Ukraine War, 23–24 April 2022
Good morning everybody!
Good morning everybody!
Here’s my review of most important developments in Ukraine for 23 and 24 April 2022.
Up front, I’ve got to ‘warn’, kind of: official reports from both sides of the last two days are… well, leaving me no choice but to switch into the ‘sarcasm mode’. Thus, please, be so kind and enjoy certain of following observations with the necessary dose of patience.
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
intel — intelligence
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
OPSEC — operational security (prevention of inadvertent revelation of potentially critical or sensitive data)
PMC — private military company/contractor
POL — petrol, oil, lubricants
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
STRATEGIC
During the weekend, Turkey imposed ‘covert’ sanctions against Russia. Henceforth, Turkish airspace is closed for Russian aircraft underway to Syria and back.
Somebody blew up the Druzhba oil depot in Bryansk the last night. Multiple fires have been reported, and about a dozen of injuries. Reason is unknown.
AIR
On 23 April, around 14.35hrs, seven Kalibr cruise missiles fired by the Russian Navy from the Black Sea have hit the Odessa area. That was a particularly ‘successful’ attack, then six have either been shot down or missed their target, but one hit an apartment block, killing 8 (including a three-month-old child) and wounding up to 20. At the time the Russian stocks of cruise missiles are getting depleted, it’s escaping me what should be the purpose of another bestiality…
On 24 April, the Ukrainians shot down two Kalibrs in the Odessa area, and another two as these were approaching Yuzhne. Furthermore, they claimed the downing of one each a Su-34, Su-35, and Su-25.
But hey: never mind. The VKS has now officially confirmed — and the Keystone Cops in Moscow have officially explained — that with those ‘strange pitch-up attacks’ by Russian helicopters we’ve seen on several videos, about a month ago. Indeed, this is praised as an attack method enabling the crew to strike with unguided rockets without entering the envelope of enemy air defence:
…and this ‘spray and pray’ method is what the best air force on this planet is proud about…
No problem, the VKS is even more proud about introducing its newest Super-Wunderwaffe. As announced by the TASS and then shown on the TV, S-13B unguided rockets calibre 130mm are in the process of being installed on Su-25s and Mi-28Ns. Please, don’t tell them these were in service already in Syria, back in 2017 or so: could scare somebody into having doubts about that plan for capturing Mykolaiv, Odessa, Moldova, the Moon and Mars…
BATTLE OF DONBASS
The Ukrainian GenStab said early on 23 April, that all the Russian attacks on the Donbass frontlines of the last 6–7 days were ‘just testing’: quasi, the RFA was probing to find out weak spots in the Ukrainian lines. Hm…. If the loss of Borova, Pisky-Radkivski, Lozove, Ridkodub, and — worst of all — Kremina and Zariche, and the forced withdrawal of such a crack Ukrainian formation like the 128th Mountain Brigade, plus additional losses of the 17th Tank were ‘just testing’…. sigh… what shall we expect from the much-announced and -expected ‘main blow’ then…?
Me and my questions….
Anyway, let me go through the following clock-wise, i.e. from north towards the south, as usually.
I find it good the Russians spent the last 4 weeks laying extensive minefields north and north-east of Kharkiv, then on 22 April the 92nd Mech rolled over one of these, smashed a better part of the 437th MRR and liberated three villages north of Kharkiv: Bezruky, Slatine, and Prudianka. The later is only some 10km short of the Russian border. Considering it turned out the town of Udy, north of Zolochiv, was already in Ukrainian hands, this would mean there are no Russian troops left inside Ukraine west of the E105 highway. This is also where the Ukrainians were stopped, yesterday: seems, the Russians are keen to retain control over the northern part of the E105.
Guess, after this catastrophe, the South OSK — i.e. Dvornikov — might open a vacancy for the new commander of the ill-fated 6th CAA. Not sure if he might find lots of candidates, though: by now the 6th CAA has proven itself as the most useless army-level command of the RFA in this war; thanks to it, it’s no surprise jokes are making circles between insiders, that BTG actually stands for any RFA brigade or regiment twice overrun by the Ukrainians.
Further east… that is: further south-east, in the Izium area: the Ukrainian intelligence has identified the Russian 64th Independent MRB — the unit staffed by despicable thugs that were massacring and raping civilians, eating dogs, and looting homes all over the Bucha area, about a month ago — as deployed in the Izium area. Apparently, that gang is now subordinated to the crack 76th VDV Division. Together with BTGs from the 2nd GMRD, 3rd MRD, and 4th GTD, this is expected to assault in direction of Barvinkove.
Part of me is really looking forward for this showdown because not only that both the 64th IMRB and the 76th VDV Division ‘excelled’ by doing nothing (except for massacring civilians), north-west of Kyiv, nearly two months ago. It’s the Ukrainian unit that’s waiting for their arrival: the 95th Airborne (and local units of the Territorial Defence) has knocked out some 5–6 Russian BTGs over the last 3–4 weeks; so much so the expected ‘giant tank battle’ simply can’t take place any more, because the Russians are about to run out of tanks in the Izium area. And things certainly didn’t get better since the 95th was reinforced by the 93rd, which promptly introduced itself to the Russians by shooting down several of their jets and helicopters, 3–4 days ago.
Seriously: pending arrival of all the heavy weaponry in the process of being rushed to Ukraine by NATO, the RFA is still in possession of superior artillery in this part of Ukraine; and, Dvornikov loves massive artillery barrages as much as he loves frontal attacks. Think, that’s something that should be kept in mind during the next few days.
Anyway…. yesterday, according to the Ukrainians, a ‘reconnaissance element’ of the RFA bypassed Dibrovne and pushed south, from Sulyhivka all the way to Nova Dmytrivka, Korulka and Pashkove. Word is: the Russians have found a gap in the Ukrainian defences.
By best will, it’s hard to believe both that this is just a reconnaissance element and that it found a gap in the Ukrainian defences; arguably, it’s hard to believe that, for once, Dvornikov attempted anything else but a frontal attack, too. After all, this means the RFA has breached the Ukrainian frontline south of Izium and came forward at least 10km: it is now threatening to cut off the road connection between Barvinkove and Slovyansk. Meanwhile, it’s certain that the Russians have taken Korulka and the situation is critical enough for the Ukrainians to have rushed significant reinforcements to the scene, including their 3rd Tank Brigade.
It’s not that much better further east. Indeed, I think it’s about the time to take a look at the ‘big picture’ of the situation in the epicentre of the Battle of Donbass. Thanks to kind help by Kornei (one of readers of this ‘blog’), let me offer you a ‘compressed’ description of what are the RFA, Separatist and foreign mercenary troops facing there. Pull out a map before you continue reading, please.
The Russians are north of Dovhenke, south of Lozove, holding Kremina, and a better part of Rubizhne — all of which are north of Slovyansk and north-west of Severodonetsk. Then they’re in Oleksandrivka (seems, there’s at least one place with this name in every of Ukrainian oblasts), Borivske, Popasna, Horlivka, Marinka, and Avidiivka, and from all these places they’re trying to — preferably: simultaneously — breach the Ukrainian frontlines and to converge on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. That’s something like ‘essence’ of what Dvornikov seems to be trying to achieve.
Now mind: after 60 days of continuous assaults, about 50,000–70,000 troops of RFA, Separatists, and Russian- and foreign mercenaries of the Wagner PMC, have managed to reach the north-western, northern, and eastern outskirts of Severodonetsk, and have captured Kremina and half of Popasna. Surely enough, this means they’re still well away from overcoming all the possible fortifications and Ukrainian frontlines in between there and the heavily-fortified Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (with the heavily fortified Mount Karachun in between)….but still: they are now in the outskirts of Lyman and Zarichne — and that’s downplayed by the Ukrainians, just like that ‘reconnaissance element’ further west…
Hm… well, we’ve seen lots of…. ‘unusual’, and few absurd things in this war already. For example, I wonder if any of Greeks and Serbs so fiercely pro-Putin have realised they’re thus supportive for Chechens and Hezbollah invading and destroying a country (predominantly) populated by Orthodox Christians…?
Anyway, through 23 April, the Russians continued shelling parts of Rubizhne and Popasna still held by Ukrainians. In Lysychansk, they hit a transformer station that was feeding the water-pumping station, thus knocking out the water supply for that town, for Novodruzhesk, and Pryvillia (Rubizhne and Popasna are without water since over a month, already). Through 24 April, the Russians continued shelling Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka, west of Horlivka, and Marinka: their attempt to assault Stepne was, reportedly, repelled.
MARIUPOL
Strictly following Putin’s TV-order not to waste time and troops with further assaults on the Azovstal — because, you know: what Putin says on the TV is the truth, only truth, and nothing but the truth, so help us whoever can — the Russians continued shelling, rocketing and bombing the compound from the air. Rumour has it, the place should be ‘softened’ for assaults by troops of the Rosgvardia and the FSB. Indeed, word is that the Spetsnaz is already probing the compound to find Ukrainian positions: as of yesterday, this resulted in the Russians capturing several depots in the northern sector of the compound.
Makes me curious to see what’s going to happen there as next.
Ah yes and: after concluding that too much of the city was left intact, and because Putin declared the battle for over, the Russians are now using UR-77 to ‘demine’ the ruins of Mariupol (see the sequence at around 50sec):
SOUTH
Through 23 and 24 April, Zusko’s 58th CAA switched from shelling to attacking almost everywhere. On 23, the Russians seem to have reached occupied the southern outskirts of Kamyanske. Further east, the advance of the 503rd MRR was quickly checked by elements of the Ukrainian 59th Motor in Orikhiv, and even the attack by the 136th GMRB around that village didn’t get very far: too heavy losses in vehicles. Further east from there, the 71st GMRR and the 291st GMRR launched a pincer-attack on Hulaipole, but both were stopped cold (the 291st short of Malynivka); the 70th GMRR was attempting to breach in between the 53rd Mech’s positions in Temyrivka and Velika Novosilka, in the Zelene Polye area: no idea what idiot came to that idea, but the Ukrainians must’ve found it ‘brilliant’ — and have subjected the Russians to crossfire… that said, the 70th GMRR kept on pushing and there’s a bitter battle over Zelene Polye going on since yesterday. Latest reports are describing the situation as ‘complex’ — which is never a good sign…
Finally, the Kherson area… Over the last few days, the 49th CAA was reinforced by elements of the 8th CAA and the 22nd CA (for example: the 127th Independent Reconnaissance Brigade), plus a full S-300VM Antey-2500 tracked SAM-system (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SA-23 Gladiator/Giant’) of the Russian Army. Obviously, the latter is supposed to replace the missile cruiser Moskva, destroyed a week ago. The sarcast in me cannot escape the observation: WTF reinforce your air defences with such a system while claiming the Ukrainian Air Force for ‘destroyed’, and that since more than a month? If Putin’s propaganda machinery would be right, perhaps they want to deploy anti-air-warfare-specialists as infantry…
But, I digress…. Considering such a concentration of forces, and the relative proximity of that part of the battlefield to ‘curious onlookers from behind the fence’ (see: NATO intel assets in Romania), it was really a big surprise the Ukrainians got wind about the HQ 49th CAA setting up a conference of about 50 of its top officers; and, that: close to the frontline. Even bigger surprise: the Ukrainians blasted the headquarters in question straight to Jupiter, claiming to have killed two, and badly injured a third Russian general.
Perhaps one or another detail of Ukrainian claims remains unconfirmed, but one fact is meanwhile sure: the 49th CAA now needs a new commander…
Exploiting the opportunity, on 23 April the Ukrainian Command South then launched an attack that, according to its reports from early on 24 April, recovered eight villages, including Chornobayivka. I’m anything but an expert in Ukrainian geography but, AFAIK, the latter is the westernmost suburb of Kherson that used to be defended by the above-mentioned 127th Independent Reconnaissance Brigade…
In turn, word is that yesterday the RFA began concentrating forces in the northern part of the Kherson Oblast: with other words, Ukrainians are expecting a renewed offensive on Kryvyi Rihh.