Ukraine War, 17 January 2023: Klishchivka

Hello everybody!

Hello everybody!

STRATEGIC

The Russian — and, as a result of that: Ukrainian, too — social media is brimming with reports according to which Putin either:

a) Ordered Gerasimov to complete the ‘liberation’ of ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (‘Donetsk Oblast declared by Putin to be a part of the Russian Federation’) by 24 February, or

b) ‘by March’, or

c) To launch a major offensive in March and ‘end the war’.

All of this is ‘pure RUMINT’, thus no idea what should be correct. However, there’s no doubt that the Russians have further reinforced their efforts in the Soledar-Bakhmut area, are counterattacking in the areas of Novoselivka (Svatove; where the VSRF is excelling in losing its ‘super-turbo’ T-90M MBTs to the Ukrainian artillery) and Kremina, and launching new assaults on Marinka (completely destroyed by now), and Vuhledar.

Right on time to distract the public from reports about the Russians massacring at least 44 Ukrainian civilians by the Kh-22 that hit an apartment building in Dnipro, they’re now running a PR-campaign according to which Ukrainian artillery shelling killed 25+ civilians in Donetsk. ‘Evidence’ is, between others, including reports by one of local ‘journalists’ that is living in Germany, but now returned to report about (quote) ‘her home being damaged’… Usually, I’m not even paying attention at propaganda warfare: mentioning this because it’s another ‘classic’ in the repertoire of Putin’s propaganda machinery.

On the battlefield of ‘Ukrainian hopes vs NATO’s idiots’: there seems to be some sanity at least in Bratislava. The eighth newly-manufactured Zuzana 2 self-propelled howitzer has been handed over to Ukraine. Original design of Zuzana is about 40+ years old, and including a howitzer calibre 152mm: Zuzana 2 is including a howitzer with NATO-standard calibre 155mm, and proved highly-popular in service with the ZSU. Another 16 are on order — but, their production is coming forward quite slowly (mind: the first of eight Zuzanas made for Ukraine was delivered back in August) and, at least officially, they are made for Denmark, Germany, and Norway. Perhaps one might hope they are going to end in Ukraine, too.

Ah yes: for those South Africans wondering why is Ukraine NOT purchasing any of self-propelled G6 howitzers manufactured by Denel Land Systems: well, the South African government has taken an openly pro-Putin stance. Thus, sorry but: guess Kyiv concluded there’s no point to ask.

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Once again, full focus on the Soledar-Bakhmut area.

North of Bakhmut, VDV and Wagner are assaulting Sil, claiming to have captured the local railway station (see still from a video below), and trying to widen their advance between Krasnopolivka and Blahodatne. The last I’ve heard, Ukrainians have stopped them short of the T0513.

That said, while the 46th and 77th Airborne are still in position, the 17th Tank was withdrawn from this sector, and its troops are bitterly complaining about their commander and being undersupplied. Think, it was about the time, then the ‘war path’ of that unit was plastered by treachery and incompetence — whether of those reponsible for ‘controlling’ it, or those directly commanding it, and its elements. That’s ‘things’ that can’t wait to be ‘discussed only after the war’.

Worst of all is the situation south of Bakhmut. Precisely: Klishchivka.

Hand on heart: what appeared as a ‘simple’ situation, just few days ago — because the Russians are assaulting up the valley through which the Siversky Donets — Donbas Canal flows, and Ukrainians are controlling hills on both sides of the area — is meanwhile degenerating into a very bad situation for the ZSU. And it’s not helping (not the least, indeed) when the GenStab-U is laconically reporting ‘shelling’ of that village…

The ruins of Klishchivka have changed hands at least two times, just the last two-three days, and then a Czech serving with one of ZSU units claimed it was lost for the third time, yesterday. The Russian social media repeated that report, but Wagner then denied it. As of the last evening, Klishchivka was still in Ukrainian hands.

The area is defended by few actually good units of the ZSU and the NG: 3rd Assault, 4th Rapid Reaction, 28th and 53rd Mech Brigades. They are supported by the 40th Artillery. All are combat-experienced troops, some with additional training in Europe. Problem: the Russians are coming in such numbers and so often (the 3rd Assault alone was repelling four major assault waves yesterday), that all units ended the day critically short on artillery- and mortar ammunition. By the evening, Ukrainians were actually down to mowing down the assaulting Russians by machine guns alone…

Add-on: supposed ‘Disappearance’ of the Russian Artillery

The last few weeks, there’s a growing number of reports — and a corresponding number of online discussions — about ‘shell hunger’ of the VSRF, sometimes even de-facto ‘disappearance’ of the Russian artillery from the battlefield. At least it is so that its fire should be some 75% less intensive than usually. I can confirm that the ZSU troops are reporting less intensive artillery barrages, too.

Now, some are explaining this with a sheer lack of shells. Supposedly, the Russians spent so much, the last year, and their production can’t keep up, that they run their stocks dry. Others are explaining this with logistics-related issues: the logistics of the VSRF is continuously disrupted by strikes of Ukrainian M142 and M270 multiple rocket launchers on its depots; there is a shortage of suitable vehicles to transport and distribute ammo to the units on the frontline; etc.

AFAIK, the VSRF is suffering no shortage of artillery ammo. Sure, there are — sometimes: severe — disruptions in its logistics. However, and foremost,

a) the Russians are building up stockpiles for their future offensive operations, and at least as important:

b) precision of their artillery strikes has significantly decreased for a reason I’ve announced already back in July: the linchpin in the targeting system of the VSRF’s artillery — Orlan-10 UAVs — can’t operate in winter weather.

The ‘disappearance of Orlans’ (confirmed by the fact that Ukrainians haven’t claimed even one shot down in more than a week), is massively extending the reaction time of the VSRF’s artillery and lessening its precision. Except it’s operating against a ‘well-known’ target (like foremost Ukrainian positions, at the start of another assault), the Russian artillery is, currently, largely ineffective, especially in counter-battery mode or when reacting to Ukrainian counterattacks.

This ineffectiveness does not mean it’s not there, or not operating, though. Instead of ‘usual’, massive barrages by MSTAs, the Russians are nowadays increasingly deploying (less precise, but still highly lethal) multiple rocket launchers.