Zele's House of Cards

by Tom Cooper & Frank Armitage

Hello everybody!

It’s Thursday - the day for which some of Ukrainian media has, de-facto, ‘announced’, we can expect Zele to sack Yermak. AFAIK, so far, nothing happened in this regards. And, hand on heart: Yermak is going to be the last character Zele might ever sack (and even then: only once he’s been dragged out of the presidential office) But, as they say: hope dies the last…

Nevermind. I’m sure that Zele was simply too busy to do so. Indeed: the president of Ukraine was out of the country this week. For example, meeting with Moron to issue a, de-facto, ‘letter of intent’ for an Ukrainian acquisition of 100 Dassault Rafale fighter-bombers. Which the media all over the world then promptly misinterpreted into a ‘firm order’ for 100 Dassault Rafale fighter-bombers.

…which is why nobody comes to the idea to wonder: and, how exactly should bankrupt Ukraine pay for 100 Rafales? Or, how should bankrupt France donate 100 Rafales to Ukraine…?

But, as we all know so well: money is irrelevant. Especially at war.

…and so much so, this has promptly encouraged me to visit the next Ferrari dealer and issue a letter of intent to buy myself a Ferrari SF90.

Arguably, the dealer was a little bit stunned when I’ve appeared to declare my intent. He said, it might be it’s my very appearance that convinced him I cannot afford even a single tyre for an SF90 - which, he added, is the most expensive private car available on the market. But hey, I’ve countered: that’s exactly expensive enough for me. Because I’m of the kind who always wants only the best for myself. And, certainly enough: I do know I can’t afford buying a single tyre for it, BUT: if Ukraine and France can officially announce Ukraine buying 100 Rafales, without anybody having a trace of clue how might Ukraine finance the resulting deal (probably worth some €10 billion), what should prevent me from meeting him to announce my decision to buy myself a Ferrari SF90, while having no money to do so…?

Indeed, I went on: I’ll also order myself a new yacht.

The present one lacks a garage for such a Ferrari…

***

Oh dear… can already ‘hear’ all the hairsplitters. Now they’re going to come back explaining that I’m too sarcastic, distracting, and posting too much rambling about politics. Indeed, that the quality of my reporting on Ukraine has decreased so much, they can’t say.

By side that hairsplitters are always complaining, and my reputation has been ruined already yea… erm… decades ago: OK: let me get back to the actual story. The intro-part of it is obvious: it’s with help of such nonsense that both Zele and Moron are highly successful in distracting away from all the mess they’re diligently creating at their respective homes. Thus, no surprise Zele rushed to Paris. Probably after a call the essence of which can be summarised with something like, ‘Hey Moron, dear buddy: how about we two staging a photo-show to announce Ukraine buying 100 Rafales? Nothing better but to busy the media with nonsensical sensations….’

How do I come to such brazen ideas, you wonder?

Oh, that’s simple: that’s precisely the way both of these… presidents… are administering their countries. For years already. And through announcing sensational nonsense. See: ‘hey, how about we continue wasting lives of dozens of Ukrainian soldiers in order to hold 2% of Pokrovsk? That’s equal to victory!’ Or, ‘How about setting up yet another major conference, and making megalomaniac announcements, while wasting taxpayer’s money to subsidise another of my pals? The media loves that so much…’

Eventually one can’t but start taking bets on when is one of the two resulting houses of cards going to collapse.

…where that with houses of cards is bringing me to the actual topic of this feature…

***

Now for that - (call it the ‘serious’, if you prefer to ignore the seriousness of all of Zele’s blunders) - second part…

One of biggest problems the public - in general - has when monitoring the air war over Ukraine, is to find out what exactly are the Russians targeting in Ukraine, and what exactly is Ukraine targeting in Russia. Especially so with their missile- and UAV-strikes. Logically, the authorities on both sides are zip-lip in this regards. Arguably, the mass of people reading related reports, do not care knowing more. And, hand on heart: sometimes it’s more pleasant not to know…. especially so in countries with a national penchant for avoiding bad news.

For the majority of others, it’s simple: it’s ‘impossible’ to find out - at least within a ‘relevant’ period of time. Say: 2-7 days post-strike.

The way I’m keeping the track, at least many times over the last few months, is that since some time I’m receiving ‘feeds’ from Frank Armitage, an OSINT-er from the USA (OSINT = open-source intelligence; information everbody can collect for free). Frank has years of military service under his belt, plus extensive experience in a discipline (still) often belittled in Europe (but taken damn seriously and gaining popularity within military circles): war gaming.

Me thinks, time has come to ‘share’ some of his conclusions on this blog.

Now, Frank’s ‘write ups’ might be hard to follow for people not used to read military intelligence reports. Thus, I have a feeling, I’ll have to adjust them by some - for the easier orientation of majority of readers of this blog. Moreover, he and me still need to better adjust our cooperation, so to better prepare sources of references. Thus, I hope, you’re going to bear us: you do have our promise to improve over the coming days and weeks.

***

Yesterday in the morning (as Zele was travelling to Turkey, perhaps to find out whether one of his ministers is determined to remain there, because he’s facing charges of corruption at home), much of western Ukraine was awaken by Russian missile- and UAV-strikes. According to official Kyiv, Russia streamed a total of 476 drones and then fired 48 missiles at Ukraine. Furthermore, it was targeting (quote), ‘energy- and transport infrastructure, and forcing emergency power cuts’… At least 26 were killed, many are still missing, and over 100 wounded. Foremost because two Russian weapons have demolished an apartment building in Ternopil. Understandably considering the tragedy caused, this is also what Ukrainian media was publishing about the most.

Demolished and afire: high-raise buildings in a residential part of Ternopil, as seen yesterday in the morning.

What caught next to no attention was the fact that during the same strike the Russians have also hit Kharkiv, in north-eastern Ukraine, but also Lviv, in north-western Ukraine.

At most, ‘detonations were reported’ from one or another.

However, photos from Lviv are indicative of… well, ‘slightly more damage’ than ‘just a few detonations’…

Lviv is the single largest strategic-level logistics hub in western Ukraine. Arguably, it’s not the only one: depending on the metrics applied, it’s a part of an entire triad, rather than a solitary apex node. But: measured by weight, throughput capacity, redundancy, and distance to the front, the Port Lviv is the Node No.. 1. Indeed, it is the primary western intake point for aid from Poland (Rava-Ruska, Krakovets, Shehyni crossings): it also has the highest rail throughput in this part of Ukraine. Already a quick review of available OSINT-information reveals not only a big railyard, but also huge bulk fuel storage facility, several munition storage barns, and brigade-level equipment shelters. Unsurprisingly, the local logistic hub is also the main transloading centre for the majority of arms and ammo shipments from NATO.

By cross-examining reporting from Kyiv and elsewhere in the Ukrainian social media (is a complex process, lasting hours - if not days - and including a review of hundreds of reports in the social media), with that from the Pentagon, and few other sources over the last 24 hours, Frank has drawn the following conclusions:

• yesterday’s Russian attack on the logistics hub in Lviv, has completely destroyed the fuel storage facility;

• has caused sequential detonations typical for hits on ammunition storage; and

• has caused the structural collapse of several large buildings, including maintenance hangars.

One of confirmations for this is that photographs from the site that was hit (starting with the one attached above) are showing smoke plumes consistent with ‘petrol, oil, lubricants’ (POL) and vehicle stores. The kind of damage that is not repairable in the short term.

Frank’s conclusions are that this strike is near-certain to have severe repercussions for the ZSU: it has effectively destroyed or disabled ~50% of Ukraine’s remaining strategic logistics capacity — fuel, ammunition flow, repair depth, and rail throughput.

Because of the damage to the Lviv logistics hub, for the next two months, possibly longer, the ZSU is likely to experience massive problems with fuel supply and even bigger problems with artillery-ammunition-supply. The ZSU will have to start rationing these not only on most of other sectors of the frontline, but even in the Pokrovsk sector. Even once the ZSU’s logistics system overcomes the period of the so-called ‘shock phase’ (usually estimated as lasting three days), for another 4-10 days it is only going to be capable of providing about 30-40% of its usual/normal/standard throughpout in terms of fuel, and mere 25-35% of artillery ammunition. Alone the latter is certain to make counter-battery operations near-impossible for a while longer.

Unless the ZSU manages to find a way to promptly solve the problem (which is highly unlikely, simply because one can’t rebuild/replace big logistic hubs ‘with ease’, even less so ‘within days’), 11-18 days after this strike, the ZSU will be experiencing ever bigger problems. Between others, it is going to be forced to use trucks (i.e. truck convoys) to haul fuel and ammunition to the frontline. Trucks have a far lesser capacity than the railway, and take 2-4 times longer to reach their destinations. Moreover, they are much more vulnerable to drone attacks…. and so on…

In grand total, Frank expects that within 11-18 days after this strike, the situation is going to reach a point where the ZSU’s corridor on approaches to the garrison of Myrnohrad is going to effectively collapse - and then to the degree where even the headquarters of units active in this sector will have to withdraw another 5-10 kilometres farther to the rear, in turn disintegrating the command integrity.

What’s worse: what’s going to happen in the Pokrovsk sector is going to closely resemble what’s already going on in the (much under-equipped and -supplied) Hulaipolye sector. Just that the evacuation is going to become much harder, because of the lack of fuel and inability to repair damaged vehicles.

Consequence: unless the ZSU does not order a withdrawal from there right away, the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad position is going to become untenable to the degree where large-scale withdrawals will be impossible, and large-scale surrenders probable.

…where one should keep in mind: we’re talking here about an equivalent of at least four, more likely six brigades of the ZSU. Arguably, so Frank, the units in question are down to 20-35% of their nominal manpower, and 10-15% of their nominal vehicles. Therefore, the total number of troops and vehicles might not be ‘much’ (at least not as high as if these units would be at their full strength). However, even such a loss would have severe consequences for the ZSU in grand total. Even more so considering that, in the case of a belated withdrawal, there’s a serious chance for a loss of up to 50% of whatever troops and vehicles are still deployed to defend Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector (is something like ‘typical rate’ of ZSU’s losses in case of belated evacuations of all the similar cauldrons in the last 12-14 months).

…and that: all provided there would be no further Russian mass strikes that might cause even more damage. If Lviv gets hit again as heavily as yesterday in the morning, Frank’s assessment is that the timeline is only accelerating (probably at 30-40%).

***

That much about this topic. Now we’ve got some 2-3 weeks to seat and wait to see how do Zele/Yermak, Glavcom Syrsky & Buddies think they can ignore this kind of a blow.

In other news from Ukraine, one is nowadays limited to monitoring the Russian advances.

- Lyman/Siversk: the Russians are advancing in directions of Dibrova, Ozerne, Zakitne, and north of Siversk (even if not on Siversk, but bypassing it); the ZSU has lost the effective control of crucially-important Yampil; latest reports are indicative of another Russian attack - this time from the south - resulting in the presence of the Russian troops inside Siversk.

- Pokrovsk: The Russians have completed the process of securing northern outskirts of the town. Curiously, there are still no reports about their presence in the centre of the Pokrovsk: could it be a ZSU unit has been trapped there?

- Kostijantinyivka: the Russians have definitely entered the town; fighting is taking places in the Mahazyn Kupava area;

- Komar: the Russians have entered Novopavlivka;

- Borova: the Russians have punched through north of Boriskaya Andriivka; and

- Hulaypole: the Russians have pushed into Zatyshshya (only 1km east of the town), and are infiltrating in direction of Pryluky (5km north of Hulaypole).