Ukraine War, 5–6 September 2022: Ukrainian Attacks in Kherson Oblast
Good morning everybody!
Good morning everybody!
It was hard, very, very hard, to hold back and not to report anything at all….or at least next to nothing…the last two days. Thus, let me get straight to the point.
Ah yes…. I can’t. Before I go on, three things I do think I have to bring back to the minds of specific characters that are going to read this:
The number of trolling attempts in ‘reader’s reactions’ increased significantly, the last few days. All trolls are blocked without further discussion, and as soon as I find the few minutes necessary to do so. All whataboutists and online-psychoanalysts are blocked: be sure, I’m not reading more than the first two-three words of your nonsense. All ‘reactions’ starting in style of, ‘and who are you to dare…’ — are blocked, too. No time to explain myself again and again, just because somebody is too ignorant. If you want to discuss ‘war’, do so: explain your point, show your evidence. If not, I’m not forcing you to read nor even to think about what I’m posting.
Today’s summary is going to be (very) unfair: it’s going to focus on the fighting in Kherson Oblast, ‘only’ and ‘once again’. Thus, it’s going to be unfair towards those fighting elsewhere. Sorry, but there’re too many news and too little time.
As usually, the following is going to be a mix of confirmed and unconfirmed info, some RUMINT, some hear-say, and — mostly — never officially confirmed (or if, then ‘in a few weeks from now’). Therefore, some might consider it for ‘brazen’ and ‘controversial’ for me to ‘dare’ posting content of this kind. Keep in mind that getting perfect cross-confirmation still takes at least 5–10 days, while developments on the battlefield have their own speed. Thus, whoever prefers to take the following with a ‘truckload’ of salt (not just a ‘pinch’), fine with me. Serious, constructive corrections are always welcome, but single-liners stressing ‘you’re wrong’ are not impressing me.
KHERSON
North
As reported earlier, on the morning of 4 September, it was ‘game over’ for the last VDV unit still holding out in southern Vysokopillya. After the failure of the BTG 126th Coastal Defence Brigade to recover Potomkyne and Olhyne from the Ukrainian 60th Brigade and thus secure a safe land connection to them, it was on a BTG of the Wagner PMC to help evacuate them. The Wagner reported they’ve managed to ‘unblock’ the company and extract it, but Ukrainians have still shown several photos of Russian troops captured there, and at least a few of knocked out MBTs and IFVs.
By that time, the Russian operations in Olhyne, Vysokopillya, and Potomkyne served the purpose of holding action, for they were in the process of losing all their strongholds further east, including Novovoznesenske, Myroliubivka, Petrivka, and Khreschenivka — and withdrawing to a new ‘line’, running — approximately — from Starosillya to Chereshneve, Novovoskresenske, Bilyaivka, Ukrainka, to Shevhenkivka… Only Arhanhelske still held: Ukrainians were (and still are) inside, but, apparently, still not in control of the place.
So far, everything was ‘still under control’ — wasn’t it for a new problem in the east. The ‘defeated/destroyed’ (your choice) Ukrainian 128th Mountain Assault was already in the process of assaulting Khreschenivka and Shevchenivka. Probably in cooperation with another ZSU unit (Ukrainians do not attack if they can’t mount a two-prong attack), it mauled a BTG of the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade and by-passed its remaining positions, somewhere in between of Zolota Balka and Mykhailivka. RUMINT had it Ukrainians have actually reached the area in between Ukrainka and Novooleksandrivka, as of yesterday morning — leaving the HQ XX Army Corps without a choice but to evacuate what was left of the 83rd over the Dnipro River.
Perhaps as a ‘confirmation’ for this, rumours surfaced later during the 5 September, about the South OSK rushing two BTGs in direction of Nova Kakhovka: one from Nyzhni Sirohozy (southern Zaporizhzhya), the other from the occupied Crimea via Preobrazhenka…
Centre
I haven’t got a trace of clue why is the ZSU still investing in this area: to me that’s not making sense. However, I have no approach to considerations of the South OK, its thinking and planning — nor do I know anybody else who does. Can only guess that, considering what’s going on on other sectors of this battlefield, Ukrainians are ‘happy’ to keep the Russians obsessed with the Inhulets Bridgehead and prompting them into yet additional counterattacks.
See, ‘hold them by the nose, kick them in the…’ principle.
And indeed, at least according to the Keystone Cops in Moscow, this is the only section of the frontline in Kherson Oblast worth paying attention. Perhaps this is so because the Wagner reports no air- and no artillery support for the northern section, whatsoever….?
At least there’s meanwhile a clear pattern in the Russian reactions to developments there: they lose another place, do not mention this, but then stress they’re ‘counterattacking and destroying’, big style. ….and that everything is fine — because they can show some visual evidence of destroyed or captured Ukrainian IFVs (is certainly going to make the HNA in Wiener Neustadt happy). Indeed, according to a few of the Russian talkingheads in the social media, they’ve ‘destroyed’ the entire bridgehead three times over by now…
Contrary to the Sector North, the VKS is, reportedly, very active there. On 4 and 5 September its spray and pray raids were reported from Sukhy Stavo and Bila Krymytsia.
Meanwhile, Ukrainians not only liberated Blahodativka, but punched through in the south-east and liberated Kostromka, further widening the bridgehead. Of course, the Russians are counterattacking and everything is fine…
South
The situation in the south is meanwhile reminding of a naval battle in which one side is limited to holding ‘islands’, and the other to ‘manoeuvring its fleet in between these islands’. For better understanding of that, check my explanations posted few days ago (Manoeuvre Warfare for Beginners). These ‘islands’ are villages fortified by the Russians: they are ‘surrounded’ by Ukrainians manoeuvring into their flanks and the rear. What is holding the Russian ‘frontline’ together is the VSRF’s artillery: its actions are frequently pinning down or forcing Ukrainians to withdraw — or to advance — in order to avoid.
Mind that the Russian military doctrine is emphasising attack/initiative to the degree where it can be said ‘attack is all the VSRF can really do’. Even the Russian defensive tactics consists of counterattacks, or at least measures aimed to enable a quick counterattack and regaining the initiative (this is why not only the Keystone Cops in Moscow, but also all of their talkingheads are as obsessed with declaring Ukrainian offensive for ‘failed’, and claiming ‘counterattaks’). However, they are good at constructing extensive fortifications, too. Foremost, they aren’t of the kind who’s going to fold and run away when attacked, regardless how ‘low’ their morale might be: the mass of their troops is fatalist enough to follow orders no matter what is happening to their left or right. So also orders for counterattacks on ruins of another village, lost and recovered three-four times before. Unsurprisingly, there are lots of reports about deep penetrations by the ZSU, lots of reports about places changing hands few times, but little in sense of tangible evidence for actual liberation of one or another locality.
What can be deducted from bits and pieces reported by most diverse instances, is something like this (as always, from north towards south):
Blahodatne: Ukrainian
Kyselivka (the one on the Inhulets): Russian
Vavylove & Tsentralne: Russian
Shmidtove: Ukrainian (was the centre of the Russian 2nd Line of defence)
Novokyika: Russian
Ljubomyrivka: Ukrainian
Ternovy Pody: Ukrainian
Zeleny Hai: Ukrainian
Barvinok: Ukrainian
Kruty Yar: contested
Kyselivka (the one near M14): contested (and bitterly at that)
Soldatske: Ukrainian
Pravdyne: Ukrainian
Parysheve: Ukrainian
Oleksandriva (the one on the coast): Ukrainian
Amid reports about the Russians recovering Tomyna Balka, on 4 September (‘confirmed’ by Ukrainians then shelling the local ammo depot, which was still burning as of this morning), the ‘most spectacular’ was the RUMINT from the morning of 5 September along which Bilozerka is under Ukrainian control.
Before you burst into, ‘Tom, now you’re completely insane’: considering what I’ve described above, I’ve got no doubts Ukrainians do have the ‘liberty’ to drive one or another or their units ‘in between’ the local Russian strongholds, all the way that deep: can’t say if they’ve really liberated the place, because there’s no evidence they did, though.
….but if they did, they’ve driven deep into the southern flank of the Russian ‘Fort Chornobaivka’ (which is including Kherson International). I call it that way for…. sigh… see the photos below, they’re explaining everything.
Rear
By now it’s undisputable that the Russians have abandoned the idea of constructing a barge bridge next to the Antonovsky Road Bridge. The latter is under such a murderous Ukrainian artillery fire, that they have entirely re-focused on keeping their ferries nearby operational. Is crucial for keeping their troops in Kherson supplied. Well, nobody said the life of a Russian military engineer is easy — or precious…
A note for the End of this Summary
Those serious enough in monitoring this war might want to understand the level of Russian dependence on the Western high-tech, too. For all such cases, I cannot but recommend checking this Twitter-thread
https://twitter.com/damspleet/status/1566413646854602753
It’s providing undisputable confirmation for Western IT being used in 3M14 Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, Ka-52 helicopters, even in such ‘old’ precision guided ammunition like Kh-59 (where I must admit, yes, ‘even I’ am surprised that such old, Soviet-times technology still needs Western high-tech to work, nowadays).
‘Best’ of all is: the Russians are using exactly the same components in all of these weapons systems.
Should be funny for all those still insisting on ‘Russian weapons are better’ — and still buying them: actually, they’re still buying Western high-tech…Pity, potential readers in most of such countries are blocked from access to Medium.com.