Ukraine War, 18 September 2022
Hello everybody!
Hello everybody!
Today, I’ll try to summarise most important developments along the entire frontline in the War in Ukraine — and a little bit beyond the borders of that country.
In grand total, the situation is nicely summarised with the following photo:
In detail, it’s something like this…
STRATEGIC: SYSTEM PUTIN
It’s anywhere between funny, absurd and grotesque — and definitely great joy for a sarcast like me — to watch, more or less at the same time:
- ….how, in the USA, a country based on illegal immigration, the oligarchy does not like having illegal immigrants anywhere near its luxurious pieces of real estate in the Martha’s Vineyard area. Doesn’t matter: the public is still busy fighting over who’s trying to take away torches from the Torch People, and pitchforks from the Pitchfork People…
- …how, in Germany, the oligarchy turned out to be so knot together with Putin, that the government had to nationalise the local subsidiary of the Rosneft. And because the media is paid not to see a forest for all the trees, it’s still, dutifully, spreading panic about the ‘coming gas crisis’, and declaring the official reason for nationalisation of the Rosneft with, ‘protection of nation’s energy supply’: it doesn’t matter that this is actually an attempt to sort out the quagmire of corruption and espionage within top ranks of the politics and armed forces. With which I’m — surprise, surprise — back to that about the torches and pitchforks…
- …and how, in Russia, where the principal problem is the ‘System Putin’ — which, actually, is closely resembling the system of governance anywhere in the West (what a surprise considering how many US$ and € hundreds of billions Putin invested into corrupting ‘Western liberal democracies’), but is focused on just a single person — the same problem is, diligently, ignored, too. Therefore, the Russians are busy sorting out that with torches and pitchforks, ‘instead’…
To some delight of mine, the effects are amazing: while the Fool in Kremlin remains eyebrows-deep involved even in tactical decision-making on the frontlines in Ukraine, and nobody dares taking decisions without him:
the mass of Western experts either don’t know better, or do not dare speaking out about his failures (at least not without ‘possessing undisputable evidence), and thus does not blame Putin (or does not know why should it do so), while,
the Russian mainstream- and the social media are brimming with accusations of ‘commanders and authorities’ below Putin’s level, just not Putin: few dare blaming Shoygu and Gerasimov (i.e. the MOD and the GenStab); some are complaining about intelligence services (GRU and FSB); but, the mass is busy blaming lower-level commanders and authorities, none of which are ever clearly defined.
….that’s why we’re still regularly hearing stories about ‘Putin sacking his commanders’ — although he did next to nothing of that; which, at a closer look, is no surprise. Why should he? Like in regards of civilian administration and economy, over the last 22+ years Putin has appointed his favourites into all crucial positions. Once appointed, they are all free to misuse public wealth and to be as corrupt as they like, to enrich themselves, their families and friends as they like, to remove rivals as they like, and whatever else. They are as untouchable as Putin is; they are above all laws — as long as they’re paying Putin his share and/or providing support when he needs some.
Unsurprisingly, in the Russian (re)invasion of Ukraine, the situation has reached a point where all the field commanders are first checking their decisions with Putin. That way, they keep Putin happy (‘he’s in control’), but — and foremost — have their backsides covered: they’re free to keep on collecting loot and having it evacuated to Russia while, if something goes wrong on the frontline… ‘t wasn’t me’.
….erm… what do you mean with, ‘what if Putin makes a mistake’….?
Putin is doing no mistakes, and can’t do anything wrong, nor is he to blame. Period.
….’lets discuss ambient noises instead’…
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Considering this ‘System Putin’ and — meanwhile: proven — Putin’s military incompetence, it’s little surprising that these days we can watch, ‘live on TV’ (or in the social media) an outright paralysis of the Russian Armed Forces (VSRF), private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner and/or Redut, and Separatist forces on the battlefields of Ukraine.
In eastern Kharkiv, what’s left of the 20th GCAA — which is continuously shaken by ever additional HIMARS-strikes on its headquarters and other important nodes — seems not to be sure about its actual task: is it to establish a new frontline down the Oskil River, or to withdraw on a new defence line, roughly between Pokrovske and Svatove in the centre?
In south-eastern corner of Kharkiv Oblast, the 1st GTAA appears to be in a similar dilemma: it can’t hold the frontline along the Oskil- and Siversky Donets Rivers, but it’s not clearly withdrawing, either. It lost Yarova, east of Svyatohirsk, yesterday, but it’s still holding out further north and south-east. Actually, it’s Putin — and similar Russian chauvinists and illusionists — who are insisting on holding ‘Krasny Lyman’, no matter what, and although it’s entirely pointless, meanwhile. But, they are still there.
….and the Luhansk- and Donetsk-Separatists are so bedazzled by what’s going on around them, they still didn’t figure out that they’re diligently deployed as Putin’s cannon fodder. Correspondingly, their survivors are holding out in Kremyna, Lysychansk and Zolotarivka: even launching counter-attacks on Bilohorivka. Foremost, they are — in cooperation with decimated PMCs — still assaulting Bakhmut from the east and south, despite hundreds of failures of the last two months.
Something similar is valid for the famed III Army Corps: after its command was surprised to hear that its troops are going to be deployed as replacements, not as reinforcements (hey: why should Putin care — or anybody remind him — that the 6-months contracts of the kontraktniki that signed back on 20–24 February expired on 20–24 August…?!?), seems, it was even more surprised by Putin’s decision to scatter its forces all over the place: thus, photos and videos of its units can be traced all the way from Kupyansk in the north, down to (at least) the Vuhledar area in the south, and Western experts in the VSRF are busy wondering who is commanding what of Russian armies in what part of Ukraine…
It’s Bardak time there in Russia…
Sure, some might try to spoil the party by pointing out that the insistence on illusions is always a bad idea — like a clear denial of Ukrainian reports along which the Keystone Cops in Moscow have stopped sending new forces to Ukraine: actually, trains from Volgograd and Rostov-na-Donu are bringing ever additional VSRF- and PMC-units, and supplies, to Luhansk, and from there to Svatove (where the main bus station was meanwhile HIARMS-ed into a pile of rubble), Krasnorichenske, Rubizhne, and Staroblisk. One of S-300 units was re-deployed all the way from St. Petersburg. Apparently, on arrival to these and similar designations, most of the troops are given the task of constructing fortifications, first. But, never mind: nothing of this matters…
Overall: if there’s anything certain, then that Putin has brought the decision to establish some sort of new frontline somewhere north-west of the former LOC. The question is only: where exactly…?
For the end of discussing the Russians, I’ll be indiscrete. Not doing this easily (and extremely rarely), but I found it interesting that a few of Russian contacts have— discretely — asked me if it is possible the VSRF has really suffered a loss of ’50,000+’ troops from February until August… as revealed in this paper:
The calcuation is….erm… ‘simple’: if the Keystone Cops in Moscow have paid a total of 361.9 billion ruble to the families of those who fell, and every family gets 7.4 million….then as of 25 August 2022, the VSRF suffered 50,000 killed in action.
The sarcast in me cannot avoid these two observations:
NO, one cannot gauge Russian losses by such ‘pieces of paper’, regardless how authentic. ‘Basic Principle №1’ of the ‘System Putin’ is enriching oneself at the costs of the state. Thus, nobody can say how much of ‘compensations’ in question have been pocketed by…. ‘somebody down the chain of command’. Indeed, local ‘authorities’ in Russia have an incentive to ‘claim losses’ — because that’s evience they’re ‘trying hard enough’ (to find and recruit volunteers), even if it means little else but that they’re doing exactly what they do all the time: pocket at every opportunity.
Like everybody else, contacts in question are only asking about VSRF’s losses. Regardless if in Russia or the West, it seems nobody is giving a donkey’s….’best piece’… about the losses of the Separatists and PMCs… Similarly, it seems nobody cares about the fact that this is a ‘(three-days-) special military operation’, no ‘war’, and thus — at least legally — none of involved Russian troops is ever going to be entitled to the rights and privileges of a ‘war veteran’….
Therefore, at most, this is ‘50,000 official Russian servicemen’ — not ‘all the Russian losses in Ukraine from 24 February to 28 August 2022’.
But well… preoccupied with describing how their troops are fighting ‘America’, indeed, ‘entire NATO armoured divisions’ in Ukraine, the Russians are not even aware of the fact how lucky they actually are: the West has still not supplied enough artillery to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU) to outmatch that of the VSRF, nor is any of famed and promised Western air defence systems anywhere near Ukraine (more about this in the coming days). Similarly, the Russians are unaware of the fact that the ZSU is having a growing problem with multi-tasking: regularly rotating units in and out of battle (in order to give them time to rest and re-organise); pushing logistics ever deeper into north-eastern Ukraine; training new troops and replacements, and adapting to new challenges… this is, currently, the primary reason why the ZSU is not already past Svatove, perhaps in Staroblisk, too.
That’s as important because nobody needs having doubts that Generals like Zaluzny and/or Nayev are perfectly aware of the fact that the easiest way to penetrate an enemy’s frontline — is to collapse it before it is properly established.
Therefore…perhaps ‘instead’….over the last few days (say: since 14 September), units of the East OK have managed to liberate Dvorichne and eastern Kupyansk (here a ‘possible geolocation’ of the TF Kraken in that part of the town) on the northern Oskil; Studenok and Sovnove in the Svyatohirsk area; they have encircled Lyman from three sides; have secured their hold on Dibrove and Ozerne, secured the area between Kremyna in the north and Serebianka in the south; they might have liberated Bilohorivka and Spirne, and have — definitely — boxed the opposition back into Lysychansk.
Down the rest of the old LOC… in the Toretsk area, the Russians claim to have captured Mykolaivka Druha and Mayorsk, sometimes early this week; Ukrainians have confirmed these attacks, but denied losing any place, and are reporting ‘regular’ attacks on Avidiivka, too. That said, Pisky is still ‘contested’, and — after several failed counterattacks — Ukrainians have recovered the Anthill, north of that place. Of course, the Russians are still ‘shelling like mad’ all of these areas.
Further south, the Russians can’t stop announcing a ‘biiiiig’ Ukrainian offensive in the Vuhledar area. Free along the motto: ‘better we show them we know their intentions — and, who knows, perhaps our guess is right — than they actually attack and hurt us…’
The VSRF is almost constantly shelling Ukrainian positions between Hulaypole and Velyka Novosilka. ‘Amazingly’ (not the least), the ‘major counterattack’ by the III AC in the Kamyanka area (south of Zaporizhzhya) reported by most of the Russian social media early this month….
….well, it never took place and related reports were quickly swept under the carpet….tsk, tsk, tsk…..
KHERSON
While many insist the Russian troops in Kherson Oblast are ‘surrounded’, ‘encircled’, ‘cut off’ from supplies etc.,: sorry, to me this does not look that way. More importantly: it seems, Ukrainian pressure is still not impressing Putin or the commanders of the 49th Combined Arms Army and the XXII Army Corps sufficiently enough. Not only that ferries in the area around the Antonovsky Road Bridge are still in service, but the last week, the VSRF brought in sections of a new — pre-fabricated (so-called ‘SARM’) — bridge to Nova Kakhovka. Have filled the dam lock earth and rubble, and then constructed a new bridge atop of that. With other words: ingenuity of military engineers remains a fascinating issue — and Putin is determined his troops there to ‘stay’…. one way or the other.
In similar fashion, while some are still insisting that the Ukrainian offensive in this oblast was something like ‘diversion’ for ‘main effort in the East’ — and, no doubt, Ukrainians did slow down the last week — the fighting is going on. No doubt, the northern sector of the frontline in this oblast is ‘quiet’ for more than a week now, and roughly running — from the Inhulets in the West to Dnipro in the East — along the this line:
Arkhankelske: contested
Kopryka: Russian
Novovoskresenske: contested
Bilyaivka: Russian
Shevchenkivka: Russian
Zolota Balka: contested
Currently, I’ve got no clear idea how comes the Russians managed to push the 128th Mountain back from the latter, and from Mykhalivka and ‘few places further south, too’, but that’s how it is.
In the centre, it must’ve been that not only ‘America and NATO’ but now also Ukrainian ‘Volkssturm and women of the 5th and 6th Wave’ are extremely dangerous for the VDV, after all — because the 17th Tank and the 35th Naval Infantry have managed to expand their Inhulets Bridgehead, the last few days. Since winning the race on Chkalove, they have liberated Bezimene, Mala Seidemynukha and Novohrednjeve. Krasnosilske and Charivne are ‘contested’.
These are ‘minimal advances’ in grand total, no doubt (and no civilians can return yet) but, they are clear indications that there are limits in defensive capabilities of the remnants of some 7–8 battalion tactical groups of the VDV facing them (AFAIK, these are including the reconstituted 11th VDV Brigade, 76th, 98th and 106th VDV Divisions, 64th Motor Rifle Brigade and the 127th Motor Rifle Division).
That said, the most active sector of this front is the southern area. For days already, rumors are flying about the 28th Mech liberating Kyselivka, mauling the 33rd MRR Don Cossacks so badly, the remnants of the latter were withdrawn east of the Dnipro. There’s still no confirmation in this regards: it is possible that the Russians have withdrawn from one or another of strongholds along the M14 highway, and it is likely that some of these, or even the entire village, have changed hands a few times. But, AFAIK, Kyselivka remains (hotly) ‘contested’, not really ‘liberated’.
North of there, since securing Shmidtove, two weeks ago, task forces of the Ukrainian Naval Infantry and the 14th Mech have raided numerous Russian strongholds: for example, in Velykopillya, Suvore, Soniachne and Naddnipryanske (all along the Inhulets). Means not that any of these has been liberated, but this is wreaking havoc with Russian logistics and forcing them to withdraw ever more of their artillery to the eastern side of the Dnipro.
Finally, Ukrainian special forces, supported by the 28th Mech have entered Sofivka, on the coast, thus either encircling a BTG of VDV in Shyroka Balka and Stanislav, or forcing it to withdraw.