Ukraine War, 5–6 May 2022
Good morning everybody!
Good morning everybody!
STATEGIC
There’s now evidence that, hard on heels of deploying its recently delivered 155mm howitzers, Ukraine began using British-made, ground-launched Brimstone 1 guided missiles against the RFA. At least the Russian troops were able to recover the wreckage of one (after it hit them).
The Switchblade loitering PGMs are now in use by Ukraine, too.
AIR
Since 4 May, the Ukrainian Air Force is ‘back’ and flying at least 10 air strikes a day, primarily targeting forward ammunition depots of the RFA in eastern Ukraine. Sadly, Kyiv is not releasing any related details in this regards though. The Russians have claimed two as shot down but actually — and slowly, very slowly — they are beginning to realise that their ‘aerial dominance/supremacy’ is ‘not so complete’.
In turn, on 5 and 6 May, particularly vivid activity of the RFA was reported from the southern front. For example, Hulaipole was hit by several air strikes. The VKS seems to be deploying Su-34s to bomb, and Su-35S as top cover — both against the threat of Ukrainian interceptors and ground-based air defences.
Late on 5 May, Ukraine was hit by another wave of cruise missiles. At least one hit an unknown object in Ochakiv, in the Mykolaiv region; one crashed into an empty field in the Pokrovske (Dnipropetrovsk region).
On 5 May, a cruise missile was shot down in the Odessa area, and a Su-30SM was claimed shot down over the ‘eastern front’; on 6 May, one cruise missile was shot down in the Mykolaiv region, and one near Bilhorod-Dnistorvsky, in the Odessa region. Two others have hit… ‘something’… in the Odessa region but no casualties were reported.
Several videos — like this one — all taken in Belarus have appeared on the social media, shown the start of 1–2 missiles of the Russian S-400 SAM-system deployed outside Zyabrovka. Apparently, these were launched at a target in the Russian airspace, well to the east. No idea what it was.
Note: by now, the Russians should have destroyed or damaged over 400 medical facilities in Ukraine, including dozens of hospitals and clinics. Especially in eastern Ukraine, there is meanwhile no treatment for cancer patients, next to no insulin for diabetes patients, there’s a shortage of antibiotics, and no way to perform surgery. All of this because of the Russian occupation, and because the Russians remain preoccupied with organising their ‘Ruble zone’, rather than taking care about the people.
NAVAL
Yesterday, I’ve reported about Ukrainian claims that a Project 11356P/Burevestnik/Admiral Grigorovich-class guided missile frigate Admiral Makarov was attacked and hit by a Neptune shore-launched, anti-ship missile, while underway south of the Zmiyniy Island, only few miles outside the Romanian territorial waters. What was unclear was if the ship was really hit, and what was her fate.
AFAIK, as of this morning, there was still no reliable confirmation.
That said, there’s no doubt that the Russian garrison on the Zmiyniy is now, de-facto, under siege. And an unusual one. Over the last week, the Ukrainians used their Bayraktar UAVs to knock out all the SA-13s and SA-15s deployed there, and are now free to destroy Serena-class assault boats used to bring in supplies.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
As indicated in my last summary, starting with 2 May 2022, the Ukrainian Armed forces have launched a counteroffensive north and north-east of Kharkiv. This is where they have the advantage of a relatively secure eastern flank: this is ‘covered’ by the Siverskyi Donets River.
What is obvious — that with the Ukrainian counteroffensive — since at least three days, was meanwhile officially confirmed by the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzny, even if not by the Ukrainian GenStab. That said, by the evening of 5 May, Kyiv confirmed the liberation of Stary Saltiv (despite a Russian counterattack), and by yesterday morning, Kyiv confirmed the liberation of Oleksandrivka (yes, there’s one in this part of Ukraine, too), Fedorivka, Ukrainka, Shestakova, and Peremoha. They might have liberated Cherkaski Tyshky, too, but it seems the Russians have counterattacked there and on Nova Dmytrivka, while Tsyrkuny and Ruski Tyshky were under the Russian control as of yesterday (6 May).
As of this morning, even the Russian social media is confirming a withdrawal of the RFA from the ‘cauldron between Tyshky and Cherkasy Tyshky’, and that they’ve withdrawn from Tsyrkuny and Liptsy.
Rather unsurprisingly considering the PRBS-barrage to which the Russian public is exposed all the time, such reports are received with surprise — even a sort of shock — in the public.
Nevertheless, the Russian artillery remains a problem — especially because it is vividly supported by short-range UAVs: about a dozen of these were claimed shot down on 5 May, and another 14 yesterday, mostly by MANPADS. The dumb — and tragic — aspect of the Russian artillery-deployment is that they are still indiscriminately shelling suburbs of Kharkiv, like Saltivka. Yesterday, they destroyed the Hryhorii Skovoroda National Museum in Zolochiv by a direct rocket strike (commemorating the Ukrainian philosopher and poet Skovoroda).
Because several people have asked: yes, I do expect this part of Ukraine to be completely liberated over the next week: the 4–5 BTGs the RFA still has east of Siverskyi Donets were badly depleted and lost their capability to run offensive operations already weeks ago. By now, they have lost their capability to run effective defence operations too: without artillery support, they could not run even local counterattacks of the kind they’re still running (in order to slow down the Ukrainian advance).
What is scary is what the Ukrainian troops are finding in the wake of the RFA. Think that something like ‘utmost devastation’ is the best description. On their retreat, the Russians have blown up at least three bridges, they have looted all the farms and destroyed them, and I haven’t seen a single house or apartment building remaining intact on any of videos taken on the liberated territories. What happened with civilians during the two months of occupation… sigh… On the positive side, the RFA is leaving behind lots of destroyed vehicles, and dozens of troops that are captured.
South-east of Kharkiv…
On 5 May, the RFA launched one more attempt to breach the Ukrainian frontline protecting the Izium-Slovyansk road, but this was repelled. Ever since, there is a growing number of reports indicating some sort of Ukrainian counteroffensive from this area. No details are available yet.
Further east… I must admit, I’m not sure any more who is holding what in between, say, Krymky, Shandryholove (both of which should still be under Ukrainian control, even if under Russian assault), Lyman and Kremina: one report is contradicting the other. ‘Problem’: the Russians are said to have constructed a pontoon bridge over the Siversky Donets somewhere in the Kremina area. No idea where, but: if they have constructed a pontoon bridge, then they have a bridgehead south of the river; and, if they have a bridgehead and a pontoon bridge, then there is their new Schwerpunkt, i.e. this is a major operation — because any river crossing is ‘automatically’ a major operation for any Russian military commander. Sure, the Ukrainians report to have caused massive losses — including something like 15–16 tanks each on 5 and 6 May — but we’ve seen how such situations ‘with RFA and pontoon bridges’ end, about a month ago, south of Izium: back then, this meant the Russians have breached the frontline, even if one of Ukrainian counterattacks went all the way to their two pontoon bridges, holding them up for 2–3 days…
What I am sure is that the RFA and Separatists have launched a vicious new assault on Vojevodivka, in between Rubizhne (southern side of which is still under Ukrainian control) and Severodonetsk. The Ukrainians claim to have repelled this, but ‘that itch in the small finger’ tells me the situation is much more critical than they would like to admit, i.e. that the Russians have actually reached the northern side of Severodonetsk/Sievierodonetsk (if for no other means, then because this means heavy losses for the 111th Brigade defending the town).
Talking about Ukrainain brigades: seems the unlucky 17th Tank Brigade is back to the frontline, and this time north of Popasna, which in turn means at least some part of the town is still under Ukrainian control. The Russians and Separatists are shelling ‘like mad’ and trying to mop up, the local authorities are calling for evacuation of remaining civilians.
Bottom line: obviously, what the NATO has delivered by now — in terms of artillery, first and foremost — is ‘nice’, but ‘not enough’. It’s enough to help the Ukrainians run one, limited offensive, along a frontline of some 20–40km. Nothing more. That’s too little to go on liberating any bigger parts of the East…
Ah yes, and many are asking about artillery and what difference it makes. Crucial point in a war of this kind is the ‘tonnage’. Literally: how many tones of high explosives can one side unleash upon the other — and then over what range and with what precision. The side that can hit the other with more tones of high explosives, from longer range, and with better precision is, literally, ‘murdering’ the other side. Artillery is simply the best way of delivering that ‘tonnage’ of high explosives upon the enemy: no air power, and nothing lese can match the amount of explosives artillery can deliver upon the enemy.
Over the last two months, the Ukrainians mostly used their old 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled- and D-30 towed howitzers. Both were outranged by longer-ranged Russian 2S19s, which in turn meant that most of the time they had to be on the move, in order to avoid counter-battery fire, rather than firing (whoever remains in the same place for much too long, ends like the crew of this 2S3 Akatsiya, self-propelled howitzer calibre 152mm, yesterday). NATO-made 155mm howitzers were supposed to change that and then more, because they’re firing such goodies like rocket-assisted and laser-guided shells…. Until the Russians began deploying their 2S7 Pions. Calibre? 203mm. Range? 37–47km (depending on the shell-type). I.e. that’s a weapon at least matching NATO-delivered, radar-supported howitzers calibre 155mm.
Arguably, the 2S7 might not be as precise as Western 155mm pieces, but that matters less: 203mm is a big calibre and when that is deployed against some area, the targeted side can’t do much — but lay down inside its bunkers or trenches, take cover and pray. ‘Even’ if one is not directly hit, the experience is nerve-wrecking: minutes-long barrages can disable plenty of troops even if not killing or wounding anybody. People get shocked to the degree where they are unable to fight for hours. That’s why artillery remains ‘effective’ even when not particularly precise.
MARIUPOL
On 5 May, the ‘third stage’ of the UN-mediated evacuation of civilians from Mariupol has been completed. AFAIK, about 500 have left the city, including about 200 from the Azovstal complex. Another 50 were evacuated on 6 May, but then the Russians violated the cease-fire and opened fire at one of vehicles as this was picking civilians: they killed one of Ukrainian soldiers, and wounded six others.
As far as I can assess, the Russians now actually have only two or three BTGs in the city, all consisting of Separatists and busy assaulting the Azovstal. Inside, nearly all of the defenders have been wounded at least once; indeed, many are fighting although wounded, and their primary problem remains the supply with fresh water. Still, they’re not only holding their positions, but occasionally running minor raids, with the aim of capturing arms, ammunition, food and whatever else they can find in the Russian trenches.
SOUTH
Except for above-mentioned cruise-missile strikes, nothing to report from this part of the battlefield, except that the Russians are ‘regularly’ — though randomly — shelling Mykolaiv.