Ukraine War, 9 January 2023
Hello everybody,
Time for few battlefield updates…
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
On the positive side: word is that Germany delivered several high-power generators to Kherson. Sadly, that’s about the only good news related to the Ukrainian power grid I’ve heard in days.
Putin and Surovikin have continued their campaign of air- and missile strikes. Over the last 36 hours, Ukrainians reported (if my count is correct) a total of 31 attacks, plus 73 strikes by BM-27s and BM-30s. The only difference to earlier times (say: before the period 31 December — 3 January) is that nowadays the mass of such attacks is hitting urban centres 10–20km behind the frontline. See: towns and villages in Sumy (hit by 144 rockets), western Luhansk and western Donetsk, Nikopol (rocketed and shelled almost every single day for months already), plus southern Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson….because the greatest strategist of our times run out of ballistic- and cruise missiles. Perhaps the ‘most civilised’, indeed, ‘according to valid rules of warfare’, was the deployment of cluster ammunition filled with incendiaries against the city of Kherson: almost a miracle that ‘just’ one person was killed…
For their part, Ukrainians have continued their HIMARS-campaign. Over the last two days, they have hit two additional targets in Tokmak, plus:
- VSRF supply depot in the Hydromash Works, in Melitopol, on 8 Jan;
- Dormitory in Rubizhne (reportedly killing 14), on 8 Jan; and
- Two other VSRF supply depots on 7 Jan.
Moreover, it turned out that on 31 December, Ukrainian M142s have hit a sports-hall in Lantratovka, in Luhansk, used to house mobiks. A video was leaked by one of survivors, shown them sleeping and eating there, and then scenes after the strike that, reportedly, killed at least 50. Bodies were removed and any kind of related reporting is strictly prohibited.
Regarding the two air forces: the Russians are reporting that their air force is ‘working well’ — apparently against targets in the Bakhmut area. Considering the prevalent weather there, not so sure, though: the VKS does not like flying through or below clouds. On the other hand, considering Ukrainian Air Force reported flying 18 air strikes on 7 January, and another 17 yesterday….well, perhaps they’ve found pieces of sky that were clear enough.
Finally, Ukrainian air defences claimed three Russian helicopters as shot down — a Ka-52, Mi-8 and Mi-24 — plus three Orlan-10s: another Ka-52 was clamed as shot down this morning, ‘north of Melitopol’, and then a Mi-24, later on. For their part, the Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed one Ukrainian Mi-8 as shot down near ‘Verolyubovka’ (Donetsk), yesterday.
On the lighter side: I’m not going to waste a single additional sentence on the Keystone Cops’ claim about ‘killing 600 Ukrainian troops in Kramatorsk’. Let me just observe that
a) I know why do I call the Russian MOD the ‘Keystone Cops in Moscow’, but
b) this might have been the first combat deployment of the Tornado-S, claimed as ‘now in service’ few days ago. If the Russians are not lying in this regards (as they often do), and if they seriously have them in production (and no ‘manual assembly of single examples’), the range of their 9M542 rockets should be around 120km, which is why many are considering them the ‘Russian revenge for HIMARS’.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Up front: meanwhile, it’s not only freezing (-10°C to -20°C) in Soledar and Bakhmut, but snow fell in the area Soledar on 4–5 January. Thus, any photos and videos shown, say, ‘mud’, were certainly taken before that date.
Generally: artillery duels are going on almost along the entire frontline, from Kupyansk in the north to (at least) Vuhledar in the south. Otherwise, there are no major combat operations…with at least one major exception.
There are bitter, fierce and murderous battles raging in Soledar.
Two days ago, the 3rd Assault Brigade (plus the 46th Airborne Brigade), ZSU, counterattacked and recovered the main complex of the salt mines, causing massive losses to the Russians — and then continued for the Bakhmutske. Gauging by (unofficial) Ukrainian admissions that the Russians have captured the latter, from the last evening, seems, this second part of the counterattack didn’t end well.
As of this morning, the fiercest fighting was reported from the area around local town hall.
Heavy fighting is reported from Pidhorodne, too (this is where the Wagner is involved). Reportedly, Ukrainians were forced to withdraw from this village, yesterday. Reportedly, they returned to it, the last night…
Meanwhile, RUMINT has it that the biggest problem of the ZSU on this sector is the massive deployment of AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers by multiple Russian units.
The ferocity of the fighting for Soledar can be gauged by several of known or at least rumoured facts:
a) For the start — after a break of almost a month — both sides are now deploying tanks in this area.
b) The GenStab-U’s reported 500+ Russians killed, 3 helicopters and 11 tanks destroyed yesterday alone. No doubt, their casualty figures for the Russians might be exaggerated but, and I’ve found no clear evidence for the Russians losing even a single helicopter yesterday yet, but: gauging by videos of severe casualties between the Russian grund forces, I doubt Ukrainians are exaggerating in this regards.
c) As usually, if Ukrainians are claiming that many VKS helicopters shot down on a single day and on a narrow sector of the front, then it means that the VKS is very active in this area — and the VKS is only as active in some area if there is a very intensive combat and things are really critical for the Russian ground forces.
d) In the Russian social media, one can find claims that between 30 December and 7 January, they have caused 500 ‘casualties’ (killed and wounded) to all four battalions of the 46th Airborne in Soledar, and to have knocked out a number of T-64s from the 4th and 17th Tank Brigades, plus several T-72s of the 61st Mech (former 61st Infantry/Jäger Brigade). Finally,
e) the last few days, the Russians are attacking Soledar with VDV-units and Spetsnaz, apparently supported by the 20th Guards Mechanised Division (and then: entire division, not ‘just few BTGs’), and one of their independent artillery brigades equipped with TOS-1 multiple rocket launchers. I.e. not ‘by Wagner PMC’. That is: VDV and Spetsnaz units mauled early during the war, then ‘re-built’ with help of mobiks, of reservists who used to serve with the VDV some 5–10 (or more) years ago. And the 20th Guards Mechanised is one of best-equipped units of the VSRF…
On the other hand, the 46th Airborne came into being through integration of para-military units originally established by the Freedom Party (Svoboda Party) and the Right Sector (Pravy Sektor), while the 3rd Assault is the former Azov Regiment of the National Guard (of course, the latter was re-organised and expanded since the loss of one of its battalions in Mariupol).
To describe this ‘combination’ as ‘arch enemies’ — would be an understatement. Rather ‘ultranationalists’ on both sides, and then some ‘with lots of outstanding balances from the last eight years…’