Ukraine War, Q&A Session for June 2024, Part 2
Hello everybody!
To continue answering your questions…
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1.) Why do you think is the western media frequently reporting Russian successes and Ukrainian failures?
Gauging by my own, first-hand experiences from (trying to) work for that media (arguably, this is some 15+ years ago), there is a combination of reasons.
Up front, ‘bad news are good news’ for our media. Already since the early 2000, the mass of what’s going on in the media is depending on the internet: the media is driven by such factors like, literally, ‘the number of clicks/views’. The more often some website is opened by more viewers, the more is it worth.
Therefore, the media needs flashy titles, sensations - because these are certain to attract more attention. ‘Bad news’ are simply attracting more attention than ‘good news’. At least they are easier to sensationalise.
Therefore, the more ‘bad news’ there are, the better - for the media: that’s earning it a lot more money.
Money - primarily from advertising, because: every time you click to open some media report, you also open lots of advertisements….but also from data-mining enterprises, because: hundreds of these are paying the media to deliver them data about your browsing behaviour, so they can analyse these and sell them to those who want to run ‘aimed advertising’….
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2.) You mention the Russians deploying Spetsnaz as line infantry… if they are winning, why are they throwing their elite forces into the meat grinder?
The practice of deploying ‘special forces’ as line infantry can be observed in numerous contemporary conflicts. See Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Lebanese Civil War (1975-2000; especially valid for the Syrians, but also for the Israelis), Second and Third Angolan Wars (1975-1992 and 1994-2003), the Yemen War of 1979, and few others. Principal reason is two-fold: higher ‘trust’ of command nodes in ‘especially loyal units’; and poor training of standard infantry formations – which is then resulting in their lack of necessary skills, flexibility, loyalty and thus the reliability.
In the case of the Russians in Ukraine nowadays, the Keystone Cops are classifying their troops in something like four different classes:
- ‘true special forces’, like GRU’s Spetsnaz (see: 78th Special Reconnaissance Centre and/or 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade, the Redut quasi-PMC etc.)
- ‘line Spetsnaz’ (VSRF’s Spetsnaz formations; rather comparable to US Army rangers or Israeli paratroopers)
- VDV and volunteer formations (in the case of the latter: former Wagner PMC)
- ‘cannon-fodder’ (essentially: all the other types of ground formations).
Their true special forces are rarely seen in action: not because they are not in action, but because Ukrainians are rarely getting to see them at all (before it’s too late). Ukraine is huge, the frontlines are very long, there are many ‘blind spots’ and thus both sides have it easy to bypass by enemy positions, and infiltrate their special forces deeper behind the enemy lines. So much so, you can bet your annual income that at any point in time, there are at least 10-15 ‘patrols’ of the GRU’s Spetsnaz underway somewhere inside Ukraine… and that the GRU and SSO is ‘doing something very similar’ inside Russia…
On the contrary, the ‘line Spetsnaz’ is regularly deployed to ‘corset’ VSRF’s formations: on the frontline. In offensives, the ‘line Spetsnaz’s is usually following the ‘cannon fodder’ into assaults (the latter is pushed forward to force Ukrainians to open fire and thus reveal their positions), or to infiltrate ZSU positions (like at Avdiivka and, lately, in the Bilohorivka area); or, in defensive, to bolster the fire-power of other formations and secure particularly important points (we’ve seen this in the Robotyne area, the last summer, where the ‘line Spetsnaz’ also proved well-equipped and -trained to closely cooperate with attack helicopters, too).
These formations are something like ‘golden bullets’: deployed only when and where ‘really necessary’. The rest is ‘spent’ at every opportunity (yes, this is meanwhile including the VDV: at earlier times the VDV either formed the rapid intervention forces and assault spearheads, or served as a reserve behind the frontline; meanwhile, it’s deployed as line infantry, too).
With other words: in this regards, the Russians are merely ‘following the herd’. Doing what they have to do in order to achieve their own gains.
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3.) Does the Ukrainian artillery advantage constitute a ray of hope (for future developments in this war)?
Yesno. At best, it’s really a ‘ray of hope’. Sadly, that’s going to remain that way for a while longer.
As for why…When considering this factor one must keep in mind that all the assessments for the Russian production of artillery shells I know are stressing: Russia is certain to continue supplying its troops with many more artillery shells than the West can supply to Ukraine – and that well into 2025. Indeed, even once the ‘Czech purchase’ arrives in Ukraine, and should it really happen that these ‘Czech purchased’ artillery shells arrive in quantities sufficient to buy time necessary for both the EU and the USA to ramp up their artillery production to the current-planned levels (later this and early the next year), the totals they’ll be shipping to Ukraine (all provided they really continue doing that, and do not find another ‘good excuse’ to stop, like from the last October until May this year) are still going to be significantly lower than the Russian. Moreover, Moscow proved more flexible and better capable of obtaining ammo from other sources overseas. See: North Korea, India, Sudan etc.
Therefore, and at best, yes, there is a ‘ray of hope’ in this regards, but only in so far that the situation is likely to become slightly better through the second half of this year (and especially towards the end of this year) – but, and again: on condition the EU and the USA seriously continue ramping up their production and continue reliably delivering they can to Ukraine.
That said, I think my standpoint should be well-known, meanwhile: Ukraine has no other solutions but to make itself as independent from western ammunition deliveries as only possible. And to replace (missing) artillery shells by advanced UAVs packing ever more punch. Meanwhile, talk is about ZSU running UAV strikes on the Russian artillery up to 40-, even 60km behind the frontline (especially in the southern Belgorod), and I think this is also the best way forward.
On the contrary: hoping and waiting the West is going to help (or, and worst of all: praying for it), is, IMHO, of next to no use. Mind that, if nothing else, the western aid is always going to be tied to a plethora of political conditions (the mass of which is aiming to prevent a collapse of the central rule over the Russian Federation). Foremost: the Western - and especially: the US - aim is NOT to enable Ukraine to effectively and quickly end this war to its own advantage and its own best interest. It’s to model an outcome where Russia gives up the idea of exterminating Ukraine, while remaining intact.
….however, while thinking that way, the US-Americans pursuing such aims do not understand (nor think about) the fact that any such Russia is going to remain a major threat for the security of Ukraine (and EU/NATO), too…
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4.) You’re often mentioning the Russian UMPK glide bombs. Does Ukraine have a similar capability?
This is an excellent question. The answer is: yes, it does.
And the PSU is regularly deploying that capability, too. Indeed, it’s doing something very similar to what the Russians are doing. For example, here a scene of a double JDAM-strike on a Russian position on Hoerhivka, back on 20 May:
However, the PSU is forced to run such strikes in a significantly different fashion.
The Russian UMPK-strikes are flown by Su-24 an Su-34 bombers. These approach the combat zone at an altitude of around 9,000 metres, at 900km/h or more, then enter a shallow climb and release their UMPKs from as far as 70km (70,000m) away from the target (and thus well outside the range of the mass of SAMs operated by Ukraine):
As far as can be gauged from related videos released by both sides, though, the Russians are regularly aiming all four UMPKs their bombers release at the same aiming point (or ‘target’); or they aim two at one, and two at another aiming point, nearby, like in this case when they have targeted Chasiv Yar with four UMPKs, back on 12 May:
Except for FABs, the VKS is meanwhile deploying its own ‘small diameter bomb’ (the UMPB D-30SN) and the Grom E1 ‘guided’ missile, too.
However… and now comes the (brutal) difference…
The Russians can do that because the PSU lacks,
a) an interceptor equipped with a long-range air-to-air missile - and then one with a range comparable to that of the Russian R-37 (deployed by MiG-31s and/or Su-35s),
b) a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system capable of reliably surviving a deployment within less than 20-30km from the frontline (so it could hit Russian fighter-bombers before these can release their glide bombs from 70km away),
c) because remaining Ukrainian stocks of SAMs are barely sufficient to provide semi-reliable air defences of its major urban- and industrial centres deeper behind the frontline, and
d) thus (but also because it suffered several losses while trying to do that), the PSU is not deploying its longer-ranged SAMs any closer to the frontlne than some 50km behind it.
(Indeed, through March, April, and May, we could monitor not only the fact that the Russians are excelling in avoiding striking Kyiv and Odesa even with their ‘best’ ballistic missiles, because they are too well-defended: they are striking Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhznya and similar, less-well-protected places instead. We could also monitor the PSU shooting down ever less of the Russian cruise missiles and attack UAVs, too – simply because it’s running out of SAMs, and the West is too slow to replace these, or even to ramp up their production….)
Back to the topic… The PSU has no UMPKs, but it actually has far more precise weapons that can do much more than the Russian UMPKs. These are such precision guided munitions (PGMs) like
- Small Diameter Bomb (GBU-39 SDB),
- Joint Direct Attack Munition (GBU-53 JDAM), and
- the French-made HAMMER.
Certainly, all of these weapons are lighter (calibre 250kg) than the standard Russian UMPK (based on the FAB-500M-62 bomb calibre 500kg, not to talk about their latest UMPKs based on FAB-1500M-54, calibre 1500kg). However: every single SDB, or JDAM, or Hammer released by a single fighter of the Ukrainian Air Force (PSU) can be aimed at a different aiming point (target). Means: a single MiG-29 or Su-27 of the PSU, can, simultaneously, target two, three, or four different aiming points - depending on how many PGMs it’s actually carrying. For example: one, two or three points along the frontline, plus something behind it. Or a squad of four widely-scattered Russian artillery pieces. We’ve seen the PSU doing this, regularly, already the last summer, and even more often lately in the Vovchansk area.
But, because of the growing threat of an interception by Russian Su-35s, MiG-31s, and - lately - Su-30SMs, too, meanwhile, the PSU is usually arming its fighters with only two PGMs: the aim is to keep the aircraft light enough to enable them to accelerate to nearly supersonic speeds, although flying at extremely low altitudes, where the air is more dense, and thus the fuel consumption significantly higher…
Now, theoretically, if released from high altitude and high speed, all of these (Western-made) weapons have at least a similar range (if not even longer) to that of the Russian UMPK. I.e. in theory, they could also be released from an altitude of 9,000 metres (or more), and then left to glide to their targets, some 50, 60, 70km….some of these weapons could, in theory, reach as far as 120km away - if released from, say, 10,000 metres altitude and supersonic speeds…
Problem: the PSU cannot operate its jets at high altitudes as closely to the frontline like the Russians can do – because the VKS is operating interceptors like Su-35s, MiG-31s, and Su-30SMs. Equipped with R-37 long-range air-to-air missiles, these can reliably shot down approaching Ukrainian fighter-bombers armed with PGMs from as far as 200km away. Indeed, at least once a month, they are shooting down PSU fighter-bombers involved in PGM-attacks, regardless how fast or low are these flying.
Precisely this is why the Ukrainian pilots are flying so extremely low: at 10-15-20 metres above the ground, where they have at least some hope of remaining hidden between man-made- or nature-made obstacles (buildings, forests, hills…).
However, when released from such a low altitude, the range of their PGMs is much shorter than that of the Russian UMPKs released from high altitudes: it’s only some 10-15km (yes: although PSU MiG-29s and Su-27s are then accelerating to 1,100km/h and releasing their weapons from a shallow dive).
Moreover, even once they fly as low and as fast, Ukrainian fighter-bombers are still anything else than ‘safe’: Russian Su-35s, MiG-31s and Su-30SMs are still, and regularly, detecting them; the Russian mast-mounted radars can still detect them. I.e. they can be – and regularly are – targeted by multiple weapons already while approaching their release points. This is why the PSU is supporting such strikes by other of its aircraft releasing ADM-160 decoys and/or AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles. Which is making their strikes with PGMs much more complex than those of the Russians with UMPKs…
….and, sometimes, such Ukrainian operations work, but… tragically… ‘at least once a month’ – they don’t…
Another problem is that the Western PGMs in question are very expensive and manufactured in relatively small numbers. They are delivered to Ukraine in even smaller amounts, too. And the number of suitably modified MiG-29s and Su-27s is low (and, constantly, decreasing, too). This is also why the PSU cannot deploy as many PGMs as the VKS can deploy UMPKs (then add the slowly growing number of UMPB D-30SNs and Grom E1s to complete the picture)….
And even if the PSU would get, say, enough PGMs to release them at a rate of ‘100 a day’: it would still need the suitable number of modified MiG-29s and Su-27s – which it simply does not have. This is why the F-16-deliveries are going to become as important: to increase the number of such strikes the PSU can fly every single day (all provided it does get enough F-16s, and spares and money to operate them as long as necessary….) - which, in turn, is going to significantly increase the costs of this war, because lobbing PGMs from F-16s is much more expensive than shelling the same targets by long-range artillery….
Of course, when the Ukrainians manage to fly at least one such air strike, the result is – usually – lots of k… kuddled Russians. But, again and overall: due to the Russian air defences (and the VKS, actually, possessing air superiority over the frontline), running such operations is extremely risky. Plus, the number of PGMs supplied by the West is always going to be much lower than the number of UMPKs the Russians can make and release.
(…to be continued…)
Thank you! that is very insightful!
Excellent explanation Tom, thanks for sharing your experience and knowledge