Withdrawal Operations, Part 1

Donald Hill is detailing facettes of withdrawal operations, and how did the ZSU 'do that' in the Avdiivka area of the last two months.

A withdrawal is used to disengage with an enemy force. The purpose of the withdrawal could be to preserve the force, release it for a new mission, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or reposition forces.

A withdrawal under enemy pressure is extremely difficult because the withdrawing force is leaving the protection of defensive positions, the unit is oriented to the rear, the movement of one unit affects the security of other units. The greater the size of the withdrawing unit, the harder it is to control. Loss of control can easily escalate into a rout and a huge loss of combat capability due to casualties and capture.

Planning can mitigate many of the threats to a successful operation. The plan should include the roles of the different units in the operation, the routes used for movement, how the movement would be controlled, and how the enemy advance would be slowed.

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Planning

The security force has to have strong leadership and disciplined troops, and must provide flank and rear security while disengaging. A reserve force is needed to react to unexpected developments.

Support units need to be evacuated but when the aid station withdraws there has to be a plan to evacuate the wounded. When logistical units withdraw there has to be a method to resupply units. If small ammo dumps are used then the dumps need to be big enough to last the duration of the battle without being so large that ammo would have to be abandoned. Vehicles should be fueled up.

The withdrawal route for each unit must be planned, and leadership and guides must be familiar with it. If possible, the route should be traveled by leadership and guides before the actual withdrawal.

In decades back it was important to deny enemy reconnaissance the true picture of what was front of them by concealing movement. If all the unit’s support vehicles were seen moving to the rear it would be an indication of a withdrawal. In the era of drones, it is difficult to deny persistent observation. Not all drones have low-light or thermal optics, so movement at night might reduce enemy observations. Night movement adds an extra level of complexity, placing even more importance on familiarity with the withdrawal route.

At Avdiivka, Ukraine added a deception element to their plan. When General Syrskyi took command the decision to evacuate the city had already been made, but Zelensky stated that he asked Syrskyi to defend the city and the general promised that he would. The 3rd Assault Brigade had great success in attacking and when it was moved to Avdiivka many assumed they would lead a counterattack. These stories continued to circulate until it was obvious that Ukraine was withdrawing and Syrskyi admitted what was clear to all.

Another critical factor in planning is the methods of controlling the movement. It is important that units across the line pull back in a synchronized manner. If one unit pulls back before the others, it creates a hole in the line which the enemy can exploit and threaten other friendly units.

If one unit doesn’t, or can’t, pull back at the same time as the rest of the line, it becomes threatened with encirclement.

One method of controlling movement is providing a timetable for when units should withdraw. Each unit is given a time to initiate movement, a route to travel and a location where to stop movement and establish defensive positions. This could be repeated several times until the final line of defense is reached. The biggest vulnerability with a timetable is enemy actions that can disrupt friendly movement which can, in turn, disrupt defenses at the next line of defense. This can also impact any further withdrawals scheduled on the timetable.

Another method of controlling movement is using a start time to initiate the withdrawal but using events to control the movement. An event can simply be all units reaching a phase line. Once all units have reported reaching the phase line, the order can be given to move to the next phase line.

Enemy actions are also the biggest threat to a withdrawal controlled by events. Reserves and support from adjacent units may be needed to counter enemy activity.

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Movement

The withdrawing forces have to be able to move faster than the opposing forces. If they have the same movement capability, such as moving on foot, then the attacking force has to be slowed down. There are several ways to do this.

There is an offensive concept called bounding overwatch, in which unit A lays down a base of fire to suppress the enemy while unit B advances. Then unit B lays down suppressive fire while unit A advances. They can continue to move in this manner until they are close enough to assault the defenders.

This same fire and movement pattern can be reversed when withdrawing. Unit A suppresses the enemy while unit B moves back. Unit B returns the favor to support unit A’s movement.

An alternative form of movement is when an entire unit pulls back except for the security force that holds the enemy at bay. Once the unit has established itself, the security force is alway withdrawn.

Terrain can also be used to provide cover while withdrawing. In this example, unit A suppresses the enemy and unit B is protected by the ridge as it pulls back into the woods. Unit B can then fire on any enemy units that move onto the ridge while unit A pulls back to the village. From there, unit A can fire on the advancing enemy unit while unit B is protected by the woods as it moves. If advancing enemy units take cover from the suppressive fires of either unit then they will be advancing slower than units A and B are withdrawing.

When the 3rd Assault Brigade withdrew from the coke plant they used armored and unarmored vehicles so they were faster than the Russians that were advancing on foot. The Ukrainians also used the terrain of the coke plant and tree lines to provide cover from Russian fire as they withdrew.

Obstacles will also slow down enemy pursuit. Over the centuries, many bridges have been destroyed to slow down pursuing armies trying to cross a river. Ukraine destroyed a bridge at Ruska Lozova, 10 km from Kharkiv. A century ago, the Germans blocked a road with trees at Cambrai, leaving only the muddy fields for movement.

When the Russians broke through and moved into the dachas, the main supply route to the Ukrainian defenders located east of the wastewater plant was cut off so the defenders withdrew. Having anticipated this possibility, the fields were already mined and the Ukrainians mined the treelines, as well, to slow down the Russians advancing behind them. The holes could have been dug already and it was just a case of placing the mine inside and arming them.

This was not an isolated event. The survivors from Zenit mentioned that they didn’t have time to place mines before they retreated. This tactic has been used in other wars and it’s likely that this was a widespread practice in this war because it’s simple and it slows the enemy down. As a force retreats, a well-supplied army might also use artillery to scatter mines behind them.

Besides using artillery to scatter obstacles (mines), regular high explosive shells would also slow down an enemy pursuit since it would force them to seek cover or suffer casualties. Ukraine had a shortage of artillery and mortar ammo at Avdiivka and they tried to compensate with drones, which helped a lot, but it did not have the same effect as massed artillery fires would.

(….to be continued…)