Ukraine War, 15 November 2024: Stavka & Tik-Tok Strategy

Hello everybody!

Before I go on, let me observe that… sigh… these are best news I’ve received from Ukraine in weeks (if not months): as of yesterday, 11.00hrs local time, the ZSU has not only managed to completely clear all the Russian troops from Kupyansk, but has completely recovered the ‘pounds’ area, north of the town. I.e. the VSRF didn’t manage to establish any kind of a stronghold there.

Of course, the Russians are still assaulting, and they have a bridgehead south of the Hnylysya River. Thus, this could still change. But, for the time being: ‘the situation is under control’.

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That’s why I’m kind of ‘feeling free’ to address questions by several readers, who have asked something like, ‘is it time to leave Kursk?’, ‘was it a mistake to go to Kursk?’ and similar.

Frankly & sincerely (as always), I’ve got no idea. It’s not only that I lack imagination necessary to imagine alternatives, but they didn’t happen and thus I find it pointless to discuss them ‘in-depth’.

That said, quite a lots of pros and cons can be deducted on basis of what is meanwhile known about the Zelensky Administration, and its way of taking decisions.

To start with, back in February-March 2022, Zelensky established the ‘Stavka’. Don’t confuse this designation with that of the former Russian/Soviet high command of the armed forces: in the Ukrainian case, this is the body including the president, his closest advisors (like Yermak, widely described as being the highest-influential upon Zelensky), few ministers or former ministers, plus top commanders of all military and security branches (and, at least until July this year: two former top commanders).

‘Core’ of the Stavka: Zelensky, Syrsky (Glavcom) and Yermak.

Inner makings of the Stavka are hard to gauge because very little but official announcements are released. Certain is only that Zelensky always has the final say (and is regularly dismissing old- and/or appointing new members, always per decree), but, at least the nominal purpose of the Stavka is that of deciding what is ‘Ukraine’ going to do as next in this war. Brought to the point: the Stavka is responsible for strategic-level decision-making.

Stavka’s decisions are then forwarded to the GenStab-U, which is responsible for converting (nominally) ‘political’ decisions into military reality.

Now, what exactly were ‘they’ (read: members of the Stavka, led by Zelensky) thinking to themselves when ordering the offensive into the Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation?

To me, this is entirely unclear. Of course, we’ve got Syrsky’s explanation (and as C-in-C ZSU, i.e. the ‘Glavcom’, Syrsky is a member of the Stavka) that this operation was aiming to ‘pre-empt’ some sort of a Russian offensive into the Sumy Oblast of Ukraine. We’ve got different other explanations, too, including the one about seizing the Russian territory as a bargain for negotiations, or proving different of Putin’s ‘red lines’ are a bluff etc. Again, I’m no member of the Stavka, nor in touch with anybody who is, and, sure, as a colleague of mine said in a private chat, few months ago: I’ve got it easy to draw conclusions and make these public (i.e. to babble around). Fact is: I don’t know. I can only deduct that none of officially published explanations are making much sense to me.

For example: I have seen no evidence for the Russians preparing some sort of an offensive into the Sumy Oblast, as claimed by Syrsky. Considering the ZSU troops entering the Kursk Oblast in August have encountered mere two weak regiments of FSB-controlled Border Guards, and a single regiment of motorised infantry…. Well, that doesn’t sound like there was some ‘big concentration of Russian troops’ there, ‘waiting to advance into Sumy’.

Arguably, the explanation with ‘sowing panic’, aired by others, might sound ‘more plausible’. However, with System Putin in total control over the Russian media and thus the public, cannot but conclude that solely people suffering from few very serious illusions might expect ‘all of Russia to panic’ because of ‘few Ukrainian tanks in Sudzha’. Even had the ZSU really managed to drive all the way to Kursk (something rather unlikely considering all the logistic limitations): I doubt this would change a lot. On the contrary, ever since the Ukrainian penetration became known in the public ‘over there’, the Russians are more than happy to be fed a steady diet of reports about ‘colossal Ukrainian losses’.

All the ones I know happen to be perfectly happy with that.

Finally, the explanation with ‘forcing the Russians to withdraw troops from Ukraine to defend Kursk’ – while perfectly logical (and mentioned by me, too, at least two-three times): well, it would have been the job of the SBU and the HUR to know – in advance, i.e. before the operation was initiated – if the operation is likely to have such effects. For this purpose, they would have to ‘count’ VSRF’s reserves and monitor their deployment, and then report about their conclusions – which is, actually, their ‘routine job’. That would have enabled them to draw conclusions like, ‘yes, the Keystone Cops in Moscow are certain to withdraw significant troop contingents from Ukraine to defend Kursk’ or, ‘nope, that’s not going to happen’.

Whether they did so, even whether the Stavka asked them for advice: is unclear. Perhaps the Ukrainian intelligence did that, perhaps it didn’t; perhaps it is too busy with all the other – often ‘rather pointless’ – tasks, assigned to it by the Stavka (like messing around in Sudan and Syria, for PR purposes). And, even if it did, perhaps Zelensky/Stavka simply ignored their reports – like so many of zombie idiots in ‘the West’ are regularly doing… Right now, there is no way to know (and, so I’m sure, ‘after the war’, there is going to be a ‘zillion’ of explanations from all the involved characters, each blaming somebody else).

Atop of this – and gauging by what I’ve got to hear from Russian sources, and my own deduction (explained back in March) – I do know that following their experiences from the attempt to seize the Sumy Oblast back in February-March 2022, even the Keystone Cops in Moscow (the Russian MOD and GenStab) were not as stupid as to think about trying that again. Because that operation was not only a dismal failure that cost them the mass of two (+) of their ‘best’ armies (both in terms of troops and equipment; should there be doubts in this regards, cannot but recommend reading stuff like War in Ukraine Vol.2 and War in Ukraine Vol.6), but: because they knew there is nothing to gain by trying to advance the ‘army’ they have nowadays – an infantry-heavy mob with insufficient training, organisation, command and communication - into the rolling hills of eastern Sumy. The Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) has it already easy to keep Sumy under pressure with help of glide-bombs. The rest is done by BM-30s.

Bottom line: ‘the Russians’ I happen to know are ‘perfectly OK’ with things remaining the way they were before August this year. And, they are happy with the way they think the things are ever since. They see no reason to go wasting time and resources in Sumy - especially not when ‘the boss’ (Putin) is obsessed with existing administrative borders, and thus the actual war objective (see: ‘Plan N’) is, meanwhile, that of securing the rest of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts within their administrative borders (including few ‘sentimental’ objectives like Lyman, Slovyansk, Toretsk…)

(Sure, here one can argue that the Russians have already made a ‘precedent’ in form of their ‘diversion’ in northern Kharkiv, earlier this year - and that, therefore, it would have been ‘logical’ if they attempted something similar in Sumy. However, that’s the way ‘we’, here in the ‘West’ might think. From the point of view of the Keystone Cops in Moscow, the diversion in northern Kharkiv was motivated by the fact that they ‘know’ that Zelensky/Stavka are always ‘extremely nervous’ about Kharkiv, and, therefore, that the VSRF could easily tie a significant ZSU contingent there, before reaching out for its actual objectives – all of which are in the Donetsk Oblast)

Because of all of this, I do dare deducting that the Ukrainian Kursk operation was motivated by Zelensky’s ‘Tik-Tok Strategy’ for this war. That it was of similar nature like when he (see ‘Stavka’) has ordered ‘no step back from Bakhmut’, although nobody in the ZSU could understand that decision (indeed, even the GenStab-U was smart enough to conclude it would’ve been better to abandon Bakhmut and stop the Russians at Chasiv Yar – and the events of this year have confirmed them in this regards).

Why is Zelensky then bringing such decisions?

The way I see it: primarily because he’s expecting the ‘Western allies’ to do a lots of things for Ukraine, which he’s proving systematically incapable and/or unwilling of doing on his own. Because he’s an opportunist, and no ‘leader’. For example: ‘if they give us enough weapons and ammo, then we need no such “unpopular” decisions like general mobilisation of the population and economy’.

The way I understand the situation, this is meanwhile reaching such absurd proportions that Zelensky is ‘obsessed with scoring PR-points at every opportunity’, especially so in the social media. Because his experience is that ‘scoring PR-points in the social media’ is serving as ‘evidence that Ukrainians can, if only given the means’, and ‘encouraging/motivating the West’ into providing additional financial- and military aid.

….although, and actually: scoring PR-points in the social media had only temporary- and very much belated effects, limited to the period ‘autumn 2022 – spring 2023’. Simply because ‘the West’ (see Biden, plus all the European ‘leaders’ hiding behind Biden’s skirt) still can’t care less about Ukrainian sovereignty: ‘the West’ only cares about short-term standings of its zombie idiots in the polls and returning to ‘business as usual’ with Putin. A ‘West’ keen to seriously support Ukraine and help it win this war… sorry, that would require a fundamental reform of our governance: right now, the same is incapable of reforming itself at least enough to counter all the oligarchy-sponsored extremism and agnotology.

Point is: along that line (and this is ‘at least extremely likely’), the Kursk Offensive was little else but PR/politics-motivated operation. Nothing of serious military significance.

In such case: it has proven as futile (because ‘the West’ didn’t increase/accelerate provision of aid), and: Zelensky/Stavka is/are now in trouble, because just withdrawing would be a big shame for them (i.e. ‘Ukraine’).

At the military level… by best will, I doubt the Glavcom then understood it as an opportunity for what I’m explaining with the ‘Wildschweinjagd’: a large-scale destruction of VSRF’s units in a manoeuvre battle, as we’ve witnessed back in August, then in October, and again in the last few days. The reason I think that way is that Syrsky has proven to be no ‘visionary’, no ‘innovator’ and commander ‘bristling with fresh ideas’, nobody capable of running a manoeuvre battle, but ‘just another post-Soviet micromanager & noisy brat’. A ‘typical late-20th Century/early 21st Century commander’ that can exercise ‘effective’ command, but is ‘successful’ only if given XY-millions of artillery shells, and XWZ-millions of troops.

Arguably, my own thinking is strongly influenced by what I happen to know about the way lower-ranking ZSU officers think. And they do consider it a ‘nice opportunity for Wildschweinjagd’ - even if (and rather ironically) disagreeing with the decision to send them into Russia (should there be doubts about this conclusion of mine: we’ve seen this when the CO 80th Brigade quit when ordered to lead his unit into this operation, and can monitor this in the case of the officer here; and mind, he’s just one example I happen to know).

A BMP-3 of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, VSRF, as caught on a video after being damaged and abandoned during one of latest Russian ‘counterattacks’ in the Kursk Oblast.

That said, if this was ‘just a Wildschweinjagd’, then… well, either it has served its purpose, and the time is to try something else, somewhere else; or, OK, fine, then the ZSU can remain there and continue mauling the Russian naval infantry and VDV, like it is doing the last few days, for example. Indeed, one can go as far as to say that NOW, when there is this large concentration of’50,000’ VDV and VSRF troops (perhaps also 11,000 North Korean troops, as widely claimed) in the Kursk Oblast… well, ‘withdrawing just like that’ is no viable option any more. Because that would expose the Sumy Oblast to a Russian ground offensive, and then one involving ‘not just the usual mob’, but also lots of (still) mechanised VDV units.

However, in such case, poorly-equipped Territorial Defence battalions – like deployed by Syrsky in Kursk in August-September – simply have nothing to do there (as should be obvious from their near-collapse and heavy losses during the first Russian counteroffensive… all provided the Glavcom and the GenStab-U might ever care about ‘such details’, of course).

With other words: this operation was a brilliant opportunity. For example, had the ZSU had the ability to drive all the way to Kursk - in August this year it could have done that and thus, ‘in grand total’, achieve much more. Sadly, saddled by its current leadership, and ‘supported’ by its ‘Western allies’ - it couldn’t. Thus, now it’s left without options but to ‘try extracting the best possible outcome’.

From that point of view it’s ‘good’ that the ZSU has some of its best units deployed there: contrary to the Stavka, Glavcom, and the GenStab-U, their commanders know their business, and their troops are extremely determined to do their job.