Good evening — or good morning, everybody!
I’ll be very busy for the next few days, so here an update at an unusual time of the day. And it’s going to be an unusual update, for much of the following is going to address the endless questions about some sort of ‘super big’ Russian offensive, including 500,000 troops and similar things.
Russian Troop-Strengths
It’s already since the late 1990s that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) are lacking troops. Sounds strange for a country with a population of 140 million? Yes, but that’s that way for multiple socio-economic reasons, all of which are resulting in one fact: Russia is lacking soldiers. For years already.
Sure, the Keystone Cops in Moscow had a corps of 600,000 officers left from the Soviet times, to start with. But, officers are no non-commissioned ranks serving in infantry, and money was in short supply through the 1990s and 2000s. And so, over the time, the Keystne Cops were constantly decreasing the total number of active service personnel: from 1.7 to 1.3, then 1.2 million of troops in service, then they decreased that to 1 million, back in the mid-2010s etc. However, pay attention: these were all the troops serving — not only in the ‘Army’ (or ground forces, abbreviated in Russian with SV), but in air force, navy, strategic forces etc.
Moreover: this 1 million was all what Putin and thus the Ministry of Defence in Moscow have authorised the VSRF to have. And it is a nominal- but no real figure. As can be read here, as of 2020–2021, the real figure was closer to around 780,000. In total, and in all the branches.
Sure, the VSRF was having an annual intake of around 280,000 recruits. However, it never happened that all of these signed to serve as ‘kontraktniki’ — as professional soldiers. The number varied from year to year, but not even 50% of them did. Even less so did they all sign to serve in the SV/ground forces, and especially not in infantry.
That’s why at the start of Putin’s (re)invasion of Ukraine, in February last year, the SV — again: the Russian ground forces — went into the war with about 260,000 troops.
Mind: Putin and his Keystone Cops in Moscow were perfectly aware of this fact, and that already since years. They have repeatedly attempted to find a cheap and working solution. They launched that project for providing military training to the members of the Russian Cossack Association; then created the Rosgvardia; then began creating PMCs by hiring from the FSB and the Paratroopers Association…. and, when the GenStab became displeased and refused to officially legalise the existence of the PMCs (probably because Putin subjected the PMCs to Rosgvardia’s control, which in turn meant the top brass of the VSRF wasn’t getting any share from the resulting business), the VSRF created the BARS system. Essentially, this did the same the PMCs were doing: hiring people fresh out of national service, especially those who didn’t want to serve regularly in the VSRF but lacked education and thus prospects in civilian life.
Even this didn’t solve the problem: the VSRF remained so short on troops that when it (re)invaded Ukraine, in February 2022, the mass of its 170+ famed ‘battalion tactical groups’ (BTGs) were consisting of crews manning vehicles meant to transport or support infantry into combat, but without carrying any infantry. Because there was none to carry. Instead of counting 600–1000 troops, average BTG went into this war with 400–500 troops — if lucky enough to have as many — and all of them were busy serving vehicles and heavy weaponry. There was no infantry to protect these.
The balance of force were support troops: clerks, maintenance personnel, supply personnel, or troops serving in railway brigades. Troops, military personnel: yes, but no ‘trigger pullers’.
It wasn’t that much better in regards of the Spetsnaz and the VDV. Units sent to assault Kyiv on 24 February, for example, had all t be ‘beefed up’ through attachment of ‘mini-BTG’s from the Redut/Redut-Antiterror PMC . Redut is one of little-known Russian PMCs, and then one working closely with the VDV.
Now, one can quarrel the whole day, week, month, probably a year too — over the issue of how many casualties the VSRF suffered by March, or May, or June or August 2022. Some say this, others say that, and everybody has his/her own reasons why to insist on their figures. Some are going to present perfectly valid numbers, based on some of (rare, very, very rare) related documentation from official Russian sources. And some say the Russians didn’t lose anywhere as many as claimed by Ukraine and West…
I’m not even going to try getting involved in that discussion. Lets say it doesn’t matter. What does matter is that, no matter what reason, the SV was down to perhaps 60% of troops with which it went into the war already as of May 2022. It was so short on troops that the Keystone Cops found no other solution but to officially legalise the PMCs, on condition of these subjecting themselves to their control. That’s what brought Wagner to the scene in Popasna of that month (and then supported by about 70% of VSRF’s artillery deployed in Ukraine).
Around the same time, the GenStab began deploying BARS and Rosgvardia on quiet sectors of the frontline, too: indeed, by August 2022, large parts of the frontline in ‘quiet’ sectors like eastern Kharkiv were held by BARS units.
This is what Ukrainians have exploited to their advantage and why they were able to run that successful, high-speed counteroffensive that brought them all the way to Svatove and Kremina in western Luhansk: except for the (already battered) 1st Guards Tanks Army — which almost became encircled by the Ukrainian rush on Kupyansk — here were no bigger, regular VSRF units behind that frontline thinnly occupied by the BARS and Rosgvardia.
Sure, amid much ado, the Keystone Cops then brought in that famed III Army Corps into Ukraine, and additional BARS units distinguished themselves while fighting in the Kremina area. However, by then it was too late: the collapse of the frontlines in eastern Kharkiv forced the VSRF to re-deploy whatever reinforcements it had to that area. In turn, it couldn’t continue supporting troops in Kherson: they had to withdraw while Putin was left without solution but to, once again, break his own word and announce a mobilisation, in late September.
Now, at the start of that mobilisatin we’ve seen the Keystone Cops announcing the mobilisation of 300,000, 500,000, 1,000,000 reservists. However, and as usually: these are nominal — and very much theoretical — figures. No real numbers. Fact is: the VSRF might have lots of generals, but it does not have junior officers, nor non-commissioned officers (corporals, sergeants etc.), and even less so technicians with skills necessary to maintain the necessary equipment, plus to command and control such a huge number of troops. It has barely enough to control, equip, and train an intake of about 280,000 new recruits a year. Mind: 280,000 a year. Not in a month, and not in six months.
And then mind: alone the process of handing out uniforms and gear to, say, a company of 60–100 troops, can easily take a full day. Then increase that to, say, 10,000, 20,000 troops… to 280,000 troops…. That’s ‘taking ages’, and the troops in question are only going to wear uniforms when this process is over: they’ll still be far away from being formed into coherent units, then trained to operate their personal firearms (assault rifles, pistols etc.), or learn to use their gear. That’s what soldiers usually learn to do in so-called ‘boot camps’: the first 4–8 weeks of their basic training once they join any armed forces. It is only at that point in time they might be properly organised into units and start their tactical training…
Therefore, all those panicking in expectation of ‘Putin now deploying 500,000 mobiks’ to Ukraine: please, keep it cool. Five months since the September-mobilisation, the Keystone Cops might have managed to accept an intake of about 150,000 reservists. Thousands of these have already been, literally, shot away: they were unlucky enough to have been rushed to the frontlines back in late September and through October 2022, with no training at all. They merely received their uniforms, were organised into platoons and companies, perhaps received few hours of training on their fire-arms, and were then rushed into combat. The subsequent ‘two waves’ were slightly luckier for they received at least some more training before being sent into combat — just in time to replace those kontraktniki whose contracts were about to expire between November 2022 and February 2023, or those recruits that signed for a 12-month contract, last year in February-March.
Bottom line: the mobilisation of September 2022 was enough to bring the troop strength of the SV/VSRF in Ukraine back to around 250,000 — so that the force become capable of running limited offensives once again. That’s exactly what it is doing these days.
Major difference to the times of April-June 2022: the mass of these troops are older — and thus less fit — than the youngsters they’re replacing, and nowadays they have to make do with obsolete equipment drawn from the mothballs, and on which they have received the absolute minimum of training.
This is so because the ‘regular’ SV lost or wore out — or whatever else you prefer to name it — over 60% of its ‘best’ equipment: MBTs, IFVs, APCs, and — especially — the artillery it brought to Ukraine at the start of the war. Moreover, the mobiks have received far less training than the kontraktniki: the first wave has got only a few days; the latest (for example those assigned to the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division while this was undergoing re-builting in Belarus, this January) something like 4–5 weeks.
Ask any serious military officer: that’s barely enough to put uniforms and boots on them, shoot few selfies about them complaining about all the chaos, lack of equipment and training, and then make battalions into which they’re organised (and which then were used to ‘re-build old VSRF units’) capable of defending some hill or village. It is far cry from what would be necessary to make them capable of running big-style offensive operations.
….and no 15 Gerasimovs and 30 Surovikins can change anything about this (except yell and course).
All of this, plus what I’ve mentioned in my last report, is why I do not expect any kind of ‘500,000 Russian troops’, and even less so ‘even bigger Russian offensives’ in the coming days. The VSRF simply has no troops and no expertise to do such things — and this is not going to change even should its support services (critically understaffed already before the war) find a way to really ‘re-equip’ it with 3,000 or 4,000 or 5,000 tanks taken out of mothballs.
As usually, I can be entirely wrong: but, you’ve all asked, and that’s what I can say on basis of the info available to me.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Back to ‘what really matters’…
Essentially, ‘rumour has it’ that ‘a lot is going on’ — so much so that I have no doubt that Gerasimov’s ‘biiig’ offensive is in full swing, meanwhile (as confirmed here too). Just, both sides are providing extremely few details. Guess, it’s bad days with heavy casualties for both sides…
Kupyansk…the Russians claim to be advancing on Kupyansk from north-eastern direction, and to have secured Synkivka, about 6–7km out of the town, capturing two Ukrainian IFVs, including the ex-VSRF BMP-2 on the photo below.
Kremina… the Russians are claiming to be ‘approaching Torske’ — and that for, meanwhile, some 3–4 days. Furthermore, they claim to be advancing from Dibrova for Yampil — and that for at least 3–4 days, too. Some of their videos of destroyed or captured Ukrainian positions are not particularly nice, and certainly indicating at least some advance. Just: how much, that’s unclear. Foremost: I do not see why should they manage to achieve something special in this area now, if they’ve failed to achieve the same with much more of much better troops and equipment while facing much weaker Ukrainian defences, back in June-July the last year?
Siversk….the Russians are claiming to have forced Ukrainians out of Bilohorivka (the one on the Siversky Donets) and to be in the process of assaulting Serebyanka and from Verkhnokamyanka in direction of Siversk. This is making me experience a sort of de-ja-vu: weren’t they ‘assaulting’ and ‘liberating’ all these places back in June-July the last year….? One way or the other: the fighting is bitter and going on, but I’ve found no evidence for any kind of Russian advance (yet?).
Soledar…. Whatever is going on in the Siversk area, is certainly not pleasant for the ZSU because of the Russian presence in the outskirts of Mykolaivka and Fedorivka, two villages along that fateful Road T0513. At least the Soledar Debating Club has closed its ranks and stopped the Russian advance, primarily thanks to some highly effective counter-battery fire (followed by 43rd Artillery’s ‘fire for effect’ with 2S7s calibre 203mm)… Of interest is that the VSRF has already engaged its ‘operational reserve’ for this sector. This is the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division, which was in a waiting position behind the Wagner and the 7th VDV Division, expecting to exploit the penetration of the Ukrainian frontline. That was already some 4–5 days ago, and gauging by the fact that nobody is complaining about something like ‘20th GMRD ante portas’ of Siversk, it is possible its advance has been stopped. Additinally, it seems that its mobiks are in the process of learning about precision of Ukrainian artillery (which is in the process of further improvement, thanks to service entry of the new automatic tactical management system, named Delta). Thus, the ZSU might have stabilised the situation.
Bakhmut…. North….Rybar and Wagner are claiming that the latter has managed to enter northern suburbs of Bakhmut, indeed is ‘fighting inside’ the urban area. No idea if this is truth, but it is perfectly possible: since the re-deployment of the 241st TD Brigade to the Soledar sector, this area was defended by the 118th TD- and the 4th Tank. Not a perfect combination (even if the latter has two rifle battalions, i.e. is anything else than a ‘pure’ armoured unit). Seems, the command of the 106th VDV Division, or somebody higher up the Russian chain of command, figured out the place is suitable for an assault. Now, gauging by the lack of reports from the Ukrainian side, I guess the garrison is still busy repelling that attack, but at least there are no reports about the Russians reaching the M03 highway: on the contrary, even the Russians are stressing that this is used for (qute) ‘arrival of significant Ukrainian reinforcements’….
Bakhmut…East… reportedly, an all-out Russian attack into the eastern outskirts of the town is going on for three days now, and both sides are fighting with everything available. Except for such short video-reports like this one, indicating massive volumes of the Russian shelling, there are no details, though.
Bakhmut…South…about four days ago, the 98th VDV Division has attacked at the joint of the frontlines between the Dudayev Regiment and the 3rd Assault Brigade, west of Opytne, on the southern fringes of Bakhmut. That attack apparently took Ukrainians by surprise and managed to force them back by about 500 metres, right to the southern edge of Bakhmut. Ever since, the 3rd Assault is reporting bitter combat, but nothing else: the Russian claims about ‘surrounding’ that Ukrainian unit belong within realms of fantasy, though.
Further south/south-west: Rybar claims Wagner and VDV have secured ‘that hill’ west of Klishchivka and then reached the outskirts of Ivanivske and Supochky, and other Russians are claiming they have the ‘fire-control’ over the T0504 west of the place they call ‘Krasnoe’ (is that Ivanivske?), but yet other Russians say they’ve failed to secure that hill and are still some 500–600 metres short of the T0504, and well outside either, Ivanivske or Stupochky. Ukrainians are only reporting that they’re fighting back with all means on hand, and that the Russians are not operating in ‘waves’ any more, but running relentless assaults, some of which are lasting 10 hours.
Marinka… the Russians have entirely re-focused on attacking south of the completely ruined town. Indeed, the last 5–6 days they’ve spent lots of troops to attack in direction of Pobjeda, further south — and are attacking in that direction ever since. So far, without any meaningful success.
Vuhledar… until 3 February, the Russians were attacking, and attacking and attacking — but always in small groups: say, 12–15 mobiks, supported by 2–3 MBTs and 3–5 IFVs. All of these have ended this way, and thus the VSRF suffered an additional loss of over 50 MBTs, IFVs, and APCs in this battle, yesterday and today. A few of ‘Marines’ from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were captured by Ukrainians, too.
Late on 4 February, ZSU’s M142s or M270s have scored another ‘killer hit’: this time they blew up a complex of buildings in Kyrylivka, used to house reinforcements moving in direction of Vuhledar. Ukrainians are reporting ’30–200 killed’, while all of Russia is zip-lip about this affair.
Ever since, Separatists deployed south of Vuhledar are reporting massive Ukrainian reinforcements and probing attacks n their positions: indeed, they are concerned ZSU is preparing a major attack. Hm… from what I can recall, the Russians are announcing another ‘major Ukrainian offensive’ in southern Zaporizhzhya for some 5–6 months now. Thus, and as so often, we’ve got to wait and see.