Ukraine War, 16 September 2024: Kursk...

Hello everybody!

This is an add-on in reaction to nummerous requests for ‘explanation’ on what’s going on in south-western Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation.

Essentially (and slightly oversimplified):

• over the last month, the VSRF Group Sever (‘North’) was reinforced to between 35,000 and 40,000 troops, commanded by FSB.

• Most important reinforcements arrived in form of the re-built 106th VDV Division.

• However, the VSRF has also suffered up to 20,000 casualties since 6 August, which is why the FSB lacks troops for some sort of an ‘all-out offensive’ that would ‘crush’ the entire Ukrainian ‘bulge’ inside the Kursk Oblast with simultaneous attacks from multiple directions.

• Therefore, the FSB opted for a ‘VDV-style’ attack: it found the weakest link in the ZSU’s deployment, attacked it by two brigades and overwhelmed the same, then attempted to exploit by collapsing the very centre of the Ukrainian deployment.

• A combination of air strikes and UAV-attacks mauled the UAV-battalion of the 103rd Territorial Defence Brigade (a brigade that used to hold the western line of the Ukrainian bulge: the area from Krasnootyabrskoe and Komarovka in the north, via Anapasovka in the centre, down to Gordeevka in the south).

• With the 103rd ‘blind’, the 51st VDV had it ‘easy’ to enter Snagost. From there, it turned east and assaulted Liubimovka. This assault failed, though: the ZSU reacted with quick counterattacks into the northern flank of the Russian advance and the VDV was mauled before reaching Liubimovka. It fell back to Snegost.

• What then ‘saved’ the Russian counteroffensive was the attack of the 155th NIB from the west: however, instead for Snagost, this aimed for Anapasovka and Obukhovka. The 103rd TD managed to hold out in Anapasovka for long enough to withdraw its battalions from Krasnootyabrskoe and Komarovka (even if suffering around 30+ losses in the process, mostly captured), then fell back to Obukhovka.

• Having secured Anapasovka, the 155th NIB then assaulted Obukhovka, secured that place, and from there attacked Liubimovka from south-west. AFAIK, it did manage to enter that village as of Saturday, but failed to secure it.

• The reason is that on the way to Liubimovka, the 155th NIB was mauled by murderous Ukrainian counterattacks into its southern flank.

• Plus, as the 155th NIB was busy with Obukhovka and Liubimovka, the ZSU crossed the border further south-west, secured Novyi Put, then rushed to Obukhovka (yes, there are two of these in this part of the Kursk Oblast) and Veseloe. From there, it assaulted in northern direction, reaching the southern side of Glushkovo on Saturday.

That’s what is shown on the map above, too.

Now, amid all the reporting about these attacks and counterattacks, the impression was created as if the Russians would have achieved much more than they did - and, often enough, in places where they certainly didn’t (or tha t they are still in areas where, actually, they are not any more….also that the ZSU is still in certain places where it is not any more).

Of course, for Ukrainian circumstances, the losses of the 103rd TD were serious (perhaps somebody ‘up there in Kyiv’ might FINALLY learn NOT to deploy poorly-equipped territorial defence units at such neuralgic sectors of the frontline?!?). However, the firepower of the 22nd Mech and the 82nd Airborne was ‘sufficient’ to cause murderous losses to the 51st VDV and the 155th NIB as these were exposed in the open while advancing from Snegost and Anapasovka on Liubimovka.

…primarily because on the Russian side there are at least as many ‘super-competent’ commanders as within the ZSU, and they’ve explained their troops that the Ukrainians would turn and run as soon as they attack…

Atop of this, gauging by what one gets to hear from the 155th NIB about ‘lack of fortifications’ and ‘chaos’ in the Glushkovo area, FSB’s generals didn’t take care to construct a defence perimeter around that town, thus making things much easier for the ZSU. Unsurprisingly, the last two days the NASA’s FIRMS-system is showing constant movement of ‘fires’ in northern direction.

Finally, few words for those with (reasonable) concerns about superiority of the Russian numbers in this area: yes, that’s right, the Russians have something like two, if not three times more troops around the Ukrainian bulge into the Kursk Oblast. They have at least enough aerial supremacy to bomb the area controlled by the ZSU with UMPK glide-bombs from safe distances; they have lots of FPVs, and even more artillery. They are close to their logistic bases in the Kursk area, have far more artillery shells, more ammunition, fuel, and other supplies.

However, by now, their two naval infantry brigades deployed there since early August have suffered very heavy losses; the other units they’ve rushed there might have famous names, but are only a shadow of their ‘fame’ even from 2022. Nowadays, they’re barely enough to hold the line. The majority of their artillery is towed, slow to move and severely hit by Ukrainian UAVs (frequently just while trying to reach the combat zone). No doubt, the VDV is easily re-filling its ranks by members of the Russian Parachute League, but also not what it used to be. And the mass of fighting is run in form of mobile warfare, in which the Russians simply can’t cope with Ukrainian manoeuvreability and firepower. Thus, the numerical superiority is not as much a factor as it might appear at the first look.

I would say: chances are at least 50:50 that the FSB is going to successfully lose another 10,000 VDV- and VSRF troops and then most of the south-western Kursk Oblast. Exactly along Pudding’s plan from 24 February 2022…

***

Ah yes and… the situation between the border and Khomutovka (45km north of Rylsk) must be serious enough for the local Russian authorities to order an evacuation of civilians from this district, early this morning. So, perhaps ‘not just another Ukrainian raid’ there, after all…