Good morning everybody!
Here’s my review for military-related developments in Ukraine of the last two days, 4 and 5 April 2022.
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
PMC — private military company/contractor
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
West OSK — Western Military District (Russia)
WIA — wounded in action
4 April was the 40th day of the Russian aggression on Ukraine. At least in the north, it was a good day for the country, too: all of RFA has withdrawn back to Belarus, all the way from Ivankiv to Shostka. As of the evening of 3 April, the 41st CAA and the 2nd GCAA have completed their pull out. This is including border crossings like Dniprovske, Dobryanka, and Hremyach. Ukrainian forces are primarily busy mopping up the forests along the border for scattered Russian troops and abandoned equipment. Ukrainian train authorities are already hard at work to repair damaged railways and — as soon as possible — restore traffic: for example, the railway to Trostianets is already back in function.
Most of RFA units withdrawn from the area north-west of Kyiv came out in a very bad shape. Just for example, a BTG of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (from Vladivostok) is known to have suffered a confirmed loss of more than 50 KIA and 110 WIA, while 220 troops were arrested for refusing to fight. The 126th Naval Infantry Brigade is said to have lost over 400 KIA, WIA and MIA. Still, the Keystone Cops in Moscow awarded both units the honorary title ‘Guards’, on 28 March.
Unsurprisingly, many of Western observers are now expecting the war to go on with a major battle in the east: actually, as the following summary is going to describe — this is already in full swing.
NORTH EAST
In the Kharkiv region, the 6th CAA is still in the process of collecting pieces of its battered units, and replacing losses with reservists. Thus, the city remains exposed to artillery barrages and air strikes, but frontlines are quiet. The whereabouts of the 92nd Mech are unknown (which is always a bad sign for the 6th CAA), but the Ukrainians have certainly deployed reinforcements for their 17th Tank in this area.
The situation is much ‘hotter’ further south-east. Over the last four days, the Russians have rushed nearly all the BTGs of the 1st GTA and the 20th CAA to the Izium area. Except for battered remnants of the 144th MRD, they now have elements of the 2nd GMRD (1st GTR), 3rd MRD (237th TR), 4th GTD (13th TR), 2–3 BTGs of the 47th GTD, a BTG from the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (this is holding Balakliya) , and at least two from the 106th Guards Airborne Division — i.e. up to 12–15 BTGs in the Izium area. An unsurprising result is a major armoured battle.
South-west of Izium, the Russians are trying to widen their penetration: as of 4 April, they have secured Protopopivka and Petrivske, and then took Brzhakivka on the T2122. However, when the 13th TR attempted to take the nearby Sulyhivka, it run into Ukrainian T-64s (17th Tank or one of units rushed from the north?): Ukrainians claim it was beaten back, while the Russians claim to have secured the village. South-east of Izium, the 237th TR is pushing along the M-03 highway in direction of Dovhenke, west of Sviatohirsk, held by the 95th Airborne. Ukrainians claim to have ambushed this BTG and caused it heavy losses. Considering extensive forests around Sviatohirsk, and good morale of their troops, I would say the 95th is likely to hold out there. Indeed, Ukrainians have released several videos, the last two days: for example, one has shown a Stugna-P-strike on a Ka-52 attack helicopter, but another two misses on Russian TOS-1 MRLS’.
However, just like the 17th Tank, 92nd Mech, and the 81st Airborne, one should keep in mind that the 95th Airborne is involved in intensive combat for 40 days already: regardless of high morale, unless all these units are significantly reinforced there remains the threat of a sudden Russian penetration on Slovyansk — which would be a catastrophe for Ukrainian units on the LOC.
EAST
The all-out offensive of the 8th CAA on the Rubizhne-Severodonetsk complex of Ukrainian defences (centred on the 79th Airborne, but including at least two other brigades, and the Donbass Regiment), on the northern flank of the LOC, began yesterday in the morning, with massive air strikes and a heavy artillery barrage. These were followed by the 6th Motor Rifle Regiment assaulting Severodonetsk from the east. That unit seems to have been stopped on approaches to Metolkine and/or Vornove. Much more threatening is the Russian push from north-west, which resulted in the capture of Bilohorivka, west of Severodonetsk.
Further south, and under similar circumstances (see: heavy air strikes followed by massive artillery barrages), the Russian 4th MRB has definitely punched through the defences of the 24th Mech, and took the train depot in the centre of Popasna. Obviously, this is no good news, then any Russian advance means that another of Ukrainian units holding the area in question has suffered heavy losses.
MARIUPOL
Getting news out of the city is ever harder: actually, while it’s ‘certain’ that the Russians are keeping the city under constant air strikes and intensive artillery barrage, attacking ‘in the east and west’, and that the 8th CAA made some ‘incremental’ gains, there seem to be no major change of the situation. Foremost, right now the best means of finding out what is going on is cross-check details about published Russian losses. That’s ‘business’ that is always taking ‘days’, literally. For example, the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (incl. 382nd and 557th Naval Infantry Battalions, plus the 542nd Airborne Reconnaissance Battalion) seems to have been taken out of the line: the unit lost its original commander (Col Aleksey Sharov, on 22 March), then his replacement (Col Vladimir Kryvolapov, on 27 March), and up to 300 KIA and WIA. Unsurprisingly, it was replaced by a BTG each from the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and, probably, the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade: at least the former is known to have already suffered several losses in Ukraine, even if it is uncertain where.
On the ‘positive’ side: with this, all the Russian naval infantry units — really: down to the last regiment and battalion — have been involved in this war, and thus any kind of amphibious landing in the Odessa area is now, definitely, out of question.
BTW, the last two days, Russian media was full of reports about a ‘capitulation’ of 250 Ukrainian Marines of the 503rd Naval Infantry Battalion in Mariupol. However, the 503rd is not even inside the city. Moreover, as several well-positioned Western observers have noted, the troops shown on the Russian TV — including numerous females, and so also in presence of Kadyrov — were not only cleanly shaven, but having full pouches. I.e. not captured recently, and not shown any sings of recent combat any more. With other words: this was another hoax. By now it’s clear that the Keystone Cops are desperate to finish off the garrison of Mariupol.
SOUTH
The 49th CAA reacted viciously to the Ukrainian attack on Olexandrivka (apparently defended by BTGs of the 34th MRB and the 56th VDV Battalion, both from the 7th VDV Division), and the battle for the village is now raging for two days. South-west of Kherson, the Ukrainians are attacking Bilozerka and Tomyna Balka (apparently defended by a BTG of the 20th GMRD). However, Ukrainians have further increased their pressure, yesterday, and heavy clashes were reported from nearly all of western and northern outskirts of Kherson, from Chornobaivka in the west, via Bysuntsi in north-west, to Zelenivka in the north. Unsurprisingly, the Russians are sending reinforcements from Sevastopol.
At least as worrisome is the rapid growth of new graves on the local graveyard: satellite photographs are shown over 800 of these over the last week…
North of Kherson, the 11th VDV Brigade and the 126th Naval Infantry Brigade are still holding a line roughly between Volodymyrivka and the Dnepr.