Ukraine War, 16 September 2022: East Kharkiv
Good evening everybody!
Good evening everybody!
It’s been about a week since my last ‘update’ on the war in Ukraine, thus there’s actually a lot to review and report today. I lack the time for more, though: thus, even if I’m writing down most important developments, let me remain focused on eastern Kharkiv, this evening.
In this regards, I’ll again try to reconstruct the Ukrainian offensive in East Kharkiv, run between 4 and 12 September. The reason is that, on one side, this was a highly effective operation, delivering a severe psychological blow upon all of Russia and its armed forces, and liberating a large chunk of Ukraine; on the other, it was not as much a ‘coup de grace’ on the VSRF as claimed by many. Above all, it’s explaining what’s going on in Ukraine ever since.
LEFT HOOK AT BALAKLEYA
The operation began with diversions: between 1 and 4 September, Ukrainian forces crossed the Siversky Donets north of Slovyansk to liberate Ozerne and Yampil (the former was liberated, but the latter is still under the Russian control). When the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) — deployed north-west of that area — re-focused its attention in this direction, Ukrainians found a section of frontline where the VSRF artillery was not present in sufficient numbers: on the western flank of the 1st GTA. They quickly concentrated elements from four or five brigades and, late on 4 September, punched through the enemy frontline at Vrebivka. From there, during the morning of 5 September they circled Balakleya: with the Russian garrison inside that town holding out, while the VDV was concentrating for a counterattack from Volokhiv Yar, what happened next seems to have been a combination of ‘inertia’ and ZSU’s typical de-centralised style of command. ‘Instead’ of advancing from Balakleya towards east, on Vesele, for example, Ukrainian rushed north-east. Alternatively, it is possible Ukrainians have picked precisely this route because it might have represented something like ‘border’ between areas of responsibility of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (20th GCAA; north) and the 1st GTA.
One way or the other, a weak BTG of VDV — perhaps something like ‘intervention reserve’ of the 20th GCAA — in Volkhiv Yar was hit by a pincer attack and overrun. Ukrainians then raced in direction of Shevchenkove, thus collapsing the entire frontline of the 20th GCAA west and north-west of that place (roughly between Bazaliivka in the north and Ivanivka in the south). This opened the way for additional ZSU units to join the offensive, by an advance on west-east axis, and caused a mass flight of the Russians (and many of Ukrainian Putin-fans) from the area along the P07 highway and north of it). By 7 September, Ukrainians were already in the western outskirts of Kupyansk and Senkove on the Oskil River. A day later, they approached Bakhtyn and then Oskil from the north.
Precisely this area — the one between Izyum, Oskil, Kamyanka and Studenok — is where the crucial showdown of this offensive took place because, at least the way I understand it, its actual aim was encircling the 1st GTA, the mass of which was deployed south and south-east of Izyum. Initially, Ukrainians had too few forces to assault Izyum and were only present north-east of this town: it took them until 8 or 9 September to secure the Vesele area. Further east, lack of roads and uneven terrain slowed them down, and it was late on 9 September before they managed to reach Kamyanka. That was about the maximum of what was possible for the place was held by far superior Russian forces. In similar fashion, ZSU units deployed along the frontline between Brazhikivka, Dovhenke, and Svyatohirsk could not breach the frontline of the 201st Military Base (something like Motor Rifle Regiment). Ukrainian forces further east did launch a three-prong attack on Lyman, but did not manage to secure this town.
Nevertheless, combined with the collapse of the frontlines north-west from that area and the fall of Balakleya, this move unnerved both Putin, the MOD and GenStab in Moscow, and the South OSK, and they ordered the withdrawal of the 1st GTA.
Net result of this was that between 9 and 12 September the 1st GTA was able to withdraw from Izyum, via Kamyanka, and Studenok to the area between Pisky-Radkivski on the Oskil River, Svatove in north-east, and Lyman. Arguably, it left over 100 tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles behind, but — and that’s important — it successfully evacuated the mass of its artillery. At least it’s clear by now that Ukrainians have captured only about 20 Russian artillery pieces, most of which were in very poor condition (worn-out barrels and other issues).
Another important development was that the collapse of ground positions forced the South OSK to rush the VKS into combat as a ‘fire brigade’: instead of its conservative ‘spray and pray’ attacks with unguided rockets against pre-selected coordinates from ‘safe’ distances, it deployed Su-25s, Su-34s and attack helicopters for direct attacks. Initially, these were primarily aiming to hit advancing Ukrainian columns. This proved anything else than easy because of the poor situational awareness on the Russian side: the Russian reconnaissance- and information-distribution system has collapsed, and they did not know where are own troops and where are Ukrainians. Some of fighter-bombers have hit own forces, and — exposed to the full spectrum of Ukrainian air defences (from assault rifles and machine guns to heavier SAM-systems, like Buk M1) — the precision of their pilots suffered a lot. Above all, the VKS seems to have suffered a loss of about 10 aircraft and helicopters during this operation (exact numbers remain unclear because only 1–2 Russian pilots were captured and the search for all the wreckage is still going on).
OSKIL FRONTLINE
In grand total, this operation did have one important bi-product: it not only caused a rout of the 20th Guards CAA, or forced the 1st GTA into a hurried withdrawal, but prompted Putin into ordering a general withdrawal of all the Russian and separatist forces from the areas north of Kharkiv. In turn, these were promptly re-routed into eastern Ukraine: in this fashion, the 20th GCAA was able to establish a new frontline down the Oskil River, roughly from Dvorichna in the north to Pisky-Radkivski in the south.
That said, the operation was nice success for Ukraine, resulting in the liberation of most of Kharkiv Oblast, together with Izyum and western side of Kupyansk. Sure, the Russians were still in control over the railway connecting Belgorod with Kupyansk and Severodonetsk, but its entire stretch from the Russian border in the north down the Kupyansk was now well inside the range of even the Ukrainian mortar fire. I.e. this line cannot be used to haul supplies for the Russian troops in Ukraine any more.
Combined with liberation of eastern Kharkiv Oblast, that was a nice morale booster for Ukraine, forcing even the Russians into the realisation that the ZSU is able to outmatch them: indeed, forcing some in Moscow into the conclusion that they can’t win this war. Finally, this operation appears to have been a confirmation that the ZSU has gained the strategic initiative, too.
However, Putin remains determined to continue this war, he remains determined to ‘at least’ secure his grip on Luhansk, Donetsk, southern Zaporizhzhya, Crimea, and Kherson, and is making ever more threats about punishing Ukraine. In his favour is the fact that despite a massive defeat and growing problems with morale of its troops, the VSRF has retained its (vast) numerical superiority in artillery. Unsurprisingly, the stories about the MOD in Moscow stopping further deployment of units to Ukraine are hogwash, and the Russian PMCs, the VSRF, and Separatists are not only ‘still fighting’, but are going to continue fighting. This war will go on for much longer…
NEW ATTACK
Following a few days of operational pause — necessary to regroup, rest and replenish involved units, but also bring in reinforcements — and following a series of artillery duels in the Kupyansk area, the ZSU did what I consider the best in this situation: it re-launched its offensive, yesterday.
Gauging by Russian reports, it crossed the Oskil River in the Dvorichna area and pushed east and south. Whether out of that movement (i.e. through driving in the back of the Russian lines further south), or as a result of additional crossings of the Oskil, Ukrainians should have punched through the frontline of the 20th GCAA and liberated the eastern side of Kupyansk, too.
Indeed, the Russians are reporting about a rapid Ukrainian advance in the direction of Borova — which is 50km south of Kupyansk, on the eastern side of the Oskil —, about the Ukrainian 66th Motor Rifle crossing the Oskil River, and RUMINT has it that what was left of the 20th GCAA is meanwhile on withdrawal in direction of Troitske in the north, and Svatove. If this is truth, the next frontline is going to be somewhere on the western ‘border’ of the Luhansk Oblast.
Finally, Ukrainian forces deployed in the area between Oskil (town) and Bohorodychne should have crossed the southern part of the Oskil River and forced the 1st GTA to withdraw from Studenok, today.
On the other hand, all Ukrainian attacks on Lyman (run from at least three directions), remained unsuccessful so far.
That much for this evening. I hope to find more time in the coming days.