Ukraine War, 23 July 2023: Yet more of Russian Counterattacks

….now for the ‘second part’ of this update, and some analysis…

AIR/MISSILE WAR

Yup, starting with this topic, ‘again’ - because additional details about the Russian air strikes on the Odesa area from the last night (22-23 July) became known, and I think there’s a need for analysis, too.

According to official Ukrainian sources, the last night the Russians deployed:

-          5 Onyks

-          3 Kh-22

-          4 Kalibr

-          5 Iskander-K

-          2 Iskander-M

….to strike purely civilian objects in Odesa. See, the earlier-mentioned cathedral (which was completely demolished), apartment blocks, and educational facilities. Ukrainians claimed 4 Kalibr and 5 Iskander-Ks as shot down.

Now, what’s the point of this ‘Odesa Blitz’?

As described in my air/missile war update, earlier today, the Russians began this campaign with striking port facilities in the Odesa area, in Mykolaiv, Ochakiv, and Chornomosk already two weeks ago. With other words: well before Pudding has cancelled the Russian involvement in the so-called ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ (GSGI; also ‘Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports’). And when it came, on 17 July, the – something like ‘official’ – reason for the cancellation of the GSGI was the Ukrainian strike on the Kerch Bridge.

Sure, I’ve seen a lots of explanations for Pudding’s decisions, the last few days. But, sorry: none is making much sense to me. For example: the GSGI was not only securing the Ukrainian, but also the Russian grain exports via the Black Sea. Indeed, even the Russian export of the wheat and other ‘foodstuff’ stolen from occupied parts of Ukraine. Plus transhipment of Russian arms from Syria back to the ‘Motherland’. Plus the supply of the Ukrainian wheat to the PR China – for which nearly every Russian I happen to know nowadays is still counting to continue supporting this war effort (and which, indeed, is meanwhile providing up to 50% of high-tech necessary for production of Russian guided weapons; the other 50% are still acquired from the West).

Sure, some of the ‘mis-targeting’ can be credited to the usual, piss-poor intelligence-gathering methods of the FSB and the GRU (expecting Ukrainian informants to risk their backsides for 20 Euro or Dollars per targeting point, is really dumb), and some to poor quality of weapons deployed and this resulting in missiles missing by hundreds of metres….

However, the essence of the officially-declared Russian reasoning for the cancellation of the GSGI was actually something like, ‘the West must accept Russian conditions’ (which, of course, the West is not going to do). No doubt, this might mean nothing, just like the mass of other official Russian statements. But, me thinks, it’s explaining everything: essentially, Pudding wants the West to lessen its economic sanctions. Yes, the same sanctions declared for ‘failed’ by so many.

Secondary aim is to reinforce his own standing in Russia – and abroad. After the Prigozhin/Wagner’s ‘March of Justice’ of 24 June, there’s no end of reports about how weak and insecure are Pudding and his regime. And, well, I doubt he’s going to appear on the TV to explain something like,

‘….oh, but the Ukrainian strike on the Kerch Bridge was a part of my plan for my Special Military Operation.

Two times….’

Finally, Pudding never had any kind of a political program – except for establishing and maintaining himself in power. Principally with help of his TV-appearances. And, when he appears on the TV-again – whether to threaten Ukraine, or Poland, Vanuatu and Mars People – then he’s ‘stronk, period’.

Thus, the message is something like: ‘Russia blasting half of Odesa to Mars: Pudding stronk’.

That much about political and diplomatic aspects. If I now take a look at the military aspects of this campaign…. ahem…. My conclusion is certain to appear  ‘cold and ignoring civilian victims’ to many. But, that (famous?) itch in my small toe is telling me that at war, it might worth keeping military aspects in mind.

From that point of view, and obviously, PSU’s ground-based air defences in the threatened area – foremost those of Odesa and Mykolaiv, not to talk about Kherson – are far too weak but to offer the same quality of protection like those of Kyiv. Thus, contrary to the failure of their ‘Kyiv Blitz’, back in April-May, here the Russians can ‘demonstrate their military power’. See: ‘bonus PR(BS) points for Pudding’.

However, cold fact is that when it comes to the military affairs, this operation actually has no effect at all. Yes, I know, I’m aware that lots of Ukrainians are suffering: people are killed, maimed, scared, terrorised. But, fact is that these Russians missiles are wasted. Deployed for nothing in return. They are neither preventing nor even hampering the flow of Western arms, ammunition, and supplies (what is summarised with ‘beans, bullet, and gas’ in military jargon) for Ukraine, nor weakening the ZSU in any way. On the contrary: this entire campaign is ‘just’ offering PSU’s units defending the threatened area to improve their training and tactics – and prompting the West into delivering yet more. So much so, and just for example, Norway has lately started delivering elements of the NASAMS-system ‘as soon as ready’: see, in form of single firing units/launchers and radars (with support equipment, of course), ‘instead’ in form of complete air defence battalions.

With other words: conclusion is on hand that Pudding is wasting his precious and scarce long-range guided weapons for little else but PRBS purposes. Except for possibly meaning that he’s certain his production can keep on with the (growing) demand, this means nothing else.

From that point of view, one can only wish him to continue. Yes, that’s going to cause yet more devastation, terror and suffering in Ukraine, and I’m sorry for what Ukrainians are going through – but: from the military point of view, it’s an entirely futile exercise. And that both in short- and in long term.

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Generally, the last week saw the Russians launching some of biggest and fiercest counterattacks in months. Certainly the biggest and fiercest by the VSRF and VDV – without Wagner PMC – in about a year. Problem: it’s becoming ever more obvious that thanks to Pudding’s predilection for ‘good news’, the Russian generals simply have no idea just how much of their combat effectiveness have their forces lost. Yes, they still have the firepower; and, yes, they still have numbers; and ‘quantity is a quality on its own’ – all nice and fine, and nothing new….but – except for Lancets and ATGMs – the Russians are lacking in terms of know-how and precision. They do not know how to deploy their forces for attack, how to command them, they’re lacking even means of reliable communications for offensive operations, their officers know little else but bunching troops atop of few APCs or IFVs and then sending them into assault supported by few MBTs, their artillery is only a shadow of what it used to be, and in grand total, the mass of their ammunition is missing. Firepower without precision tends to result in lots of ‘fire and smoke’, but rarely in casualties and lasting damage (could offer few funny examples for this, all based on cross-examination of what both sides in different wars have claimed).

Anyway…

Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina… through 12-19 July, the Russians threw really everything they could upon Ukrainian positions in this area. Air strikes, artillery barrages, assaults by VDV and mechanised formations, and then yet more artillery barrages and air strikes….. Now, no doubt: in some cases, the Russians have reached the road T-13106, but all such efforts ended in a fiasco and their withdrawal back to the east of it. Which, usually, resulted in yet more spray & pray air strikes on Novoliubivka, Nevske, Torske or the Serebryansk Forest….

Of course, time and again, official Kyiv is ‘complaining’ about ‘critical’ situations. Have no doubts, it’s not easy to first get shelled for hours, and then assaulted by infantry and tanks. It’s not easy to, time and again, find it better to withdraw to the second line, and then actually do so, before collecting reinforcements and supplies, counterattacking and recovering the lost position. That’s always connected to ‘losses’. But, in total, and as far as I can say, Ukrainians have retained their positions. Indeed, in the Dibrova area, the 63^rd Mech drove the VDV all the way back to its starting positions.

It is possible but, as of right now, anything else than sure - that there were two exceptions.

On 18 July, the Keystone Cops in Moscow celebrated the capture of the ‘railway station of Masyutivka’…. Was confused for a while, because the only one I’ve ever heard of is somewhere in the Kharkiv area. Eventually, it turned out they mean the hamlet of Maysutivka, some 1,500m east of the Oskil River, and 3,000m north of Lyman Pershyi. And even that took them about 20 air strikes and hours-long artillery barrage. Their attempt to continue advancing further south-west was promptly broken, though.

Yesterday, the Russians PRBS-industrialists celebrated the capture of the hamlet of Novojehorivka (10km south-west of Svatove, and about 1,500m north of Novovodyane) – like if they’ve captured the New York City (the one in the USA). The way I understand ZSU reports from there, it’s an area surrounded by the Zherebets River from three sides, and ‘protected’ by a low hill further west. Anybody approaching it from north, east or south is exposed like on a kitchen table. Unsurprisingly, word is the VSRF lost ‘two battalions’ of the 15^th Motor Rifle Brigade to the fire of the 40^th Artillery Brigade while attacking there but: as of about one hour before this was posted, there was no word of confirmation about any kind of a Russian advance - or an Ukrainian withdrawal - in this area.

Bakhmut….North…. On 19 July, the 30^th Mech, elements of the 127^th TD and 56^th Motor Rifle Brigades, forced the Russians to withdraw from Orekhovo-Vasilyevka.

Berkhivka…sadly, the 57^th Motorised (ZSU) was forced out of this village, about a week ago. In turn, the 77^th and 92^nd Airborne have launched attacks into northern outskirts of Bakhmut, and drove the Russians all the way back to the Rose Alley area.

Bakhmut…South…which is Klishchivka-Kurdiumivka…this was a ‘particularly funny’ area because ZSU operations there remain so misunderstood – especially by the Russian PRBS-industrialists and Pudding-fans abroad. Essentially, back around 10^th July, the 28^th Mech drove close enough to Andriivka to have the southern road into Klishchivka under its fire control (as described in one of my earlier reports). Thus, the 3^rd and 5^th Assault, 22^nd Mech, and the 80^th Airborne continued raiding positions of what was left of the 72^nd Motor Rifle, BARS-13, and the 83^rd VDV Brigade. They ‘drove in’, killed 40-50 Russians (usually: without suffering any losses in return), took away their arms and ammo, and then withdrew. Every time, the Russians sent yet more mobiks, who run into booby-traps left behind by Ukrainians, and then reconstructed old positions only to get hit by another raid, from some other direction. The Russians then bragged with ‘troops are holding out’ and ‘have repelled another Ukrainian attack’, and were producing another video of their ‘defence success’, but actually: the ZSU there decided that, if the Russians are as insistent in wasting masses of their troops to retain a place some 3,000x900 metres long and wide, the last tarmacked roads to which are both under Ukrainian fire-control: fine with them. And then all the super-important war-monitors were quarrelling about who’s controlling Klishchivka, and Pudding fans are only grudgingly ready to admit they’ve actually lost the place – although the answer is very simple. Ukrainians have the place under their control, at least since 15 July. There’s just no point in advancing any further: why expose own troops to enemy fire where the Russians are so horny about running yet another of their ‘meat attacks’, several times a day, and thus wasting yet more troops?

Why this approach? Because the ZSU still lacks enough artillery ammo to blast all the Russians in front of it, plus reserves behind the front, straight to Jupiter, and because even the supply of DCIPM ammo from the USA isn’t going to change this any time soon. Thus, the solution is to blast them by infantry raids instead. Was and remains risky, no doubt, but as long as this can be done with next to no losses (bar expense in ammunition and time): fine.

Not sure where was this taken, but it’s an ‘interesting field upgrade’ of a Russian T-80.

Avdiivka… I’m not sure I have a full understanding of the situation there. AFAIK, right on the heels of the catastrophic defeat of their 9^th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 1454^th Motor Rifle Regiment during attacks on positions of the 110^th Mech Brigade in the Vesele area, about two weeks ago, the Russians launched yet additional assaults, the last 5-6 days. Apparently, there was a sort of ‘crisis’ in the Ukrainian unit when some of the assailants penetrated its first line of defence, on 21 July, and reached a point up to 1,000m, perhaps more, east of Kamianka. However, timely deployment of artillery cut that effort to pieces (literally), and the line was fully restored.

A Russian T-80 knocked out in the Avdiivka area, early this month.

Mariinka… gauging by photos and videos from 19 July, like attached below, something similar is valid for latest Russian assaults in the Krasnohorivka area, too…

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA (& SOUTH-WESTERN DONETSK)

Staromaiorske-Staromlynivka… since the local ZSU commanders have adapted their tactics to that of the ZSU in the Bakhmut area, the fighting is similar. See: Ukrainians raid the Russians, kill a few dozens, then withdraw. That said, quite often even that is not necessary: because ZSU troops are well entrenched in the centre of Staromaiorske, and south-western side of Urozhaine, and in command of dominating heights west of Staromaiorske, and the Russians are running one counterattack after the other. And so, the last 5-6 days the Russians brought even the 247^th VDV Regiment (rebuilt by mobiks after being nearly destroyed in assaults on Mykolaiv and Voznesensk, in early March the last year) and the 136^th Motor Rifle Brigade – to reinforce what was left of their 60^th Motor Rifle Brigade, and continue counterattacking. Primarily Staromaiorske, sometimes Urozhaine, too. Of course, Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists claim ‘one defence success after the other’, but: it’s actually Ukrainians that were defending these two places and chalking kills. Sole problem Pending delivery of lots of more DPICM ammunition: that’s likely to remain that way for a while longer.

BTW, the situation of what was left of the 394^th Motor Rifle Regiment (VSRF) in Pryutne became that ‘good’ the last week, that the 58^th CAA had to send what’s left of the 71^st Motor Rifle Regiment (possibly reinforced by some VDV) into a counterattack….which was rather easily repelled, with the withdrawing Russians leaving behind a trail of knocked out tanks and other vehicles. That was rather surprising considering the counterattack was run uphill, but the map is flat, so nobody is thinking about the local terrain, isn’t it…? Just like the repulse of another Russian attempt to reach Pryutne, on 21 July. Ever since the Russian ‘frontlines’ on either side of that village have disintegrated, and Ukrainians are roaming and raiding down the hedgerows all the way to Remivka – as far as not hampered by yet more minefields. But, hey: no video = didn’t happen…

Ah yes: for those who are curious, don’t worry, the 336^th Naval Infantry remained in Volodyne. Somebody there seems to be keen to retain at least one intact brigade.   

Robotyne… in this area, the situation was particularly interesting, the last week, because of a Russian counterattack in, from what I understand, the form of a pincer: either from Kopani (roughly) in direction of Novodanylivka, or from Robotyne in northern direction, ‘on the western side’, and from Verbove, ‘on the eastern side’. Essentially, the Russians attempted to either encircle ZSU troops that were in the process of approaching their ‘2^nd Defence Line’ east and south-east of Robotyne, or drive them back into minefields in the north. These counterattacks came at the time Ukrainians were busy widening their lanes through the deep minefields, plus recovering and repairing their equipment damaged during the last 5-6 weeks, so to enable a better flow of supplies forward, and gain more ground for manoeuvre. Now, no doubt, the 47^th and 65^th Mech have lost additional tanks and infantry fighting vehicles while repelling Russian counterattacks. However, declaring that for ‘successful Russian defence’ is really nonsense – especially considering Ukrainian 15^th Mech then hit the northern flank of the eastern Russian advance and, using gaps in Russian minefields uncovered by the movement of VSRF units, drove it all the way back into Novofedorivka and about 1000m short of Verbove. And that Ukrainians are ‘back’ into northern and eastern fringes of Robotyne, while what was left of the VSRF artillery – especially the 165^th Artillery Brigade in the Polohy area – was outright massacred by Ukrainian artillery and air strikes (deploying JDAMs). In ‘retaliation’, the Russians then ‘had to’ heavily shell Orikhiv and hit the place with numerous MPK/UMPKs: is a big enough target for them to hit. Several civilians were killed…

47th Mech’s losses in M2/M3 Bradleys from June, were meanwhile completely replaced by deliveries of additional vehicles. These are recognisable by their thick add-on armour on the front and sides (weighting some 3,000kg in total).

Vasilivka… quite quiet in this area, the last 7-10 days. Guess, the 128th is in the process of bringing new equipment or de-mining additional lanes around Zherebianky. At least I’m certain, Ukrainians are not wasting their provisions and time…

That’s, essentially, ‘that’. Not much ‘advance’ by Ukrainians, but several thousands of dead and wounded Russian troops.