Ukraine War, 2 February 2023: Vuhledar
Hello everybody!
Hello everybody!
The following attempt to reconstruct developments in the Vuhledar area is something like ‘on popular demand’: in response to related requests. It’s far from complete, but might offer some useful clues.
Vuhledar is a small but dense ‘town’ with lots of tall buildings constructed within something like 1,000 by 1,000 metres, situated in an area as flat as a kitchen table. It’s almost like one of those typical (even if completely stupid) Hollywood movies with a big, tall fortress in the middle of an empty, flat desert — just surrounded by fields. Nearby, there is a ‘dacha area’ (south-east of the town), and the Pivdennodonbaska Coal Mine (north-east of the town; this mine is why Vuhledar came into being).
Vuhledar is important because — together with that mine — it has been converted into a ‘fortification’ of the ZSU and that only few kilometres north of the sole railway line connecting Donetsk with the Crimea. Indeed, some sections of that railway east of the town are less than 1,000m away from Ukrainian positions, which in turn means that it’s not safe to use for the Russians. I’m sure even Putin knows about the importance of forcing Ukrainians away from that railway…
Unsurprisingly, since September 2022, the 58th CAA of the VSRF has squandered two complete brigades while trying to reach Vuhledar via the village of Pavlivka, south-west of it. Pavlivka was completely ruined in the process and even Ukrainians gave up attempts to fully control it: point was to prevent the Russians from using it as a springboard for attacks on Vuhledar. Eventually, Ukrainians withdrew from the village, sometimes in December.
During the same month and the first half of January, the 58th CAA was busy rebuilding battered units and receiving reinforcements, before launching a new attempt. For its new offensive, the army concentrated the 40th and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigades (the original kontraktniki-complement of the latter was destroyed in Pavlivka, back in October), 136th Motor Rifle Brigade, 123rd Rifle Regiment (DNR), the Vostok and Kaskad Battalions (both of which were reinforced to a regimental-level), at least a regiment of Spetsnaz, and several minor units of the GRU.
Mind the following: since the mobilisation of late September, the VSRF has given up operating in its famed BTGs. Thus, the 58th CAA really deployed an equivalent of about four full manoeuvring brigades for this offensive, plus two artillery brigades. Say, a total of about 20,000 troops, 90 MBTs, perhaps two times as many IFVs, and about 100 artillery pieces.
On 24 January 2022, the Russians opened their offensive by attempting to pulverise forward Ukrainian positions, apparently in between of Pavlivka and Mykilske, and on the eastern side of Vuhledar by TOS-1 MRLS’. While looking like ‘hell’ on a video (and certainly being ‘comparable to hell’ for whoever was within the targeted area), I’m not sure if this was effective at all: there are simply no reports indicating a large number of casualties of the Ukrainian 72nd Mechanised Brigades, which is providing the core of Vuhledar’s defences.
Now, some say that TOS-1-strikes were followed by the — ‘compulsory’ — massive artillery barrages on Vuhledar, aiming to soften up the defences. Others say there were no artillrey barrages, because the Russians attempted to take Ukrainians by surprise.
The Russians then assaulted through Pavlivka and from its northern edge straight for southern Vuhledar. Some say, they actually tried to move around the western side of the town, with the aim of encircling it. Is possible, but I guess they might not have liked the idea to marching over 1,000 metres of open space with full Ukrainian garrison in their deep flank, all the time. On the other side…well, gauging by the intellectual qualities of VSRF officers: one can never know.
What is sure is that simultaneously with this attack in south-west, the Russian Naval Infantry advanced from Mykilske around the southern side of the datcha area before turning north — because, the first two days of this offensive the Russian social media was brimming with reports about firefights with ‘Ukrainians trapped behind Russian lines’.
Through 25 January, reports surfaced indicating vivid activity of the VKS in this area: Su-25s and attack helicopters must’ve flown a few dozens of sorties, continuously spraying Ukrainian positions with unguided rockets. It was under the cover of air strikes and the Russian artillery fire that the Naval Infantry pushed through the ‘dacha area’ towards north, apparently aiming to by-pass Vuhledar and encircle it from the east (for this reason, it would’ve made sense for them to advance from Pavlivka towards north and thus try encircling Vuhledar from the west; but, and again: sorry, no clear confirmation in this regards).
Sometimes during 26 January, perhaps after another TOS-1 volley during the night to 27 January, the Russians reportedly reached the petrol station at the northern edge of the dacha area, about 400 metres outside of Vuhledar. No idea if this was along the plan, or somebody made a mistake, but at that point in time they turned north-west and attacked the south-eastern side of Vuhledar.
This was a very bad idea. They were advancing along a relatively narrow route, all the time in sight of Ukrainian observers posted atop of high buildings in Vuhledar, and now facing about 500 metres of empty terrain on the eastern side of the town. Worst of all: by 27 January Ukrainians were ready and thus the advancing Russians came under very precise and systematically-deployed Ukrainian artillery fire, which stopped their Naval Infantry. When the infantry was stopped, accompanying T-80 MBTs and BMP-2 IFVs stopped, too — and then they began dying in big numbers. Atop of this, Ukrainian artillery not only caused heavy losses to the advancing units, but hit their rear too — cutting off both their supply links and their possible withdrawal routes. Finally, on 28 January, the 1st Tank and the 72nd Mech counterattacked the dacha area from north-east and destroyed or captured whatever shaken Russians were still around.
Certainly enough, the Russians brought in reinforcements and regrouped their battered and dermoralised units, and were back to attacking from the southern part of the dacha area in northern direction, on 30 January. Moreover, they began attacking garrisons of the 68th Jäger in villages of Zolotay Nyva and Prechystivka, west of Vuhledar. However, nothing of this left lasting impressions upon the ZSU, which also claimed the downing of some 5–6 Ka-52 helicopters in this battle, all between 24 and 28 January.
On 31 January, the Russians attacked Vuhledar directly again, this time operating in smaller groups. That was too little and ended with the loss of another bunch of T-80s and BMP-2s. What is left of the Naval Infantry of the 40th and 155th Brigades is back to the Mykilske area.
Overall: this was no ‘small-’, no ‘probing-’, and no ‘diversionary-’, but a major attack of almost all the forces the 58th CAA was able to scratch together. Denis Pushilin might be a corrupt and incompetent politician, but he clearly said, ‘’liberation of this city solves many problems’.
It appears the Russians counted on overrunning the two battalions of the 72nd deployed in Vuhledar at the start of their attack (the town and the neighbourhood are much too small for squeezing any more troops into it) and then aimed to drive further north, perhaps all the way into the southern flank of the ZSU forces deployed along the old line of control in the Donbass. The plan didn’t work thanks to a rapid reaction of the rest of the 72nd, but especially well planned fire of the 55th Artillery, and good support of the crack 1st Tank Brigade. That converted this Russian operation into a debacle: RUMINT has it the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade lost 200–230 KIA in the first three days of this operation, just for example, and another rumor circulated in the social media is that all the involved Russian units suffered ‘up to 20,000 casualties’ (KIA, WIA, MIA) over the last week. Most likely, this is (wildly) exaggerated, but some Russian sources did indicate that two of involved units flatly refused to attack after witnessing what’s happening ahead of them. AFAIK, nothing of this has been officially confirmed, and that’s unlikely to change any time soon. What is sure is that Vuhledar remains firmly in Ukrainian hands.
Me thinks, until the 58th CAA finds the way to secure the (heavily fortified) Pivdennodonbaska Mine, it’s not going to manage any kind of advances in the Vuhledar area. Certainly enough, the British MOD announced that the Russians are preparing another, ‘concentrated assault’ in the Vuhledar area.
Post Scriptum
Some of Russian reinforcements ‘announced’ by the British— according to the Ukrainian sources: up to 1,500 troops — were gathering in the village of Kyryoovka, south of the town. The mass of them was housed in the local school — which, on 28 January 2023, was then hit by either M142s or M270s of the ZSU. Number of casualties remains unknown but might went into ‘hundreds’: indeed, it might have caused some of above-mentioned RUMINT about massive losses of the VSRF in the Vuhledar area. Seems, Makiivka was no lesson for anybody in Russia.