Who is Mykhailo Drapatyi

by Donald Hill

Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was selected to be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and there are many in the army that are overjoyed.

In his first command he was a major in charge of a battalion in the 72nd Brigade. On 9 May, 2014, armed separatists tried to take control of the police station at Mariupol. His battalion was sent to rescue the police. He was in the lead BMP. When his driver said there were barricades and asked him what to do, Drapatyi told his driver to hit the gas. The vehicle breached the barricade, a dramatic action that gained widespread notice. The battalion then sped towards the police station and helped secure the city against the rebels.

Dima hits the gas.

Later that summer, Drapatyi’s battalion and another battalion were surrounded by separatists on the border and bombarded by Russian artillery. After negotiations, one battalion commander ordered his men to destroy their equipment and retreat to the Russian territory where they were interned and later returned to Ukraine. Drapatyi’s battalion broke through the encirclement. Other units followed and they traveled without reconnaissance through 40 kilometers of enemy territory before making it back to friendly lines. His decision saved 260 men, 30 pieces of equipment at the cost of one soldier killed.

In 2022, Drapatyi took command in the Kherson region and stabilized the situation quickly even though there was a shortage of combat-capable troops. He used HIMARS to attack the Dnieper river bridges over which the Russian supplies flowed, plus headquarters and supply dumps. With the possibility of the bridges being destroyed and the river freezing in the winter, the Russian forces withdrew across the river and Darapatyi’s forces liberated the city of Kherson.

He was then given command of one of the four large strategic groups in Odesa, and it was there that he took interest in the drone and electronic warfare operations that others were developing and saw its value.

He later became Deputy Chief of the General Staff, responsible for the training of personnel. While at that job, the Russians came across the border at Kharkiv and were making progress against Ukrainian troops that were unprepared even though intelligence gave ample warning. The general that Syrsky appointed was fired and Drapatyi was given command, in addition to his Deputy Chief position, and he regained control of the units.

He did not shout, as some inadequate leaders do, and he listened to subordinates before giving an order. He trusted his subordinates with using their own judgements on how to execute that order, paid attention to events and adjusted actions when something didn’t work out. The trust within his command resulted in accurate reports. Factual reporting was a real problem for much of the army because commanders had been reprimanded or fired for relaying the truth.

Reconnaissance and attack drones were used in large numbers for the first time, and his command rapidly gained control of the situation and stopped the Russian advance within a week.

On 10 May 2024, Russia crossed the border north of Kharkiv. The commander was fired after two days of chaos and Drapatyi replaced him. He quickly developed teamwork and trust with the brigade commanders and stopped the advance within 8 days.

Meanwhile, a general that had never commanded a brigade and maybe not even a battalion was appointed by Syrsky as commander of Operational Strategic Group “Khortytsia”, the most active of the three strategic groups. Just two months after the Kharkiv battle, Russia attacked and created a narrow penetration south of Kupiansk, a situation the general only made worse with his incompetence. When commanders made truthful reports about bad situations, he fired them. When the sector defenses collapsed, the incompetent commander was relieved and Drapatyi was sent to take command and salvage the situation. He had to recreate a command climate of trust. Without receiving any additional reinforcement, he was able to regain control of the situation after two months.

In July 2024, the Russians advanced in a narrow sector that grew with each passing week. The commander at the time created chaos with ill-conceived orders and firing anyone that brough him bad news. By the time he was fired in September, the sector was in a state of collapse (red). Drapatyi replaced him and was able to stabilize the situation without reinforcements by November (pink).

After stabilizing the front, Drapatyi was named Commander of the Ground Forces in November 2024. While he was in that position he tried to change the Soviet-style command environment characterized by “an atmosphere of fear (and) a lack of initiative“, ⁠as well as “systemic ​abuses”. He also had six months to study the training programs, but any efforts to make those changes were halted by Syrsky.

Then Russia began a series of attacks on large formations of units in training. The formations were forbidden and orders were given to create nearby shelters to protect against future attacks, but the orders were ignored. Drapatyi attempted to remove the responsible commanders but was stopped once again by Syrsky. On 1 June, another missile attack killed 12 and wounded 60 soldiers in training. Frustrated with his lack of authority, Drapatyi resigned, saying, “I have decided to submit my resignation from the post of Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

“This is a deliberate step dictated by my personal sense of responsibility for the tragedy at the 239th training ground, which resulted in the deaths of our soldiers. As a commander, I was not able to fully ensure the execution of my orders. I failed to press, failed to convince, failed to change the attitude towards the man in the ranks. This is my responsibility.”

“Code of silence and impunity are poison for the army. I tried to eradicate it from the Land Forces. But if tragedies happen again, it means that my efforts were not enough... An army where commanders are personally responsible for people’s lives is alive. An army where no one is responsible for the loss of life is dying from within.”

Syrsky was killing the army.

Drapatyi became Commander of the Joint Forces, which is the centralized organization responsible for planning and employment of units belonging to all branches of the military, and retained command of OSG Khortytsia. Four months later, the general staff dissolved the Joint Forces command in an attempt to sideline Drapatyi. He commanded the Khortytsia OSG for 13 months, implemented the “drone wall” tactics of swarming Russian attackers, and helped plan the operations to clear out Kupiansk in 2025-2026.

Drapatyi was the only general that publicly defended Fedorov as a true partner for the army and insisted that many of the changes had to be pushed through because of resistance from the old system and that the problems needed to be discussed openly and honestly. He went on, “Cooperation between the troops and the Defense Ministry changed. There was a new willingness to listen to commanders, to make decisions more quickly and to support changes that came from the units themselves.”

To summarize, he made bold decisions when justified as a junior officer. As a senior officer, he was called on multiple times to stabilize an emergency situation while creating an environment of trust and accountability and became known as a crisis manager. He understood and valued new technology. He studied training and administration, and was involved in planning operations in all branches of the military.

Drapatyi expects the truth, values feedback from his subordinates, and can differentiate between a difficult situation and a bad commander. He creates an environment of trust and encourages initiative, which allows commanders to develop and improve. By contrast, Syrsky stifled development with micromanagement, obedience without question, and firing commanders to cover his own deficiencies. Like Brovdi, Drapatyi creates a collaborative command environment that tends to maximize everyone’s potential.

Drapatyi makes data-driven decisions that account for the well-being of the soldier. He does not feel compelled to make a bold decision unless it is appropriate, and then he will not hesitate. He allows his subordinates to do their jobs, monitors the situation, and makes adjustments when something isn’t working.

The war has already been shaped by certain trends that will continue, such as long- and mid-range drone strikes attacking the supply chain and shaping the battlefield. It would be reasonable to expect that bad decisions will be much less common and those that occur would be corrected in a timely manner. As with any change, there will be some units and leaders that will resist new methods, but there will be immediate acceptance with most units. Some commanders might be replaced for gross negligence but the pool of competent officers will slowly grow as they are allowed to develop and are encouraged, expected even, to use their own initiative while receiving resources to accomplish the objectives assigned to them.

Proven methods will become standardized throughout the army over time. New technologies will be used to maximize Russian deaths and minimize Ukrainian deaths. A drone assault battalion will be created and tested. Drapatyi will systematically create conditions that will degrade Russian capabilities while preserving Ukrainian lives, and when the right conditions are achieved, he will take offensive action while minimizing the threat to Ukrainian capabilities.

Syrsky believed in creating mass while actively suppressing the development of combat multipliers that increased the effectiveness of that mass. He also engaged in tactics that increased the rate of destruction of Ukrainian manpower. His only perceivable strategy was to take back territory and he created very few operational conditions that would make that tactically possible.

Syrsky also had a tendency to create new brigades when some existing brigades were staffed at 30-50% levels. He acknowledged that fully-staffed brigades would be more durable but insisted that they could not cover a wider width of battle lines. Since he was expecting Russia to create a new front in Chernihiv or maybe even Belarus after mobilization, he insisted that the only way to counter that was to create more brigades. So he created (at least) four new brigades and forced existing units to give up personnel to staff the new brigades. This reduced the durability and coherence of the units forced to donate and impacted the morale of all involved.

Leadership development was not prioritized under Syrsky, only unquestioned obedience. There were decent leaders that were fired because they reported bad news created by the actions of their superiors. As a result, there was a shortage of qualified brigade level commanders and staff. Expanding the number of brigades with unqualified officers would only increase the possibility of disaster. And Syrsky still thought it was a good idea.

It is hard to overstate the incompetence of that mindset.

Drapatyi is not a man that can conjure miracles, but he is a competent commander with excellent judgement. That should be, and is, the standard in many armies. Over the months, he will strengthen the army with common sense decisions. And that is what many of the officers and soldiers in the Ukrainian army have been hoping for.