Ukraine War, 27 December 2022
Ukraine War, 27 December 2022
Ukraine War, 27 December 2022
Hello everybody!
It’s been over a week since my last report/update, so time for another one. Before I start, few answers to ‘frequently asked questions’.
West lies to Ukraine — regarding the extension of its help etc.? Oh yes, it does. Of course it’s lying: when at war, everybody’s lying. That’s including the ‘West’.
Though mind: that’s valid for Putin, Surovikin, their Keystone Cops in Moscow and all of the Putin-controlled Russian ‘media’, too.
Levels of Russian casualties acceptable for Putin? There are no limits. Face and accept it, please: he can’t care less about how many get killed in this war. He’s cynical to the point where sooner or later he’s going to start boasting with ‘emptying Russian prisons of worst sorts of human scum’ — because so many of convicts recruited by Wagner are getting killed in this war… Thus, if at all, casualties might only concern Putin if they start causing serious internal unrest against him. Right now, the Russian public is ‘light years away’ from that point and I do not see this changing any time soon.
Possible additional Russian mobilisation? Considering Russian losses of the last two months, this is not only ‘possible’, but even ‘likely’. However, for reasons explained in one of my earlier reports (please check the last 3–4), this isn’t going to change anything in this war. Number of troops alone can’t win against the combination of fire-power, precision, and manoeuvre the ZSU has nowadays. Sure, the latter is not enough to completely defeat the Russians and drive them out of the country in a matter of, say, ‘few weeks’; however, it’s enough to keep the VSRF in check because this has lost all of its ‘quality’ (or whatever was there of it).
Is the morale of Russian troops as bad as widely discussed in Ukraine and the West? Have addressed this at least three-four times, already, but here you are again: yes, the morale of Russian troops is bad. It’s awful: well below what would be acceptable levels in Ukraine and/or the West. However, in Russia, this simply doesn’t matter: the Russians are fatalist enough to keep on fighting, and they have so many troops that it doesn’t matter if entire battalions refuse to fight, or abandon their positions and run away. Not only that Ukraine still does not have enough artillery and ammunition to really break the Russian fighting spirit, but Russia is still far away from suffering enough losses for this to change.
If there are problems with understanding this: lets say that this war is a 100-storey-tall skyscraper, and getting through it is comparable with going from the level 0 up to the 100th story, by climbing its steps. Right now, we’re at around the storey №20, moving towards 21…. Now you’ve got the picture.
Withdrawal of the Rosgvardia from Ukraine? Got no info in this regards. Would be very much surprised should this ever happen: Putin has enough of his ‘Praetorian guards’ inside Russia to keep the situation under control.
Possible additional Mobilisation in Ukraine? Presently, I consider this unlikely. The ZSU is not short on troops, but on heavy weapons and related ammunition for all the troops it’s got.
Some have expressed their disbelief about Ukraine celebrating Christmas on 25 December… Well, if this is what matters to you, yes: 7 January is still a public holiday. However, in 2017, the Eastern Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church have decided to celebrate Christmas ‘along the revised Julian calendar’: on 25 December. With most of the faithful agreeing with such a decision, both churches confirmed it in October this year, and thus, yes, 25 December is the public holiday in Ukraine.
Finally, regarding copy-editing offers: thank you very much, that’s very kind and much appreciated, and be sure, I know it would be necessary. My ‘problem’, if you like, is that I’m writing ‘on inspiration’, very spontaneously, and extremely quickly. As soon as I conclude something like, ‘OK, this is enough info for today’, a new update is completed and uploaded. Finally, I’m the way I am: far from perfect, but authentic. So is my writing. And I’m oriented towards finishing one task, so I can re-focus on the next one — of which I have an endless number on my mind (see all the books I’m either writing, or for which I’m responsible as editor). Thus, sorry, but I would find such efforts time-consuming and, ultimately, a pointless exercise.
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
It was — relatively — ‘quiet’ in Ukraine of the last few days. That is: except for Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, both of which are on the receiving end of about 20 strikes by multiple rocket launchers (like BM-21, BM-27, and BM-30) every single day. There’s no peace for Kherson either: infrastructure and apartment buildings are heavily shelled every day, and there are hundreds of casualties: at least 15 were killed and more than 55 wounded there on 25 December alone. In eastern Ukraine, an industrial enterprise in Kramatorsk was hit by three S-300 missiles (Putin-fans are claiming that this was used to repair M142 HIMARS-launchers and that two of these were destroyed, and thus ‘very little of the HIMARS-myth remains’) — and Avdiivka was targeted by up to six missiles on 25 December.
That said, and despite a two-hours-long air raid alert in Ukraine on 25 December, no large-scale ballistic/cruise-missile attack took place. Have no doubt, though: the Russian defence sector is working ‘full steam’ on manufacturing new Iskanders, Kalibrs, and cruise missiles, and they’re going to strike again in the coming days (guess: probably on 30 or 31 December, or 1 January, just for example).
In turn, the ZSU continues striking into the depth of the Russian positions. On 24 December, the M142 HIMARS of the ZSU hit the Khakovka airfield (the GenStab-U claimed 150 Russian casualties); on 25 December, they hit four Russian field headquarters; and on 26 December another nine.
The last night Ukrainians have targeted the Engels AB, near Saratov, with Tu-141/143 drones, again. The Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed one drone as shot down while approaching Engels, around 01.35hrs local time: Ukrainians claim the other hit the local ‘control centre’, whatever this might have been. Keystone cops eventually admitted 3–4 casualties; others, quoting Russian social media, are claiming 5–7 damaged Tu-95s, 17 killed and 26 wounded. Must admit, I have hard times trusting anything of that kind: those Tu-95MS that were still operational have been withdrawn to the Ukrainka AB (Amur Oblast), over a week ago.
The FSB has published a short report according to which it killed ‘four Ukrainian saboteurs’, in the Bryansk Oblast, in Russia. Supposedly these were armed with ‘US-made explosives’ and ‘SIG MPX sub machine guns’. That might be explaining at least some of spontaneous fires, or smoking accidents in the Russian Federation of the last few months: on the other hand, too much ‘made in USA’ for my taste, making this sound like usual Putin’s propaganda trash…
BATTLE OF DONBASS
No matter what is going on anywhere else, Putin and Surovikin continue their efforts to maintain initiative in the Donbass, and especially in the areas of Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Correspondingly, multiple videos surfaced shown the Russian trains hauling heavy equipment and yet more personnel to Ukraine, the last week.
Kupyansk-Svatove… On 21 December, forces of the 92nd Mech, Kastus Kalinovski Regiment, and Omega and Khartia Battalions punched through the Russian lines and secured Podkuychansk. This relatively minor advance caused the Russians to rush almost the entire 4th and 47th Guards Tank Divisions from Svatove to the frontline, and to — reportedly — withdraw their local field headquarters from that town to Luhansk. Reports along which Ukrainians liberated Kryvoshiyivka and/or Kolomyichykha at the same time, proved all wrong, though.
Kremina….Further south, between 21 and 26 December, Ukrainians — spearheaded by the 25th Airborne — have crossed the P-66 highway at multiple points in the area between Ploshchanka and Zhytliva (that’s south of Svatove and north of Kremina). With this, some Ukrainians began claiming that ‘Kremina is practically ours’. Well, sorry: not that quick: so far there is no confirmation for Ukrainian troops managing to reach reaching any of additional villages, nearby. On the contrary, the VSRF run a local counterattack somewhere in the Kremina area, necessitating the 95th Airborne to re-deploy some of its assets and hit back in force.
Soledar….The last week, the Russians did their utmost to complete the conquest of Yakovlivka, and punch the frontline of the 10th Mountain Brigade. Since 24 December, the latter — reinforced by elements of the 17th Tank Brigade — launched several local counterattacks, claiming to have recovered some of positions, but AFAIK, Yakolivka is meanwhile completely under the Russian control. As next, Wagner launched attacks from Yakovlivka on the northern Soledar, combining these with attacks from Nova Kamenka and Bakhmutskove.
Bakhmut… the last week or so, the Russians brought in reinforcements to the area of the petrol station south of Pidhorodne and then attempted punching from there along the M-03 highway, in north-western direction, and into northern Bakhmut. Without any kind of success. In turn, Ukrainians exploited the opportunity to drive the Russians out of the easternmost outskirts of the town, which is why the troops of the 54th Mech were then able to take videos of themselves inside a captured Russian position. On the southern side, Wagner PMC and the 58th Motor Rifle Brigade VSRF are back into southern Opytne, and their fans are claiming that the 59th Motor Brigade, ZSU, lost 185 troops killed and wounded — mostly from its self-propelled artillery group, and the reconnaissance company. Gauging by releases of the GenStab-U, the convicts and the VSRF are suffering losses of 400–600 troops — killed, wounded etc. — in this area alone, every single day. Considering videos of this kind, or like this one…. well, no surprise…
A view from the other side of the frontline (including the presence of TOS-1s in the Bakhmut area):
Horlivka-Donetsk area… The Russians spent the last week attacking at almost the full width of this sector of the frontline, from Niu York in the north, via Novobakhmutivka, Krasnohorivka, Kamianka, Opytne and Vodiane, to Pisky and Nevelske. AFAIK, without any positive results. Similar is valid for their attacks on Krasnohorivka, Pobeda, Novomykhaliivka, all the way down to the Vuhledar area.
The Vuhledar-Pavlivka area is something like the best example for incompetence of Putin and Surovikin: as first, they squandered the re-built 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade while failing to secure Pavlivka, and only then — few days ago — did they send the 36th Motor Rifle to attack Vuhledar from south-east… What a surprise the latter was beaten back with quite a heavy loss.
…ah yes: and some of the Russian media is hinting that T-14 Armata main battle tanks are about to become involved in fighting…
