Ukraine War, 5 July 2024: Fish rots from the Head, Part 1

Good evening, everybody!

(…and good morning for those who are going to read this in the morning…!)

It’s been a few days since my last update, plus there are is a number of topics to discuss. Thus, let me get straight to the point.

(Note: due to different issues, had to delete the original version of this post, and re-post it again.)

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Up front, and amid the visit of three Ukrainian officials in Washington, and pending several other major meetings between different Western and Ukrainian talking-heads, these days, think I must caution and observe, dear Ukrainians: I’m joining those who say you need not expecting any kind of an ‘invitation’ to NATO.

That is not going to happen. At least not yet.

For the start… of course, NATO is going to repeat its statements that it’s fully supporting Ukraine, and related arrangements, and that Ukraine’s future is in NATO, and the other, usual blah-blah… But, eventually, they’re also going to add that this will be possible ‘only once conditions are met’, and add a list of explanations probably ending with something like, ‘too much corruption’.

Make no mistake: it’s not just about corruption; it’s a lot about politics and strategy, systemic incompetence and resulting hesitance, too. If nothing else, there’s at least as much corruption within NATO as there is within Ukraine.

It’s just less obvious.

But, there are other – ‘actual’ – reasons atop of that, and then some for which I’m having a growing feeling are making plenty of NATO-members ‘allergic’ about the ZSU. This is not entirely easy to explain: unsurprisingly (at least for me), it took me a few days to think about the following and start formulating it…

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The principal problem between ‘NATO’ (but especially the US-Americans, British and few other, similar people there) and the ZSU is something called the ‘mindset’.

You know, it’s one thing if Colonel-General Syrsky is a ‘maverick’, and wouldn’t let American and other Western wiseacres mess around with his selection of the staff, planning and conduct of operation.

However, ‘devil is in the detail’, as they say. And that’s when I start discussing an entirely different thing.

For example, Western generals might be even more corrupt than Ukrainian (just check how many of them end serving as ‘board members’ of different corporations and think-tanks upon their retirement from military life). But, they generally tend to dislike the ‘inflation’ on awards like ‘Hero of Ukraine’ within ranks of top ZSU commanders- which, BTW, Zelensky seems to be distributing like if they would be morning papers.

Fact is: there are no similar practices in the West. And, hand on heart: why should somebody be awarded ‘Hero of Ukraine’ for, just for example, ‘commanding the defence of Kyiv’? ….or (and, probably, more to the point, right now; see below why): ‘commanding the defences of Odesa’?

Sure, nowadays ‘there are no sanctuaries’, as they say in NATO: no place behind the frontline is any safer than directly on the frontline. That’s so because an opponent like the Russians can, as obvious from the last few months, ‘hit some place 70-100km behind the frontline’ – precisely, without any forewarning, and with ease (by Iskander ballistic missiels, for example). And heaven only knows how many of Ukrainian command posts have been blasted away over the last two years…

Still, in the West, ‘something like the norm’ in such cases is to decorate ‘troops’. Not commanders. ‘Troops’, like officers and other ranks of the 72^nd Mechanised for their heroic stand at Moshchun… and then in Vuhledar, too. Or those of the 1^st Tank at Chernihiv. Or like officers and other ranks of the 58^th Motorised, for their fantastic defence at the Desna, Nizhyn or Pryluki… to name another, next-to-unknown example etc. (and examples are really countless; these are just a few coming to my mind right away).

Instead, take a closer look around who’s earning ‘Hero of Ukraine’ in Ukraine, and for what.

Perhaps the worst example might become the issue that’s ‘topical’ since around 24 June this year, when President Zelensky - pay attention: Zelensky, not Colonel-General Syrsky (though, I hope, Zelensky did so with Syrsky’s agreement) - fired the ZSU’s commander of Joint Forces, Lieutenant-General Yuriy Sodol (BTW, yet another general awarded the ‘Hero of Ukraine’…)

But, let me start with the start.

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For two years already, I’m asking around, who was responsible for commanding the ZSU in southern Ukraine, back in February 2022? - and, ‘skillfully’, establishing exactly zero (in digits: 0) defences at the Crimean isthmus – and thus letting the Russians capture the Nova Kakhovka dam and Melitopol within 24 hours of starting all-out invasion, Kherson within some 60 hours of starting the all-out invasion, landing at Berdyansk and driving into the back of the Mariupol garrison?

By now it’s clear that it was nobody less than Zelensky who waved away all the US and British warnings – ‘for political reasons’. However, irrespective of Zelensky’s hesitance, it was the job of the ZSU to act. To deploy brigades there, construct fortifications and prevent a quick Russian advance into southern Ukraine. And yet, it didn’t. As a result, the Russians not only grabbed so much terrain (nearly all of Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhya), but: by now, my estimate is that a total of Ukrainian ground troops and equipment worth at least an entire mechanised brigade, if not two, plus something like two regiments of ground-based air defences were captured or killed in a matter of 36-48 hours.

At first, the explanations I’ve got to hear from Ukraine were like, ‘after the war’. Then the war went on and these switched to, ‘it was the SBU’ (as if the SBU would be in charge of the ZSU, which it is simply not), and then the ‘SBU is investigating’. And, as reported earlier, the SBU was ‘investigating’, and that so much that it ended interrogating sergeants and similar ranks (i.e. non-commissioned officers)….like if these would be commanding brigades or even bigger formations, and deciding where is which going to be deployed…

Nope. To make this clear, once and for all: the only body responsible for where is what ZSU unit deployed is the GenStab-U.

….and so it took until June this year for complaints from multiple directions – for example from the member of parliament Maryana Bezuhla, and the chief-of-staff 12^th National Guard Azov Brigade, Major Bohdan Krotevych, to start focusing on ‘Hero of Ukraine’ Lieutenant-General Yuriy Sodol.

Then things became even more interesting. Between others, Sodol is named as ‘commander of defences of Mariupol’ (i.e. was in command of that area, back in 2022). Well, if so, he messed up, big style, already in that case.

But, that’s still not all. For me, of particular interest in Krotevych’s accusations is this statement, related to Sodol’s recent performance:

‘…while commanding the eastern front, Sodol ordered Azov to advance, even though the brigade did not have enough artillery ammunition to do so. When the soldiers refused to do so, an investigation was launched against the Azov commander.’

….and then another:

‘It bothers me that they convict battalion and brigade commanders for the loss of an observation post, but they don't convict a general for the loss of oblasts and dozens of cities and thousands of soldiers.’ 

It’s almost ‘ambient noises’ that this is another, ‘classic’ example of ‘glorious Soviet traditions’: see, generals blaming anybody else for their failures but themselves, and, when facing complaints about their own incompetence, initiating investigations about complainers…. But, pay attention at what Krotevych said: ‘Oblasts’ (districts).

That’s plural.

Means, ‘multiple oblasts’….like Kherson Oblast (almost all of which was under the Russian control from late February until November 2022), or southern Zaporizhzhya Oblast (all of which remains under the Russian control)….?

With other words: Sodol messed up by not defending the Crimean isthmus, too…

….what a surprise then, Zelensky acted promptly and on 24 June, in the light of Krotevych filling a request for the SBU to investigate Sodol, Zelensky – pay attention: Zelensky; not Syrsky (though, hopefully, with Syrsky’s agreement) – replaced Sodol by Brigadier-General Andriy Hnatov.

….and with this, we’re back to the usual results of situations of this kind in Ukraine: ‘there will be an investigation (of Sodol)’.

….which, usually, means that nothing at all is going to happen. Zelensky and the GenStab-U are going to sit out this one, like usually.

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What bothers me at least as much is that this is not the only such case. Troops of the 14^th Mechanised Brigade (deployed in the Kupyansk-Svatove area), are bitterly complaining about their commander being replaced by Brigadier-General Sydorov (on Syrsky’s order). Sydorov, so they say, is ‘ineffective in operations’, ‘reacting inadequately’ to criticism and recommendations, has caused a crisis of the unit and many troops now want to be re-assigned somewhere else.

….all of which is, once again, pointing at systemic problems in the force: there are still too many ‘Soviet-style’ officers. People who consider troops they command for ‘expendable’ and thus not the least concerned about their safety. People issuing unreasonable orders, which then result in unnecessary and pointless casualties. Incompetent generals.

….and then, there are cases like the enthusiastic and energetic commander of the 59^th Motorised Brigade, Bohdan Shevchuk, who seems to think it’s his job to remote-control every single shot his troops are firing, while (according to complaints against him) lacking skills in command of an entire brigade, and knowledge of the terrain.

Sadly, that’s simply not the way to go: one cannot appoint an officer in command of a brigade if does not know how to delegate, nor knows to trust his subordinates – but excels in appearing in two daily briefings for his superiors. And, as observed a few times already: effective company- or battalion commander is never ‘automatically’ an effective brigade commander. Finally: upper echelons must be self-critical enough to admit their own mistakes, and reverse decisions of this kind. 

In this particular case, the problem is even bigger, because there are simply no solutions for such cases (except to send the officer in question to additional training) - also because nowadays this kind of behaviour is endemic - in the politics, military and economy alike; in Ukraine, and in the ‘West’.

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….talking about the West: if we throw a look at what is often used as ‘example for what should the ZSU strive to become’ - the US Army - this is excelling in ignoring its incompetent generals (and intelligence services alike) at least since the late 1960s. Not to talk about its latest performances both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. As a consequence, there was an uproar between its mid-ranking officers, back in 2021, and many of these have quit the service. Arguably, the US Army can afford that – or at least the service still has a serious chance to reform - simply because the USA are (still) as rich as they are, and not facing a war of extermination (at least not one involving some sort of a foreign invader). Arguably, similar is valid for few other of armed forces of different NATO-members (see the Spanish ‘performance’ in Iraq, just for example; or situations with top generals in Germany and Greece).

However, this shouldn’t mean the ZSU must follow the pattern and keep its incompetent officers in their positions. On the contrary: one should hope the force can do much better.

Finally, some of these reports linked above are at least ‘distantly related’ to something like ‘general dislike’ for General Syrsky and his style of command. As should be obvious by now, Syrsky – who was in command of ZSU’s ground forces (‘army’) already since 2019 – and his staff of new commanders of different sub-branches, does seem to have instilled a lots of discipline within the ranks over the last few months. That far, everything was OK. However, and just like Zaluzhny before him, although meanwhile the Commander-in-Chief of the entire armed forces of Ukraine, he’s still taking no steps to sort out the incompetents. At least not on his own: in most of cases, he (and Zelensky) are re-acting, instead of acting.

For this, there is simply no excuse: one can’t keep people like Sodol or Sydorov in position and expect the situation to get better – because the experience in this regards is that it can’t get better if the same people are still in the same positions.

….and please mind: even if Ukraine would join NATO, ‘tomorrow in the morning, at 09.01hrs’, no ‘NATO’ is ever going to replace any incompetent ZSU general. Only the ZSU (and the PSU) can do so. In this regards, nobody can help Ukraine.

So, if Ukrainians are doing nothing, then what shall NATO do?

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….and that’s just the ‘examples that became public now’. Tragically, there are many others. Another one coming to my mind… well, I admit: I’m lacking the insights (people are really ‘zip-lip’ about the following), and thus I’ll leave out dates and names or many other details…. but, that (notorious) itch in my small toe is telling me that perhaps the second worst example is yet another brigade-commander.

In dozens of Western descriptions of what was going on in Ukraine on 24 February, one Western Experte after the other is praising the ZSU and PSU for ‘dispersing’, and that already before the opening Russian blow. Ho-hum… well, alone after reading dozens of related accounts meanwhile published in the Ukrainian media, I could offer dozens of examples where this was not the case.

Indeed, precisely that was the case with the unit commanded by the commander in question. Essentially, his unit started the war by getting caught by the Russians while still in its base. As result, it lost precious men and equipment to missile strikes within first minutes of the all-out invasion. People died.

What happened? Was he fired? Nope.

‘Instead’, he had one of his subordinates decorated ‘Hero of Ukraine’ for something the officer in question certainly never manged to do. As next, the commander in question ‘earned’ himself the same title (‘Hero of Ukraine’) for supposedly…. ahem… shooting three… ‘Russian somethings’. Until today, there is no evidence he’s shot anything at all (and in this war, there’s meanwhile really material evidence for everything….especially something that should’ve happened in a densely populated part of Ukraine…..). Moreover, when, apparently, somebody else then killed one of his subordinates in a blue-on-blue accident, he had the latter (the officer killed in the accident in question) decorated with the same title, too… and then yet another officer from the same unit was killed, but promptly decorated, and then re-decorated again, few days later – and that for things that simply couldn’t happen (not even physically).

….and then the entire affair was rapidly swept under a carpet, because everybody involved is (i.e.: most of them ‘was’) was meanwhile ‘Hero of Ukraine’…so much so the unit in question must be one of highest-decorated in all of Ukraine (or: better said: its command staff and officers killed in action became the highest-decorated group of Ukrainian military officers)… and then, and until this very day people are wondering how then comes an asset commanded by so many heroes gets blasted by the Russians and is losing yet more of precious equipment at every opportunity…

Sure, US generals (just to name the perhaps ‘most obvious example’) do not mind if one of their…officers in similar position (like the above-mentioned Ukrainian brigade-commander) ‘overclaims a bit’ and ends being credited with ‘three kills’, while actually scoring just one. When one checks with them in person, and privately, they even admit this (both the generals and the officer in question).

But, decorating top commanders with ‘Hero of the Country’ – and that for obviously unsubstantiated overclaiming…?

Sorry, but for Western officers that consider themselves ‘cool and calculated professionals’ – that’s so ‘Soviet style’, something making them so ‘allergic’, can’t say. It’s like if they would have to deal with Leonid Brezhnev or Yuri Andropov, in person, and not with Generals like Syrsky…

….not only a ‘red line’, but a ‘red cloth directly in front of their nose’.

Those that might have a problem understanding this… well, put yourself into shoes of those ‘NATO generals’: how are they supposed to ‘talk business’ with some Ukrainian…erm… (must omit the rank and unit-designation) …‘unit commander’, wearing the title ‘Hero of Ukraine’ - but for completely unsubstantiated reasons, and that while they (‘NATO generals’) know it?

How shall they ask that officer for advice - or listen to his demands for specific kind of equipment, just for example - if they can’t take him seriously?

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Overall, dear Ukrainians, by all respect that’s due for the ZSU, your heroic troops, and the majority of their commanders (and, have no doubt: there’s a lot that is due, especially for mid-, lower-ranking-, and non-commissioned officers and other ranks of the ZSU!!!), but ‘the fish (does) rot(s) from the head’, and unless at least the majority of cases of this kind are sorted out, once and for all… sorry, there are always going to be not just a ‘few’ of ‘NATO generals’ braking admission of your country to their (‘holy’ and ‘so clean they can work in white gloves’) alliance.

….and your armed forces are going to continue experiencing major problems with mobilisation, too.

(….to be continued…)