Ukraine War, 28–30 March, 2022

Good morning everybody!

Good morning everybody!

Here’s my summary of most important developments regarding the Ukrainian War from period 28–30 Mar 22.

Abbreviations

CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)

BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)

GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)

GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)

GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)

GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)

Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)

LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)

MBT — main battle tank

Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)

MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)

MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)

RFA — Russian Federation Army

South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)

VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)

West OSK — Western Military District (Russia)

STRATEGIC

Following Shoygu’s announcement that Russia is now going to focus on its ‘key objective’ — the ‘liberation of Donbass’ — on 29 March, his deputy Aleksandar Formin, announced that Russia is going to ‘drastically reduce’ combat operations in Ukraine, withdraw units from Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblasts etc.. Regardless of euphoria in some of the Western media, I’m not the least impressed: at most, such announcements are meant for domestic consumption and actually mean nothing. Similar is valid for negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian representatives in Istanbul: contrary to the Russian propaganda, the round of talks on 29 March ended inconclusively and no new meeting is scheduled for the next two weeks.

Ironically, some of Russian hawks are meanwhile embittered about negotiations: Putin is scolded for ‘betrayal’, and demanded to negotiate solely about exchanges of prisoners and humanitarian corridors. Moreover, they dislike the negotiations are led by a ‘Jew’ (Abramovich).

In reality, the RFA exhausted the offensive capability of more than half of over 120 BTGs it deployed against Ukraine: neither Putin, nor the Keystone Cops in Moscow have ever expected to fight a protracted war in hostile territory, even less so against a huge and well-motivated armed force (probably counting over 300,000 by now). Unprepared to compromise, probably not informed about the actual situation on the battlefield by their subordinates, they cannot accept Ukrainian conditions: instead, they’re just buying time to bring in yet more reinforcements from the Far East (now it seems they’re pulling lots of reserve equipment out of storage). Right now, they’re bringing in the personnel of the 4th Military Base (two BTGs from South Ossetia) and the 7th Military Base (one BTG from Abkhazia) , but it’s unclear where is this going to be deployed.

There are meanwhile so many Belarusians fighting on Ukrainian side, that their two battalions have been joined into the Pahonya Regiment. Slowly growing is also the unit staffed entirely of Muslims: this is meanwhile wearing the title Crimea Battalion.

Yesterday (30 Mar), early in the morning, the Russian forward ammunition depot outside the village of Oktybarskoye, near Belogorod blew up. Ukrainians claimed it as hit by one of Tochka ballistic missiles of the their 19th Missile Brigade, but I haven’t seen any confirmation for this (at least: not yet). Considering how are Russians handling their ammunition — no surprise…

AIR

Late in the evening of 28 Mar, the Ukrainian air defences claimed the downing of two cruise missiles flying in direction of Lviv, about 30km short of the city. Another Russian cruise missile strike then destroyed ‘all the strategic reserves of fuel and lubricants’ stored at the Starokostiantyniv Airport, in the Khmelnytsky Oblast. As already reported, on the morning of 29 Mar, a cruise missile destroyed a regional administration building in Mykolaiv, killing 13 and wounding over 30. Slightly more successful seems to have been air defences of Kyiv: apparently, they intercepted two incoming missiles during the night from 29 to 30 Mar.

Yesterday, the Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed another Ukrainian Su-24 shot down, ‘near the village of Tumen’ (Rivne region), ‘in an air battle’. The Russians also claimed the downing of 10 additional Ukrainian UAVs…

The Russians did provide evidence for the downing of an Ukrainian TB.2, though (see attached photo): second in this war by now.

NORTH

Generally, there’s no indication of a Russian withdrawal. Nobody from the 35th and 36th CAA is ‘going home’: the units are repositioning. Over the last two days, Ukrainians continued pushing forward. On 29th, they attacked into northern Irpin from three directions, and forced remaining Russians out of the northern part of the city, plus villages of Svitylnia, Hebelky, and Ploske. Attacks on Bucha and Hostomel were either of diversionary nature, or not as successful.

NORTH-EAST

Using Nizhyn as a base, the Ukrainian 1st Armoured Brigade has liberated the village of Sloboda, south of Chernihiv: it is possible that by now it has liberated the village of Yahidne, on the M01 highway, south of the city, too; but, there’s no confirmation for this and the city remains de-facto besieged and under constant air strikes and artillery barrages.

Further south, the situation is beginning to clear. Ukrainians have liberated Nova Basan, thus forcing the 2nd CCAA to withdraw into hills and forests north of H07 highway, where it is trying to establish a new, 70km-long frontline roughly along the line Bohdanivka — Kozatske. There are no reports about the situation further east, all the way from H07 to Konotop, which is making me think that ‘something is going on there’: would be opportune, then such an Ukrainian move would force a complete withdrawal of the 2nd GCAA along the M02 back to Russia.

In the Sumy area, the frontline has stabilised north of H07, north and north-east of the town. The village of Krasnopilia, further east, is firmly under Ukrainian control. Ukrainian operations in this area seem to be centred on the 93rd Mech, with several infantry- and motorised battalions in support. These forces are meanwhile facing only some five BTGs of the 2nd GMRD: all the other units of the 1st GTA (for example: 4th GTD, 27th GMRB, 47th GTD) seem to have been withdrawn from Ukraine to the Kursk area, in Russia. In the place of the 1st GTA, the West OSK is now increasingly deploying units consisting of troops recruited in the Donbass. Several have already been killed or captured.

Kharkiv remains under ferocious artillery barrages: the defenders there counted 180 volleys from BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers hitting the city since 1 March, and a total of 39 artillery strikes on 30 March alone. That said, the Russian ground forces are not attacking the city. On the contrary, it is the Ukrainian 92nd Mech that is counterattacking them — even if not as far south-east as I understood (and reported), three days ago. Instead in the Husarivka area, it hit a concentration of three Russian BTGs — including one from the 59th Tank Regiment, and two from the 138th Motorised Rifle Brigade — and that in the area between Malaya Rogan and Vilkhivka, directly east outside Kharkiv, between 25 and 28 March. Reinforced by elements of the Territorial Defence, the 92nd destroyed all three BTGs, captured their HQs with full documentation and communication gear, and about 60 survivors. With this, the 6th CAA lost about half of its BTGs, while the Ukrainians have secured the entire M03 highway from Kharkiv to Chuhuiv.

Notably: in the aftermath of destruction of the Ukrainian S-300 SAM-site protecting Kharkiv, already back on the first day of the war (and then, apparently, by multiple Iskandar ballistic missiles), the 92nd Mech was protected by a single Buk SAM-site during this operation. The latter is known to have shot down at least one Ka-52 and several Russian UAVs, the last few days.

The question is now: what Ukrainian unit has counterattacked the 144th MRD at Husarivka and thus spoiled the Russian offensive down either side of Izium, around the same time? Right now, I do not know the answer, but photos and videos from that are area shown at least a number of MSTA-S self-propelled howitzers and support vehicles knocked out. Certain is only that the Ukrainians are now shown a number of photos and videos of destroyed Russian equipment there (see below for one example), that the 81st Airborne is back to the southern outskirts of Izium, and that the villages of Topolske, Kamyanka, and Thyhotske remain under Ukrainian control.

Additional Russian attacks in this area must be expected for the coming days, then the RUMINT has it that the RFA has meanwhile deployed more forces between Kursk and Rostov than it had there before the war.

EAST

The RFA continued to shell Rubizhne, Lysychnsk and Popasna in the Severodonetsk area, but run only minor ground attacks, all of which were repelled. Further east and south, the Ukrainian Army has reported fighting along the entire LOC in the Donbas region, from Popasna and Svitlodarsk in the north to Vuhledar in the south, but again: no major ground attacks were launched.

SOUTH

Mariupol…. remains besieged and bitterly contested. There is clear evidence that the Russians have captured two main military bases in the city: one of the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade, and one of the Azov Battalion. Both were empty, though.

The 49th CAA did attempt a diversionary attack in direction of Oleksandrivka (south of Mykolaiv), yesterday, but is otherwise on general withdrawal from the north in direction of Kherson. Between others, the Ukrainians liberated Zahradivka, Kochubeyivka, and Orlove, yesterday. In its back, activity of Ukrainian units has been reported on the banks of Dnepr both in northern and southern suburbs of Kherson. After sustaining heavy losses in repeated Ukrainian artillery barrages of the Kherson Airport, the VKS moved to the Chaplynka airport. In the rear, its engineers are mining whatever they only can. For example, the Antonovsky Bridge, near Kherson.