Ukraine War, 27 August 2024

Hello everybody!

Hard to decide where to look first, yesterday. Thus, lets get straight to the latest developments…

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STRATEGIC

Late on Saturday evening (24 August), France arrested Pavel Durov, as he arrived on a private jet at Le Bourget airport, in Paris. Durov is of Russian origin, but having honorary French citizenship, and is the founder of Telegram - a social media service that’s enciphered. Is one of reasons why it became as popular in Russia (and in Ukraine) and of special concern for the FSB at earlier times (because it was used by Russian internal political activists and oppositionals). So much so, it was heavily targeted until successfully cracked by the FSB, while Durov was under pressure of arrest in Russia. Meanwhile, Telegram is not only compromised by the FSB but widely (mis)used – and that not only by all sorts of organised crime (several terrorist organisations, racists movements, human traffickers and paedophile networks, drug cartels for example) – but by the Russian armed forces for military communications, too (especially for their tactical communications, and instead of any of their own ATMS’).

Ah, and BTW: two days earlier, a federal judge in the USA ordered Elon Musk into publicly disclosing investors into his purchase of Twitter, nowadays X. Of course, the mass of the 95 instances he’s then ‘revealed’ are institutional funds from the USA. However, it turned out, these are owned by such lovely characters like Russian oligarchs Peter Aven (Alfa Group) and Vadim Moshkvich (both are members of Putin’s inner circle), then lovely dictatorships like PR China, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, and then lots of corporations with connections to Pudding and Trump (via Lonsdale and Sacks), plus Israel (CHEQ): indeed, some are facilitating Pudding’s sponsoring for Trump (of course, always via entire series of subsidiaries and fronts in form of capital managements, investments, and consulting bodies…. Like 8VC, which is directly linked to Aven and Moshkvich; the Kingdom Holding Company owned by Prince Alwaleed, or Q Tetris Holding LLC, owned by the Qatari Investment Authority…).

(….So, instead of day-dreams about ‘deep state’, see here: organisations like ‘Specter’ from the James Bond movies now appear far more realistic…in this case Western oligarchy, in cooperation with foreign dictatorships have bought themselves a platform for their PRBS…)

…and Musk (who is under [yet another] investigation for fraud) is now concerned he might end like Durov… while Zuckerberg (this is for all those who might think he’s been unfairly left out) is coming quite clean from a similar affair because – although his Instagram is one of biggest platforms for exploitation of children pornography – he’s granted the Western governments a backdoor access to that system….

One way or another, all of the Russian mainstream- and social media is ‘at barricades’ because of Durov’s arrest – together with all the possible Pudding-shills (from Elon Musk, David Sacks, Peter Thiel, Tucker Carlson, to Nigel Farage…). See: oligarchs and their shills – love oligarchs. They are all complaining about ‘free speech being under attack’…

What a load of BS! Makes me wonder if the same characters would support, for example, paid Nazi advertising in British and French newspapers on 1 June 1940, or paid Japanese advertising in nation-wide newspapers of the USA on 9 December 1941? …or how about paid paid Egyptian advertisments in The Jerusalem Times of 7 October 1973 and Iraqi advertising in Kayvan and other Iranian newspapers of 24 September 1980…?

As much as I am ‘fiercely pro’ free speech, there are limits – especially when this freedom is misused for the purpose of spreading PRBS, disinformation, and hate speech. Besides, one should keep in mind that Durov was not ‘arrested by a country’ – but on order from an independent court, in a way perfectly normal if there is a need to determine if somebody is guilty of a crime, or not.

No, this should not mean I’m now, ‘all of a sudden’, ‘convinced the system is working’. On the contrary: the system is deeply subverted – foremost thanks to the likes of Durov, Musk etc…. and still, the predominant experience is: if he respects the law, Durov is going to be fine.

….not fall down some stairs…

….and then out of a window at the end of those stairs…

…which is of particular importance considering that, reportedly, Durov was about to meet either somebody high the FSB’s chain of command or even Pudding in person. With other words: he knew he’s sought for in France, and still concluded it’s better to ‘run West’, than to remain in Russia.

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

For two days now, Russia is heavily striking the Ukrainian power-supply system. Indeed, after ‘saving’ and ‘collecting’ missiles for weeks, yesterday (26 August), the Russians run a 15-hours-long mass-missile/attack-UAV-strike on Ukraine (lasting from around 00.00hrs in the morning, until after 15.00hrs in the afternoon). Between aircraft and warships known to have been involved were three groups with a total of 11 Tu-95 and one with 6 Tu-22M-3 bombers (launched from different air bases, this time), and four vessels equipped with Kalibr cruise-missiles (nearly all were underway in the Novorossiysk area). In total, the PSU reported the detection of 127 missiles and 109 Shahed attack-UAVs, and claimed to have detected and shot down

-          6x Iskander and/or KN-23s (from Kursk, Voronezh and the occupied Crimea; 1 claimed shot down)

-          3x Kinzhal (from Ryazan and Lipetsk; 1 claimed shot down)

-          3 Kh-22 (all from Voronezh; 1 claimed shot down)

-          77 Kh-101s (from the Caspian Sea and the Volgograd area; 75 claimed shot down)

-          28 Kalibr (24 claimed shot down)

-          10 Kh-59/69, and

-          109 Shaheds (from Kursk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and the occupied Crimea; 99 claimed shot down).

Just to illustrate the scope: at the high point of this attack, around 07.10hrs in the morning, the PSU was tracking a total of over 80 Shaheds inside the Ukrainian airspace. Obviously, these served the purpose of ‘mapping’ the PSU’s IADS: prompting Ukrainians to power-up their radars, and thus reveal positions of their air defences. Some 10-20 minutes later, the first two groups of Tu-95s have completed releasing Kh-101s, warships of the Black Sea Fleet commenced launching Kalibrs, while Tu-22M-3s were taking-off from Shaikovka AB. Read: satisfied with what they’ve found about the Ukrainian IADS, the Russians began delivering the actual ‘main blow’.

Now, while the Shaheds were still meandering all over north-eastern, northern-central, and then western Ukraine, Kalibrs entered the airspace along two ‘SAM-corridors’ (via Zaporizhzhya towards Dnipro, and north of Kherson (city) and then past Mykolaiv. The Kh-101s came in over northern Sumy, before continuing past Kyiv in western direction. Eventually, the mass of missiles and attack-UAVs converged on about two dozens of targets roughly between Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, and Ivano-Frankivsk. By the time they have reached this part of Ukraine, they were ‘joined/reinforced’ by (much faster, of course) Iskanders, Kinzhals and KN-23s.

Dozens of Shaheds were shot down by air-defence teams of different independent machine gun battalions. Like in the case of few others, the last week, some were shot down by Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters of the ZSU Army Aviation. Two disappeared inside the Belarussian airspace, and one flew all the way to Poland and then 25-30km deep into its airspace. Warsaw filled a protest…

A gunner of one of Ukrainian mobile machine gun battalions (or ‘mobile fire teams’ MBGs in Ukrainian parlance). Visible to the left and right of his shoulders are smoke trails left by a Kh-101 cruise missile he was firing at, but was meanwhile shot down by a SAM.

Because the Keystone Cops in Moscow can’t stop claiming how much they’ve improved the reliability of their cruise missiles (are they now using chips from Maybach cars instead of Bosch dishwashers?) one of Kh-101s killed lots of fish when crashing into the Dnipro:

As for targets… considering the extension of this strike it might appear surprising how little became known about its result. On the contrary: considering the extension of power outages all over Ukraine: nope, that’s not the least surprising.

One of known targets was the Vyshgorod hydroelectric power plant, immediately north of Kyiv. This received (at least) one hit and was knocked out. The dam holding the Dnipro Reservoir remained intact, though (otherwise most of downtown Kyiv would’ve been flooded, with colossal damage and massive civilian casualties as result). An apartment building is known to have been hit by a Shahed in Lutsk:

…and a hotel in Kryvyi Rih (2 people killed). Other hits are known to have been scored in the Khmelnitsky, and Odesa areas… Indeed, the mass of some 30+ weapons that have hit must have added a lot to the damage on the Ukrainian electricity network, because most of this was either knocked out, or turned off to prevent even more destabilisation and damage.

Kyiv reacted promptly, striking the biggest oil refinery in Russia: the Gazpromneft-ONPZ, outside Omsk by UAVs. Must admit: I’m surprised how poorly-protected was such an important facility: it’s like somebody tasked the Austrian Bundesheer - and then commanded by our glorious minister of defence and other members of the government - with its protection… What a surprise then, the Omsk refinery was hit by multiple UAVs and, as far as is meanwhile known, its AVT-11 primary oil-refining unit (the one with biggest capacity: 8.4 million tons of oil and 1.2 million tons of gas a year) was damaged and stopped working. Ukraine also run a UAV-strike on the Engels-2 AB: the Russians claimed all as shot down, but one hit a skyscraper with apartments (indeed, Ukrainians claim these are apartments of the VKS’ bomber-crews).

(BTW, the Federal POL-depot in Proletarsk – containing 8-10% of the total Russian POL reserves – was still burning as of this morning… for 9^th day in succession.)

The last night, the Russians repeated the exercise: as of this morning, the PSU reported 91 incoming missiles and attack UAVs: 65 of these were shot down (including 5 Kh-101s and 60 Shaheds), 10 crashed on their own, one Shahed disappeared into the Belarusian airspace, while – at the time this is written – (at least) 10 Shaheds were still underway inside the Ukrainian airspace around 08.00hrs local time. Of course, there were yet additional hits on infra-structure…

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GROUND WAR

Generally, the Russians are meanwhile in such a panic, that both Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists and diverse officials are coming up with a new announcement for another Ukrainian offensive almost every day. First, they were crying about southern Zaporizhzhya, then about Bryansk, then about southern Kherson, then about Belgorod… sincerely: I’ve lost the count… That said, on the ground, the Russians are continuing their assault into western Donetsk.

Kursk..

Essentially, and precisely as planned by the greatest military strategist of all the time - which is: ‘without withdrawing troops from Ukraine’ - the VSRF and VDV have brought in so many reinforcements (up to around 30,000 troops, meanwhile) that they have established a firm frontline around about 40% of the Ukrainian penetration (especially in eastern Glushkovky, and east of Sudzha), and began launching first large-scale counterattacks (including several that were effective and successful). Conversely, the ZSU withdrew from few places and began digging in few others. Definitely confirmed as present, meanwhile, is the presence of headquarters of the following major Russian units:

-          810^th NIB

-          155^th NIB

- 200^th MRB

-          7^th and 51^st VDV Regiments

-          11^th VDV Brigade

-          24^th Spetsnaz Brigade, and that in addition to more than a dozen of different motor-rifle regiments of the VSRF and the VKS (plus two regiments of Akhmat… as far as anybody still considers them ‘serious fighting formations’).

Western side… Along the Seym River in the Glushkovsky District, the Russians are known to have constructed three new pontoon-bridges during the weekend: two are north of Zvannoe, and one near Glushkovo. The ZSU is striking them with FPVs and HIMARS, the PSU with PGMs, however:  I do not share the optimism of those expecting ‘another Kherson’ here. This is Russia, VSRF’s logistic centre in Kursk is close, and Seym is no Dnipro (at least not before the Russians blew up the Kakhovka Dam). Plus at the rates at which the USA, UK and France are supplying air-launched precision guided munition (PGM) to Ukraine, while the Trio Fantasticus in the White House continues banning the use of ATACMs on the Russian turf… well, I wouldn’t be surprised if it happens the Russians have more PMPs over the Seym, than the Ukrainians might have PGMs to target these…

Yes, that’s a hyperbole but: unsurprisingly, the VSRF has managed to bolster the 155^th Naval Infantry Brigade enough for this to counterattack into Komarovka: some say they have recovered the place.

Read: alone the presence of the 5^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, VKS, should’ve taught everybody that especially the ‘no-step-back-FSB’ is meaning it damn seriously with defending Glushkovsky.

In the Korenevo area, three days ago, the Russians counterattacked at Tolpino and, after the ZSU withdrew from there, began attacking via Vetreno in direction of Olgovka and Kremyanoe. The ZSU then counterattacked on Tolpino from… ‘around north of Alexandrovka’, though – which leads to the conclusion that the VSRF was actually seeking to punch to yet another Russian unit cut off from the rear: probably in the Dubrovka area? Less likely, the VSRF is trying to cut off the ZSU-controlled positions in the hills further north-east, in the area between Sheptukhovka and Kauchuk – which, ironically, the ‘video, or it didn’t happen’-crowd declared for ‘non-existing’. How do they think the ZSU can run attacks from the Alexandrivka area in direction of Tolpino, without presence in that area: no idea. It’s just like the declaration that Krasnootyabrskoe is ‘under Ukrainian control, now’ – while that’s the case for over a week, and it was only ‘now’ that the ZSU troops from there were rotated out, so they can show videos from the area… the same is valid for ‘Ukrainian advance north of Malaya Lokyna’…

Actually, the last week’s losses of the 810^th Naval Infantry Brigade were ‘quickly replaced’ by yet another battalion of ‘naval infantry’ plus elements of 4-5 different mobik regiments, all brought to this area (see: sailors from warships of the Pacific Fleet and similar). But, after about 80-90 survivors of the 1009^th MRB managed to escape in direction of Bakhtinka, on 24 August the ZSU has not only secured Malaya Loknya: the ‘frontline’ in this area is running in a semi-circle approximately from Sheptukhovka (?) via Kauchuk (ZSU) to Anastasevka (ZSU) and Mashkino (ZSU) in the north, down the eastern side of the road connecting Lgov with Sudzha, to Bakhtinka (?), then Rozgrebli (?)…. As far as this can be described as a ‘frontline’ – yet: actually, there’s something like 5-10km wide ‘no-man’s land/grey zone’ where nobody is in control.

In the Bolshoe Soldatskoe area, the Russians have managed to stop Ukrainian raids, then the 11^th VDV and the 15^th MRB lifted the siege of their troops in Nizhnaya Parovaya, and then forced the ZSU back to (approximately) the Rozgrebli-Biriukovka-Borki line. South from there, the ZSU remains in control of Pushkarnoe and Russkaya Konoepelka.

However, further south, the 24^th Spetsnaz has managed to box about 40 surrounded troops out of Ulanok and then – and whether from Ulanok or from NIzhnemakhovo – crossed the Psel River to seize Spalnoe. This prompted the ZSU to withdraw from Belitsa and Giri. That was on 22-23 August: ever since, there’s a big battle going on for Borki.

In the air, the PSU is continuing to target bridges on the Seym with PGMs released from MiGs and Sukhois and the Ukrainian FPVs have caused the loss of at least another Russian Mi-8, possibly two.

The VKS is meanwhile heavily bombing Krasnootabrskoe area, while the Russian FPVs are targeting ZSU units in the Snagost area, nearby. The Russians are reinforcing their air strikes on Sudzha: indeed, Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists have warned the civilians still inside the Ukrainian-occupied area that all of towns and villages there are going to be ‘eradicated’.

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Northern Kharkiv… no major changes, but following the failure of the last Ukrainian counterattack in the Hlybovke area (see Don’s reporting from yesterday), now it’s the turn on the Russians to counterattack...

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove… on-off Russian assaults…some Ukrainian counterattacks (like in the Serebrianka forest, where Ukrainians managed a shallow advance).

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Bakhmut… the Russians continued ‘luke-warm’ attacks over the Canal. They’ve replaced the 11^th VDV Brigade with three motor-rifle battalions of mobiks, and these are meanwhile attacking in the Klishchivka area.

Like other ZSU units in this area, the (425^th) Skala Battalion is counterattacking at every opportunity. Sadly, this battle is another piece of evidence that quality is no replacement for quantity.

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Pokrovsk-Avdiivka… this sector remains the absolute Russian focus. Indeed, the Group Tsentr is assaulting with – de-facto – two combined arms armies including all the elements of the 1^st, 15^th, 30^th and 114^th MRBs, the complete 27^th Motor-Rifle Division and the 90^th Tank Division, and the 201^st Military Base, plus scores of mobik-battalions spent to re-fill demolished units (the Russian losses in this area remain at the record-high-levels for the fourth or fifth successive week). And they’re re-filling their assault groups with additional motor-cycles:

The primary axis of this advance remains the local railway section, and it’s along the same the VSRF has entered and then captured all of Novohrodivka: even the bitter-most resistance by the 151^st Mech was not enough. South of there the Russians are also widening their penetration through assaults in direction of Mykhalivka, Kalynove, and Svyato-Bohyavlenskyy.

To make sure: the mass of Russian forces in this area is making such ideas like ‘just one Ukrainian brigade could cut them off’ - little else but wishful thinking. Nope: it could not. Especially not considering the VKS is in possession of complete aerial superiority over this part of Ukraine. In addition to something like 4:1 Russian advantage in troops, artillery, and FPVs. Arguably, Zelensky in person promised ‘reinforcements’ for the ZSU in the Pokrovsk sector. What should that mean: no idea because even five Ukrainian brigades couldn’t change a lot. Indeed: 10 Patriot, IRIS-T and/or NASAMs systems – could not, because they’re lacking the necessary range to shot down Su-34s before these can release UMPKs, and because they’re also largely useless against FPVs.

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Mariinka-Vuhledar area… sadly, the Vuhledar corner’ is not really one, any more, because – despite massive losses - the Russians have captured a swath of territory from Kostyantynivka (nearly all of which is meanwhile in Russian hands) down to Vodyane, and thus reached the Road 00532 (connecting Vuhledar with Kostyantinivka) on a wide front. Arguably, they’ve been stopped, the last week, but they have also pushed the ZSU out of the artillery range to the nearest sector of the railway line from Donetsk to Melitopol.

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SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA/DNIPRO

Kherson… in the light of the sustained Russian campaign of terror-strikes by FPVs on the civilian population the city, the last few days the PSU and the ZSU began targeting Russian observation posts and artillery positions in the Oleshky area… which in turn prompted several of Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists into fantasising about yet another Ukrainian offensive – whether over Dnipro, or even all the way to Crimea. According to them, the ‘Ukrainian militants’ have gathered a huge number of UAVs and FVPs in the Odesa area for this purpose.

A PGM-strike by an Ukrainian MiG-29 on a Russian observation posts in the Oleshky area, back on 22 or 23 August.