Ukraine War, 16 December 2022
Hello everybody!
Hello everybody!
Up front, answers to the same or similar question/s received from several readers.
1.) Can Russia launch a new large-scale offensive — on Kyiv, on Kharkiv, on any other place?
On Kyiv? Nope. The VSRF hasn’t got the necessary troops in southern Belarus, and Lukashenko — as keen as he is to please Putin in any possible way — neither has enough troops and firepower, nor the taste for any kind of adventures. At least it is my assessment that, at most, Belarus is going to keep on trying to tie down few brigades of the ZSU by its ‘indirect threats’ and ‘manoeuvring’ along the mutual border. Any deployments of the necessary troop contingents (40,000+) would be promptly detected by Western intelligence and reported correspondingly.
On Kharkiv? Similar to above, which means: nope. It hasn’t got the necessary troops along that section of the border. Actually, the VSRF troops there are busy constructing a massive defence line along the border.
Anywhere else in Ukraine? Possible, but unlikely.
A large-scale offensive is requiring several elements to become possible. One needs not only troops, ammo, and supplies, but equipment too. Right now, Putin has only troops — and then poorly-trained troops. Sure, many of these are mobilised veterans of the VSRF, but at least as many are aged, in poor shape, out of training. Of course, the VSRF is trying to improve the training of its ‘mobiks’, and those in the process of reaching the battlefield now have got a least 3–4 weeks of exercises. However, having troops is not enough. A big offensive would require ammo, supplies, and heavy equipment — and all of that on, or immediately behind the frontline.
The VSRF is meanwhile back to having about 300,000–310,000 troops deployed in Ukraine, of which about 150,000 are involved in combat operations: as we’ve seen in the past, this is about the maximum its logistics can support. Actually, the logistics of the VSRF collapsed already two times as soon as the number grew to more than 150,000 troops deployed in combat operations (see withdrawals from Kyiv and Chernihiv in the first case, and then the loss of eastern Kharkiv and Kherson, in the second).
No matter what is the terrain (and terrain is always dictating the warfare), matter of fact is that foot soldiers cannot advance as fast as motorised- or mechanised troops. The VSRF has lost too many of its best tanks, too many of its best infantry fighting vehicles, and too much of its best artillery to remain capable of organising and effectively running a massive mechanised operation. It failed to suppress Ukrainian air defences; lost too many combat aircraft, helicopters and too many of its airborne troops and special forces to run any kind of large-scale airborne assaults; nowadays, it’s constantly suffering heavy losses in skilled personnel and stocks of supplies due to continuous Ukrainian HIMARS-strikes on command- and logistic facilities, too. As result, the VSRF has lost the capability to ‘line-up’, say, 200 artillery pieces and then oversaturate Ukrainian positions with similar volumes of artillery fire like it used to do in the Izyum-, Popasna-, Severodonetsk- and few other areas at earlier times.
Without this capability, the VSRF cannot ‘breach’ the frontline: it cannot destroy enough fortified Ukrainian positions within any short periods of time, so to enable its infantry — or vehicles — to advance. If it cannot destroy Ukrainian positions, the result is always the same: Ukrainians remain capable of shooting back, and then the Russian infantry is suffering stupendous casualties (such the last few weeks in the Bakhmut area).
In such cases, the actual ‘critical’ factors — from the Ukrainian point of view — is to keep ZSU troops in resupplied with ammo, and replacement barrels for their machine guns.
All the VSRF is presently able of doing is what it is already doing in the Bakhmut area, and, to a lesser degree, in the Avdiivka area: rolling infantry attacks, wave-after-wave, going on for hours, sometimes for days, supported by mediocre artillery and plentiful, but ineffective air strikes.
Problem: such offensive operations are extremely slow — at least in comparison to mechanised operations. They are ‘slow’ because humans can’t run as fast as an armoured fighting vehicle can move. Even less so can aged mobiks in poor physical condition run as far and at any comparable speeds — and that while carrying their combat gear, plus weapons and ammo — as vehicles can move. In turn, this is offering Ukrainians plenty of times to react: even if taken by surprise, they can bring in reinforcements and resupply ammo, and bring their own artillery to bear. In the last few weeks in the Bakhmut area, Russian infantry assaults were so slow in development, that Ukrainians were even able to run air strikes by their Su-25s on them.
The only thing where the ZSU can mess up is by launching entirely pointless counterattacks — and thus expose its own troops and equipment to Russian defensive fire, like this has happened several times the last few weeks, first in the Pisky area, then in the Bakhmut area. Here, one must hope that the dismissal of few of super-patriotic commanders that had ‘more guts than brains’, is going to prevent similar tragedies like when half a specific special forces battalion was squandered to, arguably, destroy most of a Russian infantry brigade… (nope: I’m not going to go into any additional details in this regards).
Finally, yes, no doubt: the VSRF might still have around 9,000 tanks, and a similar number of infantry fighting vehicles, and at least as much artillery left in its reserve, as stressed by the Chief of the Estonian Military Intel, two days ago (and then hyper-ventilated by the Western media). It’s certainly going to do its utmost to return as many of these into operational condition as possible. However, there is no indication for any kind of major reform, re-structuring and upgrades in the way the VSRF is equipped, trained and fighting. Nothing of the kind the Soviet Army did in 1941–1942, for example: the System Putin is preventing any kind of major improvement, while no amounts of gung-ho-daydreaming can overpower modern firepower.
As result, what Putin and Surovikin are sending to the frontlines nowadays are older types of weapons systems, all of lesser combat effectiveness, and they’re going to be operated by troops with poorer training and thus lesser combat effectiveness (the only exception from this rule is the deployment of Borshchevik systems, designed to track down Starlink terminals, where it remains unclear how many of these are available at all). Unless there is some sort of fundamental change in the way characters like Putin and Surovikin think — and I know no indication for this, right now — this is unlikely to change any time soon (say: 3–6 months).
That said: mind that this is likely to remain that way only if the West continues supporting Ukraine as (relatively) ‘intensively’ as it is doing the last 4–5 months. Should the amount of that support — especially: the amount of ammunition — decrease, Ukraine is going to be in deep trouble.
ADD-ON
Some are wondering about why is my critical analysis of Russia’s capability for large scale assault directly contradictive to what the C-in-C ZSU, General Zaluzhny recently stated in an interview for The Economist. Contrary to my assessment above, he predicted a major Russian offensive toward either Kyiv, Donetsk or Dnipro….
Please mind that while a military officer, a General at Zaluzhny’s level is foremost a politician and a manager. His job is to secure at least a constant flow of the same level of supplies like until now, or even more of it — for Ukraine.
Plus, what he’s doing the last few days was done by several top military- and military-intelligence officers of NATO: they all are warning about Putin sending yet more troops to Ukraine, and about giant reserve stocks of (old) MBTs, APCs, IFVs etc..
They also have to track the deployment of additional Russian troops to Belarus, and the movement of the local armed forces: they are paid to do so, and they are paid to report and warn about these.
Thus, sorry, but one can’t expect Zaluzhny (nor Milley, or Stoltenberg or whatever other top civilian- and military decision-makers have a say in this regards) to go downplaying the Russian threat — at least not before the last of Putin’s hordes was forced to leave Ukraine (and even then, he’ll continue requesting more, because Ukraine will have to secure itself for decades — if not longer — in advance). The situation is still much too precarious but to lean back and enjoy the success achieved so far.
In comparison to General Zaluzhny (and others), I’ve got it easy to draw different conclusions: if I make a mistake, I’m not going to be responsible for a nation of 40 million.
2.) Importance and impacts of the Lancet-3 LPGM (also Lancet-3M)?
Over the last two months, the Russians began deploying a slowly increasing number of their Lancet-3M LPGMs against the ZSU. As far as is known, by now these have hit about a dozen of Ukrainian tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles each, about 20 artillery pieces and up to six mobile SAM-systems (plus few Russian vehicles…).
Generally, the effectiveness of such weapons systems is heavily dependent on good reconnaissance — and nice weather: they have a very short endurance and depend on what the operator can see through the narrow field of view of their cameras for precise targeting. If one knows where to search for a possible target: fine. They’re effective. But, if not, they’re ineffective.
I’ve stated this already several times: with the VSRF losing the mass of its reconnaissance UAVs, and then with the onset of the bad-weather-season, its reconnaissance capabilities have greatly diminished, and thus since mid-November the Keystone Cops in Moscow are not releasing as many of Lancet-taken videos as at earlier times. This is indicating that the number of their deployments has significantly decreased. We have to expect this to change as the weather improves, in spring 2023.
BTW, from studying few videos clear enough to show, I’m not convinced every of Lancet-hits shown by the Russians really means some piece of equipment was even seriously damaged. Thus, it is possible that the actual effectiveness of Lancelets is lower than assumed just on basis of counting how many hits were scored in released videos. However, one should keep in mind that nobody — no Ukraine, no Russia, no US Army, none of armed forces of NATO (nope, Israel neither) — has any effective means of countering the deployment of such a weapons system in big numbers. Thus, should the Russians find a way to manufacture them in some serious numbers, they’re going to become extremely unpleasant in 2023.
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
After smashing the HQ of the 58th CAA, two days ago, yesterday, the ZSU run additional M142 HIMARS-strikes on Russian command posts and logistic hubs in Tokmak, Polohy, and Berdyansk, and then hit a hotel in Zhelezniy Port, in the southern Kherson region, reportedly used by the FSB, plus ‘something’ (ammo depot?) in Kadievka, in the Luhansk area.
Today, the VKS and the Russian Navy released 72 cruise missiles, plus 27 S-300 SAMs fired in ballistic mode at Ukraine. Tu-95s were releasing from over Saratov and the Caspian Sea, Tu-22M-3s have released several Kh-22s over the Sea of Azov, Su-34s were releasing Kh-31P, Kh-35, and Kh-59 PGMs. One of Kh-101s malfunctioned and crashed inside Russia, near Volgograd.
Primary targets were power facilities in the east and south of the country: the Zaporizhzhya area alone was attacked by 15 missiles, another half a dozen were recorded in Dnipro, and several in Vinnitsya. Ukraine quickly claimed ’80–90%’ as shot down, but from what is known by now, Kremenchuk, Kirovgrad, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kherson completely lost power (including the local sections of the railway system), Dnipro lost its underground, while emergency black-outs were imposed in Kyiv, Odessa, Zaporizhzya, and Zhytomyr. Ukroenergo dclared the state of emergency, reporting hits on 9 facilities, that over 50% of the power grid was knocked out, and in a massive reduction of production by nuclear facilities.
Sadly, this was predictable — as was the fact that now the Ukrainian power grid has received debilitating damage, and is going to take yet longer to repair — and is going to have all the imaginable negative consequences listed in my last report, and that sooner, rather than later.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Generally, the weather is slightly above freezing: colder temps are expected for the next week, only. With that, we’re back to ‘mud’… seas of mud, to be more precise…and to Russian human wave assaults in the Bakhmut area: alone reading reports about these is turning my stomach upside down (not to talk about watching videos of the ‘aftermath’)….but, well…. here you are…
Kupyansk-Svatove… back and forth fighting around Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka was reported by both sides, the last two days. Apparently, ‘nothing special’ (except for those directly involved, of course): Russian attacks on Hryanykivka (Dvorichna area) and Stelmakhivka have been repulsed. That said, the ZSU seems to have captured a few pieces of Russian heavy equipment, including a T-90M and one MSTA-S in this area.
Kremina….although the 144th Motor Rifle continued attempting to lessen Ukrainian pressure through attacks north and south of the town, Brigadier General Gromov (Main Operational Directorate, GenStab-U) claimed an advance of the ZSU to ‘1,5km’ from Dibrovna. This was a surprising statement, considering the ZSU was already ‘1,5km’ outside Dibrovna, since September. That said, later on it became known that the remnants of BARS-20 and the 30th Motor Rifle Brigade, which were sent to attack Yampolivka, suffered such losses that they fell back in disorder. So, guess, the Ukrainians first gave in to the Russian attack, hit them from three sides, then counterattacked.
That said, most intensive fighting was reported from the Bilohorivka area, on the Siversky Donets, where since three days the Russians are trying to break through in direction of Siversk — with the obvious aim of lessening Ukrainian pressure upon Kremina from the south.
Bakhmut… On 13 December, Wagner, reinforced by the 31st Brigade VSRF, launched a massive attack into the eastern outskirts of the town and over the next two days claimed to have entered the eastern outskirts, even secured many of buildings in the Fedor Maksimenko and Pervomaysky Streets. Together with rotation of several ZSU units (see earlier reports), this prompted many into the conclusion ‘Ukraine is short of losing Bakhmut’. This attack was eventually checked by the 71st Jäger and Georgians, which — with help of few precise artillery barrages — then regained all the terrain lost up to about a dozen of homes on the western side of the Fedora Maksymenka Street (here the results of the fight involving Georgians). RUMINT has it the 31st was rendered ‘non-combat-effective’ in this showdown, and withdrawn from the battlefield.
Simultaneously with above-mentioned assault, the Wagner attacked positions of the 53rd Mech in Opytne — with similar results. Actually, Ukrainians deployed there report an ‘artillery deficit’ on the Russian side.
All of this leaves me without the option but to observe that I’m enjoying, ever more so often, all the stories still ‘stressing’ how the ZSU is ‘losing 500 killed in action’ in Bakhmut — ‘every single day’ — and how ‘desperate’ should Zelensky be about the situation here. They’re funny because the local sources cannot confirm anything of that kind: ‘few dozens of wounded in action’, yes, and at most. But 500 killed every single day? Sorry, that cannot even be described as ‘science fiction’.
Why? Foremost because the VSRF nowadays — and this is including the Wagner — simply lacks the artillery it used to have the last summer. It lacks the necessary ammo: it cannot saturate such targets like specific sectors of the frontline with barrages of 20,000+ shells a day any more. What is left of its artillery is lacking precision, too: the VSRF lacks UAVs that can operate in current weather, and thus the precision of its artillery barrages is poorer — while its artillery is meanwhile suffering, heavily, to the Ukrainian counter-battery operations. Finally, thanks to improved training and equipment, but also the degeneration of the Russian military capabilities, Ukrainian CASEVAC and MEDEVAC are functioning far better than just a few months ago.
A good indication for anybody claiming something else is actually telling fairy tales are stories about ‘local hospitals being overfilled with bodies and wounded’. In reality, any seriously wounded ZSU troops are evacuated out of Bakhmut: there are several teams doing that. Sure, their job is not easy, it is dangerous and trying, and takes longer than everybody involved would like, but there are no bigger issues with such operations.
Bottom line: once again, nope, there is no Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut — and this is extremely unlikely to change. Not only because the ZSU has enough well-supplied and well-trained troops there, but alone because the logic dictates that it’s better to keep on defending well-protected positions, than to withdraw from them and then have to re-take them, later on.
Perhaps more concerning is the fact that the Russians do seem to have crossed the channel west of Kurdyumivka and, by the time they were finally stopped, almost reached Bila Hora and Dyliivka. This was actually a massacre, no military operation, with the Russians throwing several waves of infantry into the Ukrainian fire, until the waves ‘in the rear’ managed to dig out enough trenches to survive and hold out. However, it is increasing the pressure upon ZSU units deployed there.
Toretsk….haven’t found any news about possible additional Russian attacks on Druzhba and Pivnichne.
Avdiivka….on 14 December, the VSRF launched a new attack on Vodyane — apparently with the aim of reaching Sieverne and Tonenke, few kilometres further north, and thus driving in the back of the ZSU garrison of Avdiivka. This assault was cut to pieces, regardless of Russian claims to have ‘liberated the main part’ of Vodyane. Actually, Ukrainians reported that the enemy was stopped well outside the village. East of there, and in the aftermath of that Ukrainian counterattack that drove all the way into south-western Pisky, the Russians are back to trying to reach the southern side of Pervomaiske: i.e. approximately where they used to be about two months ago.
Finally, yesterday, Pushilin proudly announced the ‘liberation’ of ‘80% of Marinka’. Ironically, the Keystone Cops only claimed to have reached the road to Krasnohorivka, thus ‘cutting off the supply line to the settlement’. I’ve got no idea what military genius thinks he can ‘cut off the supply line to the settlement’ connected by three roads, through (even if) cutting off just one road, but this must be another of Russian miracles in violation of basic laws of mathematics and physics. Certainly enough, Pushilin and the Keystone Cops might want to better coordinate their statements in the future, otherwise one can’t but conclude that this was another of their failed attacks.