Ukraine War, 2–3 September 2022

Hello everybody,

Sep 03, 2022

Hello everybody,

I’m ‘sitting‘ here on quite a lots of data that piled over the last two days. It’s not that there’s a lot in terms of ‘facts’: the security control is so tight — and then on both sides — that it’s next to impossible to verify anything at all. That said, think it’s about the time to ‘dare’ and attempt reconstructing what’s going on in Kherson Oblast in particular.

Up front; the more I read and review different Russian ‘descriptions’, ‘reports’ and ‘updates’, the more I’m becoming convinced that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson is coming forward quite fine (details below). Indeed, the Russians are — slowly, very slowly — growing desperate.

Why that? It’s not only that there is a growing number of indications (even if still no ‘indisputable evidence’) about Ukrainian advances, but certain of ‘top’ Russian sources have switched their behaviour for about 180 degrees, ‘over the night’ — almost the way Russian experts are explaining behaviour of Russ… erm… ‘Ukrainian’ ammo they claim was targeting the Enerhodar NPP. That is: they switched from crying about the lack of general mobilisation and complaining about Shoygu’s incompetence, to ‘everything’s fine’. Indeed: ‘it couldn’t get any better’. Furthermore, the mass of Russian ‘online experts’ are publishing endless amounts of science fiction about only two points of this entire war. One is, essentially, a load of science fiction about ‘MI6-planned and prepared’ Ukrainian assault on Enerhodar NPP; the other about the fighting of the Inhulets Bridgehead, between Davydiv Brid, Andriivka, and Bilohirka (north-western Kherson Oblast). At the same time, most are either demanding info about what’s going on, or zip-lip about developments elsewhere — especially about southern Kherson.

This might sound like ‘online psychoanalysis’ (which I’m despising so much), but one should keep in mind not only the level to which the Putin regime is controlling any kind of media outlets in Russia, but the level of illusions into which the mass of Russians still involved in monitoring and commenting this war are descending, too. At earlier times, they would discuss combat experiences, attack on this or that place. Nowadays, they’re discussing whether Ukraine is a nation, black-magic, gay-Satanists and zombie-soldiers on dope, or posting such statements like ‘the Ukrainian military is retreating from positions in many areas’ — without any kind of details.

This is also why one shouldn’t be surprised when the Keystone Cops in Moscow claim they’ve destroyed 44 M142 HIMARS of the ZSU (just some 270% of HIMARS delivered to Ukraine by now). It’s similar in regards of Ukrainian air force: it doesn’t matter if Slovakia is still short of delivering its MiG-29s to Kyiv. What matters is that the Keystone Cops are already now 1000% sure they’ve destroyed not only the entire Ukrainian Air Force, but also all the MiGs and Sukhois delivered to it by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia too.

Bottom line, the message is that Russia (still) stronk, and Putin winning war. No matter what’s actually going on. Period.

Now back to serious news… Think that quite a few Ukrainians might want to update their ‘information’ on Lieutenant-General Mikhail Zusko. Former commander of the 58th CAA, he was neither arrested nor dismissed, but meanwhile appointed the Chief-of-Staff West OSK. As such, he’s now out of the battle in Ukraine, but in direct touch with Putin (who is still completely ignoring Shoygu, Gerasimov, and — most of time — the South OSK, and instead micromanaging the war directly with field commanders).

AIR

The situation in the air remains confusing, primarily because both sides are releasing the absolute minimum of information. I’m going to need a few days longer to assess what exactly is going on. That said, some ‘early indications’ should be obvious from the fact that Ukrainian Bayraktar UAVs are back to ‘tank-plinking’, directly over the frontline:

The Keystone Cops have claimed two Ukrainian Su-25s and a MiG-29 (and then ‘one converted for the use of American HARM anti-radar missiles’….such modifications are always disgusting for top Russian generals) — all in the Andriivka area, yesterday. Ukrainians reported flying 18 combat sorties, and claimed one Su-25 of the VKS as ‘shot down in the Kherson area’.

This morning, Ukrainian air defences claimed shooting down five 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles as these were approaching Dnipro. Must admit, this number is confusing me: warships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet are usually firing them ‘in quartets’. Thus, cannot stop wondering: ‘and where are the other three?’…. Of course, it could be three have malfunctioned, or it’s like mentioned several times already: the Russians are so desperately short on cruise missiles, that they’re firing whatever they can scratch together.

UPDATE: subsequently, official Kyiv increased the total to ‘9 Kalibrs’. Thus, I would say: most likely there were exactly eight, as usually.

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Kharkiv…For public consumption, the Russians are announcing a pending Ukrainian offensive in the Kharkiv area, and announcing arrival of their units equipped with top gear, while the VSRF spent the last few days with shelling almost every village from Udy in the north-west, via Kharkiv (where exclusively civilian targets were hit), down to Peremoha. With other words: the VSRF is actually trying to exploit Ukrainian preoccupation with Kherson by trying to oust Territorial Defence units holding Dementiivka, Velyki Prohkody, and Male Vesele by bombardment — though without outright assaulting any of these.

Izium…only minor activity reported, including Russian shelling of Nova Husarivka, Brazhkivka, Krasonpillya, Dolyna, and Bohorodichne.

Slovyansk-Siversk… despite all the possible announcements by all the possible Putin-fans of the last three months: still not under Russian control (‘big surprise’….) Indeed, the Russians seem unable to secure even Verkhnokamyanske, although there are no Ukrainian troops inside the place.

Bakhmut…things are much hotter in this area. The Russians are still shelling and assaulting Soledar and Bakhmutske. Indeed, seems to have trenches on the eastern side of both villages. Another assault into eastern Bakhmut, along the T0504, was repelled, yesterday, though. Further south… could copy-paste my reports from back in July: the Russians are (still) attacking Vesela Dolyna and Zaitseve. They did manage to enter Kodema, yesterday. The Russians lately complained about ‘soft’ units of Ukrainian Territorial Defence in the Bakhmut area being replaced by ‘though’ regulars, equipped with Western arms, and these causing them lots of problems alone with their intensive patrol activity.

LOC….the biggest news of the last few days was that the Separatists have managed to cross the M20 highway and attack Krasnohorivka, north of Avdiivka. Ukrainian positions held, but the Separatists are now entrenched south-west of M20. After about a month of announcing the capture of Pisky, the Russians seem to have forced Ukrainians to abandon their positions there and withdraw to Pervomaiske, but seem not to have followed with an occupation of the ruins of Pisky.

Not sure if this is from Donbas, but it’s an interesting comparison between MSTA-S and the (Polish-made) Krab self-propelled howitzer:

KHERSON… Considering only minimal ‘updates’ have been released by either side the last two-three days, I would say it is ‘very likely’ (even if ‘still short of being certain’) that the situation is as follows:

North

- Vysokopillya: 70–80% of the place should be under Ukrainian control, but the Russians are still trying to counterattack and either save something of their position or extract their surviving VDV from there (not easy because Ukrainians are on both flanks of their corridor to the ruins of this place); this is why Ukrainians are still reporting Russian attacks on nearby Potomkyne, too (which, obviously, remains under Ukrainian control)

Olhyne: Ukrainians are inside, but not yet in control;
Novovoznesenske: mostly under Ukrainian control, Russians might still be present in its south-western corner, though (they have to, otherwise what’s left of the VDV in Vysokopillya would’ve been cut off).
Zolota Balka: Ukrainian, and — and even better, yet largely unnoticed by the public,
Mykhalivka: Ukrainian (that’s some 10km down Dnipro from Zolota Balka).

Bottom line: part of VSRF positions on the western side are still holding out, but those along the Dnipro have collapsed. The question is only if Ukrainians might have enough troops to exploit that success and drive further south — or could it be it’s already too late for such (additional & rapid) advance?

Centre/Inhulets Bridgehead

Andriivka: Ukrainian;
Lozove: Ukrainian;
Sukhyi Stavok: Ukrainian (i.e. all the Russian reports about recovering the place were fantasy);
Kostromka: was contested on 1 September, meanwhile under Ukrainian control (i.e. the Russians are reporting their counterattacks on this place);
Bruskynske: Ukrainian (this place was the biggest problem, and the reason why Ukrainians ‘just raided’ further south-east, in direction of T2207, back on 29–30 August; meanwhile, the Russians are reporting their counterattacks on this place).

As announced at the start of this report, this is the area upon which most of the Russian ‘monitors’ have focused, the last few days. As of yesterday and this morning, they were emphasising ‘regaining the initiative’ and talking about ‘counteroffensive’ (on Kostromka, Bruskynske Andriivka, and Lozove). Beg your pardon, but this is imposing several questions:

a) When did they lose the initiative (they never reported they did, so why emphasising this now)?

b) Why do they need to regain the initiative (if they never reported losing it)?

c) How comes they are ‘now’ (as of late on 2 and early on 3 September) ‘launching a counteroffensive’ — where the same Russian sources were reporting exactly the same already on 30 August…?

Feel free to draw your own conclusions.

South

Zeleny Hai: Ukrainian;
Ternovi Pody: Ukrainian;
Ljubomirovka: contested (Ukrainians are inside, but not yet in control);
Barvinok: Ukrainian;
Krutyi Yar: contested;
Kyselivka: contested;
Blahodatne: contested (Ukrainians are inside, but not yet in control; the Russians have released a UAV-video shown artillery strikes on an Ukrainian mechanised unit some 3–4km west of Blahodatne, prompting lots of people into premature conclusions; however, the video has actually shown that the Russian fire was not precise and not fast enough: Ukrainians moved away after losing a single BTR);
Soldatske: contested;
Parysheve: contested;
Pravdyne: Ukrainian (actually, the Russians reported Ukrainians advancing well past this village, but then being ‘forced back to the Blahodatne-Pravdyne line’);
Tomyna Balka: Ukrainian (this was the deepest penetration by Ukrainians in this part of Kherson Oblast, already on the first day of this operation; it appears that it cost the VDV two of its BTGs, both of which were reduced to about 50–60 troops; Russian artillery losses in this area were heavy, too);
Oleksandrivka (on the coast): Ukrainian (though some Russians claim it as in their hands).

Additionally to the above-mentioned, the following appears highly important: the VSRF seems to have abandoned the construction of the barge bridge underneath the Antonovsky Road Bridge. Of course, this might be a temporary measure, until they find enough troops and materials to continue the work. Instead, the Russians are constantly ‘pumping’ additional equipment and supplies to the western side of Dnipro with help of several ferries — and that not only in the Kherson area, but at several other points up river to (at least) Beryslav. This is why Ukrainians are repeatedly shelling the Nova Kakhovka and Kozatske, too. Additional troops are flown in by Mi-8 helicopters (always escorted by Ka-52s and Mi-28s, as obvious from the photo below).

In turn, Ukrainians are repeatedly — and heavily — shelling the area. Back on 1 September, for example, word was that they’ve hit a column of BM-27 or BM-30 MRLS, and its ammo blew up, causing a tremendous explosion. Last night and this morning massive explosions were reported from both the Kherson- and Nova Kakhovka areas.

The VSRF still has some reserves in Kherson (city), and is regularly reacting to any new Ukrainian attack by sending these (in road convoys) in direction of the frontline. In turn, Ukrainian guerrilla and SOF are either reporting such movements, or even ambushing them. Ukrainian HIMARS and long-range artillery is striking whatever HQs and supply depots are found by them, too.

Bottom line: yes, there are no ‘sweeping manoeuvres’ in big style, no rapid manoeuvre warfare in von Manstein’s or Zhukov’s style, but, hey: there is nothing of this in this war already since the Russian breakthrough at Izium, back in April. Foremost, after five days of this offensive, it cannot be denied Ukrainians came forward much better than, say, VSRF, Separatists, and PMCs in the Siversky area over the last month (not to talk about the Sloviansk area of the last three months). Thus, characters describing this offensive as ‘failure’ (especially because of videos shown Ukrainian troops ‘firing over the obstacle’ without aiming) might want to either cross-check again, or just abstain from commenting (and/or drawing science-fiction maps).

Sarcastosaurus

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