary of Confirmed Waves and Missile Counts
Night of June 13–14, 2025:
Waves: Three confirmed waves.
Missile Counts:
First wave: ~90–100 ballistic missiles.
Second wave: ~45–60 ballistic missiles.
Third wave: ~150 ballistic missiles.
Total Missiles: Approximately 285–310 missiles.
Sources: Iranian state media, IDF statements, and X posts align on three distinct waves with these estimates. Claims of a fourth or fifth wave (e.g., from @Osint613
) lack corroboration and are excluded.
Night of June 14–15, 2025:
Waves: Two confirmed waves.
Missile Counts:
First wave: ~90–100 ballistic missiles.
Second wave: ~45–60 ballistic missiles.
Total Missiles: Approximately 135–160 missiles.
Sources: Reports from Reuters, The Times of Israel, and X posts confirm two waves, with damage reported in Rishon LeZion, Bat Yam, and Haifa. No reliable evidence supports additional waves.
Night of June 15–16, 2025:
Waves: One confirmed wave.
Missile Counts:
Single wave: ~28–50 ballistic missiles.
Total Missiles: Approximately 28–50 missiles.
Sources: IDF statements, CBS News, and X posts confirm a single wave with sirens in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, causing damage in Bat Yam and Rehovot. No credible reports indicate additional waves.
Trend Analysis
Number of Waves:
June 13–14: 3 waves.
June 14–15: 2 waves.
June 15–16: 1 wave.
Conclusion: The number of waves has decreased progressively each night, from three to two to one.
Number of Missiles:
June 13–14: ~285–310 missiles.
June 14–15: ~135–160 missiles.
June 15–16: ~28–50 missiles.
Conclusion: The total number of missiles launched per night has also decreased significantly, dropping by roughly half from the first to the second night and then to a fraction (about 10–17% of the first night’s total) on the third night.
Possible Explanations for the Reduction
Depletion of Missile Stocks: Iran may have expended a significant portion of its readily available ballistic missile arsenal on June 13–14, limiting its capacity for subsequent large-scale attacks. While Iran’s missile inventory is estimated to include thousands of munitions, liquid-fueled missiles (e.g., Emad, Ghadr) require extensive preparation, and solid-fueled missiles (e.g., Kheibar Shekan) may be in shorter supply.
Israeli Counterstrikes: Israeli airstrikes on Iranian missile production facilities, launch sites, and command centers, reported after June 13, likely disrupted Iran’s ability to sustain high-intensity attacks. Damage to IRGC infrastructure could have reduced operational capacity.
Strategic Shift: Iran may have scaled back attacks to conserve resources for potential escalation or to focus on diplomatic efforts, as suggested by some analysts on X noting Iran’s calls for ceasefires after heavy losses.
Interception Effectiveness: Israel’s multilayered air defense system (Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling), supported by U.S. and allied forces, intercepted most missiles, potentially prompting Iran to reduce salvo sizes to avoid wasting munitions.
Caveats
Data Limitations: Missile counts are approximate, as exact numbers vary slightly across sources. Some reports may undercount or overcount missiles due to confusion with drones or intercepted munitions.
Unverified Claims: Claims of additional waves or higher missile counts (e.g., from @Osint613
or other X posts) were excluded unless corroborated by reliable sources like the IDF or major news outlets.
Ongoing Conflict: As of June 16, 2025, at 09:06 AM CEST, the situation remains fluid, and new attacks could alter this trend. However, the analysis is based on confirmed data up to the night of June 15–16.
Conclusion
Yes, it can be concluded that both the number of waves and the number of missiles in Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel have been reducing between June 13 and June 16, 2025. The waves decreased from three (June 13–14) to two (June 14–15) to one (June 15–16), and the total missile count dropped from ~285–310 to ~135–160 to ~28–50 over the same period. This reduction likely reflects a combination of depleted stocks, Israeli counterstrikes, and strategic recalibration by Iran.
....and everything is developing according to plan.
Thx.