Ukraine War, 21 March 2024: Showmasters & Adventurers

Hello everybody!

Yesterday, I’ve discussed what do I think the Russians might be planning for this year. As next, lets have a look at what have Ukrainians got to prevent the Russians from achieving their aims.

In order to do that, I’ll have to start with the ‘top’: with the political leadership of the country, the top brass of the ZSU (Ukrainian Armed Forces), and their strategies.

Obviously, I’ve got to start with President Zelensky: essentially, he’s a ‘communicator’. Somebody ‘made’ by the media landscape, knowing how to make use of the media, and indeed: excelling in this discipline. That’s why he understands that the mass of the Western public thinks something along these lines:

-          Ukraine advances: ‘we’ (the ‘West’) are victorious! Give them (Ukrainians) more arms!

-          Russia advances: Ukrainians are corrupt and incompetent, told you so, and don’t give them anything at all!

As result, and massively oversimplified: he’s a ‘showmaster’, somebody ‘leaning towards fighting a propaganda war’ - sometimes almost to the degree of Pudding doing this ever since he rose to power.

To a certain degree, this is unsurprising. After all, fighting a war by military means is not Zelensky’s job. It’s on the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the GenStab-U to convert Zelensky’s political directives into military operations.

(Many people are ignoring this fact and explaining everything with politics, which is why there are as many stories about ‘long-standing tensions’ between Zelensky and General Zaluzhny, and Zelensky disliking the idea of ‘highly popular’ Zaluzhny becoming a political rival and similar, as about General Sirsky being ‘at least Russia-born’ [if not ‘Russian, who kind of ended up serving in the ZSU because his unit was in Ukraine at the time the USSR fell apart’], and ‘the Butcher’ and whatever else. This is going so far that lately there are even complaints from ‘the West’ about lack of cooperation [read: obedience] by Syrsky. With other words: Sirsky’s ‘Russia-relations’ appear to be influencing even the

-          People in Need of Fresh Air [see: the Pentagon], and the

-          People with a Broomstick up their Backside [see: NATO HQ in Brussels]).

Correspondingly, and because wars are ‘military affairs’, what matters in such situations is: how good (or bad) is this or that commander in converting president’s orders into military realities? In this case, that would mean: how good was Zaluzhny-, and how good is Syrsky at converting Zelensky’s politics into military realities?

This is something I didn’t manage to figure out even in two years since Pudding’s all-out invasion. I didn’t manage that because of very contradictive reporting about what was Zaluzhny after. Apparently, he was sceptical about almost everything and in disagreement with one plan and one decision after the other. Still, eventually he agreed with all the plans and signed them? And that without offering any alternatives? Without trying to push his own ideas?

…hm…

….and then: it was similar in regards of how Zaluzhny was leading the ZSU. Kind of, ‘a bit of everything, but nothing too specific’, no ‘clear direction’.

Zelensky and Zaluzhny during ‘better times’…

Sure, plenty of Ukrainians, and all the West, are now going to ‘correct’ me: ‘but Tom, Zaluzhny led the ZSU into NATO’, and ‘Ukraine is already very much a NATO-member, even if not officially’, and all the other, nice cliches…

Oh, come on: he neither had the time nor was ever given a chance, and even less so the money, to do so. And even if the ZSU would officially join NATO ‘tomorrow at 09.00hrs in the morning’, it would still take 10 years to… ‘become NATO’. To fully adapt.

What counts at war are results. Right now, the ZSU is no ‘NATO’. Foremost: a cold matter of fact is that the mass of ZSU is still equipped with Soviet-designed and -manufactured armament, led by officers trained to think ‘Soviet-style’, organised and led in Soviet style, and staffed by troops trained Soviet-style. The percentage of units fully trained and fully equipped by NATO is less than 10% (if not less than 5%), and most of those that are equipped that way are either artillery- or air defence units.

(Besides: are there really people as naïve as to think that the ZSU would really do sooooooooooo much better if ‘being fully NATO-style’? ….hihihihi….)

An overview of all the currently active brigades of the ZSU. Mind: the number of units even ‘just partially’ equipped with Western weapons can be counted on fingers of two hands. Those ‘completely’ equipped with Western weapons on fingers of one hand. Only the number of brigades ‘at last partially’ trained by NATO is slightly higher.

Of course, this is not Zaluzhny’s fault. As mentioned above: he never had the chance, not the time, and even less so the money to change a lot about this.

What does matter is that it appears that Zaluzhny’s solution for almost all the issues was to ‘de-centralise’ almost everything. Including his own decision-making. Syrsky is smashing the Russians in Irpin? Fine, let him do. Sumy is holding out on its own? Great, let them do. Somebody’s got a plan to recover eastern Kharkiv? Oh, how nice. Yes, please, do that. Somebody’s got a plan to recover northern Kherson? Great. Yes, please, do that – and send them two additional brigades, too… and then, somebody’s got a plan to botch up in Bakhmut? Oh, no problem with me…Avdiivka is about to fall because in two years we haven’t found a single brigade to replace the 110^th Mech? Oh, how bad… but anyway…

Overall: by all respect, and all the necessity for caution and reason, a lot of what was Zaluzhny doing, or agreeing with and thus permitting to happen, was certainly making him highly popular between the troops (because he would ‘let them do’). To a certain degree, it was even opportune to ‘lead’ (or, and better said: coach) the ZSU that way, especially in February-March 2022. This was so because there was such a chaos all over the country and in the armed forces (also because the Russians have crashed its communication system in the first days of the invasion), that nobody was able to exercise centralised command and control. Troops in the field simply had better situational awareness than their commanders and thus were better-positioned to make the ‘right’ decisions.  

However, another cold fact is that already the last few months of the battle of Bakhmut, not to talk about the way the summer counteroffensive was then conducted, the last year, have fully exposed limitations of this style of command (see: 20+ battalions from 15+ different brigades, led by 50+ local Napoleons at Bakhmut, and then ‘but, I’m in disagreement with this, and in disagreement with that so… well, eventually, let the lower-ranking officers do as they like, they know better’…). Again, by all respect, all of this resulted in what is called ‘bardak’ by the Russians (and few other nations, probably Ukrainians too).

Syrsky and Zelensky in more recent times…

For comparison, except for being called ‘the Butcher’, Syrsky is said to be an ‘aggressive’ commander: somebody keen to take decisions and impose his will, regardless if right or wrong. No ‘coach’, like Zaluzhny, but a ‘dictator’.

Because of this, I lean ‘in favour’ of the thesis that what Zelensky did when replacing Zaluzhny by Syrsky was: seeking for a way to impose stringent and centralised command and control over the entire ZSU (in turn stopping too many people do as they like).

The question at this point is: is that – this centralised command and control – good or bad?

There are many answers to this question.

Something like ‘public perception’ in Ukraine is that this is a ‘bad idea’. For plenty of veeeeery important reasons, including such like freedom and right to voice differing opinions, then traditions of the Cossack-mindset, and especially because so many of lower-ranking officers know so much better, and their generals are all ‘faggots’….and (somewhere further down the ‘Charts’ of such opinions), because of ‘that’ with Syrsky and his Russia-relations, and plenty of other, highly important reasons…. can’t say how important, you know.

Well, ladies and gentlemen: welcome to reality! Permit me to remind you that armed forces = NO democracy. First and foremost. Yes, in democracy, armed forces do serve the purpose of protecting freedom and pluralism. But, armed forces are no democracy: they are highly hierarchical organisations. The guy/lady with a bigger number of ‘rings’  (stripes, bars, stars or other marks on officer’s shoulders, denoting his/her rank), or whoever is (literally) ‘2 hours older’, has the final say. Period. Regardless if right or wrong, and no matter whether you like that or not. This is so because armed forces are foremost a team made to ki….erm… to ‘kuddle’ other people while avoiding getting kuddled in the process. And when it’s about cuddling other people in order to prevent being cuddled, that hierarchy and the discipline in respecting that hierarchy and following orders, are the fundamental functions. A matter of life or death.

All of which means: whatever so many of ZSU’s lower-ranking officers, non-commissioned officers, and troops think about their colonels, and especially their generals, and regardless how few of these really have a clue about what are they doing (so much so, the ZSU is really still short on experienced- and skilled battalion- and brigade commanders), they all - from troops up to generals - will have to learn to obey their orders.

Sure, there are times one can discuss some orders, but in the end: orders have to be followed. That’s how armed forces function.

….but, that’s digressing: I went ‘down to the tactical level’, while discussing the strategic and operational levels. Thus, lets get back to ‘Zelensky and his generals’.

Indeed, Zelensky already has something like his ‘favourite’ general: see the boss of the HUR (Military Intelligence), Budanov. Because Budanov is not only an ‘adventurer’, but ‘creating results’ (read: ‘bombing’ the Russian oil industry with help of long-range UAVs, and sending Russian troops to fight inside Russia) and thus making himself so ‘very much highly popular’ in the (Western) social media, you know. Actually, he began bombing POL-storage depots, then turned over to refineries and, lately, began targeting distillation towers in refineries. Principally because while Ukraine meanwhile does have multiple types of UAVs with a range of up to 1,000km, these are still lacking precision to target more than geographic coordinates, and then because it’s ah-so-super-turbo-cool whenever fans in the social media can cheer about another column of smoke atop of another Russian refinery. See what I’ve mentioned at the start: we’ (the ‘West’) are victorious! Give them (Ukrainians) more arms!

Arguably, distillation towers are the most sensitive parts of any oil refinery. Easy to detect (thus easily-programmable into the UAV’s guidance systems), easy to target, hard to repair or replace. And, usually, one needs to knock out just one, and the capacity of the refinery is already dramatically down.

Meanwhile, you know that itch in my small toe, and that I’m a nerd and weirdo – who can’t ‘simply run after the herd’, but ‘must ask unpleasant questions at most inopportune points in time’. And so, I can’t help but wonder: is that going to work? I.e. how is that going to put Russia under pressure?

Right now, I do not have clear answers to that question.

I do understand the aim:  cause a fuel supply crisis and force Russia to start importing fuels. Is making Putin’s war more expensive, while exercising pressure upon the Russians at home. Especially so in the days short of Pudding’s re-elections. And yes, sure, the Russian fuel exports are already down by 20% or so, and wholesale fuel prices in Russia are already increasing (and that steadily). Even the Russians have realised this, and have started to search for ways to counter this threat….

But, mind: meanwhile, there’s at least one clear answer. Pudding has got himself re-elected. So, if spoiling this was an aim: it didn’t work. And Shoygu is already celebrating ‘1,500 Ukrainian troops killed in Belgorod’ (because, you know, there can be no Russians fighting against Holly Pudding, even less so on the holly soil of the holly Mother Russia). Means: regardless how successful this raid might have been, regardless how many problems it might have caused to the VSRF: actually, that didn’t work either. Moreover, all the attacks on the Russian refineries did not prevent the VSRF from re-deploying its reserves to the Bakhmut- and Avdiivka areas, the last week, and then re-launching its offensive, the last two-three days (should there be any doubts: check the reports from the battlefields emerging since the last evening).

Atop of that: all the UAV-strikes on the Russian oil industry aren’t preventing the VKS from targeting ZSU positions along the frontline – meanwhile with up to 120 UMPK glide bombs a day. 120 glide bombs, every day. Indeed, I strongly doubt this is going to change any time soon. Which in turn means that the ZSU is going to continue suffering 20-30 killed a day to such air strikes, and the ZSU will have to continue withdrawing, and the Russians are going to continue to advance. At least for weeks-, if not for months longer. And the longer this goes on, the worse is the situation for the ZSU going to get - because ‘living under constant bombardment’ is reducing one to ‘surviving’, while making ‘fighting’ de-facto impossible.

….and because striking the oil industry of such a huge country like Russia, with… was it 10 or 11 time-zones? ….and how many refineries? - cannot have immediate effects upon the capability of the VSRF and the VKS to continue fighting. But, continuous mauling by the Russian glide bombs does have immediate effects upon the ZSU. Yes, even when this is meanwhile largely withdrawn into well-constructed defence positions – but especially when even when armed with S-200s and Patriots and whatever else, the PSU can’t shot down VKS fighter-bombers when these are releasing their glide bombs from 60-70km away.

…and especially at the times Shoygu has announced another wave of mobilisation, while Zelensky is rapidly looking like an incompetent populist because he can’t make up his mind and do what Zaluzhny was demanding already a year or so ago: launch a complete mobilisation in Ukraine.

Would you like to hear another unpleasant question?

How about considering that with the VKS’ continuous glide-bombing of Ukrainian positions: perhaps the prevention of such ability is the reason why the majority of modern-day defence doctrines are envisaging the destruction of enemy air power as one of the first things one does when at war?

…especially destroying that air power on the ground, before it can take off and then has to be fought peace-meal, one by one aircraft.

Ah yes…! That is: no, this is not valid for Ukraine. In Ukraine, this does not matter, you know. Because,

a)       Zelensky and Budanov are better in gaining popularity in the social media than Pudding and Shoygu? While,

b)      Ukraine is so very much different from Russia, and thus, just like the Russians, Ukrainians do not care about more recent combat experiences than those form the Second World War? Foremost, and above all, because,

c)       Ukrainian long-range UAVs can only target geographic coordinates (i.e. operate along their pre-programming), but have no means to target ‘targets of opportunity’ like aircraft parked on ‘heavily protected’ Russian air bases (i.e. are lacking terminal guidance system that would enable them to strike the so-called ‘targets of opportunity’) - even if the mass of these air bases is nowhere near as heavily protected as people think, and much, much closer to Ukraine than Russian oil refineries are?  

Sorry, I am the way I am: I’m keeping on my mind all the poor guys serving as ZSU infantry these days and trying to hold their positions while being systematically blasted away by UMPKs. I’m wondering how much are they going to last under the current conditions.  And I know: Putin can’t care about all the poor souls he’s sending to Ukraine, nor really about ‘his’ refineries. In worst case, he’s going to adapt once again: start exporting crude oil instead of fuels, while continuing the refine in refineries outside the Ukrainian reach, and/or import via ports outside the Ukrainian reach - so to keep his troops mobile (and the VKS supplied with kerosene too).

For him, somebody who has made himself totally unaccountable: all of this is not the least a problem.  

Bottom line: to return to the original question of this feature: waht have Ukrainians got to prevent the Russians from achieving their aims?

At the strategic level, they seem to have got a president that needs to learn the same so many ‘Western’ chancellors and presidents have to learn: to ‘superimpose’ military realities over his ‘battle for hearts and minds’; who needs to learn that fighting against an imposed, barbaric war of extermination is requiring ‘unpopular decisions’, too - and not some sort of constant manoeuvring for popularity in the public and future elections. Unless Zelensky learns doing that, it will be on Syrsky to explain it to him, at least to remind him about this fact, and that again, and again, and again, and again… and nope: I do not see Ukraine in a very good position to fend off a full year of Russian offensives.