Ukraine War, 28 June 2024

Hello everybody!

Finally, a ’slightly more comprehensive’ review for today – simply because there are enough (serious) ‘news’ to discuss them.

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

During the night from 26 to 27 June, the Russians run their latest series of air strikes on Ukrainian air bases and energy sector. According to Ukrainian sources, they’ve deployed and the Ukrainian air defences shot down:

-          1 Kinzhal (this one hit the Khmelytsky AB)

-          4 Kalibr (all four shot down while underway in direction of Ternopil or Ivano-Frankivsk)

-          1 Kh-59 or Kh-69 guided missile (was shot down while approaching Poltava)

-          23 Shaheds (all 23 shot down; most of them while approaching Khmelnytsky and Ivano-Frankivsk)

-          Unknown number of S-300s (all on Kharkiv)

Except for Kh-59/69 and S-300s, everything was targeting objects in western Ukraine: Khmelnytsky and Ivano-Frankivsk Air Bases, for example. The Russians said they were striking air bases pending delivery of Western aircraft.

Despite this defensive success, there’s no doubt that by now Ukraine lost over 65% of its non-nuclear energy-producing facilities. Their total output dropped from the pre-war capacity of 56GW, to 18GW. The EU is providing 1.7GW for this year, but that’s – obviously – sorely insufficient. And mind: it’s summer, when the consumption rates are low…

…with which I’m back to the conclusion that there’s no improvement in sight, simply because the PSU still hasn’t got enough surface-to-air missiles, and that’s not going to change any time soon – despite deliveries of additional Patriots and IRIS-Ts. Also because Ukraine hasn’t got enough tactical ballistic missiles, nor targeting systems that would enable it to strike back at the Russian launchers, to prevent the Russian strikes.

How comes? For the same reason like always. Instead of increasing its industrial production, the corrupt, incompetent Zombie Idiots administering the West on behalf of our glorious oligarchy have overslept the last two years, have failed to increase production on time – and thus now we’re all going to pay dearly for that. A part of me almost can’t wait the Western mainstream media to start discovering hot water and report ‘sensations’ about shortages of electricity in Ukraine in November-December…  

(….ah yes, and: should there be any doubts about that with ‘corrupt’ and ‘administering on behalf of oligarchy’, check this: The US Supreme Court just basically legalized Bribery ….and if you think it’s anything better in most of the Europe: sorry, you’re wrong, because it is not… which is why all the glorious populist parties are having it easy to promise milk and honey, while ‘traditional’ political parties that have administered the entire society into this are all explaining that they are not aware they’ve done anything wrong…)

Ah yes! And… Yesterday, four Ukrainian UAVs hit the Redkinsky Plant (production of aviation fuel) in Tver. Also hit by Ukrainian UAVS were few other facilities deep inside the Russian Federation (so also a pumping station on a pipeline in the Tambov region, the last night).

So much so, it seems Pudding (or was it Belusov?) fired the chief of the air defence branch (PVO) of the VKS, Major-General Valery Igorevich Varentsov. He was dismissed into reserve…

Now… if Shoygu would still be in charge, it would be easy to conclude something like: ‘Hey, this is great! Now Shoygu’s going to appoint an even bigger and more corrupt dilatant’.

But, with Belusov as MOD… sorry, no examples and thus simply not sure.

That said: even if Russia is still manufacturing ‘more SAMs then the rest of the World combined’ (as claimed by Pudding, sometimes the last year) there is simply no way to seal its entire airspace for Ukrainian UAVs. It’s much too large. And the VKS lacks both the SAMs and communication systems that would enable it to establish a trully functioning integrated air defence system. Thus, part of me thinks that the most Belusov might manage is the same that happens so often in similar situations in the West (and especially different of biggest Western private corporations): to find some clown who is going to excel at providing highly-eloquent explanations for own failures…

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Northern Kharkiv

Two days ago, the ZSU reported the destruction of two Russian Pantsyr close-in weapons systems (CIWS) in the area between Streletske and Severny, in the Belgorod Oblast, about 10km north of the border to Ukraine. Was necessary to enable the ZSU to hit some sort of a military depot or base in the same area, too:

Yes, sure, Pudding-fans in the West are still boasting about the VKS bombing Ukrainian positions with ‘FAB-3000’. However, there’s still no trace of evidence for the Russians developing any kind of an UMPK-kit for bombs of this calibre. Thus, if you see any videos titled that way: sorry, at most it’s UMPK kit on FAB-1500M-54, or on ODAB-1500.

No doubt, such strikes are impressive and appearing as if causing lots of casualties to the ZSU. Actually: the ZSU is holding its forward positions thinly occupied, exactly because of such air strikes. Of course, when Ukrainians counterattack, they must move more troops forward, but the good thing is: the VKS is very slow with its UMPK strikes. Usually, it takes 24-48 hours to react to any kind of ‘major shifts’ on the battlefield. Means: when Ukrainians counterattack, the VKS, de-facto, ‘can’t’ target these counterattacks with UMPKs.

Foremost: the mass of Russian air strikes with UMPK glide bombs are including the release of lighter weapons - like 250kg bombs, visible on the photo below; these remain unprecise and many are still malfunctioning. All of this is significantly decreasing their overall effects.

This is why (just for example) the ZSU was able to counterattack into Hlyboke, two days ago. And why it took the Russians ‘days’ to react to the ZSU liberating (what’s left of) Tykhe, north-east of Vovochansk, two days ago. Indeed, this is why it’s still largely unknown that the ZSU is on the best way of neutralising remaining Russians inside what’s left of northern outskirts of Vovchansk - thus completely liberating the town.

BTW, mind: of course, the Russians are attacking all the time… it’s just so that thanks to availability of artillery ammunition acquired within frame of the ‘Czech Arms Deal’, the ZSU has it easier to smash their assaults.

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove…The last three days, the VKS and the VSRF were bombing and rocketing Kupyansk, Petropavlicka (this was hit by several volleys from multiple rocket launchers), ZSU positions north and west of Stepova Novoselivka, Novoplatonivka (on the Oskil River, well behind the frontline). Must admit: right now, no idea why.

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Kreminna… just in are news that the ZSU has counterattacked and recovered much terrain east of Terny and Yampolivka: pushed the Russians at least 1,000 metres back from both villages (or what was left of them). Is not much but… well, after months of ‘Russians advancing’, it’s better than nothing. Moreover, this is spoiling any kind of Russian planning for a renewed offensive in this area, later this summer.

There should also be ‘good news’ from the Serebriansky forest, further south: if so, that would make the defences of the Bilohorivka (the one on the Siversky Donets), slightly easier. The area was under lots of pressure, the last few weeks.

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Siversk… the Russians have bombed Serebrianka by UMPKs heavily, two days ago, and then re-launched their assaults on Bilohorivka (yes, still the one on the Siversky Donets….just like almost exactly two years ago) and further south. Indeed, they claimed the ‘liberation’ of Rozdolivka, just for example: I’m just not sure if reaching the southernmost (and completely ruined) homes and then planting a flag there is really a ‘liberation’..

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Bakhmut… as said yesterday evening, the last two days – while the Russians re-launched their attempts to advance via Kalynivka and south-east of Chasiv Yar, along the Road T0504, Ukrainians have recovered ‘at least most of’, if not ‘all of’ the Kanal District. Of course, the area is meanwhile completely demolished and the battle is going on, but: I would say it’s obvious the 98^th VDV Division and the 11^th VDV Brigades can’t achieve any kind of successes in this area, regardless if meanwhile reinforced through the 200^th Motor-Rifle Brigade and whatever else. As next, we must expect the Russians to ‘stop and regroup’. Read: bring in yet additional thousands of mobik-refills, before trying again…

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Toretsk… one thing making me worried the last few days were reports about the Russians assaulting and securing the hamlet of Shumy, east of Pivnichne, which in turn is on the eastern side of the mining centre of Toretsk. Not yet sure if this was ‘just the testing’ or ‘increasing pressure’ upon the ZSU… or something else, but: as those reading my stuff regularly are certain to recall, back in March I’ve explained that Toretsk is the likely ‘primary target’ for the Russians in this year. Obviously, their original intention was to ‘outflank’ this area through advances via Chasiv Yar in the north and from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk in the south. They didn’t manage that entirely even after some five months of relentless assaults. Thus, if they’re attacking Toretsk ‘already now’, before securing either of ‘flanking’ objectives… could be they’ve ‘shortened’ their objectives and adapted to circumstances. See, instead of heading for Pokrovsk, they’re now trying to ‘just’ reach the T0504 (see below) and ‘meet’ the ‘advance’ from Chasiv Yar well to the north of where they’ve originally planned to do so. Point is: the ZSU is going to remain very busy doing its best in this sector, for months longer.

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Avdiivka-Pokrovsk… the Russian Group Tsentr is still attacking through Novooleksandrivka, and from there in direction of Vozdvyzhenka. Also from Sokil on Yevhenivka. That said, the last few days the Russians in this sector were foremost busy replacing or at least reinforcing battered elements of their 90^th Tank Division and the 27^th Motor-Rifle Division. Obvious aim is to reach the local stretch of the Highway T0504: the section connecting Pokrovsk (primary logistics hub of the ZSU for this sector of the frontline) with Illinivka and Chasiv Yar in North-East. It’s not like the Russians might get there any time soon: I would say, ‘at the current rate of their advance, some 5-6 weeks’ (mind: essentially, we’re still talking about the very same geographic area like back in March; it’s ‘just 5km here or there’)). And it’s not like this would be ‘the end of the World’ for Ukraine. But, obviously, it would be better not to let the Russians get that far: ideally, at least the 90^th Tank would be pulverised before getting anywhere at all. Thus, lets hope that the ZSU group of units in this sector is soon going to get as much artillery ammo as units in northern Kharkiv and the Kreminna area.

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Please mind: when I’m talking about Russian ‘Tank’ and/or ‘Motor-Rifle’ units, or the VDV (haha!) - their actual condition is really ‘relative’. Definitely not wqorth their official designations. The actual ‘hordes’ in question are not even closely reminiscent of what they used to be, just two years ago. And, back in 2022 they were not even closely reminiscent of what the Soviet Army used to be, back in the 1980s.

Essentially, 90% of the Russian troops and heavy equipment (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery pieces etc.) that used to serve in the VSRF as of 2022 have been shot away, meanwhile. The units in question are nowadays a hodgepodge of surviving veterans (usually the officer cadre) and whatever replacement vehicles the Russians were able to find in the meantime, wearing whatever uniforms, equipment, and gear their troops were able to find (including lots of ZSU uniforms, which the Russians find much better than their ‘Ratnik’). Most importantly. they do not have serious offensive capabilities in classic sense. Only the ability to continue relentless, small-scale infantry assaults and ‘advancing through getting smashed by dozens and hundreds’. ….which is a reason more to wonder about all the hype about GenStab’s generals and Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists discussing that ‘Suwalki Corridor’ and similar day-dreams.

But, they still have lots of troops – and also lots of own and North Korean artillery ammo. Arguably, some are now going to be disappointed by my conclusion that I find the use of North Korean ammo for ‘particularly cool’: but, the fact is that this actually helps the ZSU by blowing up Russian guns - like in the case of this 2S5 Hyacinth-S, which exploded while trying to fire one of North Korean shells, two days ago, in southern Kherson:

Still….well, all of this means that… sigh… unless somebody there in the West finally comes to his or her senses, and starts re-arming Ukraine in really a very serious fashion: the ZSU has no other options but to patiently wait, let them come, kill themselves with their North Korean shells, but, and foremost continue k… erm… kuddling the Russians, in big numbers, over and over again.