Ukraine War, 3 September 2024: Q & A

Hello everybody!

Few interesting questions have emerged in reaction to my updates form the last weekend, plus an earlier Q&A, thus let me address these.

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1.)    Why do the Russians make their Shahed attack UAVs fly at relatively low altitude?

Actually, for much of their flights deep into the Ukrainian airspace, Russian Shaheds are programmed to fly at altitudes of 500-1,000 metres. Good example was captured on the video from which this screen-grab came, showing a MiG-29 (or F-16?) engaging one with an air-to-air missile - and that at an altitude of more than 500 metres (more like 700-1000m):

Like cruise missiles, though, Shaheds do descend to lower altitudes once they are closer to their targets. In other cases, they variate their flight altitudes depending on what is their actual mission (see: ‘meandering to map the Ukrainian IADS’) and what kind of air defences the Russians expects them to encounter over selected areas of Ukraine.

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2.)    How can you say the PSU shot down its own F-16? What happened to the IFF-system? It’s impossible that any PSU SAM-commander has first failed to identify the F-16 with his (or her) early warning/surveillance radar, and then with his (or her) fire-control radar, too. The F-16 must have collided with the ground (or) only idiots are flying into an air defence zone with their IFF-transponders turned off, etc., etc., etc…

Oh dear, this is a big can of worms… so much so, I was short of making a ‘special feature’ just about this topic. I’m sorry to trouble many here, but you might want to re-check the last of my Q&A, from 25 August 2024, to better understand the basics of what is to follow (and even then, and as usually, I’ll ‘oversimplify’ many things… in turn surely drawing flak from ‘high-tech purists’).

Point is: answering all of this requires talking not only about equipment, but about doctrine and tactics – i.e. procedures and organisation of the Ukrainian integrated air defence systems (IADS).

A)      The first relevant issue is that of the ‘rules of engagement’ (RoEs).

Based on doctrinal procedures (hint, hint…), the RoEs are something like the ‘law’ along which every military service is operating. Between others, the rules of engagement are instructing every single trigger-puller (SAM-operators and fighter pilots) under what conditions are they granted the permission to open fire, and when not. This is of particular importance in relation to the PSU, and then the issue of IFF.

For example:

-          If the RoEs say, ‘open fire at everything that’s flying’, then the SAM-operators and fighter-pilots are going to literally open fire at everything that’s flying. Without checking the IFF first.

-          But, if the RoEs say, ‘in no way are you to open fire at anything with “unknown” IFF-response’, then both the SAM-gunners and fighter pilots have no permission to open fire at any kind of a flying object the IFF-transponder of which is responding with ‘unknown’ (regardless the reason why is the response ‘unknown’).

…and then, ‘of course’, there are between 5 and 15 different other variants for RoEs… and then there is a variant for SAM-operators, and a variant for fighter-pilots, and another for helicopter-pilots… and each of these variants can change (and is frequently changed) on day-to-day basis, too…

B)      The next issue is that of the distribution of both RoEs and IFF-codes.

Essentially, in the PSU of our days (just like in the VKS of our days), both any changes in RoEs and any kind of IFF codes are distributed to all the units by the means of an intranet used for inter-service communication. In the latter case, the relevant message (usually titled something like ‘Order of Battle Emission’) contains the information of what IFF-code and what frequency is to be used from what point in time until what point in time, or for the next XY hours, days or else.

This intranet is usually using wire-communication and thus, theoretically, impossible to jam. And, the Order of Battle Emissions is supposed to reach all the radar stations and all the firing units (more or less around the same time).

‘However’… under combat conditions there can be glitches in transmissions; some units might have moved out of touch, haven’t re-connected to the intranet on time, and thus not receive the new RoEs or the new set of IFF-codes; or, perhaps they do receive one or another, but not on time; or the crew forgets to enter the new code into its system etc., etc., etc..

…and then it happens the crews open fire at the discretion of their commander - sometimes in accordance with RoEs, and other times not…

If there are doubts, check the IRGC shooting down the Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 near Tehran, back in January 2020: the Tor/SA-15 unit in question moved to its new position few hours before, then received a flight schedule for civilian airliners from a nearby international airport (it depended on it because it lacked a modern IFF-interrogator for its radar; i.e. this was incompatible with the one installed on latest B737s, for example), and then the commander of the battery couldn’t get in touch with his superior at the crucial moment in time….while the airliner was one hour behind the schedule…

Acting along the RoEs he’s received before the action in question, and unable to check the IFF of what turned out to be an airliner one hour behind the schedule, the commander of the battery then decided to open fire – and murdered 176 civilians.

C)      Saving time to accelerate reaction time… Now, Because

1.)    of dozens of ‘precedents’ (i.e. different armed forces inadvertently shooting down their own aircraft, or civilian aircraft etc.), and

2.)    because modern air warfare is an extremely high-paced discipline, where, literally, ‘every second matters’ (otherwise one cannot hope to intercept stuff like incoming Iskanders, Zircons, Kh-22s etc.),

a lot of PSU’s SAM-actions are run with SAM-systems set to ‘automatic’ mode. Essentially, on basis of the RoEs, the operators set the system and then monitor its operation, while the system is engaging targets on its own (often while communicating to other SAM-systems that are set on ‘auto’, too). Operators are intervening only if there is some sort of a glitch.

One of methods of saving time during every engagement is to make the issue of checking IFF redundant. Theoretically, this is also offering the promise of making things with possible IFF-related mistakes ‘simpler’, too…

Therefore, the PSU is operating so that it’s creating ‘areas of responsibility’. For example; ‘this zone is for SAM-operations only’, ‘this is for fighter jets only’, ‘this is for helicopters only’ etc. Such work is organised with help of RoEs: for example, there is almost certainly a RoE valid for all of the PSU that, at times of a Russian missile strike, the ‘area within 50km around Kyiv is a no-fly zone, area within 30km around Odesa is a no-fly zone, area within 40km around Ivano-Frankivsk is a no-fly zone’ etc., etc., etc.. this is then also drawn on maps and maps supplied to whoever matters (incl. both SAM-operators and flight crews).

Correspondingly, between, say, 00.00hrs and 15.30hrs local time of 26 August, none of PSU’s F-16s, MiG-29s, or Su-27s (nor anything else that’s flying and belonging to the PSU, the army aviation, or the naval aviation) were supposed to fly anywhere within these no-fly zones.

D)     And now comes the problem with the use of IFF-transponders by PSU’s fighter jets…

Generally, the use of IFF-transponders – i.e. the question whether these are completely turned off (disengaged), set on passive (emitting only if prompted to do so by IFF-interrogators installed in ground radars or those on other jets), or turned on and thus set on active (i.e. emitting all the time) – is regulated by the RoEs.

‘However’: matter of fact is that fighter pilots dislike using IFF-transponders.

How comes?

Because one of major concerns during a combat operation by a fighter jet is that under combat stress the pilot/crew might forget to turn off their IFF-transponder, or to set it on passive. They’ve got so much to do alone in flying and operating the jet, it can easily happen. And, if they forget to do so, and the IFF-transponder is set on ‘active’, it’s revealing the position of the jet to the enemy all the time (if in no other fashion, then as ‘unknown’ return) – and that regardless if tracked by enemy radar or not.

Why that?

Because, although installed on radars, and working in conjunction with radars (whether those based on the ground, or installed into fighter jets) IFF-systems are still separate systems. That’s why there is the talk about ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ radars. Essentially, the ‘secodary’ radar is working with help of IFF-interrogators (installed in radars) and IFF-transponders (or other sorts of beacons) installed on aircraft; the ‘primary’ is the ‘radar’ in classic sense. Means: even if the radar is turned off, the IFF-interrogator is still providing de-facto the same ‘radar picture’ - all provided aircraft it is tracking have their IFF-transponders set on active or passive, but not turned off.

Versa-vice: also because of combat stress, pilots often forget to turn on their IFF-transponders, or to set them on ‘passive’ – on the way back to base, when they are near-certain to re-enter the zone protected by friendly SAMs….

Finally, there are additional ‘situations emerging from the heat of combat’. Say, an F-16-pilot is sticking to the RoEs, operating over the designated zone (and thus outside the no-fly zone), underway in a jet with IFF-transponder turned off, and receiving an intercept vector (whether per radio or data-link). Flies there, detects an incoming Shahed or Kh-101, engages, shoots it down. Then he receives another intercept vector, flies there, engages, shoots it down. Then another intercept vector etc…

….and the more often this happens, the less situational awareness the pilot still has, while ever more adrenaline is flooding his/her system… and so, at some point in time, and after – perhaps – missing the target at the first try, convinced he/she’s going to score on the second, he pursues the target straight into the no-fly zone heavily defended by own SAMs, all set on ‘auto’… and with his/her IFF-transponder turned off, thus denying own SAM-systems the ability to recognise the jet as ‘friendly’…

Has happened thousands of times already during the Second World War (just, back then, pilots were flying into the zone protected by friendly anti-aircraft artillery). Has happened to both the Arabs and Israelis during their mutual wars etc… Has happened to Americans and the British over Iraq in 2002 etc…

….and: that’s happening far more often than ‘he flew himself into the ground’…

Indeed, in the case of the PSU F-16 shot down on 26 August, word is the pilot shot down three Shaheds and then went after the fourth and then the contact was lost. Now, that itch in my small toe and experience from cross-checking diverse of earlier PSU’s claims for Russian jets and missiles shot down by its fighters, is telling me that this explanation can easily be another ‘bunch of baloney’, launched by the headquarters in Vinnytsia (whether for self-glorifying- or for PR-purposes). However, it could also be the truth: especially considering the ‘gung-ho’-traditions of PSU’s fighter-pilots (do I have to remind about that with them collecting road signs with intakes of Su-27s or claiming Russian Il-76s where there were never any, etc.?).  

In such a case, the situation should actually be clear by now – and there should be no problem with the PSU issuing an official statement in style of, ‘Lieutenant-Colonel Mes did not activate his IFF-transponder while entering a no-fly zone’. Yes, sure, many wouldn’t understand what is that about, some would consider that ‘shame’ and ‘disgracing the memory of a great pilot’ and whatever else. But, the cold fact is: shit happens. So also to best pilots. And when shit happens in military flying (usually because people violate RoEs or other procedures), people die. 100% sure.

Alternatively… and considering how silent is the PSU about this case – well, then the mistake happened somewhere else, and the ‘ground-based air defence faction’ of the service killed somebody from the ‘flying faction’. As ‘listed’ above, there can be lots of different reasons for this happening.

Whatever it is: crucial is to investigate quickly, with determination, mercilessly and objectively, find out the reasons, and act correspondingly (that’s why, just for example, the first thing after the crash of one of its Space Shuttles the NASA did was to lock down the responsible control centre: so that nobody can hide any kind of evidence for a failure).

Then it’s necessary to inform the public (without revealing sensitive details, of course). Keeping silent, or announcing investigations but then sweeping under the carpet – which appears to be one of ‘popular methods of operations’ in cases of this kind in Ukraine (and especially so within the PSU) - is the worst that can be done.

Acting the way the PSU has acted so far is only making two things certain: nobody can learn anything at all from such mistakes, and they are certain to be repeated.

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3.) Ukraine inherited large stocks of Soviet-designed FAB-bombs from the USSR. Is that correct? Why don’t the Ukrainians make their own UMPKs?

Have addressed this, a few weeks ago. Essentially: yes, of course, Ukraine has inherited large stocks of FABs. Arguably, many of these (together with hundreds of SAMs and millions of tons of artillery ammunition) were destroyed in the sabotages of three major Ukrainian ammunition dumps, back in 2017-2020. Many others have been destroyed when the Russians targeted ammunition dumps at air bases of the PSU, in the first few days of the war.

Still, there are lots of them left… And yes, Ukraine could easily 'reverse engineer' UMPK kits...

…BUT...

For UMPKs to work - to fly over 60-70km to their target - they must be released from altitudes of 9,000-12,000 metres and high (subsonic) speeds. I.e. the launching aircraft is flying high, in full sight of enemy radars (and other methods of detection).

The Russians can do that because the PSU lacks SAMs that can counter over the distances in question. Say: 60-70km to the frontline on the Russian side, plus some 70+ km to the frontline on the Ukrainian side. Longer-ranged Ukrainian SAMs can't be deployed any closer to the frontline without promptly being detected by Russian UAVs and then targeted by Iskanders...

With other words: the PSU has no SAMs to counter Su-24s, Su-34s and UMPKs from a range where its SAMs could remain safe from Russian UAVs and Iskander-Ms.

(Shouldn’t mean the PSU is not trying: time and again, it rushes one or another of its firing units forward, as close as 20 or even less kilometres from the frontline. Powers up, fires few missiles… while some of such ‘SAM-ambushes’ are effective in at least damaging the incoming Su-34s, the ranges are such that even hypersonic missiles like PAC-2 and 3 are taking ‘minutes’ long to approach their targets. That’s leaving the Russian means of electronic intelligence enough time to warn their crews, and these to avoid…)

The PSU also can’t counter such attacks with its own interceptors, because its F-16s, MiG-29s, and Su-27s all lack air-to-air missiles with sufficient range….

A related sub-question was something like: couldn’t PSU start shooting down incoming UMPKs?

And that answer is positive: yes, it could. They’re actually easy to detect. However, a cold matter of fact is that the PSU has spent de-facto all of its pre-war stocks of SAMs, while the West is delivering so few of IRIST-Ts, NASAMS, Aspide/Spada/RIM-7 Sea Sparrows, HAWKs, S-125/SA-3s etc., that the PSU simply can’t afford shooting down incoming UMPKs in the numbers in which they are used: it needs these missiles for defence of its major cities and industry facilities. Try to imagine the expenditure of SAMs if the PSU would start shooting down 90-150 glide bombs a day: at the current rate of Western deliveries (and production by such like Raytheon), Ukraine would be out of SAMs in a matter of one week (at most).

Net result: the Russians can continue bombing Ukrainians with UMPKs as they like.

In turn, of course, yes, Ukrainians could try to do the same, BUT: the Russians are in possession of aerial superiority over the frontline. Means: their long-range SAMs, and interceptors armed with such long-range AAMs like R-37M - see: MiG-31s and Su-35s - would (easily) shot down any Ukrainian jets attempting to approach the frontline at an altitude of 9,000+ metres. Indeed, as can be followed through this spring and summer, at least once a month the Russians are shooting down even MiG-29s and/or Su-27s approaching at extremely low altitudes in order to launch JDAMs and HAMMERS.

That's why 'just reverse-engineering UMPKs' is never going to work. 

Ideally… now I’m going to ‘move off-topic’, and go into something I’m still researching about, but… well, can’t hold back, right now…

Ideally, the PSU would equip its F-16s or Su-27s with air-launched ballistic missiles with the range of about 200km. Something lighter and more advanced than the Russian Kinzhal. Something of the kind the Israelis are meanwhile regularly deploying to strike IRGC/Hezbollah in Syria, even in Iran, for example. And then with hundreds of them. Alas, due to incompetence of the admin in Kyiv and lots of meddling by local- and foreign oligarchy (see: ‘market shares’), the Ukrainian defence sector that could churn out such weapons is not doing that. Indeed, although such like the Artyom-Luch conglomerate could've launched production of longer-ranged SAMs, active-homing air-to-air missiles outmatching (at least) the Russian R-77s, tactical ballistic missiles and plenty of other goodies already two years ago (at least, if not earlier), they're idling around, literally assembling 15-20 R-360 Neptunes a year... And the Zelensky admin, plus all the possible Experten are explaining them that they're not going to get any kind of funding if they do not become profitable.

Heh… just: how are such Ukrainian corporations supposed to become profitable if they're not funded so they can pay for research and development, and then paid to launch production so they can start earning money....?

(A clue in this regards: that's why anywhere else, when some government orders the research and development [R&D] and/or production of a specific weapons system, contracts usually stipulate a 50% up-front payment, and the total worth is always calculated so that the involved enterprise is always certainly making at least 10% profit, if not more...)

….at which point I’m going to add some more ‘bonus analysis’, if you all don’t mind.

Right now, the best we all can hope for the outcome of this war is that the Ukrainian ‘irregular defence sector’ – the same that has jump-started production of hundreds of thousands of FPVs a year (and is meanwhile manufacturing thousands of UAVs that are blasting the Russian energy sector, the last few days) - is going to continue growing. Massively. So far, that was foremost possible because this sector was functioning ‘outside the umbrella of incompetence’ of the Ministry of Defence and tentacles of different oligarchs. See: sure, the project is meanwhile supported by the GenStab-U, but the essence or projects like the ‘Army of Drones’ (and similar) was financed by the Ministry of Digital Transformation: people ‘used to’ jump-starting in their garages and living rooms, and then running business ‘guerrilla style’ so to say.

Sadly, ‘rocket science’ and ‘guerrilla/irregular defence sector’ are not directly compatible: rocket science requires big enterprise with massive research departments, and a lots of investment… production of high-quality rocket motors requires lots of experience, special tools, and extremely high-quality management… all of which, I’m afraid, is incompatible with the Zelensky Administration, too: this is insistent on ‘instant results’ – sometimes for the sake of maintaining its popularity, other times for the sake of maintaining its standing with all the possible idiots in the West etc…

Moreover, the Zelensky Admin seems to be keen to repeat all the possible Western exercises in regards of lacking foresight and strategy (is exactly the same behaviour one can monitor in different countries that have joined the EU over the last 10-20 years, BTW) . Correspondingly, it’s next to impossible for its members to understand the importance of ‘investment’ which in turn is then resulting in ‘growth’, ‘income’ (through the system of effective taxation, for example) and ‘profit’ – 2, 3, 5 or more years later.

Because of this, and while there are meanwhile dozens of small Ukrainian enterprises successfully applying highly-effective modifications to all sorts of available and West-supplied armament (so also to SAMs, as obvious from some of recent kills against Russian Su-25s, multiple helicopters and, especially, reconnaissance UAVs), their overall effectiveness remains limited. Essentially, the people in question first must invest their own money, their own time, their own work, and then be lucky to find field commanders (battalion- and brigade-COs) that have the necessary liberty for such decisions, and then trust them enough to let them try. This then results in ‘too little’ (for example: 2-4 modified Strela-10/SA-13s) and is – if successful – applied on something like ‘battalion or brigade at time’ basis. Because the people involved simply lack the means to do more, while the Ministry of Defence is not even paying attention.

Hope, you’ve survived reading all of this, and found it of some help.