Ukraine War, 25 February 2023

Hello everybody!

Hello everybody!

Gerasimov’s ‘biiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiig’ offensive remains in ‘full swing’. For reasons explained several times, it’s just looking differently than everybody expected — and it’s continuing to go nowhere. At least in most areas. ….and that’s why both military experts in different glorious think-tanks advising our holly governments, and all the military experts in the mainstream media are still waiting for the offensive to start, or announcing it as starting yesterday, or whatever else.

Kupyansk-Svatove…(or the VSRF Group Zapad) ….as mentioned earlier, the Russians have forced Ukrainians to withdraw from Dvorichne and Hryanykivka, east of the Oskil River. Originally, this was a small bridgehead, a ‘left-over’ from the September 2022-offensive: I never found a satisfactory explanation into how well was it connected with the ‘main advance’ in direction of Svatove, further south. Can only hope the ZSU came away with a ‘blue eye’, rather than with ‘bloody nose’, because there was only one escape route: a road to Lyman Pershyi through the forests in the south.

Further south, down the P66 highway: the last two days were ‘average’. Some Russian attacks in the Novoselivske area, and south of it, all stopped by Ukrainian defensive fire.

Kremina…. (or the VSRF Group Tsentr)….can’t help it: the Russians are down to assaulting what’s left of completely smashed Dibrova and trying to defend Chervonopopivka. Wait… weren’t these their own starting positions, 10 or so days ago? ….who can say any more after one year of war and five months of fighting in this area. Anyway, most of videos from this area are looking like this, or this one…

Bakhmut….North… (notably: despite the deployment of two divisions of VDV, and one motor-infantry, the Keystone Cops in Moscow seem not to find these forces ‘worth’ being named a ‘group’….)…no end of bad news from this area. Yesterday in the morning it became known that the ‘Wagner’ (it’s always ‘Wagner’ when Russians are advancing; I suspect the 7th VDV Division behind this action), secured Berkhivka and Yahidne. Ukrainians are confirming ‘heavy fighting’ and ‘critical situation’ in Yahidne. Not sure what’s up in Stupky, but seems most of that area is under the Russian control, too. Indeed, some of Putin-fans are meanwhile claiming that the Russians have ‘fire-control’ over the road connecting Chasiv Yar with Khromovo (Road 506). Truth or not: it’s good the ZSU has meanwhile constructed another road into Bakhmut (now, please feel free to ‘correct’ me again, tell me I’m ‘wrong’ and I mean the 506…. :rolleyes:. ).

Bakhmut…East…the last two days, the Russians have launched a series of powerful attacks through the dachas area in between the T0504 in the north, and the junkyard in the south: approximately along the Shchedriy and Pereshotrav Streets, and in direction of the Shchedra Street. Might have reached the Abrykosova Street, meanwhile, which is placing them about 1,000m east of the town centre.

Bakhmut…South…The Russians are back to assaulting from the south, too. I’m just not sure how, i.e. from what direction, but, apparently, from the area south or Cemetery, or from the Cemetery, and from Klishchivka, and east of ‘that hill above Klishchivka’ towards the dachas south of the 0504 — all in approximate direction of the WOG petrol station. Makes sense because there’s a forest there, offering their infantry plentiful of protection.

….which is bringing me to the crucial point: something apparently ignored by almost everybody debating ‘why are Ukrainians losing in Bakhmut but winning in Vuhledar’. That’s the issue of terrain and vegetation.

These two topics are hardly ever discussed nowadays. Probably because the mass of such discussions are taking place in our clean living rooms, or kitchens, or offices, all dominated by flat objects: flat floors and flat tables, surrounded by flat walls. The streets outside are flat, too, and the mass of people involved are living in cities dominated, arguably, by ‘flatness’. And because maps displayed on flat-screen monitors are always…well, flat: there are no hills, no valleys, no ravines, no hedges, no forests, no marshes, no streams, no bushes, no gardens….and there’s no mud and no dirt.

In reality (and if one cares to pay enough attention, of course), the principal difference between Bakhmut and Vuhledar is not in the style of ZSU’s command (or related, internal debates), or in the style of the VSRF’s command, but in terrain. Terrain in the Bakhmut area is wavy and broken, with plentiful small fields (the mass is some 400–600m wide) surrounded by long hedgerows. There are several forests around the town, too. That’s offering plentiful of cover for advancing Russians: indeed, it’s offering them plentiful of potential routes for advance, while in turn making it hard for Ukrainians to monitor all the possible venues of approach to their positions. Add the constant shortage of artillery ammo, and you’ve got the picture: even when they do detect an incoming Russian assault on time, Ukrainians cannot saturate the same with enough ammo.

In comparison, terrain in the Vuhledar area is flat and open: south of the town — and that’s the shortest route of advance for the Russians — there is 2,000m of open space: no hedges, and no cover at all. An ideal ‘kill zone’. The only approach venue offering cover is the ‘dachas area’, south-east of Vuhledar. Similar is valid for the nearby coal mine — the approach routes to which are even longer, while even opener. The ZSU has it easy to monitor the battlefield and react correspondingly, while the Russians have very little cover as soon as they start moving. Add the fact there’s just one ZSU artillery brigade in the area and conclusion is on hand: this one has enough ammo to do the job.

Finally, one should mind the difference in the size of involved Russian forces. In the Bakhmut area (and the following is based on actually seeing a screen-grab from the ZSU’s Kropyva ATMS), the VSRF has ‘several dozens’ of battalions. In the Vuhledar area, it’s never deployed more than about a dozen of them at the same time.

Bottom line, dear reader: keep the terrain and vegetation in mind. And then keep in mind that wars are unpredictable because the mass of command decisions is taken under immense stress and pressure and anything than ‘ideal’ conditions: with commanders short on time and hopelessly short on information. Heaven only knows how many of ‘genius’ decisions by one or another ‘famous (or famed) general’ in history of warfare were little else but sheer luck, or pure accident: what a surprise then, if sometimes things go well, and other times things go bad.

Avdiivka…(the VSRF Group Yug)…Novobakhmutivka (some 5km north of Avdiivka) is meanwhile ‘contested’. Should meant the Russians have entered the place, and the ZSU is resisting. Ukrainians run a counterattack in the Kamyanka area, and stabilised the situation there. South of Avdiivka the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade (ZSU) has, so far, managed to stop all Russian assaults on its complex of fortifications constructed north of Vodyane and Opytne, knocking out a few of Separatist T-64s in the process — and this despite being subjected to several waves of air strikes by fighter-bombers and helicopters of the VKS.

Mariinka…for the last two days, the Russians continued attacking through the town-centre, without success. South of Mariinka, their assault on Pobieda, on 23rd February, was repelled with a loss of about half a dozen of tanks and other armoured vehicles (including the BMP-3 visible below).