Ukraine War, 15 August 2024: Part 2

Good evening everybody!

Originally, I’ve intended to continue with coverage of latest developments in Donbas. Sorry, had to change that plan and start with Kursk again. Primarily because this was a day of mass-surrenders of several Russian units. Or at least a day on which official Kyiv decided to let us know about a number of mass-surrenders.

Three of captured Akhmats… apparently, they do not count as ‘Russians’… ‘or so’….

….yet another group of troops that never surrender…

Of course, the Russians never surrender, especially not when fighting on their home-turf. Moreover, everybody knows that FSB-thugs and the Chechens of Akhmat are either ‘no Russians’, or simply do not count as such. Therefore, and obviously, it’s actually so that only a few Russians were captured, if at all…

-          The biggest surrender was that by a part of the 488^th Motor-Rifle Regiment, plus a squad of the 204^th Spetsnaz Regiment of the Akhmat. They all held a large field fortification in the Gordieevka area, stuffed full with plentiful of ammo, food, and water. Could’ve resisted there ‘for years’, but were sacked by a squad of 14 operators from the Alpha SBU. A total of 102 went into captivity…. all of which is simply impossible, because, as everybody knows, the Ukrainian offensive was stopped by Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists already days ago…

-          As next, the Ukrainians sacked another company from the 488^th MRR… (or the 1428^th MRR, which was assigned to the former): 80 went into captivity. Photos or video-stills are to follow.

-          But, even more important (for reasons I’m going to explain below) was a FSB Spetsnaz unit. Part of this was caught in the open, ambushed and cut to pieces. Really: smashed. About 20 survivors were then captured in their fortified base (not related to the one of the 488^th MRR, linked above).

-          The next to go was a part of the 43^rd Railway Brigade. Primarily convicts under contract to the Keystone Cops in Moscow….

Finally, the ZSU engineers are still busy collecting all the loot from the battlefield. Between others, this is including at least 2 T-90Ms (both were operational and promptly pressed into service with the ZSU), and a number of additional T-72s or T-90s…

Now, because of so many FSB-ers in Ukrainian captivity, and unusually, Moscow rushed to contact Kyiv – demanding an urgent prisoner exchange. Of course, Kyiv is playing it cool: hope is they might get the remaining 700+ defenders of Mariupol back.

While I’m at the topic of the Russian troops in the Kursk Oblast, I’ll update my list of units known as deployed there by now. After all, things are constantly changing. Those units known to have appeared on the battlefield so far (foremost because relatives of the Russian MIA and POWs began posting requests for information in the Russian social media) were as follows:

-          Senezh GRU Spetsnaz (directly subordinated to the GenStab in Moscow)

-          VKS Rifle Regiment (essentially: air force personnel re-trained as riflemen)

-          4^th Tank Regiment (not sure about identity of this unit and seems it was incomplete; plus lost up to a company worth of T-72s by now)

-          9^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (18^th MRD, brought in from Kaliningrad)

-          22^nd Motor-Rifle Regiment (72^nd MRD; newly-established unit)

-          79^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (withdrawn from northern Kharkiv)

-          108^th VDV Regiment (7^th VDV Division, from southern Zaporizhzhya)

-          217^th VDV Regiment (could be 299^th VDV Regiment, instead; i.e. I’m not 100% sure of this one, but if it’s around, it’s from the 98^th VDV Division, currently deployed in the Bakhmut area)

-          272^nd Motor-Rifle Regiment (from northern Kharkiv)

-          277^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (from the 47^th GTD, which is in the process of being re-built in the Oboyan area)

-          488^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (was in the process of being re-built in the Voronezh area when sent to Sudzha: after all of its recent losses, anywhere else, this unit would be considered for ‘destroyed’, but, in Russia…)

-          1009^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (from northern Kharkiv)

-          1428^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (was attached to the 488^th)

-          1^st Motor-Rifle Brigade (DPR, from Ocheretyne area)

-          11^th VDV Brigade (elements, from Bakhmut)

-          15^th Motor-Rifle Brigade (LPR, re-filled by Russians)

-          38^th Motor-Rifle Brigade (from Zaporizhzhya)

-          60^th Motor-Rifle Brigade (at least its 28^th Battalion, previously deployed in the Urozhayne area)

-          64^th Motor-Rifle Brigade (from Zaporizhzhya)

-          138^th Motor-Rifle Brigade (northern Kharkiv)

-          155^th Naval Infantry Brigade (was in the process of re-building in the Kursk area, by crews of warships re-trained as riflemen; formerly deployed in Vovchansk)

-          200^th Arctic Motor-Rifle Brigade (re-built for some 4^th or 5^th time since February 2022; a battalion was re-deployed to Kursk from the Bakhmut area).

-          810^th Naval Infantry Brigade (re-built for 3^rd or 4^th time since February 2023 alone, in same fashion like the 155th)

Finally, there are two Akhmat units – which, the way I understand that, actually belong to the Rosgvardia:

-          204^th Spetsnaz Regiment (lost a lots of troops, already)

-          1434^th Territorial Motor-Rifle Regiment (used to operate as a part of the 42^nd MRD at earlier times; also lost a lots of troops in recent fighting).

Plus, word is that two battalions of ex-Wagner have arrived: I’m not 100% sure, but seems that one is assigned to the 11^th VDV, the other to the 810^th Naval Infantry.

(Of course: corrections and further input are most welcome.)

With other words: while yes, about 50% of these units were already in Russia, and in the process of being re-built with help of recruits and mobiks, the other half was still withdrawn from battlefields in Ukraine. Plus, the mass of these units are nothing comparable to their former fame. For example, the 11^th VDV: ‘elite of the VDV’, ‘conquerors’ of Nova Kakhovka and Kherson… AFAIK, that unit suffered heavy losses at Mykolaiv, Bashtanka and Voznesensk… lately, it was fighting for Chasiv Yar and helped seize the (ruins of the) Kanal District. So, potentially, a highly effective unit. However, after all the losses of the last 2,5 years – and especially the last few months in the Bakhmut area – it’s only a pale shadow of its former power. Similar is valid for the 108^th and 217^th VDV Regiments: both have suffered extensive losses since February 2022 and had to be rebuilt with mobiks from the Russian League of Paratroopers.

Of course, the FSB … heck… what a shame: I can’t even continue ridiculing the GenStab in Moscow, or the Keystone Cops (the Russian Ministry of Defence), because in Kursk it’s the FSB that’s in charge… anyway… the FSB is cold-blooded and merciless. They’re going to impose a reign of terror in the three districts of this oblast in which the ‘emergency’ was declared: they must be expected to run around wearing ZSU uniforms, loot and murder, and blame Ukraine for this, plus treat all of the VSRF and VDV as ‘cattle’. Because FSB is simply ‘better’…

Lieutenant-General Duymin…

And, characters like Lieutenant-General Alexander Duymin from FSB (‘Conqueror of the Crimea’, back in 2014), must be expected not to care the least how little training the VSRF’s recruits have got, or not at all. The currently valid law is only prohibiting the deployment of the recruits outside Russia. Plus: the mass of scared teenagers in question is easy to force into signing contracts...

With other words: the situation with VSRF’s units deployed in the Kursk oblast is going to continue changing in the coming days and weeks, as the FSB is going to continue trying to create a coherent frontline through lining-up thousands of troops.

And the ZSU?

Well, there are two thingies:

A)      The ZSU has established a Military Command of the Kursk Oblast. Commander is Major-General Eduard Moskalev. His command is henceforth responsible for occupation duties in the conquered area. This is going to include policing services: after all, the Russian civilians must be administered and kept safe, no matter where. Ukrposhta is to establish its presence, there are going to be ATBs (that’s a small shops network) etc.

B)      The other thing I can ‘reveal’ is that the ZSU is already rotating units in and out of the combat zone. That is: some of units that were in action since 6 August, have been withdrawn, and replaced by other units. That’s ‘good’, because after a week of intensive operations, some of troops were really tired. In turn, units sent in seem to be primarily elements of what I would describe as… ‘autonomous’ brigades. Not ‘independent’ brigades, but autonomous: autonomous from training along obsolete ZSU procedures. See, units trained either according to experiences of their commanders, or in the West.

(…shouldn’t mean all of them are running post-mission de-briefs, though: tragically, that remains a rare practice within the ZSU.)

….also a way to ‘geolocate’: Ukrainian T-72 (?) carrying the table ‘Lyubimovka’…

***

AIR/MISSLE WAR

Few updates regarding the air/missile war…

-          Meanwhile it’s confirmed: on 12 May, the PSU lost a MiG-29 – and then one involved in flying air strikes on the Russians in the Kursk Oblast. The pilot, Captain Oleksandr Mygulya, from the 40^th Brigade, was killed. The Russian sources say, ‘shot down by MiG-31K’. However, MiG-31K is no interceptor: this is the version adapted for deployment of Kinzhal aero-ballistic missiles. Thus, I would say: actual Russian weapon that shot down this MiG remains unknown.

-          Today, the Keystone Cops in Moscow announced the destruction of a ‘HIMARS launcher’ inside Russia. Now, to me, the vehicle visible on the video does not look like M142: rather like (Turkish-made) TRG-230 or the (Czech-made) RM-70… or something else of that kind. Gauge for yourself:

-          A note in this regards: although I know there have been 2-3 reports about deployment of M142 HIMARS (or at least GLMRS’ from M142 launchers), that ’itch in my small toe’ is telling me that the Trio Fantasticus has imposed a ban upon their deployment inside Russia. Just like the British banned the PSU from using Storm Shadows inside Russia. And that regardless of what both the official Washington and London have stated in this regards. So, instead of HIMARS and similar stuff, the ZSU is relaying upon PSU’s fighter-bombers: MiG-29s and Su-27s using GBU-63s and HAMMERs.

-          Early on 15 August, the GenStab-U claimed a Su-34 of the VKS shot down over the Kursk Oblast. No other details were released, and there is no visual confirmation yet.

Ah yes… and: at least according to Russian sources, the Ukrainian UAV-strikes of the night from 13 to 14 August were much more massive than usually reported in Ukraine and the West. Correspondingly, they included a total of 117 attack UAVs and 4 Tochka-U missiles (interestingly, the Russians are not mentioning any of Ukrainian-made ballistic missiles ‘Grom-2’ any more, like back in 2023):  

-          Kursk: attacked by 37 UAVs and 4 Tochka-Us,

-          Voronezh: attacked by 17 UAVs,

-          Belgorod: attacked by 17 UAVs,

-          Savasleyka: attacked by 11 UAVs,

-          Volgograd: attacked by 9 UAVs,

-          Bryansk: attacked by 3 UAVs,

-          Oryol: attacked by 2 UAVs, and

-          Rostov-na-dno (pun intended): attacked by 1 UAV. 

Of course, all of these were claimed shot down. So also the UAV that clearly hit the tarmac of Savasleyka, although the Russian Pantsyrs opened fire at it:

Ukrainian UAV visible in final moments before hitting the tarmac of Savasleyka AB. Visible in the rear are an Il-76 transport, and, possibly, a MiG-31K of the 44th Special Aviation Regiment. The video is not making it possible to reliably conclude whether at least the latter was damaged or not.

This morning (15 August), the Ukrainians hit the Lgov railway station with multiple UAVs.

***

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Actually, it’s a bit ironic that there’s not that much to report from most of battlefields inside Ukraine. This is no disrespect to ZSU troops hunkering in trenches and holding the line, but: over the last few days, the activity in most of sectors was relatively low. It’s only in three area where the Russians seriously continued their assaults. But, in two of these cases, it was some serious advance - even if nothing in style of ‘ZSU collapsing’, as widely claimed by Pudding’s PRBS-industrialists. Rather than this, it appears the Ukrainians decided to withdraw to positions that are easier to defend (and offering better protection against UMPKs).

Bakhmut… The last few days, the Russians were claiming quite a lot about their assaults from the Kanal District into Chasiv Yar, but I haven’t seen much evidence for any kind of serious advance there. They have re-launched their efforts to re-conquest Klishchivka, too. But, well, to me the VSRF operations of the last two months in that area appear as successful as the training of the Japanese Kamikaze pilots back in 1945. For example: the 360^th Motor-Rifle Regiment (18^th Motor-Rifle Division) has been almost completely destroyed and was disbanded.

Horlivka…yup, the last two weeks, the Russians – foremost the 1^st and thd 132^nd Motor-Rifle Brigades - have continued their advances into Pivnichne and Zalizne from the east, and into Niu York from the south. Actually, most of the latter is meanwhile under the Russian control – with exception of the eastern side, from which the ZSU must be expected to withdraw soon. With this, the battle for Toretsk has begun. The local ZSU troops – the 32^nd, 41^st, and 53^rd Mech, plus the Skala Battalion have been reinforced by the 100^th and 150^th Mech, plus the 95^th Airborne.  

Modern-day Russian Motor-Rifle… or, shall I say, ‘Motorcycle’ troops as seen during one of recent assaults… Their losses are breaking all the known records, but: why should anybody in Russia care?

Pokrovsk-Avdiivka…Most critical in the last few days appeared the situation in the Hrodivka area: from their starting positions in the triangle of Ivanivka-Prohres-Serhivka, the Russians have entered Hrodivka, and captured Orlivka. Obviously, the GenStab in Moscow is under pressure to demonstrate to Kyiv that its ‘terrorist operation in Kursk’ is having no effects upon VSRF operations. Therefore, the 30^th Motor-Rifle Brigade, elements of the 27^th Motor-Rifle Division and the 90^th Tank-Division are assaulting in complete disregard for own losses, up to 30 times a day.

That said, as mentioned above: my impression is that the ZSU gave in to withdraw towards positions that are easier to defend. Which in turn means that the Russians are now about to encounter two major obstacles as next:

A) one is the Kazeny Torets River, with two sizeable lakes.

b) The other is the fact that the urban agglomeration of Pokrovsk, Mynohrad, Novohrodivka-Selydove, Kurakhove – combined – used to have a population of around 100,000, and some 6-7 mines, too. Thus, that should be easier to defend for the ZSU, and harder to assault for the VSRF.