Ukraine War, 16 June 2023: Not an Inch back

Good evening or good morning, everybody!

Have had a lots of highly useful chats, the last few days, and some of these have made me think. Thus, instead of ‘another update’, today I’ll offer some analysis.

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Whether one trusts official Kyiv, or official Moscow, or assumes or assess one or another of recent Ukrainian attacks in the south for ‘probing’, ‘reconnaissance in force’ or whatever else: I would say it’s ‘obvious’ that the ZSU counteroffensive is in ‘full swing’ for something like two weeks now. And that there’s something like ‘operational pause’ in some areas, as NATO is urgently hauling additional arms and equipment to Ukraine, while the ZSU is analysing recent experiences, and drawing lessons from that.

This is of particular importance because I think, for once, the Keystone Cops in Moscow took the ZSU – and its Western advisors – by surprise; and that, intentionally or by sheer accident, they did so in several regards.

….at least that’s my thesis that slowly crystalised over the few days…
Let me explain.

WHAT IS IMPORTANT AND WHAT NOT?

Since there’s social media around, we’re all oversaturated by ‘news’. Overloaded to the degree where it’s getting extremely hard to distinguish between ‘important’ and ‘not important’ information. I do not underestimate anybody, but: I doubt anybody working the average shift of 8-10 hours, and then spending 1, 2, 3, 4 hours driving to the work and back home, has a serious chance of doing this. And, amid all the ‘information’, we’re easily distracted - especially by superficial information. All of this is making the task of seriously informing ourselves through finding really good pieces of information – those that matter – extremely hard. I’ll admit it: it’s hard ‘even’ for such like me.

So, what is important, and what is not – for understanding of the way Ukraine, Russia, and their allies, ended in the situation where they are now?

I think it all began back in late September last year, when Pudding announced the mobilisation in Russia, and annexed all the occupied parts of Ukraine: declared them for ‘Russia’.

At the first look, the annexation meant little, except for offering Pudding few ‘glory days’ (and Medvedev few extra vodka-shots). In Pudding’s Russia, even Pudding’s own laws mean very little – except they are supported by violent oppression (whether by authorities, private, or commercial ‘interests’). Similarly, it didn’t matter whether Pudding, or Shoygu, or whoever else announced intention to mobilise 300,000, or 1,000,000 or whatever troops. What was essential was the VSRF’s capability to accept all the new mobiks: this was limited to something like 15,000 (worst case) to 25,000 (best case) a month.

As next, one should keep in mind two additional factors: whether corrupt, incompetent, drunkards – or not – characters like Pudding, Shoygu, Gerasimov are still a product of the Soviet intelligence- and military thinking. As much as they are true ‘masters’ in what they do (otherwise they wouldn’t be where they are), they are indoctrinated into different of their own ‘dogmas’.

One is the maskirovka: lying, deceiving, decoying, subverting…. as one of essential elements of warfare. As one of crucial issues into achieving their aims. The other is – between many other things – that in military sciences there are something like ‘grades’ of quality of any kind of military units. I do not recall all the details (and lack the time to search for them). Plus, I don’t want to trouble you with them, but in essence: they’re ranging from something like ‘excellent, ready for offensive manoeuvring warfare in urban areas by night’ (best case), down to something like ‘awful, barely useful for defending your backyard’ (worst case).

TIME IS ESSENTIAL

I doubt Pudding cares about ‘such details’, and I doubt Shoygu does. But, I am ready to take bets: Gerasimov does. Even in drunken condition, it must’ve been plain obvious to somebody with Gerasimov’s military qualifications that even if there would be a mobilisation, it would take months to get the resulting ‘mobiks’ to the frontline, and even longer to equip, re-train, and organise them into something at least resembling ‘operational’ combat units – and that even then: their mass wouldn’t be capable of more than ‘awful, barely useful for your backyards’.

Why am I sure about this?

It was already sometimes back in April or May last year, quite soon after the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv, and their first realisation just what kind of massive losses the VSRF has suffered, that the retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenko said it clearly on the Russian TV (one of perhaps 2-3 sane military analysts left in all of Russia) that establishing a (new) tank division easily takes 90 days… Now think about how long it takes to establish enough divisions staffed by mobiks to properly secure the entire frontline in Ukraine, and then build up intervention reserves kept behind the frontline…

I.e. few conclusion must have been ‘on hand’:

a) Russia can’t hope to continue advancing: the pre-war VSRF was destroyed and thus Russia lost its offensive capability;  

b) Russia must secure what it has conquered – especially against such ‘Cossack-style’ forays of the ZSU like in south-eastern Kharkiv, and

c) Russia needs to train mobiks at least to the minimum necessary levels.

At least as obvious was: factors ‘b’ and ‘c’ both needed time.

Now, how to buy time at war?

The simplest solution – especially if one doesn’t care about the lives of its troops – is: attack. It doesn’t matter if they are poorly trained. Attack.

Why?

Because, even if the troops are going to get shot away, the enemy is still going to take time to stop and replenish: Ukraine (already critically short on ammunition since the start of the war) can’t continue an offensive operation if running out of ammunition while fighting Russian counterattacks.

Excellent example: some might recall my descriptions of what appeared as ‘entirely pointless, and incredibly costly’ Russian counterattacks in the area east of Kupyansk, back in (from memory) late September and early October, last year. On the first look, they were entirely pointless: the VSRF lost something like 2 or 3 brigades of mobiks (mostly mobilised only 2-5 days before) and corresponding numbers of armoured vehicles. In the social media, this was ‘spectacular’ and everybody was happy (myself included) – because there were ‘shiploads’ of videos of destroyed Russian tanks and dead VSRF troops to see.

However, with hindsight, there’s no denial: this ‘counterattack’ served its purpose. Until this very day, the ZSU troops – which, before those counterattacks – were on the best way to liberate Svatove, are still where they’ve stopped to repel these counterattacks.

Russia found the way to buy time.

What happened as next? Sure, Russia then lost Lyman and, ‘worst of all’, Kherson, in November. But, just like in south-eastern Kharkiv, every time the VSRF managed to extract the mass of troops that were shot of getting encircled. And, meanwhile, it launched its offensive on Bakhmut. 

This is where Prigozhin became very useful: he was left to recruit thousands of convicts from Russian jails into the Wagner PMC, and then squander them with assaulting Bakhmut. For months without an end, regardless the cost. And that for a place Prigozhin, in this recent interview, assessed with ‘unimportant’?

‘Good’, because that was ‘spectacular’ to watch: wave after wave of Russian convicts mowed down while assaulting the same Ukrainian positions, 10, 12, 15, 20 times a day, supported by whatever artillery the VSRF could scratch together. And the ZSU was short on artillery ammo already before of invasion of 24 February, and now also short on heavy infantry weapons necessary to repel such attacks….

Actually, Proigozhin was all the time buying time, because – as he’s stated in the same interview linked above – it was ‘clear’ (apparently: ‘to all of them’, Pudding, Shoygu, Gerasimov etc.) that already as soon as ‘Bakhmut would be over’, Ukrainians would resume their offensive.

When this appeared to be insufficient – and, very likely, ‘not to be outdone’, too – the VSRF then launched its ‘biiiiiiiiiiiiig’ winter offensives, in Vuhledar, and the Kremina area. Losing massively…. In the West, we have ridiculed it that multiple of VSRF’s commanders responsible for all the failures in question were decorated, despite such failures. Sure, some of that was ‘systemic’: they were decorated because they followed their orders. That’s the way things are in Russia since well before the Soviet times.

But, and foremost: they were successful in buying time.

PUDDING AND SHOYGU LINES

Meanwhile, Shoygu was hell-or-bent on spending billions into constructing thousands-of-kilometres-long, ‘impressive’ lines of defence. All the way from the Kinburn Peninsula in southern Kherson, via the southern Zaporizhzhya, south-western Donetsk, up through western Luhansk to the Russian border. Dozens of construction companies were involved. That cost a lot, but: nevermind. It made few of friends and favourites yet richer, too…

Doesn’t matter.

What does matter?

The result. ‘At least one, though in most parts two defence lines’ – at least according to Western analysts patient enough to painstakingly check satellite photographs over the last 8.5 months. Resulting in maps like this one:

Sorry, couldn’t find out who drew this to credit properly…

‘On the paper’, the situation is ‘clear’. The ‘big, long trench’ is most obvious, easily capturing attention. Thus, the Western analysts assessed that trench for the ‘1st Defence Line’ (I, meanwhile, am calling it the ‘Pudding Line’), about 15-20km behind the frontline; they assessed it for ‘major obstacle’. Another 15, 20-25km further south, another such defence line came into being (I’m calling that one the ‘Shoygu Line’).

Because these two are both ‘including a big trench, dragon teeth, mines, concrete fortifications (bunkers)’ etc. they were assessed as what the ZSU ‘really’ has to overcome in order to successfully advance.

…correspondingly, everybody also assessed that the ZSU would have ‘some freedom of manoeuvre’ – say, 5-15 kilometres – while approaching; before reaching what they assessed for this ‘1^st Line of Defence’. I guess (can’t know, since I’m not in the GenStab-U), the GUR MO and the GenStab-U assessed this in similar fashion.

However…

Pay attention: even the map above is clearly shown that, actually, there was (and, there still largely is) another defence line in front of what many still call the ‘1st Defence Line’: directly along the frontline and in form of what appeared as ‘minor forward positions’ to the analysts, but was actually ‘well concealed major positions, protecting deep minefields’ – without that ‘big, obvious trench connecting everything’. This is what I call the ‘Gerasimov Line’.

One way or the other: actually, the Russians have had (and, largely: still have) not one, but two defence lines everywhere, and in some areas even three or more defence lines.

GERASIMOV LINE

Again: construction of all of these frontlines was a massive undertaking. An enterprise that cost a lot. ‘But’, it was something ‘handsome’ for the Keystone Cops, and especially Shoygu, so he does not need to experience situations of this kind (where Pudding demonstrativelly, and in the public, turned his back on him), more often. Thanks to the construction of these defence lines, and for once, he was able to deliver ‘good news’ to Pudding: ‘they’re not going to get through here’.

Problem: thanks to the entire system Putin, Shoygu, Gerasimov & CO KG Gesmbh SPA are all terribly corrupt. Unsurprisingly, their construction companies are corrupt, and the bosses of these continue enriching themselves at the cost of Russia ‘even’ at war (why should they be an exception from what is a rule in the West for centuries, already…?). And so, when one chats with Russian and Ukrainian troops that….say…. ‘have seen’ that ‘1^st Line of Defence’, they’re surprised, because this is ‘awful’. Poorly-positioned and -constructed trenches, bunkers of poor quality, etc.

But, does the poor construction quality of the Pudding- and Shoygu-lines matter?

Negative.

This is so because thanks to buying all the months of time, much of the VSRF was brought to a condition where it was not to operate the way the ZSU and its Western observers expected it would operate. Where it was trained from ‘awful, barely useful for defending your backyard’-level, to something like ‘poor, but can defend a fortified position by day’-level.

Moreover, in the rear, somewhere deep behind the Pudding Line and Shoygu Line, the VSRF found the time not only to build ‘operational-level reserves’, but also train these in running counterattacks….while the Western advisors, the GUR MO and, thus, probably the ZSU too, all expected the poorly trained Russian units to sit and wait in their trenches and fortifications, and get pulverised by Ukrainian artillery, while the ZSU would clear the minefields in order to reach that ‘1^st Line of Defence’ and then penetrate it….

However, as described above, actually, the 1^st Russian defence line is not 15-20km behind the frontline, but immediately behind the minefields in no-man’s land (widely called ‘grey zone’ in the social media).

NOT AN INCH BACK

Thus, what’s happening since around 2-3 June is something like this: the VSRF is reacting almost as soon as Ukrainians start clearing minefields. Not only that the Russian artillery is sowing additional minefields, but there are artillery barrages, there are ATGM-ambushes, and attack helicopters, and there are immediate counterattacks by ground troops. The latter remain extremely costly – because Russian troops are still insufficiently trained for them, and because they’re using ever older equipment. But: the sheer weight of Russian counterattacks is stopping most of Ukrainian advances already within minefields: in many cases of the last two weeks, ZSU had to withdraw back to its starting positions (and, sometimes, it was hit while assembling at these starting positions, i.e. already before actually initiating its attack).

Shoygu can thus always deliver ‘good news’ to Pudding: the VSRF didn’t let the ZSU liberate an inch of terrain.

….which is also the core essence of the ‘message’ aired by Putin’s PRBS-machinery ever since the Ukrainian operation was initiated. ‘Failed’, ‘heavy losses’, ‘everything, just no advance’.

My conclusion is that this became obvious at least since the ZSU penetrated into what the Russians call the ‘Vremivka Bulge’: the area south of Velyka Novosilka, down the Mokri Yaly River. Already two days later, there was not only a ‘local counterattack’ – one run by multiple Russian regiments already deployed in this area – but multiple counterattacks by the 127^th Motor Rifle Divison. By the operational reserve of the 58^th CAA.

Not only the VSRF units holding the actual 1^st Line of Defence/Gerasimov Line, along the frontline (not the ‘wrong’ 1^st Line of Defence, the Pudding Line some 15-20km behind the frontline) have suffered heavy losses in Ukrainian attacks that outmanoeuvred and then hit them from the rear: the 127^th suffered massive losses in its counterattacks, too. Even after days of ‘videos’ showing diverse of this, the exact extension of its losses remains unclear.

But: confronted by the ‘mass’ of 127^th units moving in from the south, Ukrainians, who were already in the northern outskirts of Staromlynivka, mopping up Urozhaine, liberating Staromairoske, and shelling ‘like mad’ the areas further south – were, eventually, stopped. Forced to repel continuous Russian counterattacks on Storozheve and Makarivka, then replenish their ammo and supplies. Indeed, no matter how costly, additional Russian counterattacks have meanwhile forced this group of ZSU forces to shorten its frontline back to the ‘better defenisble’ area between Makarivka and Staromaiorske.

….and Shoygu has got another half a month, perhaps even a full month - to mobilise yet another 15,000-20,000 mobiks, establish additional new units, and thus replace losses: another set of good news for Pudding…

Sure, thanks to NATO-weapons – and thanks to, finally, receiving enough artillery ammunition – the ZSU is meanwhile outclassing the Russian artillery along most important sectors of the frontline. Combined with precision, this is resulting in murderous firepower: otherwise, the 127^th would’ve really driven Ukrainians all the way back to their starting positions, just like other Russian counterattacks have managed to do with few other Ukrainian attacks…

Moreover, meanwhile it’s becoming ever more obvious that the ZSU’s forward-deployed anti-aircraft defences are under severe Russian pressure: they are too weak because the ‘best’ of Ukrainian air defences had to be kept back for the protection of major urban centres and industrial facilities. That, in turn, is ‘no good omen’ for the next phase of this battle: something for which ZSU will have to find a solution (and nope: something where no ‘F-16s’ are going to help). Urgently.

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In long term, the massive destruction of the VSRF is ‘good’: after all, there is simply no way to end this war without destroying the VSRF. The sooner the Russians are reduced to fight with museum pieces like T-34s - the better…

However, in short term I do find it tragic that the involved commanders seem to be unable to achieve this aim by other means than through another plump battle of attrition….most of which is based on the fact that their political masters have no trace of clue about modern military technologies.

Sure, this - the battle of attrition - is something in which both the Russians and NATO are excelling (it’s the way the West and the Soviets won the Second World War), but: I do hope that there are enough clever (and bold) Ukrainian officers in positions of influence, who might effect finding alternative solutions. Because…. well, because that legendary itch in my small toe is telling me that ‘battering the head against the wall’ is rarely of any use.