Ukrainian Adoption of DELTA: An Institutional Assessment
by Benjamin Cook (intro by Tom Cooper)
Hello everybody!
Sometimes, ‘we’ (people posting on this blog), do ‘make things move’. Not much: we’re far from falling for illusions that we could ‘move mountains’. But, at least a notch.
Now, whatever happens, whatever is one’s topic of interest, whatever one is monitoring, one must always keep in mind: ‘just because’ the official position is, for example, ‘A’, it doesn’t mean that things in reality are all ‘A’. More often than not, they’re ‘S’, or ‘K’, or ‘Z’. The reason is not only ‘bureaucracy’, or ‘buerocratic inertia’, but also the fundamental difference between the ‘planning’, the resulting ‘ideal situation’, and the reality at the frontlines.
Nowhere is this as valid as for the difference between ‘headquarters’ in the rear, and the ‘trenches’ of the battlefield. When it’s about making one’s life - and survival - dependent on ‘some app on the tablet’ (if not the smartphone), it’s one thing to seat in a comfortable office, 500 kilometres away from where bullets, shells, and FPVs are flying, and an entirely different thing is to try doing that in that dirty, full-of-water trench - or even a ‘well fortified command centre’ - that’s under enemy fire, and, probably, within the zone where the enemy is deploying severe electronic warfare, too.
…sadly, this is even more the case when the affair in question is then also involving the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine: when this is the body in the background of the entire affair… sigh… sufficient to say: there is a huge difference between it and the trigger-pullers in the foxholes. Hope, I need not explaining the ‘why’.
Over to Ben.
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Ukraine has now registered more than 200,000 users on its DELTA battlefield management system. That figure alone indicates that the platform is no longer limited to test units, specialist teams, or headquarters staff. If the numbers are correct this is nearly full adoption, assuming the 200,000 are mostly Zero Line users. The system’s footprint is large enough that it now reflects how the force as a whole organizes information.
A few posts back Tom mentioned that there were communication and coordination problems at the front. This seemed odd to me. DELTA was supposed to solve for this. Back in 2024 the Kropyva system was competing with DELTA in some aspects for front line adoption. Kropyva had the benefit of being sort of “first to market”. It is an artillery fire control system that is well thought of at the front. It is my understanding that rather than compete, this was folded into the new versions of DELTA. I am aware of no other problems. So, what is the issue?
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I asked Lt Col Yelyzaveta Boiko with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense what the front line penetration of DELTA was. She pointed me towards two documents from the MoD. (She also said exact numbers are classified.) One day later, while doing my morning reading, I noticed this photo.
It seems DELTA usage is about 200,000.
So what is DELTA? Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal described DELTA as follows: “DELTA is a digital battlefield management ecosystem that creates a technological advantage for the Ukrainian army: it allows you to see the battlefield in real time, plan operations and exchange information within a unit, brigade, grouping, and, if necessary, with allies.” That description is sufficient. The significance for us is not the feature set, but the scale.
Current research suggests the following results during recent months: a roughly 45 percent improvement in the speed at which information about enemy targets reaches users, and a roughly 30 percent reduction in duplicated or redundant target entries. At this scale, these effects compound. When reporting friction drops across a large force, throughput rises. When duplication declines, attention is freed.
Also with the participation rate we can create a partial estimate of front-line penetration using tooth-to-tail ratios. What’s a “tooth to tail” ratio? This is how many support personnel it takes to keep one fighter on the front line. “Tooth” is the front line, “Tail” is the support. Ukraine fields roughly 800,000–950,000 personnel across regular armed forces, National Guard, and territorial defense. In modern armies, combat troops generally represent 20–35 percent of the total force, with the remainder assigned to logistics, maintenance, communications, intelligence, medical support, and administration. Ukraine’s reliance on drones, electronic warfare, dispersed logistics, and continuous equipment repair likely places it toward the higher “tail” end of that range.
If one assumes that only one quarter of Ukraine’s personnel (ratio 1:3) are consistently in direct combat roles, then 200,000 users represents a majority of the forward combat force and a substantial share of supporting units as well. That implies that DELTA penetrates into logistics, ISR cells, artillery coordination, and command functions. The system therefore spans combat and sustainment alike.
This matters because combat power depends as much on coordination as on mass. Ukraine operates under shortage conditions—of air defense, trained manpower, and ammunition—yet it continues to sustain complex operations along a long front. That is not possible without a reduction in inefficiency. DELTA appears to be one method used to achieve that reduction.
So where does that leave us? Is Tom right? Is Ben right? The answer is “yes”. Tom is getting his info from the front lines, I’m getting mine from the MoD. Both are probably degrees of correct and both probably need a few caveats. The fog of war is thick. Thick like a swarm of drones.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
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Sources
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – “Combat system DELTA implemented at all levels of the Defense Forces of Ukraine”
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – “Ministry of Defense launched a basic training course for the DELTA combat system” Statement by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on DELTA
Royal United Services Institute – analysis on Ukrainian force structure and sustainment
NATO Centers of Excellence – publications on digital C2 systems
RAND Corporation – studies on networked warfare and command systems
Sadly, we don't see this DELTA system working in practice. Battalions fighting a few kilometers apart are not able to synchronize their movements, which, for instance, led to the fast Russian progress near Huliaipole.
Good and interesting assessments 👍