Ukraine War, 16, 17, 18 and 19 April 2022
Good evening everybody!
Good evening everybody!
After a short break, here’s my summary on most important developments in Ukraine War for the last four days, 16, 17, 18, and 19 April 2022.
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
PMC — private military company/contractor
POL — petrol, oil, lubricants
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
STRATEGIC
Although not managing to recover all of his BTGs in Ukraine to their full strength, and despite systematic disruption of his logistic links — foremost the railway system between Kursk, Vornezh and Kupyansk — by the Ukrainian special forces, over the last two weeks Dvornikov has managed to deploy enough forces and enough supplies and ammunition for his ‘main blow’ into Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, he has managed to secure enough of Mariupol to ‘stabilise’ the situation there, withdraw the mass of RFA troops (up to a dozen of BTGs) away from that city; replace their losses; replace them inside the city with Separatist and Chechen troops. Correspondingly, and as reported earlier, several of BTGs of the 8th CA have already been re-deployed to other battlefields. Finally, Dvornikov he has managed to find enough troops elsewhere in Russia and thus bolster the total of BTGs deployed in Ukraine to about 75–76. At least eleven additional BTGs are currently in transit in direction of Ukraine: all of these should be in the country by Friday (i.e. around 22 April, we can consider the RFA as having a strength of about 87–88 BTGs).
The RFA is still critically short on troops, though, which is why there’s a new recruitment drive in Syria: this time, Assadists are promising US$800 a month to whoever is ready to go. Some are claiming that up to 40,000 have registered.
The People in the Need of Fresh Air are complaining that the Russians are jamming the GPS-signal in Ukraine, rendering the system largely useless. Oh no, how could they? After all, for 25+ years, the same Pentagon is explaining that there is no way to jam a GPS-signal, and all the Iraqi and Serbian attempts to do so have failed… So unfair, these Russians.
BTW, the Starlink signal is jammed for several hours a day, too. At least the SpaceX seems to be quicker with its adaptations…
The Keystone Cops claim to have published a list of Ukrainian soldiers they say have been killed in fighting so far, and that this is containing names of 23,376 people. Turned out: the list contained only names of staff of the Azov Regiment (dead or alive).
AIR
On 15 April, the Russians shot down another Ukrainian Su-25, somewhere over the southern frontlines. Another Ukrainian pilot shot down and killed — for what exactly….? But no, now even the ‘specialised’ US media is expecting the Romanians to hand over their 50+ years old MiG-21MF-fleet to Ukraine. The same was grounded after a catastrophic loss of one, back in March — and Ukrainians have no pilots and no ground crews trained for them. Plus, even these upgraded Romanian MiG-21MF Lancers have short-range air-to-air missiles, only…. Anything, just not supplying them UAVs, the losses of which are not causing the loss of a highly-qualified crew. And, of course, don’t forget to blame Germans for that…. but this all should make sense?
Well, sorry: not to me!
On 16 April, the Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed the downing of an Ukrainian military transport loaded ‘with a large load of Western military equipment’ — and that near Odessa. As so often, no evidence was provided.
After demolishing nearly all of refineries and strategic POL-stocks of Ukraine in the last two weeks, on 16 April the Russians hit the POL-facilities in the Mykolaiv- and Polvava-areas. On 17 April, the Russians switched their targets and launched a concentric attack on railway facilities in the Lviv and Dniepropetrovks Oblasts. Railway-related objects are known to have been hit outside Pavlohrad and Synelnykovo (Dniepropetrovsk), on 17, while on 18 April the VKS and the Russian Navy hit the storage facilities and the railway marshalling yard in the Lviv area. The Keystone Cops claimed the destruction of a ‘shipment of Western arms’ there, but obviously failed to cause major damage to the railway, then the trains hauling arms and fuel donated by the NATO just continued passing by.
Meanwhile, on 17 April, the Keystone Cops have claimed the downing of two MiG-29s of the destroyed Ukrainian Air Force — both in the Kharkiv area, and at least one by an air-to-air missile. A day later, they claimed the destruction of three additional Ukrainian fighter jets, while the Ukrainians claimed a Russian Su-30 as shot down over the Donbass region.
Today, Tu-22M3 bombers of the VKS have bombed Azovstal again.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
As mentioned in my last review/summary, I meanwhile consider all the developments from the Kharkiv-area, via the Severodonets-Lysycchansk-Popasna area, down the LOC to Vuhledar as ‘one, directly-related frontline’. Correspondingly, I’m going to continue the practice of summarising them in one ‘place’.
Through 16 April, the Russians have deployed their first assault echelon along the lines connecting Zavody (10km south-west of Izium), Andrivka, Mala Komyshuvakha, Kamyanka, Sukha Kamyanka towards south. Further east — which is: east of the Oskii River — they made a major advance, and word is that the local collaborators played a crucial role in helping them: from Borova (30km east of Izium) they either captured the bridge near Horokhovatka, or constructed a pontoon bridge there, and then pushed south-east, closer to the Donets River.
Then, as the Ukrainians were still busy creating a new frontline between PiskI Radkivski and Kremina (i.e. between Oskii River and Severodonetsk), at 23.00hrs of 17 April, the RFA assaulted with all available forces along a wide frontline in southern direction — and that all the way from Zavody to Kremina. For the start, this push had two obvious aims:
- South of Izium: tie down and destroy the Ukrainian forces while reaching Barvinkove and thus cutting off the next road connection between central Ukraine and Slovyansk, and,
- further east, reaching and then crossing the Donets River and thus cutting off the defenders of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area from central Ukraine.
By the morning of 18 April, the Ukrainians reported to have forced the Russians away from Zavody, Dmytrivka, Dibrovne, and Kremina. Between others, they’ve shown bodies of… ‘plenty’ of Wagner mercenaries KIA, as ‘evidence’. However, not only that it seems the Russians have at least reached all of these, but the head of Luhansk Oblast reported that, after a battle lasting three days, the Ukrainian troops have withdrawn from the latter. Arestovych then quickly denied the loss of Kremina, but meanwhile the Russians — who seem to have surrounded a part of the Ukrainian garrison in the centre of that town — have bypassed and advanced all the way down to Zarichne, about 10km south-west from Kremina. If I’m to ask, this is — so far — the most serious blow delivered by the new RFA offensive.
Notably: considering Dvornikov (i.e. South OSK) is now in charge, this can be described as a ‘typical Russian strategy’. That is: attack on a wide front, followed by a ‘decisive blow’ at the point of their choice, and then ‘exploitation in depth’ (see: breach of the frontline and then a drive into the depth of the enemy positions). I.e. we’ve again got to search for the ‘Schwerpunkt’: the place where Dvornikov must be expected to deploy his best units to exploit a breakthrough. Right now, the data is much too incomplete but to say.
For example (and from West to East again): Ukrainians say, they’ve stopped the Russians on approach to Zavody, but the Russians appear to have widened their assault there by inserting some 6–7 BTGs and not only taken Zavody, but Zavhorodne and Petrivske, further west, too, and they have
‘at least entered’ Velka Komyshuvakha, south-west of Zavody. Furthermore, after taking Kamyanka by three BTGs, they should have pushed the Ukrainians all the way south to Brazhkivka and south-east to Studenok. If they have reached the latter place, then the position of Ukrainian forces said to still be holding the southern side of Pisky-Radkivski is threatened: i.e. the only road connecting them to Sviatohirsk is about to get cut off. Similarly, if the Russians (i.e. their 2nd and 47th MRBs, and/or 4th GTD) have reached Zarichne, then they’ve already achieved a major break-through of the Ukrainian positions west of Severodonetsk…
While the Ukrainian tactics is meanwhile clear, and it seems the Ukrainians are considering the progress made by the aggressor — i.e. ‘trading space for time’ — I must admit, the extension of some of Russian advances is surprising, because even if the main Ukrainian defence lines are, actually, still some 5–10km further south of all these pushes of the RFA, mobile units north of that defence line are withdrawing slightly too fast for my taste. Foremost, it seems the luckless 17th Tank Brigade (mauled during the Russian advance on Kherson, in the first three days of the war, then rebuilt — also with help of several T-80Us captured from the Russians — and sent to the frontline between Sviatohirsk and Severodonetsk, about two weeks ago), is remaining luckless and got hit by a concentring attack of two Russian motor rifle brigades and one guards tank division. That’s simply no ‘good news’.
While this was going on along the north-western flank of the frontline, the Ukrainian units in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area (meanwhile reinforced by the Georgian Battalion, which is deployed in the Rubizhne area) were heavily rocketed, shelled and hit from the air. They did report repelling repeated assaults, too, and the Russians seem to have made no advances in this area. Only the 102nd MRR of the 150th MRD (a unit that used to assault Mariupol, back in early March) — which is now fighting inside Popasna — is said to have gained ‘a few additional streets’.
Ukrainian units defending the LOC in the Donbass area reported to have repelled 10 assaults on 16 April, and another 12 on 17 April: finally, yesterday, they claimed to have recovered Marinka (opposite to Oleksandrivka, 10–15km south-west of Donetsk).
Further south — that is: south of Horlivka — the 60th MRB of the RFA seems to be pushing over the Verkhnotoretske area in direction of Kostyantynivka along the H20 road, but — so far — with little or no success.
Overall, the only ‘positive’ development along this huge frontline were reports about an Ukrainian counterattack — and advance — from Kharkiv (which is terribly pounded by artillery and multiple rocket launchers, all the time) in direction of Kupiansk. On 17 April, for example, the 92nd Mech should have liberated Bairak, Kutuzivka, Lebyazhe, and Bazalievka. Possibly, it has taken Kochetok, perhaps Pecheniky, too: this was a drive of nearly 25km straight into the flank of the main Russian drive south of Izium — and yet: there was no reaction from the RFA so far. Ever since there are no reports from this area — which might mean both even better- or worse news.
MARIUPOL
The Keystone Cops in Moscow and the Separatists in Donbas have claimed the capture of 98% of Mariupol, and the battle thus for something like ‘de-facto over’. Khadyrov’s Chechens are bragging in the social media with videos shown captured Ukrainian Marines they are feeding, or forcing to kneel in front of memorials from the Second World War….Actually — and that’s a little bit funny — it turned out that first 400, the 800, and meanwhile word is about 2,300–2,800 of defenders (the number constantly rose over the last two days) are still holding out. Sure, most of the media is reporting them as all concentrated within the Azovstal works, which in turn was pounded by every calibre in the Russian artillery, plus Tu-22M-3 bombers of the VKS, over the last three days. However, it seems that the 1st Battalion Azov Regiment is still holding at least a narrow strip along the sea in the northern corner of the Prymorsky District, and the port on either side of the Kalmius River, while the rest of the Azov plus the 12th Brigade Territorial Defence and whatever is still around of the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade and other units are holding the Azovstal Works. The latter is said to have six levels of underground facilities in a total length of about 12,000m, much of this hardened against direct strikes by nuclear weapons. Thus, at least in theory, the defenders there are relatively safe (except when they have to get out to fight, of course), but — while turning down another Russian offer to give up — they are demanding the evacuation of at least 1,000 civilians that are still inside the pocket held by them, as well as their wounded (of which there should be at least 1,000).
Russian motor rifle troops in action inside Mariupol (this video was released on 14 April, and was probably few days old already then).
SOUTH
The 58th CAA has stepped up its activity along the entire frontline in the Zaporozhye Oblast: that is, it is rocketing and shelling all the local concentrations of Ukrainian troops from the Kamienskiy on the Dniepr, through Hulaipole to Priyutne.
Similarly, the 49th CAA — which might have received some reinforcements, too, and definitely had its ammunition stocks replenished — is shelling all the major Ukrainian positions in the direction of Mykolaiv and south of Kryvyi Rih. The attack on Oleksandrivka of the Ukrainian 80th Airborne seems to have been stopped by a Russian counterattack, and the fighting in that village is going on. In turn, the Ukrainians shelled the Kherson Airport, again.