Ukraine’s Space Forces: How To Get From Policy to Orbit

by Benjamin Cook

NOTE: The cost of unmanned space flight has come way down. Dozens of companies are competing with SpaceX, and many of them are already succeeding. Space flight itself is no longer “rocket science” in the mysterious, unattainable sense — it’s a known quantity, and has been for some time. The real challenge, the place where true cost savings live, is in building and operating reusable launch vehicles. That part still is rocket science. Or, as I like to say when I’m mixing metaphors, rocket surgery.

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When the Ukrainian government unveiled its latest action program(funding goals), one item stood out: the creation of Space Forces by the end of 2025. To some, this might sound like science fiction at a time when Ukraine is still locked in a grinding ground war. For Kyiv, space has become another domain of battle — one that Russia exploits every day with satellites for reconnaissance, targeting, and communications.

The central question is how quickly Ukraine can make this presence real. At the center of that question lies something very tangible: when will Ukraine launch its own satellites — sovereign, Ukrainian-owned eyes and ears in orbit?

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What Ukraine Wants to Do

The government’s “Program of Activity” commits to standing up a dedicated Space Forces branch inside the Armed Forces of Ukraine. By December 31, 2025, that branch should be formally established, with its first structures, doctrine, and staff in place.

This is part of a larger modernization effort that aims for 60% readiness in air, missile, cyber, and space defense by the same date. Space is being treated as a fully integrated element of national defense, equal in importance to the other domains.

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First Steps Already Underway

Ukraine has already moved in several concrete ways:

● Space Policy Department: In March 2025, the Ministry of Defense created a dedicated office to coordinate strategy, legislation, and international partnerships.

● Legislation: The Cabinet has asked parliament to pass a law authorizing the Space Forces and laying the groundwork for future procurement.

● Partnerships: Ukraine is negotiating participation in European Union space programs such as Copernicus (Earth observation) and space situational awareness initiatives.

● Pilot Projects: Ukrainian defense planners are already experimenting with integrating commercial satellite imagery, electronic warfare data, and AI analysis. The next step is moving from borrowed capacity to owned assets.

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Two Key Timelines: Rockets and Intel

Ukraine’s space ambition can be split into two tracks:

1. Launching Its Own Rockets

Ukraine has a long legacy here. The Yuzhmash and Yuzhnoye design bureaus once built rockets for the Soviet space program. The Zenit rocket, launched from Baikonur, was a Ukrainian design. But decades of underfunding and Russian aggression have eroded that base.

Realistically:

● Short term (2025–2027): Ukraine will rely on foreign launch providers. Satellites designed in Ukraine (or co-developed) could be launched by U.S., EU, or Japanese partners.

● Medium term (2027–2030): If funding and industry reforms hold, Ukraine could revive a small-lift domestic launch vehicle. This would not rival commercial giants, but it could send cubesats or microsats into low Earth orbit.

● Long term (after 2030): Full sovereign launch capacity is possible, but only if Ukraine makes it a strategic investment. Given wartime pressures, this will likely remain a secondary priority compared to satellites themselves.

2. Gathering Its Own Intelligence from Space

The core requirement is satellites owned and operated by Ukraine, where no foreign government or commercial partner decides what images or data Kyiv can see.

Realistically:

● Short term (2025–2026): Ukraine can design and launch small Earth-observation satellites (EO) or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) cubesats in partnership with Western builders. These could give Kyiv limited but sovereign-controlled imagery.

● Medium term (2026–2028): Ukraine could expand this into a small constellation of imaging satellites, backed by resilient ground stations on Ukrainian soil. This would allow daily revisits over key areas, independent tasking, and integration into targeting systems.

● Long term (after 2030): More advanced constellations, including radar, infrared, and signals intelligence satellites, could give Ukraine a robust ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) network.

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Why Sovereign Space Matters

Right now, Ukraine depends heavily on foreign commercial providers and on allies’ intelligence releases. These have been critical but come with limits. Sometimes Kyiv must wait for Washington, Brussels, or a private boardroom to approve satellite data access.

Sovereign space assets change that equation. With its own satellites, Ukraine could:

● Task imagery over the front lines in real time, without delay.

● Fuse data directly into its command-and-control systems.

● Protect itself against a future where allies’ attention might shift.

In wartime, speed of decision-making is everything. Having satellites under Ukrainian control could shave hours or days off the targeting cycle — the difference between intercepting a Russian missile launcher or letting it escape.

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The Road Ahead

If Ukraine sticks to its plan, by 2026–2027 it could have its first sovereign satellites delivering usable battlefield intelligence. These would likely be small, relatively inexpensive satellites, not massive billion-dollar platforms. Modern warfare rewards good enough ISR that is fast, flexible, and secure.

Funding remains a key hurdle. War strains the national budget, and even the most ambitious program requires steady resources. This pressure could be eased if Ukraine offers capabilities that NATO or an allied state needs. In today’s environment, very few “space shots” are financed by a single country. Shared launches, pooled satellite constellations, and cooperative data-sharing have become the norm, and Ukraine could benefit by tying its needs to allied priorities.

The challenge will be sustaining funding, industrial support, and international partnerships while fighting a land war. The creation of the Space Forces, and the “60% readiness by 2025” benchmark, show that Kyiv intends to meet that challenge.

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Key Takeaways

Ukraine’s march to space is about survival and defense. By 2025, the Space Forces will exist on paper and in command charts. By 2026–2027, Ukraine could be receiving imagery from its first sovereign satellites. And by 2030, it may have a modest but effective space intelligence network — built to serve the war effort and national security.

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Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.

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Sources

● Militarnyi, “60 на 60 у перетворенні космосу на середовище сучасної війни” (60 by 60 in transforming space into a modern warfare environment)

● Militarnyi, “Кабмін запропонував Верховній Раді до кінця року створити космічні війська” (Cabinet proposed creation of Space Forces)

● UNN, “Україна створить космічні війська до кінця 2025 року” (Ukraine to create Space Forces by 2025)

● United24, “Ukraine’s Space Forces: Kyiv unveils new action program”