Ukraine War, 30 July 2023: Oldies & Boldies

Hello everybody!

Ever more of Russians are complaining that the Western media is ‘controlled’. Ironically, can only agree. Yes, it’s controlled – foremost by commercial interests, and then by private preferences. Think, I’ll address this topic separately, though: don’t want to bore you with it right now.

AIR WAR

Gauging by reports from the Russia-occupied Crimea, the PSU’s Su-24-force has survived the 4-Kinzhal-strike on its homebase in Starokostyantyiv of 26 July. Yesterday, it flew a multi-aircraft strike on the Armiansk and Chongar Road bridges, connecting the Crimea with the mainland Ukraine. Reportedly, both were hit. Precise extent of damage remains unclear, but social-media reports are indicating six hits on the Chongar bridge and interruption of the road traffic on both roadways. If Ukrainians deployed six Storm Shadows against it alone, that would require at least three Su-24Ms. The Syvash Railway Bridge (next to the Chongar Bridge) was not attacked.

More about this topic (and various of Russian claims and reports) in the coming days….

The Krim/Kerch Road Bridge is undergoing repairs, but the railway bridge is still operational.

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Relatively few reports about fighting of the last two-three days: bad weather seems to be limiting the activity on both sides. And there were some unpleasant experiences – on both sides, too….

Svatove…. Still having no first-hand sources in the area, but gauging by reports in the social media, what the Russians call ‘Karamazinovka Offensive’ is over. At least this is localising their operation to a specific area (see: the area west of Karamyznivka), and at least now their officers are busy bragging how they’ve launched their attack on 20 July - which is good, because it means they aren’t leading their troops into yet additional attacks there.

Anyay…. accordingly, then encircled and destroyed, or overrun a weak screen of the Ukrainian 15^th Mech while approaching the Zherebets River (according to their own accounts: massacring whatever wounded they’ve found); suffered ‘just a few wounded to machine gun fire and anti-personnel mines’; and then constructed a pontoon bridge there. Related accounts are usually ending on approaches to Serhivka, Nadya, and Novojehorivka…But, that’s unimportant, you know? What’s important is that all the involved Russian troops – regular personnel and mobiks – performed heroically, communications were excellent, and everybody is very experienced, of course… little surprise then, whatever one gets to hear from Ukrainian sources is that the frontline is back on Zherebets….

….thinking of it, must admit, I’m a bit confused, then initially the same Russians were bragging with the capture of the flag of the 25^th Mech, and, AFAIK, they were all the time fighting the northern flank of the 66^th Mech. But, hey: who am I to say…

A T-72 of the 2^nd Motor Rifle Brigade (VSRF) somewhere in the Zherebets area.

Bakhmut….North… word is – or was, yesterday – that the ZSU was in the process of assaulting positions of the BARS-29 and the Potok PMC (Gazprom-owned), somewhere north-east of Soledar, when the storm came. No idea about anything after that….

South…not yet sure who, just that it should’ve happened on or around 27 July, but some extremist Ukrainian militants there were very, very…..very unkind to Kadyrov Chechens. Smashed at least a company, perhaps most of a battalion, letting only 50 survivors to flee up the railway line in direction of Opytne (the railway is also the current frontline, meanwhile). How indecent: Kadyrovites came to Ukraine to have fun while murdering, pillaging, summarily executing, and looting – while these Ukrainian sons of guns are not only resisting for 17 months, or just shooting back, but also killing them… tsk, tsk, tsk….

The Russians thus brought in the 1307^th MRR to stabilise the frontline.

Elsewhere in this area: the flying heroes of the VKS remain as professional as ever: still flying spray & pray attacks on the two pontoon bridges north of Kurdyumivka – the northern half of which is meanwhile under Ukrainian control. I’ll not go into any details but, as mentioned few days ago, the ZSU is feeling comfortable enough to rotate certain of its units out of the battle zone, but: don’t tell that to the Russians…

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA

Staromaiorske-Staromlynivka…gosh…this is complex….let me try it from west towards east:

-          The Russian 71^st MRR appears to still be holding out inside southern Pryyutne, but the ZSU is meanwhile in the process of encircling both that village and the nearby Stepove. Even more so because whatever artillery the Russians bring to support the troops on the frontline is continuously massacred by the ZSU artillery….which is why, in turn, the Russians have deployed at last three Lancet-operating teams into this area…. more about this in the coming days (too)…

-          What’s left of the Russian 60^th MRB is still holding out in southern Urozhaine, supported by the Kaskad Battalion. Further south, the Russians have brought the 136^th MRB and the 218^th TR to the Staromlynivka area, and are trying to re-organise whatever was left of the 247^th VDV Regiment.

Robotyne… this is where there is something like ‘most important’ update for today, actually. As reported on 27 July, the ZSU broke through in the area east of Robotyne. Must admit, was extremely skeptical about all the initial Russian reporting about the resuulting battle. For once: too skeptical.

Matter of fact is: this Ukrainian operation was anything else than flawless, and I’m not yet sure why. My deduction is that the ZSU plan was to advance in staggered formation: to push with the 47^th Mech past Robotyne, and follow up with the 118^th Mech east of it, to secure the flank, and then two additional brigades, to secure further of the flank towards east….

The plan started well: in the course of some 2-3 days of artillery- and UAV-preparations, the ZSU smashed more than 20 Russian artillery pieces in the area south of the attack zone (including numerous MSTA-S and Akatsiya SPHs). And so, when the attack was launched, there was no reaction from the Russian artillery. However, then the things went bad, and I’m not yet sure why – because I’ve heard at least three different versions:

• Version 1: the CO 118^th Mech received a confirmation that either a) Russian fortifications in the hills directly east of Robotyne or b) two Russian fortifications directly on the path of his advance, were secured. Which was not yet the case. Thus, he ordered the advance of his unit….

• Version 2: There was an outright mistake in communications and the 118^th Mech attacked before the 47^th Mech, instead the other way around (i.e. the 47^th first, then the 118^th)….

• Version 3: ….and if some others are to ask, it was either the 118^th’s Artillery Group or the 44^th Artillery Brigade that botched up because it didn’t deploy smoke shells to cover the advance of the 118^th…

One way or the other, the lead company of the 118^th run into two Russian fortifications and stopped almost atop of them, while still mounted on its vehicles. That with stopping was a bad idea then hardly that the troops started exiting the vehicles, they’ve been hit by ATGMs of the 1430^th MRR, 45^th Spetsnaz and the 810^th Naval Infantry Brigade - all still entrenched ‘on that hill above Robotyne’ - plus by RPG-29s of the entrenched Russian infantry in front of them, and then Lancets….

Result: 4-5 knocked out T-72s, some 13-15 BMPs and BTRs, and almost the entire company either killed, wounded, or captured (apparently including the Major in command of that attack). That’s what the Russian PRBS-machinery then converted into ‘attack by 100 tanks of which 50 were destroyed’…

Sure, immediately after, the 47^th Mech then cleared that hill, collapsing the 1430th MRR, and driving its and the survivors of the Spetsnaz and the 810th Naval Infantry back to Novoprokopivka. Moreover, on the eastern flank of that attack, the 15^th Kara-Dag and the Azov NG Brigade then hit the 70^th MRR in and around Novopokrovka so hard, its survivors run away to Verbove to complain about its incompetent CO.

But, because of the losses of the 118^th Mech, it was a pyrrhic victory… I’ll analyse and discuss this further below.

Kamyanske-Lobkove… something is going on in this area, but nobody would say exactly what. The only thing I’m sure is that Ukrainians are (or were?) inside Melnytsa and ‘very close’ to Luhove (i.e. have stopped bolstering the failure in form of grinding through Zherebyanky), and that I saw a video of their vehicles roaming the rear of ‘certain Russians there’ well to the south, too. Not sure if this was taken recently, though.

***

Have followed several online discussions about reasons for losses of the 118^th Mech east of Robotyne. Some are blaming ZSU’s generals, and their lack of divisional-level organisation; others are blaming ZSU’s inexperienced brigade- and battalion-commanders; yet others the lack of reconnaissance; then there are some blaming a headlong rush, or the lack of smoke-shells, or a failure to deploy these: Then there are some that are complaining about what are actually ‘minor tactical mistakes’ (like necessity to clear trenches with dismounted infantry, just for example)…. There are not few (including me), who are demanding accountability. Indeed, at this point I cannot avoid the observation that until this very day the ZSU remains unable to find the culprit for losing nearly all of Kherson and most of Zaporizhzhya in the first few days of the war (which became the reason why the ZSU now must go losing troops while trying to recover the same areas). Thus, I do not expect it to find a culprit for the failure of the 118^th Mech, either…which that feeling in my small toe is telling me, is very, very bad: officers that are screwing up must be made accountable for their mistakes. Should there be any doubts, check what were the US Army and US Navy doing with their incompetents during the Second World War. Then compare their personnel-politics during all the subsequent conflicts – and the outcome of the same with that of the Second World War….

‘But’, why do I think that way?

Because my own experience is that the reasons for losses of the 118^th are something of all of the above-mentioned. However, the fundamental reason is: massive expansion within too little time.

Mind that over the last 17 months the ZSU expanded at least six-fold in total number of troops, while at least doubling- if not tripling the total number of its brigades, and, probably, five-folding the number of battalions. Such an expansion is necessitating a huge number of officers, too. And, well, the ZSU simply hasn’t got the necessary number of officers with necessary qualifications, skills and proven capabilities. Apparently, this lack of qualified officers is why the ZSU remains reluctant to make them accountable, too.

Now, I happen to have experienced a similar expansion in two of ‘certain other, though very similar sectors’, back in the 1990s, and can only say: sorry, you’re not going to find the necessary officers that easily. No matter what level- or rank, and no matter in what country, in military or civilian life (if you consider the civilian life: just replace ‘officers’ with ‘managers’): that’s going to take ‘years’.

On the contrary: in such a situation one must expect the incompetence and communication failures (plus resulting intrigues) almost everywhere one goes – which, I guess, is also the reason why the ZSU has no divisional-level of command and organisation: a small number of experienced generals (see: those in charge of five major territorial commands) is, essentially, running lots of inexperienced colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains appointed to command a large number of newly-established brigades, battalions, and companies.

My experience is: one can train people as much as one wants, but the majority simply can’t learn quickly enough, and have to learn by doing. Which, in an armed force at war, means: they’re learning by having their subordinates killed (and, indeed, can consider themselves happy if they survive that experience on their own).

My experience is also: all too many are never going to learn anything at all. One can train them as much as one likes, but they’re not going to change the way they command, and even less so the way they communicate – whether with their superiors or with their subordinates. The actually crucial issue in this regards is that of the age of the officers in question. Let me explain this a bit….

In an organisation that’s as hierarchic as any military service is, fundamentals of that problem are systemic, and often outright dogmatic. For example: except for the rank, traditionally ‘decisive’ in the military is the age. Usually, the superiority between two officers of the same rank is decided by who is older. This is going all the way down to recruits: the older in the room is usually appointed the squad leader….

In my experience, this is a huge mistake: the only thing that actually matters is called ‘merits’. Essentially: the ‘quality’; quality of comprehending lessons, quality of comprehending tactical- and operational situation, quality of command, quality of demonstrating skills in practice, and the quality deserving praise.

No doubt, I’m biased in this regards. Back in the 1990s, I was stunned when somebody ‘up-the-chain-of-command’ came to the idea to appoint me, then some 20+ years-young, to train large groups of middle-aged veterans, plus few future higher-rankers… But, when I think back of it now, there’s one lesson of that experience that’s remaining valid until this very day: youngsters without experience are quicker and better in learning than veterans who – actually – have to re-learn.

Because old habits die very slowly.

Thus, my conclusion is relatively simple: the ZSU will have ‘to do something’ in regards of how is it selecting and how is it training its officers. And if NATO is going to offer any help in this regards (so far, haven’t heard about NATO providing ‘specialist’ training to ZSU middle-ranking officers), then it will have to learn its own lessons, and overcome a few of its own dogmas, too.

Only one thing is sure: appointing people just because they are older, or had some sort of military training in the past, or higher civilian education, or similar reasons is, definitely, the wrong way. Pick the youngsters who excel: they’re eager to exploit the chance and demonstrate their skills – which they are also quicker to obtain. And they have far more stamina in doing that than any middle-agers: whenever in doubt, mind that Alexander the Great ‘conquered the (known, to the Hellenes) World’ at an age of 18-23.