Ukraine War, 30-31 May & 1 June 2022
Good morning everybody!
Good morning everybody!
Today I’ll start with a story that might sound ‘great’ at first, but…. sigh… well, see for yourself…
Much Ado about Nothing
Germany — that is: federal German government — has delivered its next ‘pearl’. In what is widely declared a ‘major coup against the opposition in the Bundestag’ (German Parliament), Chancellor Scholz announced the delivery of IRIS-T SL surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) and MARS-II multiple rocket launchers (essentially: German version of the US-made M270 MLRS) to Ukraine — in addition to…. sigh… seven Panzerhaubitze 2000s, announced over a month ago…
OK, OK…IRIS-T is widely perceived as one of most advanced weapons of its kind. Thus, this sounds great, doesn’t it?
Yes, it sounds great. Reality is anything else than that, though…
Lets start with the start: the IRIS-T is a bi-product of a project named ‘Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air missile’ (ASRAAM), involving about half of NATO, back in the 1980s (couldn’t miss this part: grew up reading endless articles about the ASRAAM and similar projects, back then…). Eventually, in essence, and as so often, Americans, British, Germans, etc. couldn’t agree about almost anything, and thus every went its own way: Americans opted for their AIM-9X Sidewinder; British for AIM-132 ASRAAM (closest to the original idea), while Germans led Italians, Swedes, Greeks, Canadians and Norwegians into the project IRIS-T. After 30+ years of research and development,* and billions of Euros spent… at least a part of NATO thus got an infra-red guided, short-to-medium-range air-to-air missile, which is the primary weapon of the EF-2000 Typhoon interceptor in service with German and Italian air forces, plus F-16s in Norway, just for example.
With the IRIS proving itself as a true ‘high performance’ missile, it didn’t take long before the idea was born to develop a ground-launched variant for air defence purposes. Thus came into being the IRIS-T SL, which is radar-guided: in combination with at least two types of AESA radars, it’s the core of the MEADS air defence system, capable of engaging targets out to about 37km. So far, everything’s fine.
Now, while IRIS-T-missiles are in series production for years already, and thousands have entered service with something like a dozen air forces around the world, the service entry of the surface-to-air variant came forward very slowly. The main German manufacturer, Diehl, was lately assembling exactly two systems a year (each including vertical launchers, radars, and fire-control stations, all of these truck-mounted and thus mobile). Indeed, the company was ‘busy’ producing seven such systems ordered by Egypt and, as soon as the delivery of the IRIS-T SL to Ukraine was announced, seems to have explained that, under ideal circumstances — i.e. provided it could get all the necessary parts together — it might be able to assemble four systems a year.
Means: in best case, Ukraine might get 2,5–3 IRIS-T SLs by the end of this year. Sure, each is capable of defending something like a city the size of, say, Zaporizhzhya, but even this became possible only because Washington not only convinced Egyptians to wait for what they have ordered (and paid about 50% up front), but seems the entire deal became possible only because the USA have paid for the re-delivery of the two systems to be manufactured this year — to Ukraine (if not a few bribes to Cairo, too: the Generals there are renowned for their predilection for such solutions)…
….and when are the MARS-IIs and the seven Panzerhaubitze 2000s going to be delivered (the Dutch are going to add the others, so to make them a dozen) — is still in the stars…
Sorry, but I think I’ll not waste even more time with this story: it’s scorning members of Ukrainian Armed Forces, at least (if not all the intelligent life on Planet Earth, too). Should Scholz go on like this, as next we can expect him to announce his greatest invention ever: hot water…
Ah well: at least the — cumulative — results of all the ‘strenuous efforts’ of the EU/USA/NATO to help Ukraine already have-, or at least are in the process of resulting in delivery of 118 M777s from USA, Canada, and Australia; 72 Krab self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) from Poland (18 are already in Ukraine); 20 M109A3GN from Norway, on top of at least 8, probably more of Zuzana-2s from Slovakia, and about 30+ Dana/Dana M2s from the Czech Republic, etc…. well, with Estonia- and Italy-provided FH.70s, and French-delivered Caesars…. plus all the possible support equipment and about 400,000 rounds of associated ammunition….sometimes by July or August Ukrainian Army is going to have one of ‘most potent artillery corpses in Europe’. At least by standards from before 24 February 2022. Until then, thousands are going to die, additional thousands are going to end maimed for the time of their life, and scores of Ukrainian villages are going to be ruined forever…
AIR
Because several readers have asked: before 21.00–22.00hrs local time yesterday evening (1 June 2022), when warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet launched eight cruise missiles, and at least one of these hit ‘transport infrastructure’ in Stryi, in the Lviv area, I haven’t heard of any new ballistic- and/or cruise-missile-strikes by the Russians into the depth of Ukraine for at least a week. Over the last five-six days Ukrainians did report occasional cruise-missile strikes very close to the frontline only.
Overall, it seems that in the light of complete failure of their efforts to stop-, or at least slow-down the flow of NATO-provided arms, ammunition, and fuel from western- to central- and eastern Ukraine, and due to a more acute shortage of suitable weapons than assessed by anybody, the Keystone Cops in Moscow have completely abandoned their related efforts. Think, especially Ukrainian railway-workers were more than grateful for the resulting respite. Until yesterday evening, when it seems that five of them were killed by above-mentioned cruise missiles…
That said, earlier strikes have caused sufficient damage to the Ukrainian infra-structure to result in a nation-wide shortage of fuels: there’s enough for armed forces, apparently for agriculture too, but civilian use is severely curtailed. In similar fashion, two days ago ‘somebody’ seems to have knocked out the last power line providing electricity to the area between Kramatorsk, Severodonetsk, and Bakhmut…
Since all the other reported air strikes were related to tactical developments, I’ll mention them below — with one exception: quite a lots of action by both air forces is reported from the Borivske area: seems, there’s still bitter fighting going on there, with lots of involvement of both the Ukrainian and Russian air forces.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
The Russians are regularly shelling villages in the Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, the last 3–4 days, sometimes northern outskirts of Kharkiv, too. On 31 May, Su-35s of the VKS have deployed Kh-59s to strike an unknown target in the Bilopillia, outside Sumy.
Izium… although Ukrainians have recovered Velyka Komyshuvakha, the Russians failed to take Dmytrivka, and remain unsuccessful in Dovhenke, RUMINT has it that the RFA has withdrawn at least two BTGs from the Izium area and re-deployed them to the Lyman-Severodonetsk area. In turn, the VKS has forward-deployed a number of helicopters to a forward operating base somewhere in the Izium area. One of Ka-52s in question was claimed shot down by an Igla MANPADs of the 93rd Mech Brigade, on 31 May. Moreover, Ukrainian Air Force claimed to have directed most of its operations against the RFA in the Dovhenke area, the last three days.
South-east of Izium, and all the way to Lyman, the RFA and Separatists are pushing with at least six BTGs on Studenok and Svyatohirsk: the latter is heavily shelled, the last two days, and there is heavy fighting with elements of the 57th Infantry- and 81st Airborne Assault Brigades. Two companies of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) are fighting in this area, too: they’re volunteer-units operating as independent formations, and appear to be very well-equipped.
South-east of Lyman, the last two days the RFA is trying to push through broken terrain and dense forests on the Siversky Donets River, in direction of Staryi Karavan and Brusivka, perhaps with the outlook to then cross and attack Raihorodok. This is where Su-25s and attack helicopters of the VKS have flown most of their air strikes, the last two days.
Severodonetsk…Essentially, the Russians have secured nearly all of the town, at least all the way to the Industrial Zone on its western side. Principal reason: over 12,000 civilians are still inside, the Russians are said to have ‘filled streets’ with their tanks, and Ukrainians are thus not using their artillery to hit back the way they usually do. That said, Ukrainian withdrawal is slow and methodical, aimed to delay the aggressors and thus enable evacuation of whatever civilians can be saved, too: evacuation is run via Pavlovhrad, which is offering at least some cover, but many people have been killed or injured while trying to cross the Siversky Donets in direction of Lysychansk, the last few days.
Popasna Bulge… over the last two days, Ukrainians have managed to push the RFA about two kilometres away from the T1302 road (connecting Bakhmut to Lysychansk). The same remains under — at least ‘sporadic’ — Russian artillery fire, but is used for movement of military forces and convoys carrying humanitarian aid. The T0513 road from Bakhmut to Siversk seems to be OK, but the road between that town and Lysychansk is sporadically shelled, too. The volume of the Russian artillery fire decreased significantly over the last two days because Ukrainian artillery — meanwhile reinforced by Estonia & Italy-supplied FH70s and US-supplied M777s of the 45th Artillery Brigade — is running amok all over the Popasna Bulge: literally every Russian vehicle that’s moving is targeted in a matter of seconds, and, usually, knocked out.
On the northern side of the Popasna Bulge, the Russians were kicked out of Vrubivka: their counterattack was cut to pieces — and similar is valid for at least two of their attempts to recover Komyshuvakha. The Russian push on Bakhmut was completely stopped, too.
As said in my last summary: they run out of steam. As so often by now, the RFA and Separatists have suffered such losses, they lack troops and equipment to keep on pushing. Now we’ve got to see where is Putin going to strike as next — and with what…
In that sense — and mind: I’m not yet sure what is the importance is the following, but - one of BTGs of the ‘Musicians’ (Wagner PMC) seems to have been re-deployed to the Svitlodarsk area, north of Horlivka. Monitoring their deployments is as important because since the breakthrough at Popasna (and because the 3–4 BTGs of the 31st and 104th VDV Regiments of the 76th VDV Division were all smashed to pieces), it’s obvious that Putin is using Wagner PMC as his ‘Stosstruppen’ — ‘shock troops’ for attacks on particularly important sectors of the frontline. With other words: at earlier times, the Russian Schwerpunkt was where the 76th VDV Division was: now it’s where the Wagner is.
SOUTH
Ukrainian offensive at Davydiv Brid… the Russians are shelling a lot, and Ukrainians are complaining about Russian shelling, a lot; but, yesterday they secured Andriivka and Bilohirk, on the southern flank of their attack, thus securing their bridgehead. That said, I’m still missing an advance past Kostromka and Bruskynske, which are main RFA strongholds in this part of the Kherson Oblast: the bridgehead over the Inhulets River was significantly widened the last two days, no doubt about this; but, there is no advance in depth, to force the Russian artillery away from bridges. Talking about artillery: by now it’s certain that this advance is supported by one of two batteries equipped with M777 howitzers that are meanwhile operational with Ukrainian Army.
The train with T-62s that arrived in Melitopol, about a week ago, seems to have brought in elements of a reservist Motor Rifle BTG. This has replaced 2–3 BTGs re-deployed from the 58th CAA to the frontlines in Donbass, and word is that meanwhile it has entered the frontline in the Vasylivka area.
BTW, it turned out that some 3–4 days ago, the Russians attempted to breach the Ukrainian frontline in the Vilne Pole area, roughly half-way between Hulaipole and Vuhledar. Have captured Vilne Pole but were then stopped and forced to retreat by the 110th TD Brigade, while trying to attack Temyrivka — losing up to a dozen of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in the process. Guess, there’s another BTG that needs replacement troops and vehicles, and few weeks of rest and recuperation…
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*By now it should be clear that I’m a big fan of ironies and sarcasm. Thus, cannot avoid the observation that 30+ years was, certainly, more than enough time for the KGB and then FSB and GRU to espionage literally everything about the IRIS-T — down to the technical specification of every single of screws it contains, and toilette facilities used by people working on its research and development…. That said, Putin’s Russia is too much of a mess to make any use of resulting intelligence — even more so because all of ‘Russian’ research and development facilities for guided missiles used to be in Ukraine.
If this isn’t giving the one about ‘shot oneself in the foot’ an entirely new meaning, and/or if it’s not illustrating for how short-sighted Putin’s decision-making is…. well, I’ve got no idea what else ever will…