Ukraine War, 17 June 2023: Profit is a bad Advisor

Good evening (or good morning) everybody!

I’ll start with a quick review of latest developments on the battlefield. Some analysis of this is then going to explain the rest of what’s coming to my mind, too…

MISSILE WAR

Early on 16 June (and in the aftermath of another bestial attack on civilians in Dnipro), the Russians released six Kinzhal ‘hypersonic’ missiles upon Kyiv. Some say: not from MiG-31s. If so, then they were fired from the ground, in ballistic mode? No idea. One way or the other, the PSU claimed all six as shot down. As usually, debris caused quite some material damage and wounded at least three. Around the same time, the Russians used a stream of Shaheds to target several PSU radars in the Dnipro area, and then ‘exploited the resulting gap’ in the Ukrainian radar network to target Kyiv with six Kalibre cruise missiles, too. All of these were claimed as shot down by Ukrainians, nevertheless.

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove area… ‘quiet’

Siversk… the Russians are still running small-scale attacks in the Bilohorivka area (the one on the Siversky Donets). Still without success.

Bakhmut… the ZSU is still grinding through the outskirts of Berkhivka and Yahidne in the north-west, and in direction of Klishchivka in the south-west….

Lots of minor attacks and counterattacks took part on many other sectors of the frontline in the east…

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

In the west, the ZSU secured Lobkove, the last night, and then – according to Russian sources – not only repelled multiple counterattacks, but advanced into western Pyatikhatki.

South of Orikhiv, the ZSU ploughed a long path through the Russian minefields all the way to Novodanylivka and then half way to Robotyne.

There’s a similar battle for Novopokrovka, south-east of Orikhiv – and that for some 5-6 days already: see, a long path through the Russian minefields, followed by infantry assault on Russian positions inside that village…

South of Velyka Novoselivka, while repelling multiple Russian counterattacks on Marikivka, Ukrainians started grinding in direction of Urozhaine again. Might even have reached its eastern outskirts. Further east, the situation in Novodonetske remains unclear, but it seems the ZSU is attacking in direction of Kermenchyk, which makes me think Novodonetske is under Ukrainian control, after all…

A ‘quick and dirty’ description of the situation in the area along the Mokri Yaly (or what the Russians call ‘Vremivka Bulge’), as of yesterday in the morning. Drawn by Donald HIll.

Now pay attention, please: remember what I’ve posted about the combination of Russian Orlan UAVs and MSTA-S self-propelled howitzers, again and again, in spring and summer last year? Remember what I said about Orlans being de facto non-operational in cold weather and rain? Well, the spring is here and, even though the weather is cloudy, with some showers, the last 2-3 days, it’s ‘good enough’. Therefore, ‘Orlans are back’. Indeed, it turns out that, except for mines, the major new problem for the ZSU is not the combination ‘Orlans + MSTAs’, but the combination of Orlan and Zala reconnaissance UAVs, with Lancet LPGMs, and Ka-52 attack helicopters.

Essentially, Orlans and Zalas are used to scout positions of the Ukrainian artillery, air defences, and electronic warfare assets, and these are then targeted by large waves of Lancets, followed by Ka-52s (and, occassionally, Mi-28s).

Ka-52 ‘in its element’: low over - and often: between - the trees…

A view at a LMUR PGM, milliseconds after being released by a Mi-28 attack helicopter.

Like already the last year, the ZSU not only still has no solution for Orlans, but now even less so has a working solution for Lancets. Sure, pick-up-mounted KPT machine guns are frequently effective against them, but they are too few, and too scattered: there’s no way the ZSU can buy enough of these. And the ZSU has not enough electronic warfare systems to block them, ‘big style’. Indeed, in regards of electronic warfare, the situation is, de-facto, ‘hopeless’.

And so, because of Lancets, ZSU artillery has to move very frequently (if not, then it gets hit by Lancets). And when it’s moving, it can’t shot. And thus it often happens that units advancing into Russian positions are not receiving necessary (and promised) artillery support.

….and, again: there’s no solution in sight, because even Ukrainian air defences (like this P-18 radar) and electronic warfare systems (like this rare Bukovel) are under severe pressure of the Orlan+Zala+Lancet+Ka-52 combination.

Venture into online-psychoanalysis and tell me I’m ‘having a depressive day’, if you like, but, hand on heart: it’s ‘absurd’, sure, however, right now, and although having no high-tech industry in its back, the VSRF is actually fighting this war - and surviving - thanks to more modern means than the ZSU.

Ukrainian P-18 radar under attack of a Lancet, some 3-4 days ago. The LPGM detonated on hitting the logs, and its blast went underneath the truck carrying the radar, but: be sure: this was no pleasant experience for the crew…

....at least the ZSU seems to have changed the tactics of its artillery: instead of deploying this in 'phases', like early during this offensive (when it was like '2 days shelling of this kind of targets, then 2 days of shelling that kind of targets'), now the artillery is foremost deployed in 'close support mode'. The job of targeting Russians deeper behind the frontline is now run by M142s and M270s with help of GLMRS.

Bottom line: even if actually superior in firepower and precision of its artillery vis-a-vis the Russian artillery, the ZSU cannot fully exploit this superiority, because it lacks effective air defences. These are still busy protecting Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv….

….which is prompting me into yet more analysis. Yesterday, I’ve discussed the way I understand the Russian strategy of the last few months. Obviously – and this was meanwhile confirmed by Pudding, in one of his latest public appearances – this is aiming to buy time: buy time to mobilise yet more troops necessary to replace losses, to construct additional fortifications, and to ‘outsit’ its enemies in this war, until they are fed up of fighting and losses, and/or supporting Ukraine… and that principally through the defence by the means of localised counterattacks…

In this regards it was interesting to monitor today, how, ‘hours after’ the release of my analysis, assessments appeared in the social media pointing out the ZSU is ‘actually’ trying to ‘provoke’ exactly this behaviour by the VSRF: i.e. trying to drag its big units out of their fortified ‘defence lines’ into the open. 

Hand on heart: that’s perfectly possible. At least it wouldn’t be anything new if strategists are trying to outsmart each other. However, I’m not ‘buying’ that – and I think there are plenty of reasons why.

For the start - and feel free to correct me: I’ll feel better if I’m wrong, but - I do not see any kind of serious, long-term strategy in what is the government in Kyiv doing. Even less so in what are all of its ‘allies’ in the West doing. Sure, the official aim remains to liberate every square centimetre of Ukrainian soil (and this is, apparently, supported by the majority of Ukrainian population still in the country). And there will be no negotiations before the Russians withdraw. And there are solemn promises at least from Washington, Berlin, and London, that the support is going to go on as long as it takes….which in these three cases actually means: 1000% sure - until the next elections…

That much has been stated often enough, and is perfectly clear. However, how is that war aim going to be achieved? By reluctance, hesitation, keeping the low profile?

Of course, one can say that’s ‘secret’, but I do not have impression that anybody ‘there’ really knows how to do this.

….at least I cannot imagine this can be done by (belated) deliveries of obsolete weaponry, the stocks of which are certain to run out by the end of this year…

Things are getting even more worrisome considering nobody in the West seems to have a trace of an idea – whether about strategy or about modern military technology. Our glorious politicians are ‘CEOs on a hunt for short-term profits’: they do not know how to lead, only how to administer. They’re experts in laying low, and in restrained reactions to Pudding. Neither they nor their advisors have own ideas, tough, no solutions, and thus no trace of clue about autonomous operations: they do not even think about outthinking Pudding. They’re too scared by his blackmails to do so. If that’s not enough, they can’t see any further than tips of their noses: like when the former CEO of the Boeing cut short the testing of the Boeing 737Max, and the jets then started crashing, killing hundreds. But hey: before being removed, he cashed millions, and then even more so for being fired….

Unsurprisingly, NATO is still no ‘two-’, but ‘five steps’ behind: still in the process of shipping largely obsolete weapons and ammo it should’ve shipped 8-9-10 months back; and still not thinking about re-equipping the ZSU with latest in its technologies – and then in large numbers. That would require thinking beyond the tips of noses, though: considering the inability of places like the Pentagon and NATO HQ in Brussels to reform, and that for decades already, this is little surprising. Therefore, both are dominated by people used to squandering billions to buy obsolete technologies, while too incompetent but to at least understand latest in military sciences.

(….no surprise I’m getting requests from people working ‘there’, to sign my books with ‘For People in need of fresh Air’ and ‘For People with broomstick up their Backside’…)

So, how should one expect Washington, the Pentagon, Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, Amsterdam etc. to quickly adapt and change anything at all? To at least understand, already some 8-10 months ago, that the ZSU and the PSU can’t run counteroffensives if they haven’t got even enough air defence systems for protection of major urban centres and industrial facilities, not to talk about enough for protection of ZSU’s frontlines…?

….all of which is even more absurd considering such Ukrainian needs were crystal clear already as of March the last year…

….which is bringing me back to the victim of the Russian aggression, war of extermination and mass attrocities: I still wonder who is controlling whom in Kyiv. Or, shall I say: I’m not sure the government has perfect control over different of its bodies – especially intel services?

By side that even 15 months since the Russian walkover in Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhya, Kyiv still can’t clearly point with finger at the culprits…But, and for example: the last two weeks the ZSU is attacking through 10-15km deep Russian minefields, sown along the frontline, but – obviously – without a clear picture about the extension of the minefields in question, or about Russian positions constructed to protect these (then, the mass of Russian generals might be professional military incompetents, and drunkards, but even they know: minefields are useless if not well protected). The ZSU simply hasn’t got the necessary intel, although this should’ve been available already months ago. Unsurprisingly, the situation is thus only getting poorer when the Russians deploy additional mines with help of their Zemlodeliye ISDMs.

Of course, one can be sure ZSU did try to do its part of the job by running ‘field reconnaissance’: by using the last winter to send patrols to scout through the minefields and search for Russian positions. But, these can’t really go much deeper than 5-10km behind the Russian lines. Anything beyond that point is hopeless. Even more so considering the fact that more than half the ZSU’s special forces – units actually established, equipped and trained to do that part of the job - have spent the last winter deployed as line infantry in the defence of Bakhmut…

Ok then… but, shouldn’t it be the job of the GUR MO to find out? Was it really ‘impossible’ for this service to, with help of NATO reconnaissance tools, systematically track the work of VSRF’s engineers, the last 6-7 months – and that while single ‘OSINT’-buffs in the social media proved capable of tracking their work on construction of fortifications….?

….once again, as soon as I start thinking about the GUR MO, conclusion is unavoidable that, ‘something is rather smelly there’.

….and it’s not the only such case. Here’s another example: Ukrainian long-range UAVs are still regularly deployed to attack refineries 100-200km deep inside Russia. Yes, it’s ‘sexy’ when there are videos shown ‘attacks on Russia’. But, what’s the point of such attacks? Is anybody at least measuring their effects? Because, So far, there’re none to be seen. At least no indications the VSRF is ‘short on fuel’. Correspondingly, the UAVs in question are squandered for non-military purposes – while urgently needed for undisputable military purposes.

How ‘sound’, isn’t it…?

Because, at the same time, and as obvious from the following sat photo that is making circles in the social media since a few days, some of the most effective Russian weapons – Ka-52s attack helicopters – are nicely bunched together on such an exposed site like Berdyansk airport, mere…. lets say, 110km from nearest ZSU positions. Was the place hit by now? AFAIK, nope. Only the local port and different of storage facilities there.  

That much about ‘strategy’ and thus about ‘shaping operations’. Please, be so kind, do not ask me about these any more. There’s no clear strategy to see, and thus there are no ‘shaping operations’: the ZSU has to run ‘armed reconnaissance’ while actually in the process of assaulting - just to find a way to and through the foremost Russian positions…

To make sure: I do not expect ‘Zelensky’ to create wonders. He’s got no clue about strategy or modern military technology, and can’t do better but what he is advised to say. And I gave up the hope about Western ‘presidents’ and ‘chancelors’, ages ago: they’re entirely useless. But, what’s with Zelensky’s advisors? What’s with generals and other ‘Experten’? All too busy with ‘give us F-16s’-affairs?

As much as they’re all certainly very patriotic, sorry: ‘the fish always starts smelling from the head’, as we say in Austria. Thus, ‘somebody’ there is in need of urgent re-thinking and re-organisation, so Ukraine can - finally - get what it actually needs. And, right now (which is already ‘months late’) - that’s no ‘sexy fighter-bombers’…