Ukraine War, 20 September 2024

Hello everybody!

Just when one plans some more updates and analysis, work and private affairs come in between… anyway: here an update on the last three-four days.

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For the start today, I would like to point at a few ‘must read(s)’:

Tatarigami’s thread on Twitter is a perfect summary about all that’s going wrong within top ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces.

….which is of particular importance if one wants to understand Olga Kyrylenko’s review of what went wrong in the Pokrovsk sector since February, published in the Ukrainska Pravda.

Related to this, The Guardian is reporting that Russian military documentation captured in the Sudzha area included warnings about a pending Ukrainian offensive across the border, some of these dated back to late 2023… I mean: this reads like ‘1x1 of Internal Security of the GenStab-U: When you are successful in hiding your Intentions from your Western ‘allies’, but not from the GRU’…

Ah yes, and: at least as good is what one can read in the Air & Space Forces Magazine: correspondingly, the PSU is not the least keen to let the USAF know what was the reason for its first F-16AM-loss, the last month – and, hand-on-heart, even the Americans have learned that it’s better not to have a closer look…

Of course, in best Ukrainian traditions, this affair is ‘still under investigation’. Means: Oleshchuk in charge or not, nothing has changed within the PSU…

…after all of this, and once again, cannot avoid the impression that the ZSU could meanwhile have won this war – without its top commanders; not to talk with its Commander-in-Chief, the Command Ground Forces, and the GenStab-U doing their actual job and writing a new doctrine and procedures (instead of micromanaging and appointing favourites around), so to take care to provide better training for task force-, brigade-, and battalion commanders. Of course, this wouldn’t be particularly popular in Kyiv (and even less in the West), but in turn it could at least enable the force to stop the Russian offensives cold, and with minimal losses.

Oh, you wonder, how comes I dare saying something of this kind?

Because, it is meanwhile a ‘standard’ in the ZSU that its lower ranks fighting like lions, every single minute, despite the bardak within upper echelons.

But, don’t worry: help is underway. The Ukrainian Parliament has dismissed ‘crazy’ Maryana Bezuhla from the National Security Committee. Now everything is going to be instantly better… indeed: much, much, much better…

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

Early on 17 September, Ukrainians have HIMARS-ed a major Russian ammunition depot outside Mariupol. Hidden in a forest, the facility was completely destroyed by the resulting conflagration.

Early on 18 September, six Ukrainian UAVs hit the 107^th Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, outside Toropets, Tver Oblast (about 500km from the border to Ukraine). Reportedly, the construction of this facility was completed between 2012 and 2018 (at the price of some US$39 million) stuffed full with 30,000 tons of ammunition, primarily artillery shells calibre 122mm and 152mm, artillery rockets calibre 122mm, and mortar bombs. The initial detonation caused an earthquake of 2.8 magnitude and reportedly resulted in a crater with diameter of 90 metres. The depot was still burning as of the last night: as far as can be assessed from satellite photographs, its sectors B and C have been completely devastated. RUMJNT has it, the VSRF suffered over 200 killed alone (gauging by obituaries in the social media: primarily convincts)…

The second of two major fireballs at the start of the conflagration that wrecked most of the 107th Arsenal. Tragically, Ukrainians know what such explosions of major arms depots are looking like, very well: the Russian sabotages caused at least three similar conflagrations in Ukraine of 2017-2020…

Early on 19 September, the Russians avenged these blows in their, meanwhile, usual fashion: they’ve targeted a ‘strategic NATO-base’ in Sumy, and ‘killed 100 US Marines’ - about half of whom were ‘Generals’, of course… who then turned out to be inmates of a geriatric centre…

….sigh… at least I’m not surprised the GenStab in Moscow is targeting everything else - especially hospitals and geriatric centres - but the GenStab-U: why killing people that are helping them so much?

In between of all of this, the Russians are gradually stepping-up their Shahed-attacks, night-for night. Yesterday, the PSU claimed to have shot down all 42 Shaheds it detected. This morning, the PSU claimed to have shot down 61 attack-UAVs and 1 Kh-59/69. Still, one of these went all the way to Lviv…

At least one thing is now sure: in the air over Ukraine, this is going to be a particularly hot winter… This also because this week both Paris and Copenhagen announced their intentions to deliver Mirage 2000s, and additional F-16AMs to Ukraine - and that before the end of 2024.

Additional F-16AMs are going to be crewed by the second group of PSU’s pilots and ground crews that is undergoing training in the EU-part of NATO. That far, not that many news. However, these French fighter jets are particularly interesting (the fact the French are training a group of PSU pilots should, actually, was reported earlier this year).

The variant announced as to be delivered to Ukraine is designated Mirage 2000-5F (photo above). Actually, this is a single-seat interceptor, principally armed with MICA active-radar-homing- and infra-red homing air-to-air missiles (effective range of around 40-45km). Of course, it has air-to-ground capabilities, too, but: in France, its pilots spend perhaps 20% of their flying time training in that discipline. And they are not equipped with SCALP-EGs: only by two-seat Rafales and Mirage 2000Ds. However, the French intend to modify Ukrainian examples for carriage of SCALP-EG long-range missiles.

Thus, it’s making me curious how do the French expect Ukrainian single-seaters to do the job. Guess, that’s something the GenStab-U and the High Command PSU know the best…

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KURSK

Since their endlessly glorious counteroffensive was stopped, three days ago, the Russians are complaining that the ZSU is deploying Swedish-delivered Strv 122 tanks on their territory. Essentially, that’s the Swedish version of Leopard 2. So, kind of, ‘it’s unfair that these Nazis are deploying German Panzers on the soil of Holy Mother Russia again..

A still from a video taken in the ‘depths of the Russian bush,’ showing the distinct silhouette of the Leo 2A5 or 2A6…

Actually, Leo2s are deployed inside Russia for over a month: indeed, there’s one unit equipped with them active in the Kauchuk area, as ‘confirmed’ by one of its losses, published by the Russians back on 18 September:

A Ukrainian Leo 2A6 set afire outside Kauchuk.

The Strv 122s spotted now are operated by the 21^st Mechanised Brigade, which is deployed on the western side of this penetration. This is one of three major units meanwhile known to be involved in this advance on Glushkovo. The other two are the 225^th Assault Battalion (fighting in southern approaches to Glushkovo; reinforced by the Khorne Group from the 116^th Mech), and the 95^th Airborne (western side of the penetration)

(BTW, the British feel offended by such Russian claims: there’s no talk about their Challengers any more…)

Since the start of their assault on Glushkovo, on 10 September, and despite dozens of Russian counterattacks, the Ukrainians have secured Volfino, Veseloe (that’s where a MiG-29 of the PSU demolished the local school full of Russian troops, back on 14 September), Medvezhe, attacked Sadovoye Tovarishchestvo (it’s not yet clear if the entire village is under the control of the 95^th), and took Elizavetovka (by the 21^st).

This forced the FSB generals into reorganising their units in the Glushkovo area. The battered 155^th NIB was meanwhile entirely re-focused on defending Glushkovo, while the 106^th VDV (and one of 810th NIB’s regiments) is now holding the area south of Korenevo and trying to form a defence line down to the border.

A pair of BMDs knocked out during one of failed assaults by the 51st VDV on Liubimovka, earlier this week.

A BMD of the VDV about to get hit by an FPV…

A BMD knocked out after deploying a squad of VDV troopps into Obukhovka (the eastern one), on 15 or 16 September.

There must be at least a regiment of VDV on the western side of the Ukrainian drive on Glushkovo, too, because this BMD was knocked out during the Ukrainian assault on Veseloe, on 14-15 September. The vehicle blew up few milliseconds later…

I see this as a confirmation of what I’ve mentioned few days ago: the VSRF Group Sever obviously has not enough troops for its counteroffensive. Despite meanwhile being bolstered to more than 40,000 troops, and especially not after a reported loss of 400 troops in just one day of fighting, on 17 September. Indeed, it hasn’t even got enough troops to stop Ukrainians and the huge number of different units one can see on the map below, too, only means that most of these are present in company- or perhaps battalion-sized contingents only, are poorly commanded, poorly equipped, and poorly trained, and barely good enough to hold their trenchlines.

Even the Keystone Cops in Moscow know very well: if they lose Glushkovo, because of the local terrain, this area is going to be extremely hard to recover. That’s why the FSB and the GenStab in Moscow will have to withdraw yet more units from somewhere else to send them to Kursk (which in turn is a part of the reason why are they mobilising additional reservists to expand the entire armed forces up to around 2.5 million).

A map of the Kursk Oblast as of 17-20 September. I write ‘17th’, because the red arrows are indicating the last string of Russian counterattacks, undertaken on that day: it cost the VDV and the VSRF ‘just# some 400 troops killed, wounded, or missing.

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NORTHERN KHARKIV….two days ago, the ZSU recovered the western part of Starytsia. Which is why yesterday, the Russians ‘retaliated’ by striking the city of Kharkiv by another 3 BM-30s and 1 Kh-59/69.

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BATTLE OF DONBASS

Bakhmut… the Russians continued their efforts to infiltrate Chasiv Yar. So far, the ZSU smashed all such efforts.

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Pokrovsk… focus of the Group Tsentr’s operations the last few days was… a bit strange. Essentially, since reaching the main ZSU defence line in front of Pokrovsk, two weeks ago, the Russians began advancing in western direction – along the defence line, not through that line in northern direction. They took Novohrodivka, and three days ago completed the capture of Ukrainsk. Gauging by this, it must be expected the Group Tsenter first to secure Selydove (meanwhile held by ‘our’ re-organised 151^st Mech), through advances north of it (from Novohrodivka in western direction) and south of it (from Ukrainsk in western direction) – before turning north and launching the actual attack on Pokrovsk.  

South-east of Pokrovsk, the Russians (i.e. their 8^th CAA, I AK and the LVIII AK, including the 39^th MRB, 18^th MGD, 20^th MRD and 150^th MRD) also continued their assaults from Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka in direction of the (meanwhile: fortified) agglomeration including Kurakhivka, Vovchenka, and Kurakhove.

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Vuhledar… up front, it turned out the 72nd Mech is still around in this sector.

Secondly, through the last four days, the Russians continued assaulting not only west of Vodyane, but also the eastern and north-eastern side of Vuhledar. That is: those Russians that were still alive after Ukrainians blew up one of local mine shafts atop of their heads.

Meanwhile, Ukrainians are demolishing and mining everything in and around Vuhledar: they are determined not to repeat any of mistakes of Avdiivka, and thus not to leave anything of any use behind them. That’s why they’ve run a local counterattacks into the dachas area, south of the ruined down, too, few days ago. Details about that affair can be read here.

Fact remains: two Ukrainian brigades at around 60% strength are simply not enough to hold off the assault of another, reinforced Russian combined arms army…

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Well, I’m happy because all of this is enabling yet another useful conclusion: the Ukrainian military and political leadership remains stoincally on the best way of joining the exclusive club already including that megalomaniac in Moscow, and our glorious politicians and oligarchs here in the West - all of whom are striving to make everybody else a head shorter…

The only thing still unclear to me is: whom do they want sell their sh!t and rule, whenever they achieve that objective?