Ukraine War, 21 April 2024: Fundament(s)

Good morning everybody!

It’s Sunday… times when the life is slow to get moving – in peace. On the frontlines of the war in Ukraine there is no time nor place for that. It’s just another day of bitter fighting. Thus, here the next update.

AIR/MISSILE WAR

Indeed, I’ll start with a literal ‘update’. Further to their claims for destruction of ‘three’ MIG-29s at Aviatorske Airport outside Dnipro, the Keystone Cops in Moscow have released three additional videos, all showing strikes by Iskander missiles. (Think, this is illustrative for how desperate for any kind of success they meanwhile are…. but, of course, I’m an imperialist mouthpiece if pointing this out).

Sadly, the first of these is showing the destruction of one (thought not the ‘third’) PSU MiG-29 on the ground.

…in this segment of that new video, one can ‘even’ see the ground crew moving around the parked aircraft.

The other is ‘confirming’ the (already confirmed) kill of an Ukrainian S-300 SAM-system… or at least a part of it (including 1 5N36S radar and 2 5P85S launchers), outside Novonikolaivka…

….plus adds the destruction of one 79K6 Pelikan radar:

…for such nerds like me, this is a ‘useful reply’ to all those Western experts still claiming ‘Russians do not run SEAD operations’ (SEAD = suppression of enemy defences). They do. Just, contrary to the Western air forces, they do not follow Giulio Douhet’s doctrine – along which the air power is a decisive weapon of war, and should be deployed ‘independently’ (from other branches of armed forces). As not only ‘should be known’, but actually ‘must have dawned upon even to people with least clue about air warfare in Soviet/Russian style’ by now, already the Soviets have always considered air power as a tool of support for ground forces (and naval forces). Therefore, they have always emphasised its tactical potentials, and always subordinated it to their ground forces. Except for show purposes, like in Syria, they have never left it operate on its own.

This is so because the Russians are always fighting wars to win (except, again: in Syria; that was a big PRBS-show). Contrary to the West, they do not fight to ‘model the outcome’, or to enrich their oligarchy (Putin is enriching the same ‘anyway’, and always depending on its loyalty): they fight to destroy their enemies.

Their principal doctrine is thus best summarised with ‘lowest common denominator’. See: why wasting time with any kind of expensive finesse if the ultimate purpose of any war is the destruction of the enemy?

….which is why the VKS is not wasting its time, aircraft, fuel, weapons etc. with flying its Su-30s, and Su-34s, and Su-35s all over Ukraine, 24/7, to ‘demonstrate air superiority’, or to search, find and destroy the last MiG-29 and Su-25 and whatever. Instead, it’s all the time focusing on supporting the mission of the ground forces. And if some Ukrainian MiG-29 is then found, then this is targeted by ballistic missiles. Because these have a much quicker reaction time and are far cheaper than organising a SEAD operation in order to bring in an air strike by a formation of Su-34s – which then might completely miss their target, too…

As a result, the VKS is, actually, an ‘administrator’: it’s administering the routine, peace-time operations of flying- and air defence units. However, when Russia fights a war, then the VKS is ‘merely’ providing its flying and air defence units, and these are doing what commanders of ground forces tell them to do.

Arguably, some of this was diluted during the 1950s-1960s when, impressed by the demonstration of the US air power during the Korean War, and because the Krustchev concluded close air support for ‘unnecessary’ at times all of warfare was thought to be dominated by nuclear weapons – the Soviets emphasised air defence.

However, and regardless of all the PRBS and daydreaming about ‘super Flankers’ of the last 20+ years, in more recent years Gerasimov & Co ‘returned to the basics’. Correspondingly, no matter how much ‘multi role’, and ‘super-über-turbo’, types like Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 are all still used for tactical purposes, ‘only’ (indeed: Su-34s are frequently deployed almost in same fashion like Il-2s were deployed some 75+ years ago) ….while SEAD is done ‘the Russian style’ – which means that it is be done by all means on hand. Not necessarily by air power alone.

That’s one of ironies of this war.

Another is the Ukrainian and Western reporting about the destruction of a Russian Fundament-M system by Ukrainian ATACMS at Dzhankoi AB: apparently, different experts either do not know, or can’t explain the function of this system and thus it’s characterised as ‘air surveillance system’ or even ‘air defence system’ – while being none of that.

Actually, the Fundament-M is an ‘ATMS’. Stands for ‘automated tactical management system’.

That is a computer-supported system of command and control, integrating the work of all available sensors and air defence weapons. As such, the Fundament-M is successor to earlier, Soviet-era ATMS’ like Universal, Panorama, Polye/Polyot, Vozdukh etc. The Westerners tend to call this ‘C4ISR’ and similar names…. 

The Russians have one such system for every level of integration: Fundament-1E for divizion/battalion-level, Fundament-2E for regimental level, Fundament-3E for brigade-level, Fundament-M for divisional level, and then there are systems like Baikal and/or Krim with which they can integrate multiple Fundament-Ms (plus the work of A-50s, Il-20Ms and Il-22Ms) at the level of their joint strategic commands (or military districts). Their purpose is centralised command.

….and, to make it more complex: the Fundaments are then connected to BCP/Ranzhir systems of every command post of every of integrated regiments, which in turn are integrating their divizions/battalions, plus those of attached radar-sites [Nebo, Valda, Polet etc.], ESM-sites, EW-sites etc., etc., etc….

But, before you burst in tears because this is too technical and too complicated… In this, specific case, the Fundament-M served as the command and control tool of the 31^st Air Defence Division: as the headquarters of the air defence division protecting the occupied Crimea. This is including (at least) five regiments:

-          1 (though probably 2) equipped with S-400s (or one with S-400 and another with S-300s; or one with S-400s and now including S-300s),

-          2 with Buks, and

-          2 with Pantsyrs,

-          plus several of what the Russians call the ‘radio-technical’ units.

The latter are units equipped with early warning/surveillance radars, units equipped with electronic support systems (see: communications-/electronic-/signals intelligence systems), and electronic warfare systems. A single Fundament-M is then connected to all of them, integrating all of their inputs, and thus enabling the commander of the division to command and control the work of all of his units from the same spot.

With other words: when smashing that Fundament-M, Ukrainians have hit the ‘headquarters’ of the 31^st Air Defence Division.

….which in turn explains everything about what happened as next.

All of which reminds me of another ironic story. Namely, one of funny thingies about one of the ‘best’ of modern-day Russian ATMS’ is known since around the times of the Russian military intervention in Syria. Back then in 2015-2016, the VKS deployed a unit with similar composition and controlled by one of their latest ATMS’ at the Hmeimim AB, south of Latakia. Long story short: it turned out that the software of the ATMS in question ‘does not like’ units assigned to it being ‘deleted’ from the system: disconnected, whether through a technical failure, or combat loss, or maintenance requirements, or whatever other reason. Any such ‘deletion’ tended to ‘crash’ the entire system: to crash the software of the ATMS and thus collapse the entire system of command and control….at least until the same was rebooted.

…which always took some time (and nope: I’m not talking about ‘few seconds’, or even ‘few minutes’)…

….was a co-reason why the Keystone Cops in Moscow never integrated their air defence system in Syria with that of the Assadists, despite multiple claims of the contrary: they could never control what were the Assdists doing (the other reason was the geography).

….and was perfectly in best traditions of continuous software-related issues with the all other of modern-day ATMS the Russians have attempted to introduce to service with different branches of their armed forces over the last 10-15 years (see ASU, see YeSu-TZ, Armata, Bumerang, Kurganets, Shlem, Baikal, Krim, Metronome, Universal, Andromeda etc., etc., etc.). Essentially: all of these have experienced extensive software problems, usually to such degree that this frustrated Russian generals away from their use. (Which is just another reason why the Russian command and control is so slow in this war: except for software problems [which is why most of Russian generals still prefer to stand somewhere in the field, read maps printed on paper and communicate per radio or telephone], the fundamental issue remains that the Russian commanders are indoctrinated to wait until they are confident they’ve got all the information necessary to bring their decisions.)

Point is: the Fundament proved to work better, which is why it’s used (and Universal, just for example, not).

But, I’m digressing (I know, that’s something like my trade mark)… in this case, a hit on the Fundament-M collapsed the air defence of the entire 31^st. So much so, there was nothing left to reboot… Call it, ‘SEAD, Ukrainian style’.

Now, is the Fundament-M really as ‘scarce’ as some say? Supplied only to ‘most important military districts’ etc?

Nope and nope.

Have doubts about my answers?

No problem.

Just ask yourself: why having more Fundament-Ms than there are air defence divisions in the VKS?

…or are you driving five cars?

And: even if you have five, keep in mind that you can only drive one at time.

If you understand this, then you understand the way the Russians (i.e. their GenStab) think, and fight their wars, too.

Finally: mind that fact the Russians do not show something in the public, or do show it but only very rarely, doesn’t mean it’s ‘rare’ or whatever. It only means that they’re not keen to show it in the public. With other words: there’s at least one Fundament-M for every Air Defence Division of the VKS. Plus spares. And if not, then they’re using one of older systems, like ages-old but highly reliable Panorama…

…which in turn means: if you see some video showing ‘a medium-sized’ or ‘big’ Russian military truck, carrying a ‘big container painted in dark green’… pay attention. The stuff in question is no ‘cargo container’: the Russians neither use pallets nor containers in their military transport system. It’s a  (mobile) command post. Something very important.

Function of a Panorama ATMS….

***

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Sadly, the ZSU is still critically short on surface-to-air missiles and artillery ammunition. Thus, there’s not really much in terms of ‘news’ from the fighting on the ground. That is: there are lots of news, but nothing is new. Essentially, the VKS is pulverising one of ‘interesting’ Ukrainian positions with UMPKs (AFAIK, these are meanwhile deployed at the rate of ‘150+ a day’), almost at will; then the Ukrainians have no other options but to abandon their ruined positions (as far as still alive); then the Russians assault whatever is left of these positions, and then the entire exercise is repeated again. ….and again… and again…

Of course, in between of this, Ukrainians manage to smash another of Russian assault groups, and then we get some ‘sexy’ videos to see.

Ah yes: just how critically short on artillery ammo the ZSU is, is best illustrated by the following ‘piece of statistics’ provided by a contact ‘there’… which says that out of 100% of Russian armoured vehicles destroyed the last and this month:

-          30% are destroyed by FPVs,

-          16% by ‘bomber’ UAVs

-          5% by heavy drones

-          2% by anti-tank guided missiles, and

-          6% by mines.

…leaving the rest to artillery, mortars, and other means.

….which is just another illustration for what would be possible if only the ZSU could get enough ammo, because: if Ukrainians can ‘still hold out’, despite this critical shortage, and k….kuddle as many Russians as they are regularly doing, and that although short on artillery ammo…

Yes, yes: have told you this only some 2-3 million times by now….

Bakhmut… The Russians are glide-bombing Kalynivka and Chasiv Yar like ‘there’s no tomorrow’. No surprise then, the 67th Airborne, ZSU was withdrawn, and replaced by the 42nd mech, and the Lyut Assault Brigade. The 5th Assault is still holding out west of Ivanivske, but a Russian assault north of that village did drive a wedge between it and the 42nd Mech and  drove all the way to the Siverky Donets-Donbas Canal (the situation was ‘stabilised’ through a counterattack by the 1st Mech Battalion of the Presidential Brigade).

Avdiivka-Shakhtarsk… On 16-17 April, the Russians punched through north of Berdychi. Or between Berdychi and Novokalynove, and are ever since attacking Ocheretyne. If they manage to capture this place, they’ll be past the northern flank of that new ZSU defence line stretching down the Durna River. Indeed, latest reports are indicative of them already attacking Berdychi from the north (additionally, the place is bombed by UMPKs). Considering the fact they’re still having their bridgehead across the Durna in between Semenivka and Orlivka, and that they’ve continued their advance on Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, and Netailove in the south of this line… and it’s going to be June before the ZSU starts getting all the artillery shells from the ‘Czech Arms Deal’, well… it’s obvious: one can’t really expect the ZSU to hold that new defence line ‘forever’.

Personally, I would send the idiots in charge of Washington, Berlin, London, Paris and few similar places an ‘invoice’ for all the Ukrainian troops killed, and all the equipment lost since around January this year – and then in this area alone – just to show them how much have they fucked up. But, that’s me. The government in Kyiv is never going to apply such ‘drastic’ measures: it knows that the West would then be so humiliated, it would send even less. Instead, they’ll express their gratitude for whatever did arrive…

Mariinka… except for pulverising the ruins of Krasnohorivka by UMPKs, the Russians are meanwhile trying to reach the place in ‘indirect’ fashion. See: through an advance south of it. Further south, they’re assaulting Heorhivka, and attempting to widen their hold on Pobieda – which turned out to be ‘incomplete’, to put it mildly. With other words: the Ukrainian 31st Mech is doing really well in the Pobieda area, although facing near-impossible odds.

Ah yes, and: in the Novomykhailivka area, the 79th Mech has celebrated a sort of a ‘jubilee’ this week. 320 visually confirmed (and geo-located) Russian armoured fighting vehicles destroyed - in six months of fighting for one village.

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA

Essentially, after bringing in yet more replacements, the Russians are back on attacking the Robotyne salient from all directions. From the west, from the south, and from the east. The ZSU has at least found the newly-established 141st Infantry to replace some of units that got tired after fighting in this area for months. Good hunting to the ‘new guys in the block’.

***

….and that’s about that for today.

The ladies and gentlemen serving with the 3rd SSO were very busy the last two weeks, so we’ll have to wait for a few days longer with answers to different questions about donation for their Shark. I’ll post an update as soon as possible.