Ukraine War, 21 February 2024
Hello everybody!
Must admit, I’m still ‘martyring’ my brain trying to find evidence for what the New York Times termed with ‘hundreds of missing Ukrainian troops in the Avidiivka area’. Contacts in Russia are zip-lip about this issue; the Russian social media still recycling the photos and videos of 5-6 POWs from the 3rd Assault Brigade; contacts within the ZSU know about no ‘hundreds’ of troops ‘missing’ or ‘killed’ (at most, it’s ‘10 from this brigade, and 12 from another’), etc. So, either the issue of ZSU’s losses in this battle is about to become the second biggest secret of this war (right after how comes Ukraine left the Russians walk-in to Kherson, Melitopol and Berdyansk, in the first 48 hours of the all-out invasion)…. or…. ‘crickets’.. I’ll end up sortying such US media reports into the same file with ‘Tank Battle of Vuhledar’, ‘Ukraine’s rapid collapse’ and few other stories of that kind. Read: incompetence, no ‘journalism’.
And while I’m working on finishing different other of my features, here a bit of an update on latest developments on the front, just so to help cool down nerves of quite a few that are asking questions.
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Before I go on, one big plea of mine. PLEASE, be so kind, do not send me any ‘news’ (see: media reports) about what kind of tanks, and other armoured vehicles, or whatever Wunderwaffen is the West ‘sending’ to Ukraine. I can’t stand that sea of lies any more. It’s too salty even for my taste. If you want to know why, here just a few examples:
- No idea how many were ‘pledged’ anymore, but Germany has so far delivered exactly 18 Leopard 2s to Ukraine. And these arrived without enough spares.
- I do not even care to think how many Leopard 1s were promised, but out of 20 that were ‘delivered’ mere 12 were made operational – and that after months of overhauls. Now there’s no ammo for them.
- And all the ‘extra’ Panzerhubitzen etc. pledged few days ago, are due for delivery ‘sometimes’ between 2025 and 2027.
- The same is valid for all the promises by talking-heads like Macron and Sunak, and with 20 Spanish M113s…
….and no, I’ll not even try to comment the events from the western side of the ‘United States of Absurdistan’ (USA + EU): it’s pointless to try discussing all the systemic incompetence there, anyway.
Point is: PLEASE, keep any such reports well away from me. All the MRAPs, all the Taurus’, ATACMs, F-16s, and Mars II, lasers, x-wing fighters, death stars, and whatever else… I’m ‘deeply allergic’ about all that nonsense.
Ah yes, and another plea: somebody in Ukraine might be so merciful and explain all the idiots in the West, that ‘MRAP’ is not the same like ‘APC’, and even less so an ‘IFV’ (indeed, I’m sure Ukrainians could do that in a much more polite fashion than I can: after two years of this mess, I think in the place of Zelensky & Co, I couldn’t but yell and shout whenever meeting any of Western incompetents, regardless what are their names).
IFV = infantry fighting vehicle: armoured fighting vehicle used not only to carry the infantry into combat but to provide direct fire-support with weapons calibre 20mm or higher; see M2 or M3 Bradley, BMP-1, BMP-2, Marder and similar.
APC = armoured personnel carrier: armoured vehicle primarily used for transport of infantry to the combat zone, usually (if at all) equipped with weapons calibre 20mm or less. See M113, MT-LB, FV.432, BTR-3, BTR-4, BTR-70, BTR-80, Fuchs, VAB, and similar.
MRAP = mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle. Essentially an ‘armoured truck’, shaped so that the crew can survive driving over an anti-tank mine, or getting hit by an improvised explosive device, and ‘usual’ ambushes with hand-held arms. For examples of MRAPs, see MaxxPro, M-ATV, Cougar, Mamba, such trash like the BATT UMG (which nope, is not even comparable to the Fuchs APC in its armour protection), and similar stuff…
Foremost: a MRAP is neither an IFV, nor an APC. Anybody trying to tell you something else is plain dumb. Indeed, sending dozens of MRAPs to Ukraine, and then expecting (even advising) the ZSU to deploy them as IFVs or APCs is not only dumb, but outright criminal.
….yet so typical for gangs of incompetents calling themselves politicians and military advisors, here in the West (yes, regardless how often they did the same with different armed forces in Africa and Asia of recent years).
From the Battlefields…
Kupyansk & Kremina… yes, there were lots of Russian attacks in the last few days. Up to 80 combat engagements were reported by the ZSU. For example, the 25th Motor Rifle Brigade and the 138th Motor Rifle Brigade have attacked in the Synkivka-Petropavlivka area. Without success. The 2nd Motor Rifle Division (‘Tamanskaya’) is still experiencing massive problems whenever trying to manoeuvre its elements in front of the ZSU positions along the line Ivanivka-Kotlyarivka, and only suffering additional losses. Indeed, sporadically-released videos of Russian tanks blowing up on Ukrainian mines or when hit by FPV-drones are really nothing new. Sufficient to say: all the assaults of the last few days were repelled. The re-re-built 4th Tank- and the 144th Motor Rifle Divisions did have slightly more success in the Yampolivka area, but that’s also measured in hundreds of metres. Mind: that’s at the times the ZSU remains critically short on artillery ammunition… when I now think what the Ukrainians could do if they would have enough of the same… sigh… That said, the Russians are bringing in some reinforcements, and thus additional attacks must be expected.
Good news from this area is that the 93rd Mech re-appeared on the battlefield - and then armed with Swedish-made CV-90 IFVs:
Apparently, it was in this part of Ukraine that the VSRF did manage to hit one of ZSU units equipped with German-provided Marder IFVs - and that with several Zala attack drones. Here one of stills from a video showing 3-4 such attacks:
Sufficient to say, there were no 'secondaries’: so either the Zalas in question failed to penetrate, or caused only limited damage. Lets hope, the ‘thorough’ Germans have thought about supplying enough spares for Marders…
Siversk….think I’ve mentioned this the last week: the Russians did manage to get into the ‘industrial zone’ of Bilohorivka (the one on the Siversky Donets). Cost them a bunch of IFVs and APCs, though, and when they’ve tried to enter the eastern side of the village, the 81st Airborne kicked them out in a high loop.
Bakhmut… the VKS is heavily bombing Chasiv Yar, the last few days. With MPK/UMPK glide bombs, of course. On the ground, there is heavy fighting going on from Andriivka to Bohdanivka: i.e. the 200th Motor Rifle Brigade, VSRF is trying to break through to Chasiv Yar on the ground. So far, without success.
Avidiivka… with some cheering from the Pudding-sphere, the Russians attacked Lastochkyne, eight or nine times, on 16 and 17 February. AFAIK, lost some 7-8 of involved BMPs. Few of the Russian troops did manage to actually reach the village, but were all eliminated, too. Think, this is also explaining a lot about the ‘lack of ZSU positions west of Avidiivka’, and the ‘ability of the VSRF to push further west from there’.
Somewhere around Avidiivka, the Russians have even found an abandoned Bradley IFV. Gauging by the colour (see the photo below), probably from the 47th Mech. Another is known to have been destroyed in combat. So, once again, no trace of ‘heavy Ukrainian casualties’ claimed by that pearl of the US journalism…
The mass of other stuff the Russians can find while mopping up in Avidiivka of these days is looking like this - an very much their own. See: knocked out T-72s, T-80s, T-90s, BMPs etc., etc., etc. Sad fact is, though: with over 70% of the current armoured vehicles of the VSRF consisting of overhauled/refurbished vehicles, any that’s still intact must be expected to be repaired. Which is why is the ZSU meanwhile striking any kind of Russian armoured vehicles it can find as abandoned on the battlefield, but outside its own reach: to prevent them from being repaired.
Sadly, the Russian attack on Pobeda, two days ago, was much more successful: seems, the VSRF did manage to capture the place, yesterday.
Vuhledar…. The 72nd Mech is still trying to count all the Russian armoured vehicles knocked out during the last few months, while attempting to approach Vuhledar or other ZSU fortifications in this part of Ukraine. Further behind the frontlines, and two days ago, a HIMARS-attack blasted two companies (4th and 6th) of a Russian infantry unit as these was gathering at the Trudivskoe, a village east of Volnovakha. Initial reports indicated 65 killed on the spot: meanwhile (probably after collecting all the pieces), the talk is about ‘over 100’…
Robotyne… yes, yes, the Russians – their 42nd Motor Rifle Division – came in, driving T-90s, T-80s, T-55s, BMP-1s, BMP-2s, and MT-LBs. On 16 and 17 February, four big columns attacked ZSU positions in Robotyne from the western side. There are so many videos of their blown-up tanks and other armoured vehicles that I have no idea which one to look at as first. In just one of assaults, 18 out of 30 involved Russian armoured vehicles were knocked out, about 70 Russian troops killed, and 80 wounded. Tragically, they did overrun several forward positions of the ZSU: that’s why they’ve murdered at least three Ukrainian troops – after these have surrendered and dropped their weapons…
Attacks by the 49th VDV Brigade further east, about half-way between Robotyne and Verbove, seem to have gained some 200-300 metres of terrain, though.
Kherson… even the Russian social media is belittling Shoygu’s claims to have eliminated the Ukrainian bridgehead in Krynki, so that’s all to say in this regards.
More - including some analysis of latest developments in air warfare - is to follow in the coming days.
Stefan Korshak makes an interesting analysis of the last few days in Avdiivka:
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/ktcqhM6zrydC1yWS/
"The main aspect of this battle that I would point out is that this was the first time in a very long time, if ever, that we have seen the UAF commit an entire brigade to combat with a very clear operational objective and that objective was achieved. I’ll get into guestimates about casualties and implications a bit lower, as have others, but what struck me was how bog-standard military and regular army the commitment of 3rd Assault to Avdiivka was. Lots of times one gets the impression the UAF is just so short of resources and planners it’s making ops up as it goes along, this wasn’t the case with the 3rd at Avdiivka.
First, the brigade appears to have gone into combat at near full strength, in good morale, and I monitor enough of their internal chat channels to have been surprised first at their security discipline and second and the absence of griping. Normally, when a UAF unit gets thrown into combat, low level soldiers immediately surface griping about how higher has no idea what they were doing. Not this time. From what I can see, they knew where they were going and what the job was: get 110th Brigade out of a near-encirclement and then retire lines to prepared positions.
They went in near full-strength and aggressively, with the clear goal of creating enough space for the retreat to have a chance. I’ve read reports that the 3rd got beefed up to the equivalent of six or seven battalions, which is a little misleading because since they are a UAF unit skilled at recruiting and finding volunteer funding, they have TOE three infantry battalions, and a “battalion” each of artillery, drones and armor.
The lost a very few POWs and captured POWs. Comms points knew where to go and casualty evacuation appears to have worked. They had been training for urban fighting and the infantry that I saw was armed for that. It seems like they did what they needed to do: extract the remains of the 110th and then facilitate a retreat of about 5 km. to prepared positions on high ground, and it took about five days.
Which is not to paint the UAF’s loss of Avdiivka as military miracle, it was a defeat, zero questions.
My point is, that for close to two years I’ve been watching the UAF like a hawk for cases where I can clearly say a UAF area commander made an operational decision involving an entire brigade, and the UAF gets a result it wanted. Almost always, overwhelmingly, when the UAF has had a battlefield crisis, the response has been to throw bits and pieces of multiple brigades at the problem. This makes defending more sustainable as that means the organizations of multiple brigades feed reinforcements into a fight, but the UAF force is inherently impossible to maneuver, and if casualties go on then doomed to die in place because rotation of pieces of the force is really complicated.
That’s not what happened at Adviivka, and for me it was striking. A single brigade (with attachments) went in, it had a mission, it completed it, and then it went on to its next mission. The military brainiac crowd would call it all a competent commitment of force on an operational level, and in and of itself it’s a respectable achievement. Moving a brigade into combat and then keeping the situation under control isn’t easy in training,it’s hard in a war, it’s harder in a unit commanded by non-career officers and with limited sergeants, and it’s even harder on unfamiliar ground.
That 3rd Assault managed it is mostly a testament to the combat experience of the soldiers and junior leaders, two frigging years a lot of them, but even more, very strong evidence that at least in one Ukrainian brigade there is a functional staff that can plan an operation and then manage its subordinate formations so that the op comes off roughly as planned. If this is a one-off, well, we all know the 3rd recruits around Kyiv and so that’s better-educated soldiers and more volunteer donations. Image attached, it’s from the 3rd, so you can decide for yourself if they’re typical UAF or not.
If it’s not a one-off, then we have just seen the light of a horizon for a time when UAF formations are actually capable of conventional operational maneuver. Again, this is not to deny it was overall a defeat, or to claim really the Ukrainians one. Rather, it is to point to something the UAF did, that a lot of us have been waiting for the better part of two years to see them do.
That being said, there are a lot of brigades in the UAF, this was just one. Off-hand I suspect maybe of the 30 or so combat brigades the UAF fields, maybe 3 or 4, tops, would have probably been able to do what the 3rd just did."
Cancelled my subscription to the "New Orc Times" on account of their pro Kremlin bias, clearly stated in my feedback.